Sajid Alias Bhola vs State Of U.P.
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Allahabad High Court

Sajid Alias Bhola vs State Of U.P. on 7 March, 2025

Author: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal

Bench: Rohit Ranjan Agarwal

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


?Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:33548
 
Court No. - 9
 

 
Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. BAIL APPLICATION No. - 41403 of 2024
 

 
Applicant :- Sajid Alias Bhola
 
Opposite Party :- State of U.P.
 
Counsel for Applicant :- Noor Muhammad,Yogesh Kumar Srivastava
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
 

 
Hon'ble Rohit Ranjan Agarwal,J.
 

1. This is the second bail application filed on behalf of the applicant.

2. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned A.G.A. for the State respondent.

3. By means of this application, applicant, who is involved in Case Crime No. 323 of 2022 under Section 2/3 of U.P. Gangster & Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 Police Station Shamshabad, District Agra seeks enlargement on bail during the pendency of trial.

4. The first bail application being Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 22267 of 2024 was rejected on 01.07.2024 and following order was passed;

"1. Supplementary affidavit filed today is taken on record.

2. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Rajeshwar Singh, learned A.G.A. for the State.

3. The applicant before this Court Sajid alias Bhola has a long criminal history of 23 cases details of which are as under :

"I. Case Crime No. 299 of 2019 under section 379/411 I.P.C., Police Station-Etmaddaulah, District-Agra.- BAILED OUT.

II. Case Crime No. 395 of 2019 under section 392/411 I.P.C., Police Station-Etmaddaulah, District-Agra. - BAILED OUT.

III. Case Crime No. 408 of 2019 under section 3/25 Arms Act, Police Station-Etmaddaulah, District- Agra. BAILED OUT.

IV. Case Crime No. 409 of 2019 under section 41 Cr.P.C., Police Station-Etmaddaulah, District- Agra. BAILED OUT.

V. Case Crime No. 770 of 2019 under section 379/411 I.P.C., Police Station-Etmaddaulah, District-Agra. - BAILED OUT.

VI. Case Crime No. 825 of 2019 under section 379/411 I.P..C., Police Station-Etmaddaulah, District-Agra. BAILED OUT.

VII. Case Crime No. 873 of 2019 under section 392/411 I.P.C., Police Station-Etmaddaulah, District-Agra. BAILED OUT.

VIII. Case Crime No. 940 of 2019 under section 380/457/411 I.P.C., Police Station- Etmaddaulah, District-Agra. BAILED OUT.

IX. Case Crime No. 941 of 2019 under section 380/457/411 I.P.C., Police Station- Etmaddaulah, District-Agra. - BAILED OUT.

X. Case Crime No. 946 of 2019 under section 380/457/411 I.P.C., Police Station- Etmaddaulah, District-Agra. BAILED OUT.

XI. Case Crime No. 990 of 2019 under section 41/102 Cr.P.C., & 411/414 I.P.C., Police Station- Etmaddaulah, District-Agra. BAILED OUT.

XII. Case Crime No. 993 of 2019 under section 379/411 I.P.C., Police Station-Sikandra, District- Agra. BAILED OUT.

XIII. Case Crime No. 159 of 2021 under section 379/411 I.P.C., Police Station-Shamshabad, District-Agra. - BAILED OUT.

XIV. Case Crime No. 167 of 2021 under section 307/399/402 I.P.C., Police Station-Shamshabad, District-Agra. BAILED OUT.

XV. Case Crime No. 168 of 2021 under section 25 Arms Act, Police Station-Shamshabad, District- Agra. BAILED OUT.

XVI. Case Crime No. 228 of 2019 under section 392/411 I.P.C., Police Station-Khandoli, District- Agra. BAILED OUT.

XVII. Case Crime No. 103 of 2023 under section 392/411 I.P.C., Police Station-Fatehabad, District-Agra. - BAILED OUT.

XVIII. Case Crime No. 166 of 2023 under section 411, 413, 420 I.P.C., Police Station-Shamshabad, District-Agra. BAILED OUT.

XIX. Case Crime No. 167 of 2023 under section 3/25 Arms Act Police Station-Shamshabad, District- Agra. BAILED OUT.

XX. Case Crime No. 323 of 2022 under section 2/3 Gangsters Act, Police Station-Shamshabad, District-Agra. BAILED OUT.

XXI. Case Crime No. 58 of 2018 under section 457, 380, 411 I.P.C., Police Station-Sikandra, District- Agra. BAILED OUT.

XXII. Case Crime No. 327 of 2018 under section 25 Arms Act, Police Station-Sikandra, District-Agra. - BAILED OUT.

XXIII. Case Crime No. 328 of 2018 under section 411 I.P.C., Police Station-Sikandra, District-Agra. BAILED OUT."

4. Counsel for the applicant was asked to address the Court on Section 19(4)(b) of Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 but he could not submit his argument.

5. Looking to the long history of criminal cases of the applicant, this Court finds that in case the applicant is enlarged on bail, he would be a threat to the society at large. No case for interference is made out.

6. Bail application stands rejected."

5. The Division Bench of this Court in Satya Pal vs. State of U.P., 1998 (37) ACC 287 has considered the question with regard to fresh argument to be considered in second bail application on those very facts that were available to the accused while his earlier bail application was moved and rejected. The Division Bench, relying upon the decision of Apex Court in case of State of Maharastra vs. Buddhikota Subha Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2292 held as under:-

"5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the cases which were cited before the learned single Judge as also before us. We think that the point is well settled by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Buddhikota Subha Rao, (supra). In the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court while disapproving grant of bail by a learned single Judge of the High Court just after two days when a number of bail applications had been dismissed by another learned single Judge of that Court the Supreme Court also considered various other aspects relating to the question as to under what circumstances an application for bail should be considered even a previous application for bail had been rejected. It will be proper to. quote relevant passages from paragraphs 6 and 7 of the said judgment :-

6. ...The question then is whether there was justification for releasing the respondent on bail to facilitate yogic exercises under expert guidance at his residence, albeit under conditions of surveillance, even though Puranik, J. had rejected a more or less similar prayer only two days before? Should this Court refuse to exercise jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution even if it is satisfied that the jurisdiction was wrongly exercised.

7. Liberty occupies a place on pride in our socio-political order. And who knew the value of liberty more than the founding fathers of our Constitution whose liberty was curtailed time and again under Draconian Laws by the colonial rulers. That is why they provided in Article 21 of the Constitution that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according the procedure established by law. It follows therefore that the personal liberty of an individual can be curbed by procedure established by law. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is one such procedural law. The law permits curtailment of liberty of antisocial and anti-national elements. Article 22 casts certain obligations on the authorities in the event of arrest of an individual accused of the commission of a crime against society or the Nation. In cases of under-trial charged with the commission of an offence or offences the Court is generally called upon to decide whether to release him on bail or to commit him to jail. This decision has to be made, mainly in non-bailable cases, having regard to the nature, of the crime, the circumstances in which it was committed, the background of the, accused, the possibility of his jumping bail, the impact that his release may make on the prosecution witnesses, its impact on society and the possibility of retribution, etc. In the present case the successive bail applications preferred by the respondent were rejected on merits having regard to the gravity of the offence alleged to have been committed. Once such application No. 36 of 1989 was rejected by Suresh, J. himself. Undeterred the respondent went on preferring successive applications for bail. All such pending bail applications were rejected by Puranik, J. by a common order on 6th June, 1989. Unfortunately Puranik, J. was not aware of the pendency of yet another bail application No. 995/ 89 otherwise he would have disposed it of by the very same common order. Before the ink was dry on Puranik J.'s order, it was upturned by the impugned order. It is not as if the Court passing the impugned order was not aware of the decision of Puranik, J. in fact there is a reference to the same in the impugned order. Could this be done in the absence of new facts and changed circumstances ? What is important to realise is that in Criminal Application No. 375 of 1989, the respondent had made an identical request as is obvious from one of the prayers (extracted earlier) made therein. Once that application was rejected there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change, in the fact situation. And, when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. Between the two orders there was a gap of only two days and it is nobody's case that during these two days drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed reversing all earlier orders including the one rendered by Puranik, J, only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact-situation. In such cases it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the& Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order, which had hitherto eluded him. In such a situation the proper course, we think, is to direct that; the matter! be placed before the same learned Judge who disposed of the earlier applications. Such a practice or convention would prevent abuse of the process of Court inasmuch as it will prevent an impression being created that a litigant is avoiding or selecting a Court to secure an order to his liking. Such a practice would also discourage the filing of successive bail applications without change of circumstances. Such a practice if adopted would be conducive to judicial discipline and would also save the Court's time as a judge familiar with the facts would be able to dispose of the subsequent application with despatch. It will also result in consistency. In this view that we take we are fortified by the observations of this Court in paragraph 5 of the judgment in Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan (1987) 2 SCC 684. For the above reasons we are of the view that there was no justification for passing the impugned order in the absence of a substantial change in the fact-situation. That is what prompted Shetty, J. to describe the impugned order as 'a bit out of the ordinary.' Judicial restraint demands that we say no more.

A reading of the above mentioned passage from the judgment of the Supreme court makes it clear that there is no bar in successive bail applications being moved for consideration by the Courts. However the Supreme Court clearly ob-served that the practice suggested would also discourage filing of successive bail applications without change of circumstances. This observation makes it clear that it should be only when some new facts and circumstances have developed after rejection of the previous bail application then only the second bail application should be considered on merit. The learned single Judge who referred this case to be considered by the Division Bench had made the following observations in his referring order;-

"In my view this direction of the Supreme Court is intended at maintaining some degree of finality even to interim orders and not keeping it open to frequent change unless substantial changes in fact-situation are indicated. Otherwise our Courts including' superior Courts would tie flooded with frivolous repeated prayers for bail as new arguments and new twists on same facts would always be advanced by legal experts. It is therefore, necessary that a decision should be given by a higher Bench on the question if at all it would be open for a Court to allow fresh arguments on the same facts after a former prayer was although specifically the points urged in the subsequent applications were not considered."

6. We are in complete agreement with the views expressed by the learned single Judge and agree that a second bail application cannot be entertained on the same facts after a formal prayer was rejected although subsequently points urged in the subsequent bail applications were not considered.

7. Learned counsel for the applicant strenuously wanted to support the view taken by the learned single Judge in the case of Gama v. State of U.P., (supra). We are not inclined to accept the view taken by the learned single Judge in the said case. It is not uncommon but rather almost an accepted norm that the High Courts while rejecting the bail application do not give reasons for such rejection. Reasons are generally not given as observations tend to influence and affect the trial in pending cases. Therefore, the following observations of the learned single Judge in the case of Gama v. State of U.P. (supra) does not lay down the correct law:

"Even though it may be second or third bail application, but unless it is apparent from a reading of the first bail order that the point urged in the subsequent bail applications was also considered and rejected, it cannot be said that the point urged in the second or third bail application would be deemed to have been considered in the first bail application just by implication."

8. We accordingly overrule this view taken by the learned Single Judge in Gama's case (supra)."

6. From perusal of the material placed before this Court, I find that all the grounds were taken by the applicant in first bail application, which was rejected on 01.07.2024. No new ground has been taken by the applicant's counsel apart from the fact that the applicant is languishing in jail since 30.06.2023. Applicant has a long criminal history of 23 cases and there being no good ground for releasing the applicant on bail.

7. A second bail application is generally permissible, even if the first one was dismissed, as long as there are new or changed circumstances; if new evidence emerges or the situation changes significantly; if the first bail application was rejected due to false information or misrepresentation by the prosecution or a second bail application is maintainable when the first one was rejected due to prosecutorial misrepresentation.

8. From perusal of the allegations made in the first information report and the material on record, I find that no case for interference is made out as no new ground has been made out for release of the applicant on bail nor the applicant has brought on record the stage of trial.

9. Bail application is misconceived and same stands rejected.

10. Today when the Court has proceeded to reject the second bail application, a prayer has been made by applicant's counsel for expeditious disposal of the trial pending against the applicant.

11. The Apex Court in case of Rup Bahadur Magar @ Sanki @ Rabin Vs. The State of West Bengal, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 11589 of 2024 on 02.09.2024 observed as under;

"In the case of High Court Bar Association, Allahabad Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (2024) 6 SCC 267, a Constitution Bench of this Court has taken a view that as a matter of rule, the Constitutional Courts should not fix a time-bound schedule for conduct of cases before the Trial and other Courts and the said approach can be adopted only in very exceptional cases. Notwithstanding the pronouncement of law by the Constitution Bench of this Court, we have noticed that several High Courts while rejecting the bail applications, are fixing time-bound schedule for the conduct of trials. It cannot be that the bail is denied on the ground that the trial will be disposed of in a time-bound schedule."

12. Further, in Sangram Sdashiv Suryavanshi Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3526, Apex Court relying upon the judgment of High Court Bar Association, Allahabad (Supra) has held that Constitution Courts should refrain from fixing a time-bound schedule for the disposal of cases pending before any other courts. Relevant paragraph nos. 6 and 7 are extracted hereasunder;

"6. Before we part with this order, every day we notice that in several orders passed by different High Courts while rejecting the bail applications, in a routine manner, the High Courts are fixing a time-bound schedule for the conclusion of the trials. Such directions adversely affect the functioning of the Trial Courts as in many Trial Courts, there may be older cases of the same category pending. Every court has criminal cases pending which require expeditious disposal for several reasons, such as the requirement of the penal statutes, long incarceration, age of the accused, etc. Only because someone files a case in our Constitutional Courts, he cannot get out of turn hearing. Perhaps after rejecting the prayer for bail, the Courts want to give some satisfaction to the accused by fixing a time-bound schedule for trial. Such orders are difficult to implement. Such orders give a false hope to the litigants. If in a given case, in law and on facts, an accused is entitled to bail on the ground of long incarceration without the trial making any progress, the Court must grant bail. Option of expediating trial is not the solution.

7. In paragraph 47.3 of the decision of a Constitution Bench of in the case of ?High Court Bar Association, Allahabad vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.?1, this Court has held that in the ordinary course, the Constitutional Courts should refrain from fixing a time-bound schedule for the disposal of cases pending before any other Courts. Paragraph 47.3 reads thus:

?47.3. Constitutional courts, in the ordinary course, should refrain from fixing a time-bound schedule for the disposal of cases pending before any other courts. Constitutional courts may issue directions for the time-bound disposal of cases only in exceptional circumstances. The issue of prioritising the disposal of cases should be best left to the decision of the courts concerned where the cases are pending;?

13. In view of the judgment of Apex Court rendered in case of Sangram Sdashiv Suryavanshi (Supra), this Court is of the view that no direction can be issued for expediting the trial of criminal case pending against the applicant. On due consideration of the aforesaid, this Court declines to grant the relief, as prayed for.

Order Date :- 7.3.2025

Shekhar