Allahabad High Court
Raghuraj Singh vs Union Of India And Others on 23 April, 2025
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:61342
Reserved
A.F.R.
Court No. - 49
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 48918 of 2014
Petitioner :- Raghuraj Singh
Respondent :- Union of India and others
Counsel for Petitioner :- Raj Kumar
Counsel for Respondent :- S.C., U.S.Singh, V.K. Pandey
Hon'ble J.J. Munir,J.
1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 24.09.2013 passed by the Disciplinary Authority, the Chief Regional Manager, Indian Overseas Bank, Punj House, Connaught Place, New Delhi and the appellate order dated 03.02.2014 passed by the Deputy General Manager, Indian Overseas Bank, Central Office, Chennai, punishing the petitioner with dismissal from service, after disciplinary proceedings.
2. The petitioner is an Ex-Army Man. He was a Nayak in the Indian Army and retired from service in the year 2001. He was appointed a Watchman with the Indian Overseas Bank (for short, 'the Bank') on 25.08.2005 and there does not appear to be anything to show that prior to the incident, giving rise to this writ petition, there was any dereliction or delinquency on the petitioner's part. The petitioner was charge-sheeted about making a fraudulent claim for reimbursement of medical bills to the tune of Rs.12,185/-. A charge-sheet dated 17.09.2012 was issued to the petitioner regarding the allegations that relate to the period of time when he was posted as the Armed Guard at the Arun Vihar Branch of the Bank, located in NOIDA, District Gautam Budh Nagar. The charges carried in the charge-sheet, to which allusion would presently be made, carry two charges along with the statement of imputations. The petitioner denied the charges and a departmental inquiry was held on 18.04.2013 and concluded the same day i.e. 18.04.2013. The management produced eight documents, whereas the petitioner produced two in his defence. The management examined two witnesses whereas the petitioner examined one. The Inquiry Officer submitted his inquiry report, holding both charges proved, apart from statement of allegation Nos.1, 2 and 3 also proved. The inquiry report was submitted on 07.06.2013.
3. The Disciplinary Authority, that is to say, the Chief Regional Manager vide order dated 24.09.2013 proceeded to hold the petitioner guilty on all allegations under the articles of charges found proved against him by the Inquiry Officer and punished him with dismissal from service for an act of gross misconduct within the meaning of Clause 5(d) and Clause 5(j) of the memorandum of settlement dated 10.04.2002, executed between the Bank and its workmen. The petitioner, by his appeal dated 25.10.2013, appealed the order dated 24.09.2013 to the Appellate Authority under the memorandum of settlement dated 10.04.2002, that is to say, the Deputy General Manager of the Bank, sitting at Chennai. The Appellate Authority concurred in the findings of the Disciplinary Authority and affirmed the punishment of dismissal vide his order dated 13.02.2014, dismissing the petitioner's appeal.
4. Aggrieved by the order dated 24.09.2013 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the order dated 13.02.2014 by the Appellate Authority, the petitioner has instituted the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
5. A notice of motion was issued to the respondents vide order dated 11.09.2014. It appears that a counter affidavit was filed by the Union of India on 24.09.2018, to which a rejoinder dated 28.09.2019 was filed. These affidavits were not traceable on record, and, accordingly, the Court, vide order dated 05.12.2022, directed those affidavits to be traced. The office report dated 24.05.2023 indicates that according to the computer database, no counter affidavit has been filed by the Union of India and the office was unable to trace the rejoinder either. Apparently, the Union of India is not a contesting party. Therefore, what is relevant, are the pleadings between the Bank and the petitioner. The respondent Bank put in their counter affidavit dated 12.11.2014. There is no rejoinder to the Bank's counter affidavit. The parties having exchanged affidavits, the writ petition was admitted to hearing on 27.11.2024, which proceeded forthwith. Judgment was reserved.
6. Heard Mr. Raj Kumar Keshari, learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of the petition and Mr. Vinod Kumar Pandey, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 to 4.
7. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties and perusing the record, what this Court finds is that the petitioner underwent a coronary angiography at the Kailash Hospital and Heart Institute, NOIDA, District Gautam Budh Nagar in the month of May, 2012. He was admitted to the said hospital on 10.05.2012 and discharged on 12.05.2012. The petitioner, being an ex-serviceman, held a mediclaim card from the Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme Polyclinic, NOIDA (for short, 'the ECHS Polyclinic'). The petitioner held ECHS Polyclinic Card No. DL-0078387. The petitioner's bill dated 12.05.2012 for a sum of Rs.12,070/- for the treatment received by him as per ECHS rates had been submitted to the ECHS/ UTI-ITSL for payment. The bill was settled by the ECHS Polyclinic. The petitioner was issued with a duplicate bill dated 12.05.2012, which he submitted to the Bank for reimbursement along with his application for reimbursement of hospital expenses vide an application dated 25.05.2012 in the prescribed proforma.
8. The application for reimbursement of medical expenses together with its enclosures was forwarded to the Regional Office, National Capital Region, Delhi for reimbursement. On 21.06.2012, the petitioner made an application saying that he had submitted the medical claim by mistake and withdrew it. In the meantime in the Regional Office, it was noticed that the bill was duplicate and an inquiry was made from the hospital, where the petitioner had received treatment. There, it was revealed that his bill was settled by the ECHS Polyclinic. There was, thus, a period of less than a month between the petitioner submitting his claim for reimbursement and its withdrawal. The petitioner's stand is that the mistake that he committed was that he intended to make a leave application, which was written for him by Manoj Chand, Clerk, Arun Vihar Branch and Secretary of the Employees Union. He would write many applications for employees, who could not read or write in English, like the petitioner. Manoj Chand was helping one Aditya Raj with claiming his medical reimbursement. The petitioner had with him his discharge summary and medical bills, which made Manoj Chand think that the petitioner too had to apply for reimbursement. Accordingly, he filled up the medical reimbursement form, that was submitted to the Branch and forwarded to the Regional Office.
9. Later on, on 21.06.2012, when the petitioner went to inquire of Manoj Chand whether his sick leave application had been granted, Manoj Chand said that the petitioner would automatically know once his medical reimbursement is sanctioned. It was then that the petitioner realized that there was something wrong and told Manoj Chand that he had never applied for reimbursement. This led to discovery of the mistake and on the same day, an application was written to withdraw the reimbursement claim. The Bank would have nothing of it. They said that the application to withdraw the reimbursement claim was made by the petitioner, once he came to know that preliminary inquiry had commenced and Jerry D'Souza, an Officer of the Bank was inquiring about it in the second week of June, 2012. He had also inquired from the hospital on 14.06.2012. It is for said reason that the petitioner scripted an application to withdraw his medical reimbursement claim on 21.06.2012, but handed over the same to the Branch Manager on 07.07.2012.
10. Amongst the two article of charges that had been framed, both were found proved, holding the petitioner guilty of an attempt to cause damage to the property of the Bank, which constitutes gross misconduct within the meaning of Clause 5(d) of the memorandum of settlement dated 10.04.2002 between the Bank and its workmen. The Inquiry Officer also held the petitioner guilty of acting in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Bank within the meaning of gross negligence as defined in Clause 5(j) of the memorandum of settlement last mentioned.
11. These charges were held proved on the touchstone of the fact that the petitioner attempted to realize medical reimbursement for his treatment, that had already been paid by ECHS Polyclinic at the time of his discharge. What seems to have weighed primarily with the Inquiry Officer as also the Disciplinary and the Appellate Authority is the fact that the petitioner at the time of discharge knew that his bills had been settled, but he secured a duplicate copy of the bills, on the foot of which he laid his claim for medical reimbursement with the Bank. The other reasons for not accepting the petitioner's otherwise plausible defence about his illiteracy and consequent mistake in filling up the medical reimbursement form, thinking that it was a sick leave application, is the fact that the petitioner made the application for withdrawal on 21.06.2012, after preliminary investigation had begun.
12. The Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority have taken the view that the petitioner had become aware about the fact of investigation, and, therefore, withdrew. Otherwise, he had every dishonest intention to claim reimbursement. Still more is the fact that the withdrawal application dated 21.06.2012 was submitted to the Branch Manager on 07.07.2012. No doubt, the conclusions drawn by the Inquiry Officer, may be implausible for many reasons and the petitioner's defence quite plausible. After all, he is a person, who has passed his Class-VIII and not much literate. He could have committed a mistake of this kind.
13. There are irrelevant things also that the Inquiry Officer has taken into consideration, like the petitioner proceeding on unauthorized leave, which may have swayed him into erring on some of his conclusions. What, however, forbids this Court from holding the conclusions of the Inquiry Officer bad on merits of the two charges is that in a secondary review, unless the conclusions are perverse, or there are serious procedural lapses in the inquiry, it is not for this Court to enter judgment on the merits of the matter, appreciating evidence led at the inquiry, like a Court of first appeal. The conclusions of the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority may, in our opinion, be implausible, but that does not entitle us to substitute our view for that of the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority, merely because it may be a better view of the possible conclusions that could be drawn from the evidence. By no means, the conclusions of the Inquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority can be said to be perverse.
14. In support of this conclusion of ours, reference may be made to Union of India v. Subrata Nath, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1617, where the Supreme Court held:
"25. We have noted above that the findings of the Disciplinary Authority had met with the approval of the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority. However, the learned Single Judge overturned the order of dismissal from service and converted the same to compulsory retirement on the sole ground of non-availability of the original record, more specifically, the Beat Book, while giving a go-by to the extract of the Beat Book that was produced before the Inquiry Officer and the fact that the respondent had admitted the said document. The learned Single Judge also ignored the fact that the Beat Book was not the only piece of document produced before the Inquiry Officer. There were depositions of other witnesses produced by the department to prove the charges levelled against the respondent and the said witnesses had corroborated the version of the Department. At no stage, did the learned Single Judge observe that the departmental inquiry was vitiated on account of violation of the rules of natural justice or that the inquiry had been conducted in gross violation of the statutory rules.
26. The Division Bench went a step further and proceeded to reappreciate the evidence and observed that it was not persuaded to conclude that such a major theft of 800 kgs comprising of 42 bundles of copper wires could have happened "in the blink of an eyelid" despite holding that the view of the learned Single Judge regarding non-production of the original Beat Book was unsustainable. The Court held that the allegation of connivance in the theft levelled against the respondent was presumptive and there wasn't enough evidence to conclude that theft of such a magnitude could have happened during the duty period of the respondent alone, yet charge-I pertaining to negligence and dereliction of duty on the part of the respondent was sustained. At the same time, the order passed by the learned Single Judge directing substitution of the punishment of dismissal with that of compulsory retirement was set aside and the respondent was directed to be reinstated in service with full back wages, while giving liberty to the Disciplinary Authority to issue a fresh order of punishment commensurate to the negligence and dereliction of duties on his part, except for punishment of dismissal or removal from service or compulsory retirement.
27. We are unable to commend the approach of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench. There was no good reason for the High Court to have entered the domain of the factual aspects relating to the evidence recorded before the Inquiry Officer. This was clearly an attempt to reappreciate the evidence which is impermissible in exercise of powers of judicial review vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are of the opinion that both, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench, fell into an error by setting aside the order of dismissal from service imposed on the respondent by the Disciplinary Authority and upheld by the Appellate Authority."
15. The point, that was asserted with much vehemence by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is that even if the charges are held proved, the punishment awarded is shockingly disproportionate. Now, 'shockingly disproportionate', in the context of a penalty to be awarded by the employer is not a word of art, as proverbially said, but one of a definitive legal connotation. It is not that the Court, upon looking to the facts, can do a nascent invocation of its conscience and say, 'without reason' that it finds the penalty imposed to be 'shockingly disproportionate'. The doctrine of proportionality has very limited application in the context of the choice of punishment, once the inquiry is procedurally fair and the conclusions of the employer not perverse or beset by illegalities that permit a secondary review.
16. If there is nothing wrong on grounds known to law, on the foot of which, the Court may interfere with the finding of guilt, the very limited scope to interfere with the quantum of punishment, is reserved to those few matters, which may truly be called 'shockingly disproportionate'. Now, 'shockingly disproportionate' again is a conclusion, which the Court may draw, if upon the charge proved, the punishment awarded is so harsh that no reasonable person, circumstanced as the employer, could ever think about it. If there is a possibility that some person, donning the employer's cap, could think the awarded punishment to be a possibility, the Court cannot condemn the penalty as 'shockingly disproportionate'. If the Court is to reach a conclusion that the punishment awarded is indeed 'shockingly disproportionate', in the sense that it shocks conscience of the Court, the Court must record reasons for the conclusions reached. The law in this connection has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank v. P.C. Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364, where it was held:
"11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.
12. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigation it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.
13. In the case at hand the High Court did not record any reason as to how and why it found the punishment shockingly disproportionate. Even there is no discussion on this aspect. The only discernible reason was the punishment awarded in M.L. Keshwani case. As was observed by this Court in Balbir Chand v. Food Corpn. of India Ltd. [(1997) 3 SCC 371 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 808] even if a co-delinquent is given lesser punishment it cannot be a ground for interference. Even such a plea was not available to be given credence as the allegations were contextually different.
14. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with the money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik [(1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1194] it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court.
15. It needs no emphasis that when a court feels that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons for coming to such a conclusion. Mere expression that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate would not meet the requirement of law. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning, M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union [(1971) 1 All ER 1148 : (1971) 2 QB 175 : (1971) 2 WLR 742 (CA)] observed : (All ER p. 1154h) "The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration." In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree [1974 ICR 120 (NIRC)] it was observed:"Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at." Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking-out. The "inscrutable face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. .........."
17. In Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank and another v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372, the principles, regarding the Court's power to interfere with the quantum of punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority, were summarized thus:
"19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows:
19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities.
19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority.
19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court.
19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case.
19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.
20. It is made clear that such a comparison is permissible only when the other employee(s) who is given lighter punishment was a co-delinquent. Such a comparison is not permissible by citing the cases of other employees, as precedents, in altogether different departmental enquiries."
18. The same principle in the matter of the Court's jurisdiction to interfere on the issue of quantum was followed in Union of India and others v. Ex. Constable Ram Karan, (2022) 1 SCC 373, where it was held:
"23. The well-ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to the delinquent employee. Keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee, it is not open for the courts to assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary authority.
24. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment is available but with a limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/appellate authority to take a call and it is not for the court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. However, it is only in rare and exceptional cases where the court might to shorten the litigation may think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority that too after assigning cogent reasons."
19. The holding of the Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 is clearly in point, where it is held:
"Punishment in disciplinary matters: Wednesbury and CCSU tests
32. Finally, we come to the present case. It is not contended before us that any fundamental freedom is affected. We need not therefore go into the question of "proportionality". There is no contention that the punishment imposed is illegal or vitiated by procedural impropriety. As to "irrationality", there is no finding by the Tribunal that the decision is one which no sensible person who weighed the pros and cons could have arrived at nor is there a finding, based on material, that the punishment is in "outrageous" defiance of logic. Neither Wednesbury nor CCSU tests are satisfied. We have still to explain "Ranjit Thakur [(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113] ".
33. In Ranjit Thakur [(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113] this Court interfered with the punishment only after coming to the conclusion that the punishment was in outrageous defiance of logic and was shocking. It was also described as perverse and irrational. In other words, this Court felt that, on facts, Wednesbury and CCSU tests were satisfied. In another case, in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44] a three-Judge Bench said the same thing as follows: (SCC p. 762, para 18)
"18. ... The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary authority/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof."
Similar view was taken in Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar Arora [(1997) 3 SCC 72 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 636] that the Court will not intervene unless the punishment is wholly disproportionate.
34. In such a situation, unless the court/tribunal opines in its secondary role, that the administrator was, on the material before him, irrational according to Wednesbury [(1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680] or CCSU [1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 All ER 935] norms, the punishment cannot be quashed. Even then, the matter has to be remitted back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration. It is only in very rare cases as pointed out in B.C. Chaturvedi case [AIR 1961 SC 418 : (1961) 2 SCR 343] that the Court might -- to shorten litigation -- think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in the place of the punishment awarded by the competent authority. (In B.C. Chaturvedi [AIR 1961 SC 418 : (1961) 2 SCR 343] and other cases referred to therein it has however been made clear that the power of this Court under Article 136 is different.) For the reasons given above, the case cited for the respondent, namely, State of Maharashtra v. M.H. Mazumdar [(1988) 2 SCC 52 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 436 : (1988) 6 ATC 876] cannot be of any help."
20. The crux of the matter in this case, so far as the choice of punishment is concerned, is that on the evidence available, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority have come to a conclusion that it was the intention of the petitioner to defraud the Bank. If the respondents have come to that conclusion, it is not for this Court to go into evidence and hold that the conclusion is wrong and then say that for an inchoate act, where the petitioner could not cause actual loss to the Bank, the punishment awarded is shockingly disproportionate. We cannot also say that the withdrawal of the medical reimbursement claim was an act of locus poenitentiae on the petitioner's part before he actually received the reimbursement. Whether he did that in the exercise of locus poenitentiae was a matter for the respondents to consider on the evidence and the respondents have not thought so. Rather, they have minutely analyzed evidence with the Inquiry Officer pointing out circumstances to show that the petitioner submitted his application to withdraw the medical reimbursement claim, after he became aware of an investigation or preliminary inquiry commenced in the matter by the Bank. There is also a difference in the date of the withdrawal application and the date it was actually presented to the Branch Manager for its onward transmission to the Regional Office. On an analysis of these circumstances, the respondents have held that the petitioner had an intention to defraud. The findings of the respondents, therefore, exclude any kind of a locus poenitentiae for the petitioner, where the petitioner, harbouring an initial dishonest motive, retraced his steps so quickly that the ill-intention could be ignored. Even if it could be, it is not for this Court to draw that inference in substitution for what the respondents have thought about it on the available evidence. This is so because what the respondents have concluded is not, in any way, perverse or based on no evidence.
21. In the circumstances, this Court does not find any good ground to interfere with the orders impugned.
22. This writ petition fails and is dismissed.
23. There shall be no order as to costs.
Order Date :- 23.4.2025
Anoop
(J.J. Munir)
Judge
