Deepanshu And 4 Others vs State Of U.P. And Another
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Allahabad High Court

Deepanshu And 4 Others vs State Of U.P. And Another on 13 May, 2025

Author: Raj Beer Singh

Bench: Raj Beer Singh

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


?Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:77721
 
Court No. - 71
 

 
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 4972 of 2025
 

 
Applicant :- Deepanshu And 4 Others
 
Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another
 
Counsel for Applicant :- Anand Kumar
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Madan Singh
 

 
Hon'ble Raj Beer Singh,J.
 

1. Heard learned counsel for the applicants, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 and learned A.G.A. for the State.

2. This application under Section 528 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (hereinafter referred to as BNSS) has been preferred against summoning order dated 19.04.2023, passed by the Civil Judge (J.D.) / Judicial Magistrate, Thakurdwara, Moradabad, in Complaint Case No.2033 of 2022 (Ravi Kumar Vs. Deepanshu and others), under Sections 452, 323, 325, 504, 506 IPC, Police Station- Bhagatpur, District- Moradabad, pending before the court of Civil Judge (J.D.) / Judicial Magistrate, Thakurdwara, Moradabad. The order dated 04.01.2025, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.13, Moradabad, in Criminal Revision No.192 of 2024 (C.N.R. No. UPMO01-001049-2024), is also being impugned, whereby the revision against order dated 19.04.2023 has been dismissed.

3. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the applicants that impugned complaint has been lodged by the opposite party no.2, making false allegations and no prima-facie case is made out against applicants. Learned Magistrate has not scrutinized the statement of complainant and of witnesses and passed the impugned summoning order in a routine manner. There is long and undue delay in lodging of the impugned complaint. As per medical examination report, the alleged first incident was shown of 22.06.2021 and the impugned complaint was filed on 30.09.2022 and the long delay in filing of complaint has not been explained.

4. Learned counsel has given much thrust to the argument that no inquiry has been conducted by the learned Magistrate before passing the summoning order regarding the incident in question. It was submitted that as per provisions of Section 2(g) Cr.P.C., it was mandatory for the concerned Magistrate to conduct inquiry. In this connection, learned counsel has referred case of Mahboob and Others. Vs. State of U.P. Through Secy Home Dpett Civil Secret & Another 2016 LawSuit (All) 3768 and Smt. Kranti and another Vs. State of U.P. and another 2021:AHC:94876.

5. It was further submitted that on 22.06.2021 one first information report was lodged by Smt. Narayanwati from the side of applicant against father and uncle of opposite party no.2 and the impugned proceedings are counterblast to the said case. It is further submitted that revisional court has also not considered facts of the matter in correct perspective and dismissed the revision in an arbitrary manner. Referring to facts of the matter, it was submitted that both the impugned orders and proceedings are liable to be quashed.

6. Learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 has opposed the application and submitted that the applicants have been summoned by a reasoned order. The said summoning order has been upheld by the revisional court. Once the revision is dismissed against summoning order, interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. / 528 BNSS can only be made in extraordinary circumstances. It was further pointed out that alleged first information report was lodged by one Smt. Narayanwati wife of Hari Singh and she is not an accused in the present matter and thus the impugned proceedings can not be termed as counterblast. The complainant has supported his version in statement recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and the version of complainant is further supported by witnesses examined under Section 202 Cr.P.C. It was submitted that there is no material illegality or perversity in the impugned orders.

7. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record.

8. In case of Mahboob and others (supra), this Court has held as under:-

"(11) In the present case, the learned Magistrate has not conducted any inquiry so as to satisfy himself that the allegations in the complaint constitute an offence and when considered alongwith the statements recorded and the result of such inquiry. There is ground for proceedings against the petitioners under Section 204 CrPC. There is nothing on record to show that the learned Magistrate has applied his mind to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. It must be recalled that summoning of accused to appear the criminal court is a serious matter affecting the dignity self-respect and image in the society. A process of criminal court cannot be made a weapon of harassment."

9. In case of Smt. Kranti and Another (supra), the court has referred a number of judgments and in para no.8 observed as under:-

"8. When impugned summoning order passed by court below is examined in light of law as noted herein above, the Court finds that same is cryptic and does not stand the test laid down by this Court as well as Apex Court regarding the manner in which summoning order should be passed in a complaint case."

10. At this stage, it may be stated that applicants were summoned by summoning order dated 19.04.2023 for offence under Sections 452, 323, 325, 504, 506 IPC and the revision filed by applicant against that order has already been dismissed. It is correct that availing of the remedy of the revision before the Sessions Judge under Section 399 CrPC does not bar a person from invoking the power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. / 528 BNSS but it is equally true that the High Court should not act as a second Revisional Court under the garb of exercising inherent powers. While exercising its inherent powers in such a matter it must be conscious of the fact that the Sessions Judge has declined to exercise his revisory power in the matter.

11. In Deepti aliasArati Rai v. Akhil Rai & Ors, (1995) 5 SCC 751, the Apex Court held that second revision application, after dismissal of the first one by sessions court is not maintainable and that inherent power under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilized for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. In case of Laxmi Bai Patel Vs. Shyam Kumar Patel; 2002 0 Supreme (SC) 283, the Court held:

"3. Before taking up the merits of the case, it would be proper to consider the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482Cr.P.C. of the High Court in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a case where the sessions court exercising revisional power under Section 397(3)Cr.P.C. has dismissed the revision petition by the aggrieved party, a second revision petition about acceptance of the same party is barred. The position is well- settled that in such a case power under Section 482Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the High Court in rare cases and in exceptional circumstances where the court finds that permitting the impugned order to remain undisturbed will amount to abuse of process of the court and will result in failure of justice."

12. Similarly, in the case of Dharampal & Ors. v. Ramshri; 1993 (1) SCC 435, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that-

" .... Section 397(3) bars a second revision application by the same party. It is now well-settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilized for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Hence, the High Court had clearly erred in entertaining the second revision at the instance of Respondent 1. Onthis short ground itself, the impugned order of the High Court can be set aside."

13. In the case of Rajathi Vs. C.Ganesan; 1999 SCC (Cri) 1118, the Court held as follows:-

"In Krishnan v. Krishnaveni(1997 (4) SCC 241 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 544), this Court explained the scope and power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. The question before the Court was if in view of the bar of second revision under sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Code was prohibited, whether inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person - accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings.''

14. Thus, it is clear that availing of remedy of revision before Sessions Judge under section 399 Cr.P.C. does not bar a person from invoking power of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. / 528 BNSS but Court should not act as a second Revisional Court under garb of exercising inherent powers. Interference in such cases can only be made when there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of the Court or the required statutory procedure has not been followed with or there is failure of justice. It is therefore to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process that High Court is preserved with inherent powers and would be justified under such circumstance to exercise inherent powers.

15. In the instant matter, the opposite party no.2 has inter-alia made allegation that on 28.09.2022 the applicants have stopped him in the way and they have assaulted him. Applicant no.1 Deepanshu was having a sickle (daranti) in his hand. The complainant has further stated that when he ran to his home, applicants followed him to his home and threatened to kill him. The version of complainant is supported by witnesses examined under Section 202 Cr.P.C. So far the case of Mahboob and Others (supra) is concerned, it appears that in that case the trial Court has not conducted any inquiry to satisfy itself whether the allegations constitute an offence. In case of Smt. Kranti and another (supra), the summoning order was set aside on the ground that the same was cryptic. In the instant matter, perusal of record shows that in inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C., two witnesses have been examined and the applicants have been summoned by a reasoned order. Further, as stated above, revision against summoning order has already been dismissed and in such circumstances interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. / 528 BNSS can only be made in case of abuse of process of court or grave miscarriage of justice or that some mandatory statutory provisions have not been followed. In the instant matter, no such contingency is made out. Applying the principles set out in the judgments referred above to the case on hand, no case for invocation of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. / 528 BNSS is made out.

16. After considering arguments raised by learned counsel for the parties and perusing the impugned complaint and the materials in support of the same, no case for quashing of impugned proceedings is made out. Accordingly, the prayer as made above is hereby refused.

17. However, it is directed that in case applicants move an application for discharge before the trial court concerned within a period of three weeks from today, the same shall be considered and decided expeditiously in accordance with law by the court concerned. It is further directed that for a period of three weeks from today and in case such an application for discharge is filed within the aforesaid period, till the disposal of discharge application, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicants, provided the applicants cooperate in early disposal of discharge application.

18. The application u/s 528 BNSS is disposed of with aforesaid observations.

Order Date :- 13.5.2025

'SP'/-