Mritunjay Tiwari And 6 Others vs State Of U.P. And Another
2025 Latest Caselaw 2994 ALL

Allahabad High Court

Mritunjay Tiwari And 6 Others vs State Of U.P. And Another on 6 January, 2025

Author: Manju Rani Chauhan

Bench: Manju Rani Chauhan

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


?Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:2501
 
Court No. - 52
 

 
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 39224 of 2024
 

 
Applicant :- Mritunjay Tiwari And 6 Others
 
Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another
 
Counsel for Applicant :- Anand Pal Singh,Harish Chandra Singh
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Sanjay Kumar Mishra
 

 
Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan,J.
 

1. Heard Mr. Anand Pal Singh, learned counsel for the applicants, Mr. Sanjay Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 as well as Mr. Amit Singh Chauhan, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record.

2. The present application has been filed by the applicants to quash the order dated 18.09.2024 passed by Additional Session Judge, F.T.C.-II, Kushinagar at Padrauna rejecting the discharge application moved by the applicants dated 26.09.2023 and in continuation passed the another order on 24.09.2024 framing the charge against the applicants under Sections 498A, 304B, 201 (Alternative under Section 302) I.P.C. and Section 3/4 D.P. Act, in S.T. No.958 of 2023, arising out of Case Crime No.1203/2016 (State vs. Mritunjay Tiwari and Others), Police Station- Kotwali Padrauna, District- Kushinagar, pending before the court of Additional Session Judge, F.T.C.-II, Kushinagar at Padrauna.

3. At the very outset, learned A.G.A. as well as learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 points out that earlier the applicants had approached this Court with a prayer to quash the charge sheet and the entire proceedings by means of filing Application U/S 482 No.13307 of 2020 and the aforesaid case has been dismissed by a detailed order on merits passed by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court on 11.09.2024 after which the discharge application has been rejected on 18.09.2024 and the charges have been framed on 24.09.2024, therefore, this Court cannot examine the veracity of the said order while exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

4. A three Judges Bench of Apex Court in Bhawna Bai Vs. Ghanshyam and others, reported in 2020 (2) SCC 217, wherein Court has held as follows in paragraphs:

"15. Considering the scope of Sections 227 and 228 Crl.P.C., in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and another (2012) 9 SCC 460, the Supreme Court held as under:-

"17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the "record of the case" and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code. ........?

19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We may refer to the well-settled law laid down by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39: (SCC pp. 41-42, para 4) "4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If ''the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing', as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, ''the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which -- ... (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused', as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction.

Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227."

16. After referring to Amit Kapoor, in Dinesh Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2014) 13 SCC 137, the Supreme Court held that for framing charge under Section 228 Crl.P.C., the judge is not required to record detailed reasons as to why such charge is framed. On perusal of record and hearing of parties, if the judge is of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence triable by the Court of Session, he shall frame the charge against the accused for such offence."

5. The aforesaid view has also been held in case of Ravindra Pratap Shahi @ Pappu Shahi vs. State of U.P. and Another, reported in 2021 SCC Online ALL 778.

6. Learned counsel for the applicants could not dispute the aforesaid proposition of law.

7. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court does not find any error in the order impugned, accordingly the application u/s 482 is dismissed.

8. The Court below is directed to proceed in accordance with law.

Order Date :- 6.1.2025/Kalp Nath Singh