Allahabad High Court
Bablu Ashish Alias Bablu Ayush And 2 ... vs State Of U.P. And Another on 19 March, 2025
Author: Manju Rani Chauhan
Bench: Manju Rani Chauhan
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
?Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:39944
Court No. - 52
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 34399 of 2024
Applicant :- Bablu Ashish Alias Bablu Ayush And 2 Others
Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another
Counsel for Applicant :- Rajesh Kumar
Counsel for Opposite Party :- Anupam Dubey,G.A.
Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan,J.
1. Heard Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel for the applicant, Mr. Anupam Dubey, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 and learned counsel for the State.
2. The present application has been filed by the applicant to quash the order dated 13.08.2024 passed by Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act)/Additional Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad in Special Session Trial No.590 of 2024 (State v. Bablu Ashish and Others), arising out of Case Crime No.686 of 2023, under Sections 323, 354, 427 I.P.C. & Section3(2)(5ka) of S.C./S.T. Act, Police Station-Khoda, District-Ghaziabad.
3. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the charge under Section 354 IPC has been wrongly framed as there was a fight between the ladies, therefore, the offence under the relevant section is not made out against the applicants.
4. Learned AGA as well as counsel for the opposite party no.2 submits that the FIR has been lodged by the opposite party no.2 against three named accused persons and one unknown, wherein the allegation has been made against the named accused-Bablu Ashish Alias Bablu Ayush for misbehaving and molesting the daughter of opposite party no.2. In the statement of the victim-Payal recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. also there are specific allegations against Bablu Ashish Alias Bablu Ayush and Sanjay for touching the chest of the victim and putting their hands inside the top (shirt) and also tearing the top. In the aforesaid statement, it has also been alleged that Piyush (applicant no. 2) came and joined the above accused and later he attacked the victim with a stick on her left leg. Therefore, there is no illegality in the impugned order in framing of charge. They further submits that once the charges have already been framed, this Court cannot examine the veracity of the said order while exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
5. A three Judges Bench of Apex Court in Bhawna Bai Vs. Ghanshyam and others, reported in 2020 (2) SCC 217, wherein Court has held as follows in paragraphs:
"15. Considering the scope of Sections 227 and 228 Crl.P.C., in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and another (2012) 9 SCC 460, the Supreme Court held as under:-
"17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the "record of the case" and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code. ........?
19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We may refer to the well-settled law laid down by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39: (SCC pp. 41-42, para 4) "4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If ''the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing', as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, ''the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which -- ... (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused', as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction.
Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227."
16. After referring to Amit Kapoor, in Dinesh Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2014) 13 SCC 137, the Supreme Court held that for framing charge under Section 228 Crl.P.C., the judge is not required to record detailed reasons as to why such charge is framed. On perusal of record and hearing of parties, if the judge is of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence triable by the Court of Session, he shall frame the charge against the accused for such offence."
6. The aforesaid view has also been held in case of Ravindra Pratap Shahi @ Pappu Shahi vs. State of U.P. and Another, reported in 2021 SCC Online ALL 778.
7. Learned counsel for the applicants could not dispute the aforesaid proposition of law.
8. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court does not find any error in the order impugned, accordingly the application u/s 482 is dismissed.
9. The Court below is directed to proceed in accordance with law.
Order Date :- 19.3.2025
Jitendra/-
