Allahabad High Court
Rajwati And Another vs State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. ... on 5 April, 2025
Author: Alok Mathur
Bench: Alok Mathur
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
?Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:19069
Court No. - 12
Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 377 of 2025
Revisionist :- Rajwati And Another
Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Home And Another
Counsel for Revisionist :- Gyanendra Mishra
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
Hon'ble Alok Mathur,J.
1. Heard Sri Gyanendra Mishra, learned counsel for the revisionists and learned A.G.A. on behalf of the State.
2. By means of the present revision under Section 397/399 Cr.P.C. read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. (now Section 438/440 of BNSS, 2023) the revisionists have challenged order dated 24.1.2025 passed by Sessions Judge/District and Sessions Judge, Sultanpur in S.T. No.1419/2023 (State Vs. Vishwanath and others) under Sections 323, 308, 302, 504, 506 IPC, P.S. Kurebhar, District Sultanpur wherein the application for discharge preferred by the revisionists has been rejected, specially pertaining to offence under Section 302 IPC.
3. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the revisionists that an F.I.R. was registered by opposite party No.2 at police station Kurebhar, District-Sultanpur on 6.8.2023 in case crime No.208 of 2023 under Section 323, 308, 302, 504, 506 IPC stating that on 6.8.2023 at 7.30 a.m. the complainant as well as his uncle Maghghuram was tying his cattle when Amarnath son of Jawahar Lal and Vishwanath son of Jawaharlal and Jawaharlal and Rajwati wife of Amarnath armed with lathi, danda and gadhala started quarreling with regard to place of tying the cattle and assaulted his uncle Magghuram as well as the complainant. Number of villagers came to rescue the complainant and his uncle and subsequently the accused ran way. At the time of lodging the FIR the uncle of the complainant Maghghuram had fallen unconscious and had been referred to District Hospital but after registration of the FIR he died.
4. The matter was duly investigated and charge sheet was filed adding Section 302 IPC apart from the one under which the FIR was lodged.
5. The grievance of the revisionist is that no evidence was collected with regard to offence under Section 302 IPC in the charge sheet submited by the police and consequently this ground was raised by them while filing the present application for discharge. He submits that a perusal of the statement of the witnesses would indicate that the essential ingredients of Section 302 are absent and consequently no charges could have been framed under Section 302 IPC.
6. The trial court had duly considered the application preferred by the revisionist and also considering the subsequent events where Maghghuram the uncle of the complainant died subsequently due to the injuries sustained in the said incident.
7. The only ground raised by the petitioner is that there was no intention to kill the deceased and consequently Section 302 IPC could not have been invoked considering the staid statement.
8. In this regard it would be relevant to refer Section 300 of IPC which reads as under:-
"300. Murder.?
Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or?(Secondly)
? If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or?
(Thirdly)
? If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or?
(Fourthly)
? If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid."
9. A perusal of Section 300 (3) clearly indicates that an offence under Section 302 would be made out even if there is no intention to cause death but the intention is to cause fatal injury and that injury in all likelihood can result in death. Clearly a perusal of Section 300 would indicate that there is no requirement of existence of intention to murder and the intention to cause fatal injury on vital part would be sufficient to make out necessary ingredients of Section 300. In case such fatal injury is grave in nature would result in death. In this regard following injuries were found on body of the deceased:-
1. Lacerated wound of dimension 4x2 cm over head in entre in midline.
2. Lacerated wound looking like incised wound of dimension of 6 x 2 cm over left parietal bone near midline.
3. Incised wound of dimension 3 x 2 cm over right side of head over occipital area.
4. Abrasion over left should of dimension 6 x 4 cm.
10. A perusal of the aforesaid injuries indicate that the deceased had suffered lacerated wound of dimension 4x2 cm over head in entre in midline, lacerated wound looking like incised wound of dimension of 6 x 2 cm over left parietal bone near midline, incised wound of dimension 3 x 2 cm over right side of head over occipital area, abrasion over left should of dimension 6 x 4 cm. Accordingly, all the aforesaid three injuries were on vital part of the head coupled with the statement the complainant recorded by the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of Manik Lal Kori, the complainant and the injured witness Vijay Bahadur clearly indicates that the accused had reached the spot duly armed with lathi, danda and gahdala and assaulted the deceased and the complainant. They not only assaulted the deceased and the complainant but also assaulted the father of the complainant with brick. Considering the aforesaid the very fact that the accused had come armed with it cannot be said that there was no intention of causing fatal injury.
11. In this regard, Honorable Supreme Court has held in the case of Kunhimuhammed Kunheethu vs State of Kerala, 2024 Live Law (SC) 964 as under:-
"25.10. This Court held in Virsa Singh (Supra), that the prosecution must prove that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say that the injury was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended, and that particular injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
25.11. The third clause of section 300 speaks of an intention to cause bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This Court in the above-mentioned judgment held that to bring the case under this part of the section the prosecution must establish objectively:
1. That a bodily injury is present;
2. That the nature of injury must be proved;
3. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury;
4. That the injury inflicted is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of the nature.
25.12. The Court further held that:
"13. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under S. 300, "Thirdly. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional."
25.13. This position has further been upheld by this Court recently in the case of Vinod Kumar v. Amritpal7, wherein the bench observed that:
"24. Once the prosecution establishes the existence of the three ingredients forming a part of "thirdly" in Section 300, it is irrelevant whether there was an intention on the part of the accused to cause death. Further, it does not matter that there was no intention even to cause the injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. Even the knowledge that an act of that kind is likely to cause death is not necessary to attract "thirdly"."
25.14. This Court in the case of Balkar Singh v. State of Uttarakhand8, while following the judgment in Virsa Singh (Supra) further elaborated the position of law and laid down that culpable homicide is murder if two conditions are fulfilled:
a. the act which caused death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and
b. the injury intended to be inflicted in sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
25.15. The Court in the above-mentioned judgment clarified that even if the intention of accused was limited to inflicting a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, the offence of murder would still be made out.
25.16. The third clause of Section 300, IPC defines murder as the act of causing death by causing such bodily injury as is likely to result in death in the ordinary course of nature. In the present case, the appellant's actions satisfy these criteria. The appellant was armed with a knife, which he used to inflict multiple injuries on vital organs. The fatal nature of these injuries, as confirmed by medical evidence, and the circumstances of the attack clearly point to an intent to cause death or at least an intention to inflict injuries with the knowledge that they were likely to result in death. Even if it is presumed that the appellant - accused no. 1 did not have an intention to cause such bodily injury, the act of causing injuries with knife to vital parts is reflective of the knowledge that causing such injuries is likely to cause death in the ordinary course."
12. In any view of the matter, we find that prima facie the ingredients of Section 302 of IPC are made out and accordingly, in case the applicants so want to take sufficient ground that there was no fatal fatal injury so as to invoke the provisions of Section 302 IPC, they would have adequate opportunity to do so during the trial. We do not find any infirmity in the order of the trial court rejecting the application for discharge.
13. Apart from the above, framing of charges which is the discretion of the court and undoubtedly the parties are liable to be heard at that stage. It is relevant to reiterate the observations of Supreme Court in the case of P. Kartikalakshmi v. Sri Ganesh, (2017) 3 SCC 347 where in para 7 it has been observed:-
'7. We were taken through Sections 221 and 222 CrPC in this context. In the light of the facts involved in this case, we are only concerned with Section 216 CrPC. We, therefore, do not propose to examine the implications of the other provisions to the case on hand. We wish to confine ourselves to the invocation of Section 216 and rest with that. In the light of our conclusion that the power of invocation of Section 216 CrPC is exclusively confined with the Court as an enabling provision for the purpose of alteration or addition of any charge at any time before pronouncement of the judgment, we make it clear that no party, neither de facto complainant nor the accused or for that matter the prosecution has any vested right to seek any addition or alteration of charge, because it is not provided under Section 216 CrPC. If such a course to be adopted by the parties is allowed, then it will be well-nigh impossible for the criminal court to conclude its proceedings and the concept of speedy trial will get jeopardised.'
14. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any infirmity in the order of the trial court. The petition being bereft of merits and is accordingly dismissed.
15. The trial court shall proceed without being influenced by any of the observations made in this order.
(Alok Mathur, J.)
Order Date :- 5.4.2025
RKM.
