Mahesh Kumar Gupta vs State Of U.P. And Another
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Allahabad High Court

Mahesh Kumar Gupta vs State Of U.P. And Another on 14 February, 2025

Author: Manju Rani Chauhan

Bench: Manju Rani Chauhan

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


?Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:21546
 
Court No. - 52
 

 
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 36450 of 2024
 

 
Applicant :- Mahesh Kumar Gupta
 
Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another
 
Counsel for Applicant :- Animesh Pandey,Awadhesh Kumar Malviya,Gunjan Yadav
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
 

 
Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan,J.
 

1. Heard Ms. Gunjan Yadav, learned counsel for the applicant and Mr. Amit Singh Chauhan, learned AGA for the State.

2. The present 482 Cr.P.C. application has been filed against the order dated 11.09.2024 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate-3, Gorakhpur in Criminal Case No. 2461 of 2022 (State Vs. Mahesh Gupta), arising out of Case Crime No. 24 of 2021, under Sections 498A I.P.C., Police Station Pipiganj, District Gorakhpur by which the applicant's discharge application has been rejected by the court below and also to quash the charge-sheet dated 27.10.2021.

3. Brief facts of the case are that an F.I.R. has been lodged by Ms. Shalini Gupta on 16.02.2021 at about 18:21 hours with the allegations that the informant had registered on the Jeevan Saathi Matrimonial Site where the accused Mahesh Gupta had also registered himself for the purpose of marriage. On 19.5.2018, the accused made a call on Informant's mobile phone and introduced himself as a Technical Officer in the Air Force and getting information about her, proposed to marry her. Informant's father gave his consent for the aforesaid. After the proposal of marriage was finalized, the accused while going from his workplace RSS Campus Saharanpur to Gorakhpur used to stay at Kanpur and met with the informant. Informant's father was old, so he wanted to marry his daughter as soon as possible. When her brother approached the father of applicant, he asked for photo and biodata of the girl, which was sent by him. When he was contacted again, he asked for some time. Meanwhile, the accused kept giving assurances to the informant, promising her for marriage and kept meeting her continuously. He kept postponing the issue of marriage by giving some excuse on one ground or other. Believing on the assurance of the applicant, family members of the informant kept sending cloths to his family members from time to time. After the year 2019 passed, when the informant put pressure on the accused for marriage, he said that his family is not ready for marriage, therefore, asked opposite party no.2 that he will for the time being perform marriage at Temple. On 10.02.2020, the applicant and informant got married at Anandeshwar Temple, Kanpur according to Hindu rites and rituals and after staying with her for two days and having a honeymoon, he went away saying that they would soon get married magnificently. On 13.03.2020, the accused called informant to Lucknow, they stayed together for two days, established physical relations and again he promised to marry soon magnificently. When the informant started talking about going to her in-laws' house, the accused started making excuses and said that his father is not ready and requested for some more time to asked her not to do so as his parents are talking about his marriage. He further asked her to take her stuff belongings and refused to marry her. In these circumstances, life of the informant has been ruined by the applicant, hence the present F.I.R. was lodged.

4. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the present case in order to extract money from him. The F.I.R. has been lodged with false and frivolous allegations. He further submits that the story as narrated in the F.I.R. as well as statements of the victim as recorded under Sections 161 appears to be highly contradictory as the applicant has not solemnized marriage with her. He further submits that the Investigating Officer without conducting proper investigation has submitted the charge-sheet against the applicant and learned magistrate has taken cognizance on 27.01.2022.

5. She further submits that on 26.09.2022 the applicant filed a discharge application and the learned trial court has not taken into consideration the grounds as taken in the discharge applicant wherein no evidence has been given by the victim that any marriage was solemnized between them but the order impugned has been passed in a mechanical manner without application of judicial mind. He also submits that no offence under Section 498A I.P.C. is made out against the applicant, therefore, the order impugned may be set aside by this Court.

6. On the other hand, learned counsel for opposite party no.2 and learned A.G.A. for the State submit that previous counsel of the applicant had stated that the parties had amicably settled the dispute and requested to refer the matter to mediation centre and was ready and willing to deposit a draft of Rs. 50,000/-. They further submit that subsequently engaged counsel Ms. Gunjan Yadav, Advocate states that she is ready to argue the matter on merits as the applicant is not ready for the purpose of mediation itself shows the conduct of the applicant of lingering the matter.

7. Learned counsel for opposite party no.2 and learned A.G.A. for the State further submit that there is no illegality in the order impugned as a detailed order has been passed wherein the court concerned has mentioned about no evidence being given by the applicant to prove that he had not performed marriage with opposite party no.2. They next submit that all the contentions raised by the applicant's counsel relate to disputed questions of fact. From perusal of the records, prima facie, it can not be said at this stage that no offence has been committed by the applicant.

8. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the records.

9. Earlier applicant has filed an Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. No.233 of 2024, wherein a Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 12.02.2024 had passed following order:-

"1. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned A.G.A. for the State.

2. This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by applicant for quashing the entire proceedings of Case No.2461 of 2022, State Vs. Mahesh Gupta, arising out of Case Crime No.0024 of 2021, under Sections 498A I.P.C., Police Station Pipiganj, District Gorakhpur pending in the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) (FTC) CAW, Gorakhpur.

3. At the very outset, learned counsel for the applicant submits that against the criminal proceedings, applicant has filed a discharge application before the court concerned. However, the same is pending consideration.

4. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that ends of justice would be served in the event the discharge application is decided by the court concerned in a time bound manner.

5. Learned A.G.A. for the State submits that the discharge application filed by the applicant would be decided in accordance with law in a time bound manner.

6. Considering the fact that the discharge application of the applicant is pending before the court concerned, it is hereby directed that the court concerned shall endeavour to decide the discharge application dated 30.5.2022 as expeditiously as possible, preferably, within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order without granting unnecessary adjournment to any of the party.

7. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant is working in Air Force, considering the aforesaid fact, the applicant is set at liberty to prefer an application for appearing before the court concerned through video conferencing in accordance with Rules for Video Conferencing for Courts in the State of Uttar Pradesh, 2020. In the event, any such application is filed by the applicant before the court concerned, the court concerned shall pass order in this respect forthwith.

8. Subject to the aforesaid directions/observations, the present application is disposed of."

10. Discharge application filed by the application before the trial court was rejected on 11.09.2024, which has been challenged by means of the present application.

11. On 20.01.2025, the previous counsel on behalf of the applicant appearing in the matter requested that the matter may be referred to the mediation centre and was ready and willing to come up with a draft of Rs.50,000/-.

12. Today, when the matter was taken up, Ms. Gunjan Yadav, subsequently engaged counsel on behalf of the applicant states that the applicant is not ready to deposit the amount and she is ready to argue the matter on merits.

13. The conduct of the applicant goes to show that the applicant is putting in all efforts to save himself and is avoiding from judicial process. It is noticed that the applicant is avoiding to appear before the court concerned and is adopting dilatory tactics to prolong the entire criminal proceedings. The proceedings of the court concerned have been held up on account of non appearance of the applicant and as such he is fleeing from the process of law without any reasonable cause.

14. "Fleeing from justice" refers to the act of accused in evading or avoiding arrest, prosecution, or punishment for a crime. An accused in aforesaid act tries to avoid facing criminal prosecution by often avoiding summons, warrants and other process issued by the court. An accused is legally bound to comply with the summons issued by the court of law except where the process is challenged before the higher forum by the accused. Any person who has been issued process by court of law cannot be permitted to evade the same thereby not permitting the court of law to proceed in the administration of justice. The said act of accused in avoiding the process of court of law without any justification effects the very cause of justice. An accused fleeing from justice without reasonable cause has the effect of stopping/slowing the criminal process of law which effects the cause of speedy justice to the victim or society at large. Non appearance of an accused before the court concerned when the summons has been served (without reasonable explanation for non-appearance) may be indicative of the fact that such accused do not have respect to the process of law.

15. It is important for rule of law to prevail that the criminal trial is completed without delay. Where an accused flees from the process of law and thereby avoids appearing before the court, the very concept of speedy trial is put at peril and justice to the victim is delayed.

16. The supreme court in Vipan Kumar Dhir v. State of Punjab, (2021) 15 SCC 518 has observed that while granting bail, the possibility of the accused to influence prosecution witnesses, fleeing from justice or creating other impediments in the fair investigation, ought not to be overlooked.

17. While considering the question of whether an accused is fleeing from justice, the conduct of the accused in respect of the process of law is required to be considered. In criminal prosecution when the court find material against the accused sufficient for prosecution, the court issues summons or warrants for appearance to the accused for participation in the trial. When the summons or warrants are served on the accused in accordance with law then duty is cast on the accused to appear before the court concerned except where there exists justification for non-appearance of the accused before the accused. An accused who is served with the process of court and fails to appear before the court concerned without any reasonable cause can be said to be fleeing from the process of law.

18. This Court in the case of Vaibhav Jain Vs. State of U.P. & Another (Application U/S 482 No. 35886 of 2024) vide order dated 19.12.2024 rejected the discharged application filed by the applicant therein.

19. Perusal of the record goes to show that the discharge application has been decided on merits in accordance with law. There is no illegality in the order.

20. All the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the applicant relate to disputed questions of fact. The court has also been called upon to adjudge the testimonial worth of prosecution evidence and evaluate the same on the basis of various intricacies of factual details which have been touched upon by the learned counsel. The veracity and credibility of material furnished on behalf of the prosecution has been questioned and false implication has been pleaded.

21. Before proceeding to adjudge the validity of the impugned order it may be useful to cast a fleeting glance to some of the representative cases decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court which have expatiated upon the legal approach to be adopted at the time of framing of the charge or at the time of deciding whether the accused ought to be discharged. It shall be advantageous to refer to the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh; 1977 (4) SCC 39 which are as follows :-

"4. Under S. 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and State by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter, comes at the initial stage, the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either u/s. 227 or u/s. 228 of the Code. If "the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing", so enjoined by s. 227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which ...................................

(b) in exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused," as provided in S. 228.

Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at this stage of deciding the matter under s. 227 and 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under S. 227 or S. 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under S. 228 and not under S. 227."

22. Aforesaid case was again referred to in another Apex Court's decision Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal Versus Anil Kumar Bhunja AIR 1980 (SC) 52 and the Apex Court proceeded to observe as follows:-

"18. It may be remembered that the case was at the stage of framing charges; the prosecution evidence had not yet commenced. The Magistrate had, therefore, to consider the above question on a general consideration of the materials placed before him by the investigating police officer. At this stage, as was pointed out by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018, the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of Section 227 or 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged; may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence."

23. In yet another case of Palwinder Singh Vs. Balvinder Singh reported in AIR 2009 SC 887, the Apex Court had the occasion to reflect upon the scope of adjudication and its ambit at the time of framing of the charge and also about the scope to consider the material produced by the accused at that stage. Following extract may be profitably quoted to clarify the situation:-

"12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it entered into the realm of appreciation of evidence at the stage of the framing of the charges itself. The jurisdiction of the learned Sessions Judge while exercising power under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is limited. Charges can be framed also on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshalling and appreciation of evidence is not in the domain of the Court at that point of time. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in state of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568 wherein it was held as under :

"23. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, in our view, clearly the law is that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material. Satish Mehra's Case holding that the trial Court has powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage of Section 227 of the Code has not been correctly decided."

24. The following observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanghi Brothers (Indore) Pvt. Ltd. v. Sanjay Choudhary reported in AIR (2009) SC 9 also reiterated the same position of law :-

"10. After analyzing the terminology used in the three pairs of sections it was held that despite the differences there is no scope for doubt that at the stage at which the Court is required to consider the question of framing of charge, the test of a prima facie case to be applied.

11. The present case is not one where the High Court ought to have interfered with the order of framing the charge. As rightly submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, even if there is a strong suspicion about the commission of offence and the involvement of the accused, it is sufficient for the Court to frame a charge. At that stage, there is no necessity of formulating the opinion about the prospect of conviction. That being so, the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained and is set aside. The appeal is allowed."

25. In fact, while exercising the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or while wielding the powers under Section 226 of the Constitution of India the quashing of the F.I.R. or charge sheet can be done only if it does not disclose any offence or if there is any legal bar which prohibits the proceedings on its basis. The Apex Court decisions in R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 and State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 SCC(Cr.) 426 make the position of law in this regard clear recognizing certain categories by way of illustration which may justify the quashing of a complaint or charge sheet.

26. The submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicant counsel call for adjudication on pure questions of fact which may be adequately adjudicated upon only by the trial court and while doing so even the submissions made on points of law can also be more appropriately gone into by the trial court in this case. This Court does not deem it proper, and therefore cannot be persuaded to have a pre-trial before the actual trial begins. A threadbare discussion of various facts and circumstances, as they emerge from the allegations made against the accused, is being purposely avoided by the Court for the reason, lest the same might cause any prejudice to either side during trial. But it shall suffice to observe that the perusal of the F.I.R. and the material collected by the Investigating Officer on the basis of which the charge sheet has been submitted makes out a prima facie case against the accused at this stage and this Court does not find any justifiable ground to set aside the impugned order refusing the discharge of the accused. This court has not been able to persuade itself to hold that no case against the accused has been made out or to hold that the charge is groundless.

27. The prayer for quashing or setting aside the impugned order dated 11.09.2024 is refused as I do not see any illegality, impropriety and incorrectness in the impugned order or the proceedings under challenge. There is absolutely no abuse of court's process perceptible in the same. The present matter also does not fall in any of the categories recognized by the Supreme Court which might justify interference by this Court in order to upset or quash them.

28. With the above observations, this application is rejected.

Order Date :- 14.2.2025

Abhishek Singh