Allahabad High Court

Sunder Lal vs State Of U.P. on 10 April, 2025

Bench: Saumitra Dayal Singh, Gautam Chowdhary





HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:53289-DB
 
Court No. - 45
 

 
Case :- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 5001 of 2002
 
Appellant :- Sunder Lal
 
Respondent :- State of U.P.
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Kamal Krishna,B.S. Shrinet,S.T. Siddique
 
Counsel for Respondent :- D.G.A.
 

 
Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal Singh,J.

Hon'ble Dr. Gautam Chowdhary,J.

1. Heard Sri Ram Vishal Mishra along with Sri Sachin Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Vikas Goswami, learned A.G.A.-I for the State and perused the records.

2. The present criminal appeal has arisen from judgment and order dated 28.09.2002 passed by Sri Shashank Shekhar, Additional Sessions Judge, Room No.18, Allahabad in Sessions Trial No.430 of 1999 (State Vs. Sunder Lal), under Section 376 IPC, arising from Case Crime No.179 of 1998, P.S. Shankergarh, District Prayagraj, convicting the accused appellant and sentencing him to undergo life imprisonment for the offence under Section 376 IPC and to pay fine Rs. 50,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further additional rigorous imprisonment of one year of the amount of fine deposited, Rs.20,000/- was directed to be given to the victim.

3. The present prosecution story emerged on the Written Report submitted by the prosecuterix 'X' dated 24.10.1998. In that she (aged about 15 years) narrated, rape had been committed on her by her father (the present appellant), while she lived in his custody along with her two sisters, her mother having died earlier. Her next younger sister was aged about 13 years and other aged about 2½ years, at the time of occurrence. She described that such occurrence of rape was being suffered by her for the last four years. Last, on 24.10.1998, the appellant committed rape upon her at about 2.00 p.m. Again at about 9.00 p.m., he attempted to commit rape on her next younger sister, aged about 13 years. 'X' further narrated, she had earlier disclosed such fact to her paternal aunt (tai) and also to her paternal grand father. That Written Report submitted by 'X' is exhibited as Ex.Ka-1 at the trial. On the strength of that Written Report, FIR was registered in Case Crime No. 179 of 1998, under Section 376 I.P.C., Police Station Shankargarh, District Allahabad (Prayagaraj) on 24.10.1998 at about 22.15 hours. It is exhibited as Ex.Ka-5 at the trial.

4. On 02.11.1998, the statement of 'X' was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. In that she disclosed that the appellant had been committing rape on her and on her younger sister, for the last four years. On objection raised by her mother, the appellant had assaulted her. Thereafter, the mother of 'X' died by suicide. She also narrated that the appellant had attempted to commit rape on her younger sister, as well. That statement of 'X' is on record.

5. X-Ray report, medical report and Supplementary Medical Report of 'X' were also prepared. Those are on record and exhibited as Ex.Ka-4 (dated 26.10.1998) as Ex.Ka-2 (dated 25.10.1998) and Ex.Ka-3 (dated 29.10.1998) at the trial, respectively. It may be noted that there is no doubt as to the age of 'X' being about 15 years, on the date of occurrence.

6. Upon completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was submitted by the I.O. Ranjeet Singh. It is exhibited as Ex.Ka-9 (at the trial). Upon the case being committed for trial to court of Sessions, following charge was framed against the appellant:-

"यह कि दिनांक: 24.10.98 से पूर्व विगत 4 वर्ष को अर्वाध के दौरान आप अपनी 15 वर्षीय पुत्री ('X') के साथ अपने निवास जारी, थाना शंकर गढ़ में समय-समय पर बलात्कार किया, जो धारा 376 I.P.C. के अन्तर्गत दण्डनीय अपराध है, जो इस न्यायालय के प्रसंज्ञान में है।"

7. At the trial, besides the above documentary evidence, 'X' was examined as P.W.-1. During her examination-in-chief, she clearly proved the occurrence consistent to her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. In that regard, she clearly stated that the statement was recorded by the learned Magistrate in absence of any other person. Also, the statement of 'X' was recorded by the learned court below on 01.03.2001. On that day, 'X' disclosed she was married about three years ago; was living with her in-laws and had come to the Court with her father-in-law. During her cross-examination on behalf of the appellant, 'X' admitted, she had earlier filed an affidavit seeking to contradict the FIR allegation. As to the reason for furnishing that affidavit, she stated, at that stage, it was filed to allow for the release of the appellant, from jail. On being further questioned, she elaborated, while the appellant was in jail, all family expenses were borne by her paternal grand mother (dadi) i.e. the mother of the appellant. She also elaborated that the appellant owns a truck from which he derives income. That truck remained parked while the appellant remained in jail. Thereafter, no further cross-examination was conducted by the appellant on 25.04.2001. On being further examined by the prosecution, she made statements to the effect that she was aware of the consequences of making false statement in the Court. Thereafter, 'X' was recalled by the defence and subjected to further cross-examination. At that stage, she first clarified, she had no concern/relation surviving with the appellant. She also stated, she had lodged the FIR on the advice of and with the help of her paternal aunt. At the same time, she reiterated that she did not want to maintain any relations with the appellant and she had never visited her paternal home after her marriage and the appellant had not visited her matrimonial home.

8. Thereafter, Dr. Manisha Gupta was examined as P.W.-2. In the context of law as it now exists, though, the said doctor had conducted internal examination of 'X' and applied a physical test to determine occurrence of rape, that test (two finger test) has been rendered obsolete and unacceptable in view of the law as it has progressed. Thereafter, Dr. B.B. Pandey, Senior Radiologist was examined as P.W.-3. He proved the age of 'X' to be 15 years on the date of occurrence. Next, Constable Sant Ram Maurya was examined as P.W.-4. He proved the 'check' report, the FIR, certain G.D. entries, etc., and the fact that investigation was conducted by S.I. Ranjeet Singh (not examined at the trial). On conclusion of prosecution evidence, statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. He denied his involvement.

9. Thereafter, defence evidence was led. Thus, the mother of the present appellant was examined as D.W.-1. She only stated that false prosecution story emerged for reason of 'X' having solemnized her marriage against the wishes of the appellant. At the same time, she admitted 'X' had changed her statement, on the intervention made by the said witness (D.W.-1)

10. Thereafter, the learned court below heard the parties and convicted the appellant for offence under Section 376 I.P.C. It is also on record that the appellant was not on bail during trial. He was enlarged on bail, at a later stage of the trial but that bail was later cancelled. Thereafter, he has been enlarged on bail vide order dated 24.05.2005, passed in this appeal. According to the Custody Certificate produced by learned A.G.A., the appellant may have remained confined for five years and five months (in all).

11. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the prosecution story is not proven beyond reasonable doubt. A simple family dispute between the father and his daughter has been blown out of proportion on the intervention made by certain other relatives. According to him, 'X' had developed a love relationship with a close relative, who she wanted to marry. Because the appellant was opposed to that marriage and the wife of the appellant i.e. mother of 'X' had died earlier in a suicidal occurrence, the opposition offered by the appellant to the marriage sought to be solemnized by 'X', was met with the present false accusation. Heavy reliance has been placed on the fact that 'X' denied the occurrence as narrated in the FIR, during her cross-examination. That fact is wholly corroborated by the defence evidence (D.W.-1).

12. As to the occurrence, it has been submitted, no credible evidence exists. Neither there is any medical evidence to corroborate the occurrence nor there is any recovery to corroborate such occurrence. Both younger sisters of 'X' were not produced by the prosecution, to prove any element of rape committed on 'X'. The appellant owns a truck that he drives to earn his livelihood. On the ill advice and/or motivation offered by certain third parties (to 'X'), she levelled wholly false and inherently improbable allegations against her own father. Referring to fact that there is no other occurrence reported against him, it has been strenuously urged, that the appellant had never misbehaved with 'X' and that he had never committed any rape on her. The fact that the eldest daughter of the appellant with respect to whom similar allegation was made and the further fact that the younger daughter of the appellant with respect to whom attempt to commit rape was alleged, were not examined at the trial, itself proves that there is no element of truth in the prosecution story.

13. Last, it has been submitted, the appellant has no criminal history. Yet, he may have remained confined for more than ten years, thus minimum sentence that may be awarded even if the appellant was to be held guilty, on a technical reading of the evidence led by the prosecution.

14. It has also been submitted, presently the appellant is aged about 74 years. He re-married and has three children (all are minor) born from that second marriage. The appellant is the sole bread winner of his family. He is also suffering from heart ailment. In such circumstances, if the appellant is awarded sentence as may require in further incarceration, it may not be in the interest of justice.

15. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Thongam Tarun singh Vs. The State of Manipur (2019) 18 SCC 77 and in Mallan alias Rajan Kani Vs. State of Kerala 2024 SCC Online SC 2442.

16. On the other hand, Learned A.G.A. submitted that the FIR allegation is wholly true and correct. It has been proven beyond reasonable doubt at the trial through oral evidence of 'X'. Not only the FIR narration has been proved during the examination-in-chief of 'X' as was also maintained during her initial cross-examination but that statement and stand of 'X' is consistent to her statement first recorded before the learned Magistrate, under Section 164 Cr.P.C.

17. As to the later statement made by 'X', it has been submitted, the statement has been made after 'X' was recalled by the defence that too at a stage after the defence had first abandoned the cross-examination of the said witness, on 25.04.2001. Thereafter, at the fag end 'X' was recalled. In that stage on 22.05.2001, she made an ambiguous statement. However, she did not offer any contradiction.

18. In the context of the undisputed fact that 'X' maintained her stance despite extensive cross-examination, it has been submitted, the victim who was a minor daughter of the appellant, has proven the prosecution story beyond all reasonable and even possible doubts.

19. Referring to the inherent facts involved in such cases where a person of absolute trust i.e. the father of the victim is accused of such a heinous offence, learned A.G.A. submits that the proof of the case lies in the consistency and exactness of accusations maintained by 'X'. Her testimony could not be shaken as to the commission of rape on her, to any extent. All other details referred to by learned counsel for the appellant, are of no consequence. Thus, whether 'X' wanted to maintain any relations with the appellant after the occurrence of rape or after her marriage and whether the fact that she may have filed some affidavit under the then existing family circumstances then existing to allow for the release of the appellant, to relieve her grand mother of the burden to bear family expenses (which fact was duly narrated by 'X' during her cross-examination) as corroborated by D.W.-1, may remain extraneous to the issue at hand.

20. As to all other fact evidence including medical evidence, in the context of the facts proven, the same would be secondary and not decisive. To the extent, there is no contradiction arising from other evidence led at the trial, the present appeal merits no interference.

21. As to the sentencing, learned A.G.A. submitted that in the nature of occurrence proven, no exception may be made to the maximum sentence of life imprisonment, awarded. It is further averred, before we consider the above submissions advanced on the issue of sentence, it is noted that at the relevant time, the minimum sentence that may be awarded to the appellant is seven years and maximum life imprisonment. Against that, the appellant has remained confined for less than six years. Learned A.G.A. has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of H.P. Vs. Asha Ram (2005) 13 SCC 766.

22. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, in the first place, in the context of offence of rape committed under Section 376 I.P.C. the law is clear. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550, the Supreme Court emphasised, unless compelling reasons necessitate corroboration, statement of the victim/rape victim should be acted upon by Courts and unnecessary corroboration may not be sought. To that extent, such a witness was described to be at par with an injured witness. In that regard, it was observed as below:

"16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. We have, therefore, no doubt in our minds that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix who does not lack understanding must be accepted. The degree of proof required must not be higher than is expected of an injured witness. For the above reasons we think that exception has rightly been taken to the approach of the High Court as is reflected in the following passage:

"It is only in the rarest of rare cases if the court finds that the testimony of the prosecutrix is so trustworthy, truthful and reliable that other corroboration may not be necessary."

With respect, the law is not correctly stated. If we may say so, it is just the reverse. Ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix must carry the same weight as is attached to an injured person who is a victim of violence, unless there are special circumstances which call for greater caution, in which case it would be safe to act on her testimony if there is independent evidence lending assurance to her accusation."

23. That principle was applied in State of H.P. Vs. Raghubir Singh (1993) 2 SCC 622. There it was further observed as below:

"5. ... The High Court appears to have embarked upon a course to find some minor contradictions in the oral evidence with a view to disbelieve the prosecution version. In the opinion of the High Court, conviction on the basis of uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix was not safe. We cannot agree. There is no legal compulsion to look for corroboration of the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. In the present case the evidence of the prosecutrix is found to be reliable and trustworthy. No corroboration was required to be looked for, though enough was available on the record. The medical evidence provided sufficient corroboration...."

24. Applying the above principle, in State of Punjab Vs. Gurmit Singh (1996) 2 SCC 384, the Supreme Court further observed, to seek corroboration of the statement of such a witness i.e. a victim of sexual assault would be to insult the injury. At best, the Courts may look for some "assurance" of statement of such a witness- "to satisfy its judicial conscience". In that regard, it was observed as below:

8. ...The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self-inflicted, is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable...."

25. In the present facts, we find that FIR was lodged by 'X' herself. On that date, she was about 15 years of age. She clearly disclosed that rape had been committed on her by the appellant, for last about four years. As to the occurrence giving rise to the FIR, she narrated the same with reference to the date and time i.e. 24.10.1998 at about 2.00 p.m., in the afternoon. With respect to that narration, during her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. on 02.11.1998, she maintained that the appellant had committed rape on her as also on her younger sisters. At the trial, during her examination-in-chief, she not only supported that FIR allegation, she also proved that the statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the learned Magistrate was not tainted with tutoring/influence of any other person.

26. On the first date, i.e. 01.03.2001, she appeared in Court along with her father-in-law as she had been married three years ago. She maintained the allegation of rape. During her cross-examination, she only explained-earlier, she had filed an affidavit to allow for release of the appellant so that the appellant could contribute to the family earning as in his absence, her grand mother had to borne all family expenses, as the truck of the appellant lay parked while he was in jail. During her further cross-examination, she specified that she had no intent to maintain any relations with the appellant. Thereafter, she was recalled by the defence on 25.05.2001. At that stage she appears to have made a statement that the appellant had not committed rape on her. Also at that stage, she stated that she had made her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., on the suggestion of the police authorities.

27. While, learned counsel for the appellant has laid great stress on the above statements made by 'X'-late during her cross-examination, we are not inclined to offer any credence to such stray statements made after the witness had successfully maintained her stand during her elaborate cross-examination, earlier. Both at the stage of the occurrence i.e. lodging the FIR and soon thereafter in her statement recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. (both recorded before her marriage). 'X' maintained her stand of having suffered repeated rape by the appellant-her father.

28. Second, even after her marriage-when she first appeared in Court (along with her father-in-law), as a witness, she maintained that stand, only. Now married, allegedly to a man of her choice, and thus free from the control of the appellant, she did not change her stand. Not only during her examination-in-chief but during her extensive cross-examination, she stood firm and consistent. Thereafter, her cross-examination was disbanded by the defence, for reasons unknown to the Court.

29. Still later, she was recalled to the witness box. It is at that wholly belated stage, barring the stray sentence that her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded on the suggestion made by the police authorities, and a single sentence, that rape had not been committed by the appellant, no other statement emerged. Neither she was questioned further, nor she offered any contradiction nor she created any doubt as to her previous statement/earlier deposition made to the Court. Remarkably, the defence did not seek to contradict her, to any extent with her previous statements as recorded during her examination-in-chief and her initial cross-examination, where she maintained with clarity that the appellant had committed rape on her and that she had reported the same to the police.

30. Merely because at the late stage of the trial, 'X' was recalled when she made two statements on which the defence now relies to claim that the appellant had not committed the offence of rape, it cannot be said, either that no rape has been suffered by 'X' or that her stand was self-contradicted. Unless she had been confronted with her previous statements, it would be casual to reach that conclusion. In absence of any other or further material or other statement extracted during the further cross-examination (upon recall of 'X'), we are unable to place any reliance on those two statements. Here, we are also mindful of fact that 'X' specifically admitted that she earlier filed the affidavit only to enable release of the appellant for the reason during the period of his arrest, the truck owned by the appellant lay parked and the burden to bear the family expenses rested on her grand mother. It remained unsaid but it is self-apparent that the release of the appellant had become necessary for the economic needs of the family of 'X'. She had thus stated:-

"आज मै अपने ससुर के साथ आई हूँ।To Court मैने हलफनामा पिता को जेल से छुड़वाने के लिए दिया था। मेरे घरवाले चाहते थे कि मेरे पिता जेल से छूट जाएं। मेरे पिता मुल्जिम सुंदरलाल ट्रक चलाते थे। मेरे पिता की आय से ही हमारा खर्चा चलता था। जब मेरे पिता जेल चले गए तो मेरी दादी को हम लोगो का खर्चा वहन करना पड़ता था। मेरे पिता के निजी ट्रक थी। जब जेल चले गए तो ट्रक खड़ी रही।"

31. Therefore, no benefit may be drawn by the defence on such statement made as part of the further cross-examination statement of 'X', made upon recall, after the defence had disbanded her cross-examination, earlier. Clearly the pressure earlier exercised (as was proven by 'X'), may have been again applied on her as may have prompted her to make a statement after being recalled to the witness box, to ensure that the appellant is not convicted as her family would be deprived of economic means of sustenance, in that event.

32. Thus, the statement being relied is one as may have been procured for economic reasons. Clearly such statement would remain to be described as a tutored statement for reason of the same being not freely given but obtained on incentive, or force (of proven circumstance) or pressure exercised on the victim.

33. What we cannot lose sight of is 'X' is a natural born daughter of appellant. She was about 15 years of age on the date of occurrence. It would have taken a lot of effort and struggle and pure courage to understand the occurrence of rape and its consequence that too when such offence came to be committed on her by a person who enjoyed her complete trust, namely, her father. In the absence of her mother, it is natural and wholly permissible in law that in such circumstances, the child victim 'X' would have required help from other quarters to lodge such an FIR. Therefore, the fact that 'X' lodged the FIR with the help of her paternal aunt is wholly natural and normal.

34. What is equally remarkable and may never be lost sight of is, despite her natural relationship with the appellant, she maintained her basic stand from the stage of the FIR being lodged, right up to the end of the trial. Besides the two statements noted above, her testimony is unshakable as to the occurrence suffered by her. On the examination by Court, she also plainly expressed the complete broken status of her relationship with the appellant. Therein, she stated, she will never visit the appellant and that the appellant has not visited her ever. Without any explanation for such hard stand taken by a natural born daughter of the appellant against her father, it is clearly proven that the occurrence was caused by the appellant, resulting in a dead relationship between the parties.

35. As to the medical evidence, law is very clear as medical evidence is not mandatory to convict under Section 376 I.P.C. In Ranjit Hazarika Vs. State of Assam (1998) 8 SCC 635, the Supreme Court observed, sufferance of physical injury on the private parts of the prosecutrix or on the hymen as may also involve bleeding is not a necessary ingredient of offence of penetrative sexual assault. Penetration however slight was held to be sufficient to complete the ingredient of the heinous offence of rape. Once such occurrence is established on credible deposition of the victim, no reason may exist to doubt the veracity of such statement or admit possibility of false implication on the strength of medical opinion of the doctor that may appear to suggest that no rape may have been committed. In that regard, it was observed as below:

"5. ....To constitute the offence of rape, penetration, however slight, is sufficient. The prosecutrix deposed about the performance of sexual intercourse by the appellant and her statement has remained unchallenged in the cross-examination. Neither the non-rupture of the hymen nor the absence of injuries on her private parts, therefore, belies the testimony of the prosecutrix particularly when we find that in the cross-examination of the prosecutrix, nothing has been brought out to doubt her veracity or to suggest as to why she would falsely implicate the appellant and put her own reputation at stake. The opinion of the doctor that no rape appeared to have been committed was based only on the absence of rupture of the hymen and injuries on the private parts of the prosecutrix. This opinion cannot throw out an otherwise cogent and trustworthy evidence of the prosecutrix. Besides, the opinion of the doctor appears to be based on "no reasons".

6. The evidence of the prosecutrix in this case inspires confidence. Nothing has been suggested by the defence as to why she should not be believed or why she would falsely implicate the appellant. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that in the absence of corroboration of the statement of the prosecutrix by the medical opinion, the conviction of the appellant is bad. The prosecutrix of a sex offence is a victim of a crime and there is no requirement of law which requires that her testimony cannot be accepted unless corroborated."

36. Similarly, in State of M.P. Vs. Dayal Sahu (2005) 8 SCC 122, it was observed as below:

"14. A plethora of decisions by this Court as referred to above would show that once the statement of the prosecutrix inspires confidence and is accepted by the courts as such, conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the courts for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition for judicial reliance is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. It is also noticed that minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Non-examination of doctor and non-production of doctor's report would not be fatal to the prosecution case, if the statements of the prosecutrix and other prosecution witnesses inspire confidence. It is also noticed that the court while acquitting the accused on benefit of doubt should be cautious to see that the doubt should be a reasonable doubt and it should not reverse the findings of the guilt on the basis of irrelevant circumstances or mere technicalities."

(emphasis supplied)

37. Again, in State of H.P. Vs. Manga Singh (2019) 16 SCC 759, the Supreme Court observed as below:

"11. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the "probabilities factor" does not render it unworthy of credence. As a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence. However, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence may not be available. In such cases, solitary testimony of the prosecutrix would be sufficient to base the conviction, if it inspires the confidence of the court."

(emphasis supplied)

38. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No.789 of 2013 (Pappu alias Jalikh Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh).

39. In Pappu alias Jalikh (supra), the prosecuterix denied commission of rape on her by her father to the extent she made specific statement that her father had not formed physical relation with her. On the contrary, she also proved that she formed physical relation with a boy of her choice. The issue whether the prosecuterix was under age, was not raised in that case. Then, the Madhya Pradesh High Court also considered the fact that the younger sister of the prosecuterix was declared hostile to the extent she claimed no occurrence took place involving her younger sister. Moreover, the mother of the prosecuterix was also examined at the trial. She also did not support the allegation of rape. In those facts, the prosecution story was disbelieved and the order of conviction set-aside by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. Such facts are not involved in the present case. For reasons noted above, the ratio of the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Pappu alias Jalikh (supra) is of no application in the present case.

40. In Thongam Tarun Singh (supra), the accused was a person, who had formed friendship with the victim aged about 16 years. In such fact, the trial court had awarded sentence of 15 years. That was not a case of rape committed by father on his own minor daughter. By very nature of the occurrence proven in the present facts, it is a case of perversion on two counts. One, for reason of rape committed on an under age girl and two for reason of that offence found committed by the father of the victim. Therefore, the decision in Thongam Tarun Singh (supra) is also of no application in the present case.

41. Mallan alias Rajan Kani (supra) does not lay down any principle of law to be applied in the given set of facts. It may remain a decision referable to the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

42. On the contrary, State of H.P. (supra) relied by learned A.G.A., in para 22 following observations were made:-

"This leads us to consider as to the quantum of punishment. The Trial Court on conviction sentenced the respondent to 5 years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default rigorous imprisonment for 3 months. Here is the case where the crime committed by the respondent not only delicts the law but it has a deleterious effect on the civilized society. Gravity of the crime has to be necessarily assessed from the nature of the crime. A crime may be grave but the nature of the crime may not be so grave. Similarly, a crime may not be so grave but the nature of the crime may be very grave. Ordinarily, the offence of rape is grave by its nature. More so, when the perpetrator of the crime is the father against his own daughter it is more graver and the rarest of rare, which warrants a strong deterrent judicial hand. Even in ordinary criminal terminology a rape is a crime more heinous than murder as it destroys the very soul of hapless woman. This is more so when the perpetrator of the grave crime is the father of the victim girl. Father is a fortress, refuge and the trustee of his daughter. By betraying the trust and taking undue advantage of trust reposed in him by the daughter, serving food at odd hours at 12.30 A.M. he ravished the chastity of his daughter, jeopardized her future prospect of getting married, enjoying marital and conjugal life, has been totally devastated. Not only that, she carries an indelible social stigma on her head and deathless shame as long as she lives. "

(emphasis supplied)

43. We may also note that earlier in Siriya alias Shri Lal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 8 SCC 72, the issue of sentencing was considered. In that context, it was observed as below:-

"13. "7. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and the courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a corner-stone of the edifice of "order" should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his "Law in Changing Society" stated that, "State of criminal law continues to be - as it should be-a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society". Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or the deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration.

8. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1991 (3) SCC 471).

9. The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpability of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows some significant discretion to the Judge in arriving at a sentence in each case, presumably to permit sentences that reflect more subtle considerations of culpability that are raised by the special facts of each case. Judges in essence affirm that punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice sentences are determined largely by other considerations. Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that are offered to justify a sentence. Sometimes the desirability of keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic results of his crime. Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from just desert as the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are serious and widespread.

10. After giving due consideration to the facts and circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the Court. Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been very aptly indicated in Dennis Councle MCGDautha v. State of Callifornia (402 US 183: 28 L.D. 2d 711) that no formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would provide a reasonable criterion in determining a just and appropriate punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof formula which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess various circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment may be equitably distinguished.

11. These aspects were highlighted in Shailesh Jasvantbhai and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. [2006 (2) SCC 359] and State of Karnataka vs. Raju (AIR 2007 SC 3225)."

14. In this case, the accused's lustful acts have indelible scar not only physically but also emotionally on the victim. No sympathy or leniency is called for.

15. Looked at from any angle the appeal is without merit and deserves to be dismissed which we direct. "

44. In view of the discussion noted above, we are unable to accept the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellant. We find no merit in the appeal against conviction. It is dismissed.

45. The facts of the case do not merit a lesser sentence than life imprisonment. In administering the law and especially under criminal jurisprudence, the appeal Court may remain mindful of the consequence of not only interfering in order of conviction but also with sentencing. If in the present facts, the Court were to offer a lenient view, either arising from the second marriage of the appellant and children born therefrom or for reason of age of the appellant, the Court would also have to consider the effect of such intervention made on humanitarian grounds. That may conflict with the interest of justice, to the victim and the society. It may have taken one occurrence by the appellant to destroy the life of 'X'. It may have scarred the life of the victim for her entire life time. The occurrence of this nature not only cause the physical scars but also emotional scars that may not heal in a life time. Second, in offering a lenient view, at this stage, the Court may inadvertently incentivise offenders to seek lenient treatment on the issue of sentencing by claiming second marriage or children born therefrom or age. Those concerns are found to be individual and not relevant for the society at large for which the law must be administered and enforced commensurate to the proven facts. In this case it is not only the victim's interest that must have justice delivered to her but it is in the societal interest that must also be guarded. A clear message must be given to all such offenders, where such an occurrence is proven beyond doubt, it will not go without adequate sentence/punishment. Any person who enjoys absolute or inherent trust of a minor when found to have committed an act of penetrative sexual assault must be dealt with very firmly. The offence is on two counts. One of rape and the other of abuse of inherent and here absolute trust. For the society, it breaks the basic underlying bond on which any community may be built.

46. On the adequacy of the sentence, at present, we have no doubt, it merits maximum sentence provided in law being life imprisonment.

47. Last, no leniency may arise in the present case for the reason that the occurrence took place in the year 1998. 27 years have passed of which less than six years have been spent in confinement.

48. For the reasons noted above as also on the issue of sentencing, the appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.

49. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds are cancelled and sureties discharged. Appellant-Sunder Lal shall surrender before the C.J.M., concerned by 15.05.2025 and lodge back to jail for serving the remaining sentence. Failing that, C.J.M., concerned shall ensure arrest of the appellant.

50. Let the trial court record along with a copy of this order be transmitted to the court concerned through Registrar (Compliance) forthwith and a copy of this order may also be sent to the C.J.M., concerned.