Allahabad High Court
Smt. Neelam Devi vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. ... on 28 August, 2025
Author: Pankaj Bhatia
Bench: Pankaj Bhatia
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Reserved : 17.07.2025
Pronounced: 28.08.2025
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
(LUCKNOW)
WRIT C No.9043 of 2024
Smt. Neelam Devi . Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. through Principal Secretary Panchayat Raj
and others .Respondents
Counsel for Petitioner(s):
Sri Rakesh Kumar Srivastava & Sri Veerendra Kumar Tiwari
Counsel for Respondent(s):
C.S.C.
ALONG WITH
WRIT C No.5333 of 2025
Ravi Shankar Yadav . Petitioner
Versus
State Of U.P. Thru. Additional Chief Secretary Panchayati Raj
and others .Respondents
Counsel for Petitioner(s):
Sri Gaurav Mehrotra and Sri Tushar Mittal
Counsel for Respondent(s):
C.S.C.
HON'BLE PANKAJ BHATIA, J.
J U D G M E N T
1. Heard Sri Gaurav Mehrotra, learned Counsel for the petitioners as well as Sri Saharsh Srivastava, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel along with Sri L.M. Khare, learned Standing Counsel.
2. Both the petitions raise a common issue as such both are being decided by means of this common judgment.
3. The facts in brief of Writ-C No.5333 of 2025 are that the petitioner is an elected Gram Pradhan and an order came to be passed against him on 16.11.2024 in purported exercise of powers under Section 95(1)(g) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 whereby, the financial and administrative powers of the petitioner were ceased on the basis of a preliminary inquiry. The said action was taken based upon a complaint made against the functioning of the petitioner. On the basis of the said preliminary inquiry, a show cause notice dated 08.11.2023 was issued to the petitioner calling upon him to submit his reply against the allegations levelled within fifteen days (Annexure-6). The case of the petitioner is that he had suffered a brain stroke and was unwell and thus he had not submitted the reply. Subsequently, a reminder was sent on 19.01.2024 calling upon the petitioner to give a reply to the show cause notice within three days, to which, the petitioner gave a reply ultimately on 07.11.2023, on which, the order impugned came to be passed on 16.11.2024 ceasing the financial and administrative powers of the petitioner.
4. Apart from the attacking the said order on various grounds, the submission of the Counsel for the petitioner is that in pursuance to the order passed, no final inquiry has been held as is contemplated under Rule 6 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj (Removal of Pradhans, Up-Pradhans and Members) Enquiry Rules, 1997 (in short the 1997 Rules) and the order ceasing the financial and administrative powers had continued for more than six months, which is contrary to the mandate of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 and irrespective of the pendency of the final inquiry as contemplated under Rule 6 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Rules, the order ceasing the financial and administrative powers cannot continue indefinitely and is liable to be set aside.
5. The facts in brief of Writ-C No.9043 of 2024 are that the petitioner is an elected Gram Pradhan and on the basis of a complaint made on 27.12.2022, a preliminary inquiry was ordered and a report was submitted on 13.06.2023 and based upon the said report, an order dated 04.11.2023 came to be passed under Section 95(1)(g) of the Panchayat Raj Act ceasing the financial and administrative powers. The petitioner challenged the said order in Writ-C No.10633 of 2023, which was disposed of vide order dated 07.12.2023 (Annexure-3) and the petitioner was permitted to raise all the grounds in the final inquiry which was pending. It is stated that the petitioner filed a detailed objection and the final inquiry was concluded and a report was submitted on 15.04.2024 (Annexure-4). It is also stated that in pursuance to the inquiry report, a show cause notice was served to the petitioner on 27.04.2024 (Annexure-5) proposing the removal of the petitioner. The petitioner once again preferred Writ-C No.4434 of 2024 challenging the final inquiry report. The said writ petition was allowed vide order dated 22.05.2024 quashing the final inquiry report as well as the show cause notice mainly on the ground that the documents referred were not provided to the petitioner which resulted in violation of principles of natural justice. It is stated that thereafter final inquiry was not concluded and the restrictions placed on the financial and administrative powers of the petitioner were continuing since 04.11.2023. The petitioner made a representation for restoration of the financial and administrative powers, owing to which the development work was getting adversely affected as no action was taken. The petitioner preferred Writ-C No.6303 of 2024 seeking a mandamus. The said writ petition was dismissed with the observations and directions to the District Magistrate to conclude the inquiry expeditiously say within a period of two months (Annexure-9).
6. It is stated that subsequently on 18.11.2024, a charge-sheet has been submitted by the Inquiry Officer during the pendency of the writ petition and ultimately it is prayed that the financial and administrative powers of the petitioners should be restored as it cannot continue indefinitely.
7. As Counsel in both the writ petitions have argued on the common question arising whether, the order ceasing the financial and administrative powers under Section 95(1)(g) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act can continue beyond a period of six months as prescribed under the Act and the Rules.
8. In the backdrop of the said, it is essential to note the mandatory provisions contained under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act and the 1997 Rules. The mandate Section 95(1)(g) of the Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 prescribes for removal of Pradhan. Section 95(1)(g) of the Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 is reproduced herein-below:
"95. Inspection (1) The State Government may
(g) remove a Pradhan, or member of a Gram Panchayat] or a Joint Committee or Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti,
if he -
(i) absents himself without sufficient cause for more than three consecutive meetings or sittings.
(ii) refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting for any reason whatsoever or if he is accused of or charged for an offence involving moral turpitude.
(iii) has abused his position as such or has persistently failed to perform the duties imposed by this Act or rules made thereunder or his continuance as such is not desirable in public interest, or
iii-a) has taken the benefit of reservation under sub-section (2) of Section 11-A or sub-section (5) or Section 12, as the case may be, on the basis of a false declaration subscribed by him stating that he is a member of Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes or the backward classes, as the case may be.
(iv) being a Sahayak Sarpanch or a Sarpanch [xxx] takes active part in politics, or
(v) suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clauses (a) to (m) of Section 5-A;
Provided that where, in an enquiry held by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed, a Pradhan or is prima facie found to have committed financial and other irregularities such Pradhan or shall cease to exercise and perform the financial and administrative powers and functions, which shall, until he is exonerated of the charges in the final enquiry, be exercised and performed by a Committee consisting of three members of Gram Panchayat appointed by the State Government.
[(gg)[* * *];
(h) [* * *];
Provided that
i- No action shall be taken under Clause (f), Clause (g) except after giving to the body or person concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed;
ii- [* * *]"
9. In terms of proviso of Section 95(1)(g) of the Panchayat Raj Act, it is incumbent that after holding an inquiry in such manner, as may be prescribed, the pradhan, who is found committing financial and other irregularities, can be restrained from exercise his financial and administrative powers till his exoneration after the final inquiry. The phrase such manner as may be prescribed is traceable to the prescriptions contained under the 1997 Rules, which specifically prescribes the manner of making complaints in Rule 3. The manner in which the preliminary inquiry shall be held in Rule 4. The manner in which the final inquiry is to be held in Rule 6.
10. The Full Bench judgment in the case of Vivekanand Yadav vs State of U.P. and another: 2011 (29) LCD holds that preliminary inquiry is an inquiry for forming an opinion as to whether any action should be taken or not and at that stage, there is no necessity to provide a copy of preliminary inquiry report.
11. Sri Gaurav Mehrotra appearing on behalf of one of the petitioners, apart from drawing my attention to the effect referred hereinabove, argues that by virtue of second amendment Chapter IX was introduced in the Constitution of India prescribing for establishing panchayats to promote the local self governance and in pursuance to the said amendment carried out in the Constitution, Sections 11 and 11-B were incorporated in the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act. Section 11-B (2) & (3) are quoted below:
11-B. Election of Pradhan
(1) ...
(2) If at any general election to a Gram Panchyat, the Pradhan is not elected, and less than two-thirds of the total number of members of Gram Panchayat are elected, the State Government or an officer authorized by it in this behalf may, by order, either appoint
(i) an Administrative Committee consisting of such number of persons qualified to be elected as members of the Gram Panchayat, as it may consider proper;
or (ii) an Administrator.
(3) The members of the Administrative Committee of the Administrator shall hold office for such period not exceeding six months as the State Government may specify in the order referred to in sub-Section (2).
12. Sri Gaurav Mehrotra also draws my attention to Section 11-B (2) to argue that the legislature itself was conscious even the statutory provisions provide for the working of the administrative committee for a period not exceeding six months and thus although Rule 6 of the 1996 Rules provides for completion of an inquiry within six months may be directory and not mandatory, the power ceasing the financial and administrative powers cannot continue beyond six months in terms of the mandate of the Act. My attention is also drawn to Rule 8 which mandates the inquiry officer to conclude the inquiry within six months from the date of receipt of the complaint. Rule 8 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj (Removal of Pradhans, Up-Pradhans and Members) Enquiry Rules, 1997 is quoted hereinbelow:
8. The Enquiry Officer shall conclude the enquiry within six months from the date of receipt of complaint and forward to State Government the records of the enquiry, which shall include, -
(a) the report prepared by him under Rule 7;
(b) the written statement of defence, if any, of the person against whom the enquiry has been held;
(c) the oral and documentary evidence produced during the course of the enquiry;
(d) written briefs, if any, filed during the course of the enquiry; and
(e) the orders, if any, made by the State Government and the Enquiry Officer in regard to the enquiry.
13. He thus argues that on a conjoint reading of Section 11-B (2) and (3) read with Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules, the mandate of the Act and the Rules is that a Gram Pradhan cannot be denuded of his powers for more than six months and in any case cannot be deprived of his powers to serve the people for which he has been elected without exercise of administrative and financial powers for a period exceeding six months.
14. The issue with regard to whether the prescriptions contained in Rule 8 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj (Removal of Pradhan, Up-Pradhan and Members) Enquiry Rules, 1997 is mandatory or directory came up for consideration in the case of one of the petitioners itself and were decided vide judgment and order dated 24.07.2024 [Neelam Devi vs State of U.P. and others: 2024 OnLine All 4920], wherein this Court relying upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court held that it is well settled that where the consequences of not following the timeline, which if not prescribed would be directory and not mandatory. The relevant extract are as under:
9. A perusal of Rule 8 of the Rules of 1997 clearly indicates that there is direction of six months' time for conduct of the inquiry but there is no consequence given in case the said inquiry is not conducted within six months. There is no dispute with regard to interpretation of the said provision particularly with the time period fixed for taking decision by any authority but where the authority has consistently failed to proceed with the said inquiry no consequence is given of not deciding the same within the stipulated period of time as provided for under the Act or the Rules.
10. The issue as to whether time limit fixed for performance of a public duty without consequence being specified is directory or mandatory has been dealt with by Hon'ble Supreme Court in numerous judgments. Here it would be pertinent to refer to the case of C. Bright v. Distt. Collector, (2021) 2 SCC 392, where Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-
"9. The question as to whether, a time-limit fixed for a public officer to perform a public duty is directory or mandatory has been examined earlier by the courts as well. A question arose before the Privy Council in respect of irregularities in the preliminary proceedings for constituting a jury panel. The Municipality was expected to revise the list of qualified persons but the jury was drawn from the old list as the Sheriff neglected to revise the same. It was in these circumstances, the decision of the jury drawn from the old list became the subject-matter of consideration by the Privy Council. It was thus held that it would cause greater public inconvenience if it were held that neglecting to observe the provisions of the statute made the verdicts of all juries taken from the list ipso facto null and void so that no jury trials could be held until a duly revised list had been prepared [Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Normandin, 1917 SCC OnLine PC 3 : AIR 1917 PC 142].
10. The Constitution Bench of this Court held that when the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold acts done in neglect of this duty as null and void, would cause serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, the practice of the courts should be to hold such provisions as directory [Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay, (1952) 1 SCC 372 : AIR 1952 SC 181 : 1952 Cri LJ 955] . In a seven-Bench judgment, this Court was considering as to whether the power of the Returning Officer to reject ballot papers is mandatory or directory. The Court examined well-recognised rules of construction to observe that a statute should be construed as directory if it relates to the performance of public duties, or if the conditions prescribed therein have to be performed by persons other than those on whom the right is conferred [Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233].
11. In a judgment reported as Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. Workmen [Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 224] , Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 came up for consideration. The argument raised was that the time-limit of 30 days of publication of award by the Labour Court is mandatory. This Court held that though Section 17 is mandatory, the time-limit to publish the award within 30 days is directory inter alia for the reason that the non-publication of the award within the period of thirty days does not entail any penalty.
12. In T.V. Usman v. Food Inspector, Tellicherry Municipality [T.V. Usman v. Food Inspector, Tellicherry Municipality, (1994) 1 SCC 754 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 187] , the time period during which report of the analysis of a sample under Rule 7(3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 was to be given, was held to be directory as there was no time-limit prescribed within which the prosecution had to be instituted. When there was no such limit prescribed then there was no valid reason for holding the period of 45 days as mandatory. Of course, that does not mean that the Public Analyst can ignore the time-limit prescribed under the Rules. He must in all cases try to comply with the time-limit. But if there is some delay, in a given case, there is no reason to hold that the very report is void and, on that basis, to hold that even prosecution cannot be launched.
13. This Court distinguished between failure of an individual to act in a given time-frame and the time-frame provided to a public authority, for the purposes of determining whether a provision was mandatory or directory, when this Court held that it is a well-settled principle that if an act is required to be performed by a private person within a specified time, the same would ordinarily be mandatory but when a public functionary is required to perform a public function within a time-frame, the same will be held to be directory unless the consequences therefor are specified [Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal, (2003) 2 SCC 577] .
14. In P.T. Rajan v. T.P.M. Sahir [P.T. Rajan v. T.P.M. Sahir, (2003) 8 SCC 498] , this Court examined the effect of non-publication of final electoral rolls before the time of acceptance of nomination papers. The Court held as under : (SCC p. 516, para 48)
"48. Furthermore, even if the statute specifies a time for publication of the electoral roll, the same by itself could not have been held to be mandatory. Such a provision would be directory in nature. It is a well-settled principle of law that where a statutory functionary is asked to perform a statutory duty within the time prescribed therefor, the same would be directory and not mandatory. (See Shiveshwar Prasad Sinha v. District Magistrate [Shiveshwar Prasad Sinha v. District Magistrate, 1965 SCC OnLine Pat 43 : AIR 1966 Pat 144 : ILR 45 Pat 436] , Nomita Chowdhury v. State of W.B. [Nomita Chowdhury v. State of W.B., 1999 SCC OnLine Cal 235 : (1999) 2 Cal LJ 21] and Garbari Union Coop. Agricultural Credit Society Ltd. v. Swapan Kumar Jana [Garbari Union Coop. Agricultural Credit Society Ltd. v. Swapan Kumar Jana, 1996 SCC OnLine Cal 209 : (1997) 1 CHN 189] .)"
11. In the present case, the time prescribed for concluding the final inquiry is six months as per Rule 8 but there is no consequence in case the prescribed authority does not take a decision within six months in usual course and in case the decision is not taken within six months it is always open to the delinquent/petitioner to approach Writ Court seeking a direction to the prescribed authority to take decision within a stipulated period of time. The argument of the petitioner that in case the appeal is not decided within the stipulated time period as per Rule 8 the proceedings would lapse and the benefit of the same should be given to the petitioner, is rejected. It is further noticed that once the order dated 4.11.2023 is in existence and the administrative and financial powers of the petitioner has been seized no direction can be given by this Court during currency of the aforesaid order permitting the petitioner to revive her administrative and financial powers.
15. As, no arguments have been advanced, to argue that the provisions of Rule 8 are mandatory and not directory, the said issue is not being gone into in the present writ petition. Thus, the only issue is to be decided is whether the financial and administrative powers can continue to be ceased even beyond the period of six months or not.
16. This issue was noticed by this Court in the case of Neelam Devi (Supra) in para 7, however, the said issue does not appear to have been decided. Para 7 reads as under:
7. I have heard the rival contentions. The only question which calls for consideration before this Court is as to whether there is any power to any authority to restore the financial and administrative powers to the petitioner during pendency of the regular inquiry. Under the peculiar facts of the present case, it is noticed that by means of order dated 4.11.2023 the financial and administrative powers of the petitioner was seized and the petitioner had assailed the said order before this Court by filing writ C No. 10633 of 2023 where this Court did not interfere with the order dated 4.11.2023 but gave liberty to the petitioner to raise all the grounds legally permissible during the regular inquiry.
17. On the basis of the arguments raised and noted above as well as the law cited and quoted above, the first issue to be decided is whether the financial and administrative powers can continue to be ceased even beyond the period of six months or not?
18. In the light of the prescriptions contained in the 1997 Rules, there is a clear prescriptions that the proceedings initiated shall be concluded within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the complaint as is evident from the Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules. However, prima facie, in the said 1997 Rules, the consequences of not following the time limit of six months as stated in the 1997 Rules, has not been provided. On the basis of there being no provisions, prima facie, this Court had held that the said 1997 Rules to be directory and not mandatory in the judgment and order dated 24.07.2024 passed in Writ-C No.6303 of 2024 (Neelam Devi vs State of U.P. and others). While doing so, this Court had relied upon the judgment of Honble Supreme Court, wherein it was prescribed that when the consequences of not following the time limit prescribed in the statute is not provided, the same has to be interpreted as directory and not mandatory.
19. As both the petitioners Counsel have given up their challenges to the said provisions by arguing that the prescriptions contained in respect of time under Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules is mandatory and not directory, this Court is not going into the said issue, although, prima facie, it does not appear to be correct that the consequences of not following time limit of six months is not provided. The proviso to Section 95(1)(g) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act itself clearly prohibits the restoration of administrative and financial powers till the conclusion and exoneration in the enquiry, thus, the consequences of not following the time line in Rule 8 are contained in the proviso to Section 95(1)(g). However, as both the petitioners have not argued the said point, I am not dealing with the said argument.
20. The second arguments that arises is whether, the ceasing of financial and administrative powers as prescribed in the proviso to Section 95(1)(g) can continue beyond six months, the Counsel for the petitioner Sri Gaurav Mehrotra argues that in the light of the judgment in the case of Raj Kumar Singh vs State of U.P. and others: 2014 (2) AWC 1333, this issue was dealt with in the following manner:
31. The proceedings for removal of the Pradhan is to be conducted in accordance with Rules 6 onwards of the Rules, irrespective of the fact whether right to exercise financial and administrative power was ceased or not. However, where right to exercise financial and administrative power is also to be ceased then procedure of Rules 3 to 5 has to be followed. Preliminary inquiry need not precede regular inquiry. Paragraphs 74, 94, and 96 of Vivekanand Yadav's case (Supra) is as follows:
"74.In our opinion there can be a proceeding for removal of a pradhan without ceasing his financial and administrative powers.
94. The procedure provided in rules 6 to 8 is for the final enquiry and not for the preliminary enquiry. A report by an enquiry officer defined under rule 2(c) is also a report by a person prescribed. It is not necessary for the enquiry officer to conduct the preliminary inquiry only on the direction given by the DM. His job is to submit a report, so that the DM may take a decision.
Whether there is prima facie case against the pradhan or not; and
Whether the final enquiry should be held after ceasing his powers.
96.A report by an enquiry officer defined under rule 2(c) is also a report by a person and the manner is prescribed under the Rules--irrespective of the fact that he was so asked by the DM or not. In our opinion, it is also a preliminary report within the meaning of the proviso to section 95(1) (g) of the Panchayat Raj Act."
32. The petitioner complainant shall have an opportunity during the course of regular enquiry to lead oral and documentary evidence as is provided for in sub section (11) of Section 6 of the Rules and further will also have an opportunity of hearing as contemplated under sub section 16 of Rule 6. Sub section (11) and sub section (16) of Rule 6 reads as follows:
"(11).On the date fixed for the enquiry, the oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charge are proposed shall be produced and the witness shall be examined, by the Enquiry Officer by or on behalf of the complainant, if there is one, and may be cross-examined by or on behalf of the person against whom the Enquiry Officer is being held. The witnesses may be re-examined by the Enquiry Officer or the complainant, as the case may be, on any point on which they have been cross- examined, but no on any new matter, without the leave of the Enquiry Officer."
(16) The Enquiry Officer may, after the completion of the production of evidence, hear the complainant, if any and the the person against whom the enquiry is being held, or permit them, or him, as the case may be, to file written briefs of their respective cases."
33. Thus it is evident from the scheme of the Act and the rules framed there under, the complainant only has a right to participate in the regular enquiry to the extent rules provided for, but he has no locus to challenge the order passed by District Magistrate either on the report of preliminary enquiry or that of final enquiry.
34. Rule 8 of the Rules provide that the Inquiry Officer shall conclude the inquiry within six months from the date of the receipt of the complaint and forward to the State Government the records of the inquiry. Since the inquiry is pending for the past 20 months, it is expected that it shall be concluded expeditiously within three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order.
21. Sri Gaurav Mehrotra thus argues that although the proviso to Section 95(1)(g), prescribes the ceasing of financial and administrative powers till the Pradhan is exonerated from the charges in the final inquiry. The same has to be interpreted so as to reconcile the provisions of Section 11-B of Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act read with Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules. The said argument merits rejection for the sole reason that there is no challenge to the proviso to Section 95(1)(g) and in the present cases, the petitioners have already given up their challenges insofar as the prescriptions of time line contained in Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules being mandatory.
22. In the absence of there being any challenge, there is no occasion for the Court to interpret that the phrase until he is exonerated of the charges in the final injury, in the manner, in which Sri Gaurav Mehrotra proposes to argue, thus, on that count, the writ petition cannot be entertained and in view thereof, the Writ-C No.9043 of 2024 (Smt. Neelam Devi vs State of U.P. and others) is liable to be dismissed only with direction that the final inquiry if not already been concluded, shall be concluded positively within a period of two months. The other argument attacking the order ceasing the financial and administrative powers cannot be gone into as the same was subject matter of challenges in earlier petitions and decided in para 11 of the earlier judgment in the case of Smt. Neelam Devi (Supra).
23. Insofar as, the case of Ravi Shankar Yadav (Writ-C No.5333 of 2025) is concerned, the judicial review of the order impugned is required. The petition Ravi Shanker Yadav is the Gram Pradhan duly elected and on the basis of complaint made, a preliminary inquiry was ordered. The said preliminary inquiry report was furnished on 28.10.2023 and thereafter in the light of requirements prescribed in the case of Vivekanand Yadav (Supra), a show cause notice dated 07.11.2023 was issued to which the petitioner could not give reply as he was suffering from brain stroke and a simple reply denying the allegations was made which led passing of the order impugned dated 16.11.2024.
24. On perusal of the said order, it transpires that firstly, it was held that the reply given was not satisfactory and the prima facie case for ceasing the financial and administrative powers, the allegations pertain to excess payment with regard to the constructions of Panchayat Bhawan at Khanpur; deficit payment in respect of the construction of public toilet at Khanpur; excess payment for construction of a boundary wall of Primary School Vishambhar Kheda; reboring of the hand pump in front of the house of one Mohd. Salim and fixing of few dustbin and the dustbins not being in consonance with the prescribed format, were levelled. However, the petitioner-Ravi Shankar Yadav was alleged to be prima facie guilty of allegations contained in the Charge Nos.1, 2 and 3. It is argued that the said charges and the constructions pertain to the period prior to the Gram Pradhan having taken charge and are for the period prior to the petitioner coming into office. Even otherwise, in the show cause notice, there was no allegation of the petitioner-Ravi Shankar Yadav being guilty of excess payment and siphoning of the funds.
25. In view thereof, prima facie, the exercise of drastic powers of removal of Gram Pradhan are not justified. In addition to the said, on account of the petitioner-Ravi Shankar Yadav suffering from the medical condition, his reply also could not be filed. Thus on both the counts, the order impugned dated 16.11.2024 challenged in Writ-C No.5333 of 2025 cannot be justified and is quashed. However, the final inquiry which is said to be continuing in terms of the Rule 6 of the 1997 Rules, the same shall be continued in accordance with law.
26. In view of the findings recorded hereinabove, Writ-C No.5333 of 2025 stands allowed on the limited question of the order impugned not satisfying the test of judicial review. The Writ-C No.9043 of 2024 (Smt. Neelam Devi vs State of U.P. and others) stands dismissed with the direction as stated above.
August 28, 2025 [Pankaj Bhatia, J.]
akverma
