Allahabad High Court
Jagat Narain Puri vs The Chief General Manager State Bank Of ... on 15 April, 2025
Author: Rajesh Singh Chauhan
Bench: Rajesh Singh Chauhan
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:21218
Reserved
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 6719 of 2002
Petitioner :- Jagat Narain Puri
Respondent :- The Chief General Manager State Bank Of India And 2 Ors
Counsel for Petitioner :- Anuj Kudesia,Ashutosh Nigam,K.K. Gautam,R.C.P.Srivastava,Rajiva Dubey,Vishal Verma
Counsel for Respondent :- N.K. Seth,G.K.Srivastava,Gopal Kumar Srivastava
Hon'ble Rajesh Singh Chauhan,J.
1. Heard Sri Vishal Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Gopal Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank assisted by Sri Akash Deep Srivastava, Advocate.
2. The order under challenge is a dismissal order dated 22.09.1999 (Annexure no. 2) passed by the disciplinary authority i.e. General Manager (D & PB), State Bank of India, Local Head Office, Moti Mahal Marg, Lucknow, opposite party no. 2 and the order dated 03.08.2002 (Annexure no. 8) passed by the Appellate Authority i.e. Chief General Manager, S.B.I., Local Head Office, Moti Mahal Marg, Lucknow, the opposite party no. 1 dismissing the appeal of the petitioner.
3. The brief facts of the case are that on 21.11.1966 the petitioner was appointed as 'Typist' in S.B.I. at N.S. Road, Calcutta Branch. Petitioner was promoted to the Officers Junior Management Grade Scale-I on 01.12.1982.
4. The petitioner was placed under suspension on 09.10.1993 allegedly on serious lapse committed by him while serving as Branch Manager at Chandan Chowki, S.B.I. Branch, Lakhimpur Kheri from 25.08.1987 to 24.05.1993. Pursuant to the aforesaid suspension order departmental inquiry was conducted in terms of Rule 68 of the State Bank of India Officers Service Rules (herein after referred to as 'Rules').
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court towards the supplementary counter affidavit dated 27.01.2025 wherein some facts have been admitted by the respondent-Bank that the date of birth of the petitioner is 25.06.1943 and he submitted his joining in the Bank on 21.11.1966. Further, as per Circular of the Bank bearing No. PER/3/88 dated 14.03.1988 (Annexure no. 14 of the writ petition) the age of the retirement of the employee who joined the Bank prior to 19.07.1969 would be 30 years of pensionable service or 30 years of service (for those who are not members of the pensionable fund) or 50 years of age whichever occurs first, unless extension in service has been granted by the competent authority.
6. As per aforesaid circular vide para 2 thereof the review for grant of extension in service may be considered for two sets of employees, first category of those officers who had joined the Bank Services before 19.07.1969 and the other category of those officers who joined Bank services on or after 19.07.1969. For the officers who joined the Bank before 19.07.1969, applicable for the petitioner, the first stage would be on attaining the age of 50 years of age or completing 30 years of pensionable service or 30 years of service (in case of those who are not members of the pension fund) whichever occurs first. The second stage would be on attaining the age of 55 years and third stage would be of attaining the age of 58 years (para 7 of the supplementary counter affidavit).
7. In the present case since the date of birth of the petitioner is 25.06.1943, therefore, on or after 25.06.1993 his extension of service could be reviewed in view of the aforesaid circular. At that stage the petitioner was admittedly not under suspension inasmuch as he was placed under suspension on 09.10.1993.
8. Admittedly, before placing the petitioner under suspension on 09.10.1993 he was given extension in service on 24.06.1993 from 25.06.1993 to 24.06.1998 from the age of 50 years to 55 years.
9. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that on 25.06.1993 the competent authority of the Bank decided that the remaining service of the Bank would be discharged by the petitioner on the basis of extension of service under point no. 2 of aforesaid circular dated 14.03.1988. Further, if in any case the petitioner was not granted extension after 24.06.1998 he would not be treated in service and would be treated as if he has been retired from service.
10. Admittedly, the next extension in service was granted to the petitioner w.e.f. 25.06.1998 to 24.06.1999 from the age of 55 years to 56 years. Notably, as per aforesaid circular the second extension should have been given up to 58 years. As per the aforesaid circular no extension shall be granted beyond 60 years of age. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that giving extension in service for one year from the age of 55 years to 56 years is against the aforesaid circular dated 14.03.1988.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that though in para 11 of the supplementary counter affidavit it has been indicated that the petitioner was given extension in service from 25.06.1999 to 24.06.2000 from the age of 56 years to 57 years but no such extension order had been received to the petitioner nor such order has been enclosed with the counter affidavit or short counter affidavit. It would be pertinent to indicate here that the learned counsel for the respondent-Bank was confronted, on the aforesaid submission, by the court, the learned counsel for the respondent-Bank did not show such extension order in service from 25.06.1999 to 24.06.2000 as learned counsel for the respondent Bank has stated that, the order is not traceable.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted on affidavit that the Bank discontinued the payment of subsistence allowance to the petitioner after June, 1999 till passing of the impugned dismissal order dated 22.09.1999. As a matter of fact the respondent-Bank closed the account of the petitioner on 12.07.1999. The specific recital to this effect has been given in para 12 and 13 of the writ petition and no specific reply to that effect has been given in para 31 of the counter affidavit wherein only this much has been indicated that since the petitioner did not submit his defense reply properly, therefore, the disciplinary inquiry has been concluded on the basis of material available on record.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that if the petitioner was getting his regular subsistence allowance w.e.f. the date of his suspension dated 09.10.1993 and has received his first service extension order on 24.06.1993 and second extension in service order on 25.06.1998 then if he was given any extension in service on 25.06.1999, though no such order has been received by him, he would have been paid subsistence allowance till his dismissal order. Therefore, if the petitioner was not provided formal order of extension in service from 25.06.1999 and was not paid his subsistence allowance from June, 1999 till his dismissal order, it may be presumed that the services of the petitioner had not been extended and in that case he would be treated as retired employee w.e.f. June, 1999. Learned counsel has further submitted that the submission of the respondent-Bank in para 8,12 and 13 of the short counter affidavit to the effect that there is no provision of automatic retirement, only the short extension was given to the petitioner as the disciplinary inquiry had been concluded and he was dismissed on 22.09.1999 would be misconceived inasmuch as without having any formal order of extension in service from 25.06.1999 the petitioner was not in service at the time of dismissal of his service and a retired employee might not have been dismissed from service. Besides, point no. 2 of Circular dated 14.03.1988 clearly provides the mechanism to review for grant of extension in service. Point no. 2(a) defines the mechanism for officers who had joined the Bank's services before 19.7.1969 indicating therein three stages of granting extension and point no. 2(b) provides mechanism for officers who had joined Bank's services after 19.07.1969. Point no. 2(b), which is not applicable in the case of the petitioner, does not provide three stages of giving extension but it clearly provides that these officers are not eligible for grant of extension in service beyond 58 years of age. However, both the aforesaid conditions have been summed up by indicating that "Review for grant of extension in service or otherwise may be undertaken well in advance and a decision about grant / non-grant of extension may be taken say 3 to 6 months before the officer is due for extension in service". From perusal of the aforesaid direction it is clear that review for grant of extension in service must be undertaken well in advance. Though in the present case what to say about advance decision, no decision for grant of extension in service had been intimated to the petitioner or after 25.06.1999, to be more precise, till the impugned suspension order dated 22.09.1999.
14. Having considered the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the parties, this Court passed order dated 06.01.2025 in the present case which reads as under :
"1. Heard.
2. The thrust of argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that as per the then prevailing rules, as the petitioner had been appointed prior to 19.07.1969 (his date of appointment being 21.11.1966) as such his service was up to 30 years of pensionable service which entailed he being retired in November, 1996. However, the respondents on their own accord had granted an extension of service to the petitioner vide order dated 21.05.1998, a copy of which is Annexure-1 to the petition, up to 24.06.1999.
3. Subsequent thereto, the petitioner has been dismissed from service vide an order dated 22.09.1999 on the basis of inquiry proceedings which were started when the petitioner was in service.
4. The contention is that the disciplinary proceedings could not have been continued after the petitioner attained his actual date of superannuation i.e subsequent to November, 1996.
5. Refuting the same, Sri Gopal Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Bank, has referred to the extension in service order dated 26.06.1999 per which the services of the petitioner were extended up to 24.06.2000. Copy of the said order has been filed as Annexure SA-2 to the supplementary affidavit dated 05.09.2005.
6. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner has invited the attention of this Court towards the rules governing the extension of service dated 14.03.1988, a copy of which is Annexure-14 to the petition, which provides in Clause 2 the stages at which the extension is to be granted of which the first stage is on completion of 50 years of age or completion of 30 years of pensionable service whichever occurs first; second stage is on attaining 55 years of age and third stage is on attaining 58 years of age.
7. Placing reliance on the aforesaid circular as well as the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India vs. A.N. Gupta and others - 1997 (8) SCC 60, the contention is that the Bank rules do not provide for continuance of an inquiry subsequent to retirement and thus it is contended that in case the respondents did not follow the stages for grant of extension in service and as per the petitioner there was no extension of service that had been granted to the petitioner subsequent to 24.06.1999 consequently the dismissal order of the petitioner dated 22.09.1999 would itself become vitiated irrespective of the alleged extension that had been granted to the petitioner dated 25.06.1999 which may not conform to the stages as specified in the aforesaid circular.
8. As the date of birth of the petitioner is not clear from any documents on record and further the stages at which the extension is to be granted would have to be seen vis-a-vis the petitioner's entry into service as well as the age of the petitioner as such both the parties may file supplementary affidavits clearly indicating the date of birth of the petitioner, the date of completion of 30 years of service and the extensions that had been granted to the petitioner in terms of the circular dated 14.03.1988, as indicated above.
9. Let the affidavits be filed within three weeks.
10. List this case in the week commencing 27.01.2025. "
15. In compliance of the aforesaid order the supplementary counter affidavit was filed on 27.01.2025 by the respondent-Bank indicating therein the date of birth of the petitioner as 25.06.1943 but no order of extension in service have been enclosed. Since the petitioner has taken a specific plea that no formal order making extension in service from 25.06.1999 has been received to the petitioner and he was not paid his subsistence allowance from 25.06.1999 till the order of dismissal dated 22.09.1999, the competent authority of the respondent-bank must enclose such order of extension w.e.f. 25.06.1999 and must indicate the reason as to why the petitioner was not paid his subsistence allowance w.e.f. 25.06.1999 till the order of dismissal dated 22.09.1999. Since both the aforesaid submissions of the petitioner have not been replied in the counter affidavit nor in the supplementary counter affidavit, therefore, it may be presumed that no such extension in service was given to the petitioner on or after 25.06.1999 till the dismissal order dated 22.09.1999. Further, the respondent-Bank could not explain properly as to why the second extension order from 25.06.1998 could not be issued in terms of Point no. 2(a) of the Circular dated 14.03.1988 which clearly provides that second extension would be given till the age of 58 years whereas admittedly the second extension was given from the date of 55 years to 56 years as per para 10 of the supplementary counter affidavit.
16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court towards Annexure no. 20 which is a representation dated 09.03.1999 preferred to the disciplinary authority apprising his grievance that the departmental inquiry was not being conducted strictly in accordance with law and the same has been concluded ex-parte, therefore, the fresh departmental inquiry may be conducted against him providing him proper opportunity of hearing in the interest of justice. The petitioner preferred aforesaid representation dated 09.03.1999 for the reason that the ex-parte departmental inquiry concluded on 30.6.1998 and no punishment order was passed by that date as the dismissal order has been passed on 22.09.1999. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that if the authorities were interested to award major punishment to the petitioner on the basis of alleged allegations at least the proper departmental inquiry must have been conducted against him providing him ample opportunity of hearing to defend but no such decision has been taken on such representation of the petitioner and impugned punishment order of dismissal has been passed on 22.09.1999.
17. Feeling aggrieved from the aforesaid inaction on the part of the inquiry officer / disciplinary authority the petitioner preferred statutory appeal before the appellate authority i.e. the opposite party no. 1 taking pleas and grounds which were available to him but the appellate authority passed a mechanical order without considering the factual and legal matrix of the issue rejecting the appeal of the petitioner vide order dated 03.08.2002 (Annexure no. 8). In such appellate order neither the representation of the petitioner dated 09.03.1999 (Annexure no. 20) has been referred whereby the petitioner had requested for fresh departmental inquiry in accordance with law by affording him proper opportunity of hearing nor the fact that the petitioner has not been given extension in service after 25.06.1999 and he has not been paid any subsistence allowance from June, 1999 to 22.09.1999, the date of dismissal have been considered by the appellate authority. Only this much has been considered that since there is no provision of automatic retirement, therefore, the petitioner treated in service till the date of passing the impugned order of punishment dated 22.09.1999.
18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that since the charges had been levelled by the disciplinary authority, therefore, the inquiry officer must have proved those charges by fixing date, time and place to conduct the oral inquiry but no such exercise had been undertaken and charges have been proved against the petitioner ex-parte. The disciplinary authority took about one year and three months time to pass impugned dismissal order inasmuch as the ex-parte inquiry concluded on 30.06.1998 but the dismissal order has been passed on 22.09.1999 and the reason to take one year and three months to pass impugned order has not been explained by the disciplinary authority. Before passing the dismissal order the petitioner had preferred a representation dated 9.3.1999 and that representation must have been considered in the interest of justice and to follow the principles of natural justice. The appellate authority did not consider all these aforesaid aspects while rejecting the appeal of the petitioner.
19. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner has requested that the impugned orders dated 27.09.1999 (Annexure no. 2) and 03.08.2022 (Annexure no. 8) may be set aside and quashed.
20. Per contra, Sri Gopal Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank has stated that he has already given his submissions in his supplementary counter affidavit and in such supplementary counter affidavit he has categorically indicated that since the age of retirement of the officer and other staff employee was 60 years and the impugned punishment order has been issued before the petitioner attained the age of 60 years and there is no provision for automatic retirement under the Bank Rules, therefore, the impugned punishment order has been passed strictly in accordance with law. So far as the request of the petitioner for fresh departmental inquiry is concerned pursuant to his representation dated 09.03.1999 (Annexure no. 20), Sri Srivastava has stated that since the petitioner had not cooperated in the departmental inquiry properly, therefore, there was no purpose to provide him a fresh opportunity and to conduct fresh departmental inquiry. Sri Srivastava has also submitted that since the departmental inquiry was concluded on 30.06.1998, therefore, the petitioner was given second extension w.e.f. 25.06.1998 to 24.06.1999 as the final decision was to be taken by the disciplinary authority, therefore, the third extension was given for short period w.e.f. 25.06.1999 to 24.06.2000. On being asked about the order of extension in service w.e.f 25.06.1999 to 24.06.2000, Sri Srivastava has stated that the said order is not enclosed with short counter affidavit or the counter affidavit and is also not with him but that extension was given to the petitioner. On being further asked as to why one year and three months period consumed in passing the punishment order inasmuch as the ex-parte departmental inquiry concluded on 30.06.1998 but the dismissal order has been passed on 22.09.1999, Sri Srivastava could not answer the query of the Court properly.
21. On being asked from Sri Srivastava as to how the charges has been proved against the petitioner ex-parte inasmuch as the specific recital to that effect has not been given in the punishment order or appellate order or in the counter affidavit or in the supplementary counter affidavit as to when the date, time and place was fixed to conduct the oral inquiry against the petitioner to prove charges levelled as law is trite on the point that even if the charged employee does not cooperate in the departmental enquiry, the charges will have to be proved by the department by means of oral enquiry fixing date, time and place.
22. On being further asked from Sri Srivastava as to whether petitioner has been given subsistence allowance since June, 1999 till 22.09.1999 when the dismissal order has been passed, Sri Srivastava could not demonstrate any piece of material or evidence showing that the petitioner has been paid subsistence allowance since June, 1999 to 22.09.1999.
23. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material available on record it is clear that there are some undisputed facts that the service of an employee of the Bank may be dispensed with considering his past services or condition of health at the age of 50 years. He / she may be given his post retiral dues and other service benefits as per Rules and Regulation as well as scheme of the Bank. If the competent authority is willing to grant extension in service to that employee after the age of 50 years it may be done. For doing so the eventuality may be of various nature, e.g. if any departmental proceeding is pending against the employee or he is not having sound health but is willing to discharge his duties, the extension in service may be granted to him. Modality to this effect has been given in Circular dated 14.3.1988 (supra).
24. In the present case the first extension of service was given to him on 24.6.1993, though at that point of time no departmental inquiry was pending against him nor he was placed under suspension. The petitioner was placed under suspension on 9.10.1993 pending departmental inquiry, therefore, on 24.6.1993 when the petitioner completed the age of 50 years has been given extension in service. The reasons might be known to the competent authority inasmuch as no specific reason has been indicated in the impugned punishment order as well as the impugned appellate order as to why the petitioner was granted extension in service on 24.6.1993, before more than three months from his suspension order. The second extension order dated 21.5.1998 is on record which clearly provides that the extension in service to the petitioner was granted till 24.6.1999, however, no order granting extension in service after 24.6.1999 received to the petitioner.
25. If the service of any employee is extended by granting extension in service for a specific period then the subsequent extension must have been given well in advance for continuity in service inasmuch as if the subsequent extension is not granted, the status of an employee would be jeopardized as after completion of the extension period without having any further extension he / she would be treated no more in service and in that case he / she would be treated as a retired employee. The aforesaid analogy may be drawn from the circular dated 14.3.1988 (supra) which provides five service eventualities : (1) age of retirement, (2) review in grant of extension in service, (3) competent authorities to grant extension in service, (4) criteria for grant of extension in service or otherwise, and (5) review committee. The first service eventuality is age of retirement which category provides that the officer joined in the Bank prior to 19.7.1969 may likely to be retired on 30 years of pensionable service or at the age of 58 years whichever occurs first and no extension shall be granted beyond 60 years. Since point no. 2 provides for review of grant in service, for that it has been categorically indicated in point no. 1(a) that no extension shall be granted beyond 60 years of age so the condition no. 2 would be dependent on condition no. 1 and condition no. 2 has been further explained that review for grant of extension in service or otherwise may be undertaken well in advance. If aforesaid two conditions are read together then the inference would be drawn that if any employee / officer has been stopped to discharge the duties beyond 50 years and no extension in service has been granted, he may be deemed to have been retired. In other words if no written extension in service is granted to such officer / employee he would be treated as if he is no more in service and if he is no more in service without having any punishment order pursuant to the departmental inquiry, he would be considered as a retired employee.
26. In the present case after placing the petitioner under suspension on 9.10.1993 the impugned punishment order i.e. dismissal from service has been issued on 22.9.1999. Further, since the petitioner was placed under suspension on 9.10.1993, thereafter he was getting subsistence allowance, therefore, on account of the fact that he was getting subsistence allowance, his continuity in service could not be treated as broken when order for extension in service has allegedly been issued on 24.6.1993 and on 25.6.1998. Since the service of the petitioner could not be extended beyond 25.6.1999 as no formal order to that effect has been received to the petitioner nor has been enclosed with the counter affidavit or supplementary affidavit, therefore, it may be presumed that no such order of extension in service w.e.f. 25.6.1999 had been issued. This fact may be substantiated from the admitted position of the respondent-Bank that no subsistence allowance was paid to the petitioner after 29.6.1999 till passing of order of dismissal from service dated 22.9.1999. Even the account of the petitioner was closed on 12.7.1999 as recital to this effect has been given in para 12 of the writ petition. The aforesaid contention of the petitioner has not been disputed in para 31 of the counter affidavit thereby no specific denial has been given and it has not been explained as to why the petitioner has not been given subsistence allowance w.e.f. 29.6.1999 till passing of impugned dismissal order dated 22.9.1999 and also as to why his account has been closed w.e.f. 12.7.1999. Notably, the respondent Bank has filed supplementary counter affidavit on 5.9.2005 and again on 27.1.2025 but the specific contention of the petitioner to the effect that he has not been paid the subsistence allowance w.e.f. 29.6.1999 and his account has been closed on 12.7.1999, has not been denied. Therefore, this Court while appreciating the argument of learned counsel for the parties on 6.1.2025 (supra) rightly noted the statement of the petitioner in para 7 thereof that in case the respondent did not follow the stages for grant of extension in service and as per petitioner there was no extension of service that had been granted to the petitioner subsequent to 24.6.1999, consequently, the dismissal order of the petitioner dated 22.9.1999 would itself become vitiated irrespective of alleged extension that had been granted to the petitioner on 25.6.1999 which may not conform to the stages as specified in the aforesaid circumstances.
27. Notably, as per Circular dated 14.3.1988 (supra) first extension in service may be given at the age of 50 years: second, at the age of 55 years and third, at the age of 58 years but in the present case first extension has been given at the age of 50 years, second, at the age of 55 years but no third extension has been given at the age of 58 years. If the contention of opposite parties is considered on its face value that the third extension was given at the age of 56 years, not at the age of 58 years, then the respondent-Bank has violated its own circular. Since no formal extension order w.e.f. 25.6.1999 has been provided to the petitioner nor he has been paid subsistence allowance, therefore, the aforesaid alleged extension may not be accepted and it may be presumed that no such extension in service has been given after 25.6.1999 till passing of dismissal order dated 22.6.1999.
28. Therefore, in absence of any proper extension order after 25.6.1999, the status of the petitioner would be treated as if he was no more in service after 25.6.1999 and hence, was nothing but to a retired employee, even though there is no provision for automatic retirement. Retirement of the petitioner, in view of the given facts and circumstances would be treated as deemed retirement. When any officer of the Bank has not been dismissed or removed from service and his services has not been extended as per the Circular of the Bank dated 14.3.1988 (supra) it may safely be presumed that he has been superannuated on 29.6.1999 and the impugned punishment order dated 22.9.1999 was issued when the petitioner was a retired employee.
29. The Apex Court in the case reported as (1997) 8 Supreme Court Cases 60 : State Bank of India vs. A.N. Gupta and others has held that continuation of the departmental inquiry after the retirement of employee would not be permissible. The relevant para 14 and 16 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under :
"14....The Court said even if an enquiry was pending against an employee there was nothing to stop him from retiring on his attaining the age of superannuation. The enquiry could not continue after his retirement."
16. .....Proceeding in the garb of disciplinary proceedings cannot be permitted after an employee has ceased to be in the services of the Bank as Service Rules do not provide for continuation of disciplinary proceedings after the date of superannuation."
30. There is one more aspect which should be considered that admittedly, the petitioner had been awarded major punishment of dismissal vide order dated 22.09.1999 pursuant to the enquiry report dated 30.6.1998 and that enquiry proceeding was ex-parte. After conclusion of enquiry proceedings and before passing the impugned punishment order dated 22.9.1999, the petitioner had preferred a detailed representation dated 9.3.1999 for conducting departmental enquiry wherein he had undertaken to participate in the enquiry proceedings and that representation must have been dealt by the disciplinary authority but the aforesaid authority had not dealt with that representation for the reasons best known to that authority as no recital to that effect has been given in the impugned order. Even the appellate authority has not considered this fact in its appellate order. Further, the inquiry report did not disclose as to how the charges against the petitioner had been proved as per law as no reference had been given for oral enquiry fixing date, time and place. Hence, admittedly, the major punishment order of dismissal has been passed without conducting the departmental enquiry as per the procedure prescribed whereas the law is trite that if the charged employee does not cooperate in the departmental proceedings, the charge must have been proved by the department as per law. Therefore, this may also be one of the reasons to quash the punishment order.
31. Hence, the impugned orders dated 22.09.1999 (Annexure no. 2) passed by the disciplinary authority i.e. General Manager (D & PB), State Bank of India, Local Head Office, Moti Mahal Marg, Lucknow, opposite party no. 2 and the order dated 03.08.2002 (Annexure no. 8) passed by the Appellate Authority i.e. Chief General Manager, S.B.I., Local Head Office, Moti Mahal Marg, Lucknow, the opposite party no. 1 are hereby set aside / quashed.
32. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. Consequences to follow.
33. No order as to the costs.
.
[Rajesh Singh Chauhan, J.]
Order Date :- 15.4.2025
Om
