Allahabad High Court
Ashok Kumar vs State Of U.P. And Another on 11 November, 2025
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:199614
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL REVISION DEFECTIVE No. - 1728 of 2024
Ashok Kumar
.....Revisionist(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and Another
.....Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Revisionist(s)
:
Satyendra Narayan Singh, Tarun Kumar Sharma
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)
:
G.A.
Court No. - 67
HON'BLE ACHAL SACHDEV, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the revisionist and learned AGA for the State are present.
2. There is delay of 118 days in filing the instant revision.
3. As per the office report dated 07.01.2025, notice has been served personally upon the opposite party no.2, however, none present on behalf of the opposite party no.2, even in the revised call.
4. Learned counsel for the revisionist submits that this revision has been filed for the reason beyond his control in preferring the present revision against the order dated 31.07.2019, passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.5, in Complaint Case No.788 of 2017 (Kewla Devi Vs. Ashok Kumar), under section 23 of Domestic Violence Act, by which an ex-parte order against the revisionist was passed for payment of Rs.10000/- per month to the opposite party no.2/wife as maintenance and also against the judgment dated 10.04.2024, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge(MP/MLA), Prayagraj, in Criminal Appeal No.34 of 2024 (Ashok Kumar Vs. Smt. Kewla Devi), under section 29 of Domestic Violence Act, Police Station Holagarh, District Allahabad, by which the order dated 31.07.2019 was amended thereafter direction was given to the revisionist to pay Rs.3000/- per month to opposite party no.2/wife as maintenance, on the 10th day of every month.
5. Perusal of record and in the light the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the revisionist reveals that vide judgment dated 31.07.2019, passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.5, in Complaint Case No.788 of 2017 (Kewla Devi Vs. Ashok Kumar), under section 23 of Domestic Violence Act, by which an ex-parte order against the revisionist was passed for payment of Rs.10000/- per month to the opposite party no.2/wife as maintenance, which was amended vide order dated 10.04.2024, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge(MP/MLA), Prayagraj, in Criminal Appeal No.34 of 2024 (Ashok Kumar Vs. Smt. Kewla Devi), under section 29 of Domestic Violence Act, and the revisionist was directed to pay Rs.3000/- per month to opposite party no.2/wife as maintenance, on the 10th day of every month.
6. The affidavits accompanying the application for condonation of delay filed with the instant revision does not show any cause except the fact that the revisionist is a poor person and doing contractual labour work under MNREGA SCHEME as earned Rs.213/- per day as and that he had contacted his local counsel who advised him to approach the High Court for filing the revision. The revisionist has admitted the fact that he participated in the Criminal Appeal No.34 of 2024 (Ashok Kumar Vs. Smt. Kewla Devi), under section 29 of Domestic Violence Act, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge(MP/MLA), Prayagraj, by which the order dated 31.07.2019 was amended thereafter direction was given to the revisionist to pay Rs.3000/- per month to opposite party no.2/wife as maintenance, on the 10th day of every month, after full contest.
7. In the light of the order dated 22.08.2013, passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of "Basawaraj & Another Vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer", (2013) 14 SCC 81, wherein in paragraph no.12 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "it is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds".
8. In paragraph no.15 of the judgment of Basawaraj(Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that "the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Case "Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, (2013) 12 SCC 649", has outlined the principals in paragraph no.21 of the judgment that are to be observed while deciding an application seeking condonation of delay. The paragraph no.21 is reproduced herein below:-
"21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-
pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.
iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude."
10. There has been delay of 118 days in filing the instant revision and learned counsel for the revisionist has not reasonably explained the reasons for delay in filing the instant revision against the orders dated 31.07.2019 and 10.04.2024.
11. In the aforesaid facts and circumstance, there is no sufficient grounds for condoning the delay in filing the instant revision. The instant revision is filed beyond time and is liable to be dismissed.
12. Accordingly, the instant revision is hereby dismissed.
(Achal Sachdev,J.)
November 11, 2025
VKG
