Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P. Thru. The Prin. Secy. ... vs Dev Vrat Gautam And Another on 13 February, 2025
Author: Alok Mathur
Bench: Alok Mathur
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
?Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:9240
Court No. - 6
Case :- CIVIL MISC REVIEW APPLICATION DEFECTIVE No. - 26 of 2025
Applicant :- State Of U.P. Thru. The Prin. Secy. Secondary Education And 2 Others
Opposite Party :- Dev Vrat Gautam And Another
Counsel for Applicant :- C.S.C.
Hon'ble Alok Mathur,J.
C. M. Application No.1 of 2025- for condonation of delay.
1. Heard Sri Sanjay Sarin, learned Additional Chief Standing counsel for the review applicant.
2. The cause shown is sufficient. The application is allowed.
3. The delay in filing the review application is condoned.
Order on memo of the review application.
1. Heard Sri Sanjay Sarin, learned Additional Chief Standing counsel, who presses instant review application for review of the judgment and order of this Court dated 10.7.2024 passed in Writ C No.7137 of 2022 (Dev Vrat Gauam Vs. State of U.P. through Principal Secretary, Secondary Education and others).
2. It has been submitted that the review-petitioner had approached this Court seeking a direction to Madhyamic Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh for correcting the details of his mother, father and date of birth. The said application was moved beyond a period of three years and accordingly, the said writ petition was opposed by the State stating that as per the Regulations framed under U.P. Intermediate Education Act, a limitation of three years has been prescribed for making any such correction in the certificates issued by the Madhyamic Shiksha Parishad and accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
3. This Court while allowing the writ petition had considered certain judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court as well as Division Bench judgments of the Court, namely, Anand Singh Vs. U.P. Board of Secondary Education and others, 2014 (3) ADJ 443 (DB) filed along with the said writ petition.
4. After considering the aforesaid judgments this Court was of the considered view that right to change his name is a fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution and also held that a Division Bench of this Court considered Regulation 7 of Intermediate Education Act and opined that the limitation of three years is not mandatory but directory and name of parents of the applicant can be changed after a period of three years. The objection of the State is with regard to change of date of birth after a period of three years and in this regard he submits that the Division Bench in the case of Anand Singh (supra) was of the view that this aspect may infringe upon the rights of the others and limitation period of three years is mandatory.
5. After hearing the arguments of the applicant as well as perusing the judgment in the case of Anand Singh (supra), this Court finds that in the said case the question before the Division Bench was limited only to change in the name of father and mother of the candidate and there was no issue pertaining to request for change of date of birth. Accordingly, with regard to change in the name of the parent, the Division Bench has held as under:-
"When so considered, we feel persuaded to hold that the time limit of three years prescribed in the substantive part of Regulation 7 for submission of an application for making correction in the certificate issued by the Board in regard to the name of the candidate or the names of the parents of the candidate should not be insisted upon, particularly when the Board itself has considered it appropriate to have no time limit under the proviso for making correction in regard to any spelling mistake in the name of the candidate or his parents."
6. But the Division Bench further proceeded to hold that when there is a request or change of date of birth in educational certificates then the time limited of three years has to be adhered to. It is noticed that as far as the finding of the Division Bench pertaining to change of the name of a candidate or his parents is concerned, would be binding in as much as the same was subjected before the Division Bench and would be a valid precedent for this Court to adhere to but the direction with regard to date of birth are only an observations considering the fact that the said observations would be purely an obiter dicta and would not be binding upon this Court.
7. The difference between jurisprudential concept of ratio and obiter has been well established by various jurists and case laws. It has been reiterated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in recent case of Career Institute Educational Society Vs. Om Shree Thakurji Educational Society, 2023 (Live Law (SC) 380 as under:-
?6. The distinction between obiter dicta and ratio decidendi in a judgment, as a proposition of law, has been examined by several judgments of this Court, but we would like to refer to two, namely, State of Gujarat v. Utility Users' Welfare Association, (2018) 6 SCC 21 and Jayant Verma v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 743.
7. The first judgment in State of Gujarat (supra) applies, what is called, ?the inversion test? to identify what is ratio decidendi in a judgment. To test whether a particular proposition of law is to be treated as the ratio decidendi of the case, the proposition is to be inversed, i.e. to remove from the text of the judgment as if it did not exist. If the conclusion of the case would still have been the same even without examining the proposition, then it cannot be regarded as the ratio decidendi of the case.
8. In Jayant Verma (supra), this Court has referred to an earlier decision of this Court in Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab5 to state that it is not the findings of material facts, direct and inferential, but the statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts, which is the vital element in the decision and operates as a precedent. Even the conclusion does not operate as a precedent, albeit operates as res judicata. Thus, it is not everything said by a Judge when giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding as a legal precedent is the principle upon which the case is decided and, for this reason, it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the obiter dicta.?
8. Present review application has been preferred only on the ground that the judgment of this Court is contrary to the Division Bench in the case of Anand Singh. Accordingly, on a careful consideration we find that the binding of the Division Bench pertains to the time limit for change of date of birth are not having laid down any binding precedent to be followed by other coordinate Benches or this Court and, as such, we do not find any infirmity in the judgment. The application for review is accordingly rejected.
(Alok Mathur, J.)
Order Date :- 13.2.2025
RKM.
