Allahabad High Court
Ram Das vs D.D.C. And Others on 3 January, 2024
Author: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
Bench: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:579
Reserved on: 13.12.2023
Delivered on: 03.01.2024
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
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Court No. 36
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Case :- Writ- B No. - 6142 of 1978
Ram Das ........ Petitioner
Through :-Sri R.C. Yadav Advocate
Vs.
D.D.C. And Others ........ Respondents
Through :- S.C.
Hon'ble Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J.
1. Heard Sri R.C. Yadav, learned counsel for petitioner and Sri A.C. Nishad, learned Standing Counsel for State.
2. The original petitioner has claimed that he was in possession of land in dispute before date of vesting as sub-tenant and thus became 'Adhivasi' and 'Sirdar'. In alternative he also claimed that he acquired 'Sirdari' rights on basis of adverse possession. Per contra contesting respondents have claimed that his father has mortgaged land in dispute in favour of father of original petitioner. It was further claimed that mortgaged money was deposited in Court.
3. During consolidation proceedings, rival objections were filed. The Consolidation Officer held that petitioner remained in possession and became tenant holder and thereafter became Sirdar. Relevant part of order is reproduced hereinafter:-
"आराजी निजाई के बावत फरीकैन ने बहुत पुरानी मुकदमाबाजी साबित है और फरीकैन मौके व मुहल के अनुसार रहन की बात करते रहे और बिगड़ते रहे। फरीकैन के पुरानी मुकदमाबाजी स्वीकार है। उपरोक्त से यह बात पुरानी है। स्वीकार है कि बंदोबस्त 1348 फ० से पहले आराजी निजाई वादीगण के पिता के पास रेहन थी। और रहन का रूपया अदा हो जाने के बाद रेहन टूट गया। और प्रतिवादी के पिता मोतीलाल का आराजी निजाई पर कब्जा हो गया इसके बाद वादी के पिता शिवदास का दुबारा शिकमियाना कब्जा आराजी निजाई पर हो गया। यह कब्जा शिकमियाना जरिये रहन साबित नहीं है। प्रतिवादी की ओर से कोई दस्तावेज रेहन की शरायत नहीं बताई गई है। जब तक यह बात न हो नहीं माना जा सकता। प्रतिवादी का आधार खसरा 1351 फ० से 1362 फ० के शिकमी खाना में शब्द राहिन मुरतहीन पर है यह केवल पटवारी और कागज की गलती है क्योंकि बंदोबस्त के पहले आराजी निजाई रेहन थी जो रुपया देेने के बाद बंदोबस्त के आस पास टूट गया चूंकि बंदोबस्त 1349फ० 0 में हुआ है और 1351 फ० तक बंदोबस्त दौरान रहा 1351 फ० में जब पहली बार इन्द्राज बंदोबस्त के बाद किया उसमें पुराने इन्द्राज के अनुसार ही कर दिया। इस प्रकार इस इन्द्राज का कोई महत्व नहीं क्योंकि प्रतिवादी के पिता ने खुद स्वीकार किया है कि रहन का इनफकाब हो चुका था। मुकदमा नं० 14 तरमीम खतौनी मोती लाल बनाम सेवादास तारीख फैसला 15-3-46 के अर्जीदावा के दफा 2 में प्रतिवादी के पिता मोती लाल ने खसरा 1351 फ० ता 1362 फ० के राहिन मुरतहीन के इन्द्राज को खुद गलत बताया है कि पटवारी ने मुरतहीन का इन्द्राज साजिसन कर दिया है। इस प्रकार दुबारा रेहन साबित नहीं होता। अब प्रतिवादी 1351 फ० को इन्द्राज को सही कैसे बता सकता है। वादी श्री राम आदि के पिता, 1352 फ० से लगातार 1369 फ० तक और उसके बाद उसके वारसान आज तक काबिज दाखिल आराजी निजाई पर चले आ रहे हैं। निहत होने के दिनांक यानी 1-7-52 को शिवदास आराजी निजाई के अधिकारी हो गये और उसके बाद सीरदार हो गये और वाद मरने शिवदास उसके वारिस सीरदार काबिज हैं। प्रतिवादी का आराजी निजाई से कोई संबंध नहीं था और न अब है। तनकीह नं०
1 व 2 व 3, 4 इसी अनुसार तय कर दी गई।"
(Emphasis Supplied)
4. The aforesaid order was challenged by way of filing an appeal at behest of respondents. The appeal was allowed in part and instead of granting a status of Sirdar, petitioner was granted status of 'Asami' by order dated 30.09.1977 and the relevant part thereof is mentioned hereinafter:-
"There has been litigation between the parties for the said land previously too. According to the defendants appellant the plots were mortgaged with possession before Abolition of Zamindari and possession of pliff. Respondents since been coming as mortgagor which according to the later they do not mortgage rather they have been coming. Respondent has tresspassed and perfected right of Sirdari Rule no.36 of 1946 Moti Lal father of Jagoo Vs. Shirtal and others was justified under Civil Court. It was justified in case reference of mortgagee was made.
That in the case that it was pleaded by the pliff. of that case that even other redemption of mortgage the defendant was the learned court framed that the suit was not cognizable by civil court, therefore, dismissed the same.
Therefore, suit no.48 of 1967 Moti Lal vs. Sheodas and No.8 Moti Lal Vs. Sri Ram and others u/s 202 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act were filed. They were dismissed respectively on 14.4.61 and 16.12.66 for the reasons that the mortgage money was not paid. In these suits the pliff. alleged that suit plots were mortgaged while the defendants denied to the mortgage. They pleaded to the Adhivasi and subsequently sirdars. 1361 to 1362 being recorded the possession as mortgagee. Same was the entry in Khasra 1362 also. In 1366 the pliff. respondent was recorded Qabiz in the column of remarks of the Khasra with date and 11 of diary and P.A.10 and the Khatauni for the said year. It has been Sirdar that the pliff. respondents be recorded the class 9 since entry of class 9 has been coming in the favour with possession. On the pliff.-respondents. The defendant appellant was occupancy some of the suit plots u/s 21(9) of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. The piff. Respondents, therefore, cannot get Bhumidhari right. Appeal has much force.
It is allowed, order disposed by the lower court is set aside and basic entries are recorded on the suit plots. The pliff. respondents are held to be Assami of class 7 of the Khatauni."
(Emphasis Supplied)
5. Both parties preferred revisions before Revisional Authority, however, revisions were rejected by order dated 06.04.1978 and the relevant part thereof is mentioned hereinafter:-
"लेकिन दोनों पक्षों ने अपनी-अपनी सुविधा के अनुसार जिसकी जैसी सुविधा हुई उस प्रकार का झूठ जान बूझ कर बोलने में और उसे सही सिद्ध करने का भरसक प्रयास किया है लेकिन दरसल मेरे समझ से जो कागजी या मौखिक साक्ष्य आये हैं उनमें और जो विभिन्न प्रकार के मुकदमे इन पक्षों के बीच चले है उनसे यह भलीभांति सिद्ध है कि विवादित भूमि पर कुछ रुपया दिया गया था और विवादित भूमि रिहन के रूप में दी गयी थी। रिहन के रुप में इन्द्राज जमीनदारी विनाश के पूर्व से होता चला आया और सर्व प्रथम द्वितीय पक्ष ने उसे गलत कहने की कोशिश मु० नं० 33/39 सन् 1946 में किया। लेकिन उसका कथन सही नहीं माना गया और मूर्तहीन का लेख सही माना गया। उसके पश्चात् पुनः खसरा 1352 से 1359 के विवरण विशेष के लेख से यह स्पष्ट है कि दोनों पक्षों का साक्ष्य रेहन और मूर्तहीन का रहा। और वह सम्बन्ध जमीदारी विनाश के अन्तिम दिनों तक कायम रहा। यह भी सर्व विदित है कि कानूनी स्थिति जो भी रही हो बराबर जवानी या खुश्की रेहन हुआ करते थे अब भी हो रहे है। पहले इस विवाद में प्रथम पक्ष तो ही कई बार अपने प्रत्युत्तर में यह कहा है कि रेहन का रुपया नहीं दिया गया फिर सुविधा के अनुसार रेहन का रुपया घटाते बढ़ाते रहा। अतः मैं पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध सभी साक्ष्यों की विवेचना से स्पष्ट रूप से इस मत का हूँ कि विवादित भूमि में प्रथम पक्ष श्री राम आदि का कब्जा बतौर मूर्तहीनी जमीदारी विनाश के पूर्व था। और वही कब्जा बाद में भी कायम रहा विपक्षी द्वितीय पक्ष विभिन्न अवसरों पर विभिन्न प्रकार के मुकदमे करता रहा और बराबर किसी न किसी टेक्नीकल त्रुटियों के कारण असफल होता रहा और द्वितीय पक्ष का कब्जा कायम रहा इस बीत चकबन्दी आ गयी। और अन्त में यह विवाद चकबन्दी में आ गया राहीन और मूर्तहीन की दशा में अधिक से अधिक जो लाभ काश्तकारी भूमि पर जमीदारी विनाश के पूर्व मूर्तहीन को जो मिल सकता है वह आसामी का ही हो सकता है इन सम्बन्ध में द्वितीय पक्ष के विद्वान वकील ने दृष्टान्त आर०डी० 1969 पृष्ट संख्या 402 से 403 सम्हारू बनाम धरम राज दिखाया है जिसके अन्तर्गत राहीन और मूर्तहीन के बारे में धारा 2111-डी०/ जमीदारी विनाश अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत नीति निर्धारित की गयी है कि इसका अर्थ विस्तृत है न कि सकुचित और राहीन मूर्तहीन का यह अर्थ है कि अगर कोई व्यक्ति किसी अन्य अथवा अनियमित प्रकार से भी मूर्तहीन हो तो उसे मूर्तहीन माना जायेगा और उसे आसामी का हक होगा स०ब०अ०च० ने सही रुप से यह निस्तारित किया है कि प्रथम पक्ष श्री राम आदि विवादित भूमि का आसामी है और द्वितीय पक्ष विवादित भूमि का भूमि धर है इसके उपरान्त प्रथम पक्ष के विद्वान वकील ने यह तर्क किया कि जब दिवानी के मुकदमा में दिनांक 24-7-47 को विद्वान मुंसिफ ने विपक्षी को यह कहते हुए वापस किया कि यह भूमि धारा 180/2/ की है तो क्यों न तत्काल द्वितीय पक्ष ने धारा 180/2/ में वेदखली का मुकदमा दाखिल किया और अगर उसने मुकदमा नहीं दाखिल किया इसका अर्थ यही होगा प्रथम पक्ष का कब्जा उस तिथि से अनाधिकारी माना जायेगा। और प्रथम पक्ष विधिवत मौरुसी काश्तकार हो जायेगा। इसके उत्तर में द्वितीय पक्ष के विद्वान वकील का यह तर्क थी कि यदि इस मुकदमें मे यदि अन्तिम निर्णय गुण दोष के आधार पर नहीं हो तो भी, यदि कोई निर्देश दिया गया हो तो वह रेसजुडिकेटा का प्रभाव नहीं रखता है और ऐसी दशा में उसका अर्थ यह कदापि यह होगा कि प्रथम पक्ष धारा 180/2/ के अन्तर्गत मौरुसी काश्तकार माना जायेगा। मैं भी इस राय से सहमत हूँ। क्योंकि यह सिद्ध है कि दोनो पक्षों के बीच विवाद राहीन और मूर्तहीनी का है। जिसको समय-समय पर दोनो पक्ष स्वीकार करते आये हैं तो ऐसे सम्बन्धों के बारे में बेदखली का दावो विला रेहन बेदखली का रुपया अदा किया हुआ नहीं माना जा सकता और सम्भवतः जमींदारी विनाश के पूर्व काश्तकारों के लिये ऐसी स्थिति में यू०पी० टेनेन्सी ऐक्ट के अन्तर्गत यह भी प्राविधान नहीं था कि वे विला रुपया अदा कराये या उसका हिसाब करायेे माल न्यायालय में मुकदमा दाखिल कर सके। जब जमींदारी विनाश के पश्चात् भी यह प्राविधान है कि जब तक रेहन का रुपया जमा न कर दिया जाय या यह कहकर न आया जाय कि रुपया अदा कर दिया गया और उसका प्रमाण दिखाया जाय। तब तक धारा 202 जमींदारी विनाश अधिनियम का मुकदमा दाखिल नहीं हो सकता। ऐसी दशा में मेरी राय में भी धारा 180 जमींदारी विनाश अधिनियम का मुकदमा द्वितीय पक्ष को दाखिल करना आवश्यक नहीं था। इसके उपरान्त प्रथम पक्ष के विद्वान वकील ने यह तर्क किया कि चूँकि कई सालों में द्वितीय पक्ष यह कह कर आया है कि रेहन का रुपया अलग हो गया। तथा अन्त में उसने 9-5-66 को 340-00 रुपया बैंक में जमा भी कर दिया इसलिये रेहन समाप्त माना जाना चाहिये। और इसके बाद से प्रथम पक्ष का कब्जा अनाधिकार माना जाना चाहिये। इस सम्बन्ध में द्वितीय पक्ष की ओर से आर०डी० 1975 पृष्ट सं० 357 ए डब्ल्यू आर० 1966 पृष्ट सं० 278 दिखाया लेकिन जो साक्ष्य में ऊपर वर्णित किये गये हैं। और मैने जो निष्कर्ष निकाला है उससे यह स्पष्ट है कि अब भी विधिवत रेहन का रुपया जमा नहीं है और न तो मूर्तिहीन को वापस हुआ है। साथ ही साथ मूर्तहीन को विधिवत बेदखल भी नहीं किया जा सका है। ऐसी दशा में प्रथम पक्ष इस दृष्टान्त में वर्णित परिस्थितियों का लाभ पाने का हकदार नहीं है।
दूसरी निगरानी जो जगत की है उसके बारे में श्री तिवारी, जगत् के विद्वान वकील कुछ भी तर्क करने में असमर्थ रहे क्योंकि जगत आदि स्वंय अपनी आपत्ति अन्तर्गत धारा 9 में श्री राम आदि को आसामी कहकर आये है। इस निगरानी में कोई बल नहीं है। निष्कर्ष यह है कि दोनो निगरानियों में कोई बल नहीं है और स०ब०च०अ० के आदेश सर्वथा सही है। और उसके विरुद्ध कोई विभिन्न निष्कर्ष निकालना सम्भव नहीं है। अतः दोनो निगरानियां खारिज हो।"
(Emphasis Supplied)
6. Sri R.C. Yadav, learned counsel for petitioner submitted that findings returned by the Consolidation Officer that mortgage was not redeemable by respondents, and, therefore, petitioner remained in possession on land in dispute, on vesting as well thereafter, therefore, became 'Sirdar' was accepted by the petitioner.
7. Learned counsel further submitted that reasons given by Appellate Authority were not legally justified. The findings returned by the Consolidation Officer was not set aside and there was no basis to grant petitioner status of 'Asami' instead of being 'Sirdar' though possession of petitioner was upheld on vesting as well as that mortgage was not redeemed by the respondents. The Revisional Authority has simply followed the order passed by Appellate Authority without considering independently.
8. None appears on behalf of respondents. I have perused counter affidavit carefully and relevant paragraph Nos. 5, 7 and 12 are mentioned hereinafter:-
"5. That in reply to the contents of paragraph 3 of the writ petition it is stated that the contents are matter of record. The answering respondents never accepted petitioner as Asami. In fact after redeem of mortgage the answering respondent had been in continuous possession till date over the land in question. The entries of petitioner of possession were without any basis and were irregular and hence objections were filed. There is admission of Sheo Das regarding redemption of mortgage and giving possession over land in dispute to Moti Lal father of respondent. Moreover, finding of consolidation authorities are to this effect. The case of Sheo Das of subsequent mortgage was not accepted by consolidation authorities the physical possession was given to respondent prior to 1352-F, however, the entries of petitioner possession continued by mistake of revenue authorities.
7. That the contents of paragraph 7 of the writ petition relates to order of consolidation officer and matter of record. It is, however, submitted that the findings of consolidation officer relating to petitioners possession are vague, contradictory and without any material on record. On one hand, he has observed that the respondents had come in possession over land in dispute after redemption of mortgage and rejected the petitioners theory of record, mortgage and the entries of petitioner possession are by mistake after 1349F, however, without any basis he has concluded otherwise. The respondents objections for expunging petitioners name were not considered at all much less in right prospective.
12. That the contents of paragraph 13 of the writ petition are wrong and vehemently denied. The petitioners had given possession to ancestors of respondents before 1349F and respondent is in continuous possession over land in dispute since then the relevant revenue extract to this effect is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No.1 to this counter affidavit. The consolidation authority had doubted the Khasra entries in their order also."
(Emphasis Supplied)
9. Rejoinder affidavit has already been taken on record, wherein averments of writ petitioners were reiterated.
10. Sri A.C. Nishad, learned Standing Counsel for State has supported impugned orders passed by Appellate as well as Revisional Authority.
11. The issue involved in present case is squarely covered by a judgment of this Court in Babau Ram and others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2023:AHC:185998 and relevant part of it is extracted hereinafter:-
"14. Before considering the rival submissions following two judgments of Full Bench of this Court and one judgment of Supreme Court, wherein judgments of Full Bench on issue of limitation on redemption of mortgage, were referred, affirmed and approved, would be appropriate to refer hereinafter:
(I) Mahabal Singh and another vs. Ram Raj and others, 1950 SCC OnLine All 138 (Paragraphs 9, 10 and 22):
"9. In the second Full Bench case of Ghassu v. Babu Ram (A.I.R. (31) 1944 All. 25 : I.L.R. (1944) All. 166 (F.B.), the question arose as to the legal effect of a mortgage of an occupancy holding and the relief which in certain circumstance is open to the mortgagor in relation to a such a mortgage. There being conflict upon that question, the case was referred to the Full Bench. Dar, J., who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench, laid down several propositions which may be summarised as follows:
(1) That the usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding by a tenant is void and not voidable.
(2) That a mortgagor after giving possession to the mortgagee cannot recover possession of the holding without paying the money which lie (sic, he) had taken from the mortgagee.
(3) That a mortgagee of an occupancy holding by remaining in possession for over 12 years does not extinguish the rights of the mortgagor to redeem him and by such possession the mortgagee only prescribes for mortgages rights.
(4) That it is open to the mortgagor to seek possession of the holding by tendering the consideration which he had received and he may do so by a redemption suit.
(5) The relationship which comes into existence as a result of the mortgage of an occupancy holding and its possession being transferred to the mortgagee, though not strictly speaking that of a mortgagor and a mortgagee, is analogous to that relationship, and the action which is raised by the mortgagor to recover possession of the holding on payment of the money due to the mortgagee, though not strictly in the nature of a redemption, is analogous to a redemption suit.
10. A large number of authorities are referred to in support of these conclusions. It follows that upon the question whether the mortgage of an occupancy holding is void, there is no conflict between the Avadh and the Allahabad cases. The only conflict is that while the Avadh Chief Court has consistently held that a mortgagor can recover possession of the occupancy holding without being called upon to return the consideration money he had received from the mortgagee, save where the consideration can be proved independently of the mortgage, the Allahabad High Court has equally consistently held that the mortgagor is not entitled to recover possession without being called upon to return the consideration. The following are some of the cages (sic, cases) in which possession was decreed at the instance of the mortgagor on return of the money received by him on principles of equity: Bahoran Upadhya v. Uttamgir, 8 All L.J. 931 : (33 All. 779), Durga Chowdhuri v. Jagroop, A.I.R. (10) 1923 All. 191 : (79 I.C. 232), Bisheshar Pathak v. Rup Narain Singh, 26 A.L.J. 401 : (A.I.R. (15) 1928 All. 286), Mt. Raj Rani v. Gulab, A.I.R. (15) 1928 All. 552 : (117 I.C. 831), Mt. Dukhi v. Inderman Ahir, A.I.R. (21) 1934 All. 656 : (153 I.C. 903)."
"22. According to the view of law enunciated above, it is clear that the mortgagors are entitled to recover possession subject to the payment of the money received from the mortgagees and no question of limitation arises in the case. The possession of the mortgagees was a permissive possession and the only right they have is to be allowed to claim the money which the mortgagors had received. The plaint as framed, however, does not justify the granting of this relief to the plaintiffs in the two cases. Both the cases conveniently ignored the mortgage transactions and the plaintiffs put themselves forward as hereditary tenants of the land and treated the mortgagees as trespassers. They sued not only for possession but damages also. The cause of action was also wrongly stated. The plaintiffs did not offer to restore the benefit which they had received from the mortgagees as a condition precedent to their obtaining the relief for possession. Upon the present allegations in the two plaints, it is not possible to grant the relief for possession to the plaintiffs against the defendants, The cases will, therefore, go back to the trial Court and the plaintiffs of the two cases will be allowed to amend their plaint in the light of the above observation. The defendants will be allowed to raise such pleas in defence as may be open to them, and the parties will be entitled to produce such additional evidence as may appear necessary. The Court will then pass a proper decree according to law."
(II) Balwant and others vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1975 SCC OnLine All 69 (Paragraphs 6, 58, 73, 74, 83, 86, 87, 88 and 89):
" 6. ......In order to resolve this conflict, the following questions of law have been referred to a Full Bench:--
"(1) Whether the possession of the mortgagee whose rights have extinguished under Sec. 14(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is on or after the date of vesting per se adverse or permissive?
(2) Does the period of limitation for a suit under Sec. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act commence to run from the date of vesting or on the date of demand of possession?".
"58.N.D. Ojha, J.:-- I have gone through the opinion of brother Satish Chandra but I regret my inability to agree with the conclusion reached by him. The necessary facts are contained in the opinion of brother Satish Chandra and as such without repeating them here I propose to deal with the questions of law straightaway."
"73. As already seen above, there is nothing in the Act as a result of which the possession of the mortgagee could be said to have by operation of law per se become, on the date of vesting, without the consent of the mortgagor. Consequently, unless it was established that the mortgagee had clearly and unequivocally repudiated the permissive character of his possession to the knowledge of the mortgagor, his possession would continue to be permissive and with the consent of the mortgagor till such consent was revoked.
74. From the above discussion it also follows that the period of limitation for a suit under Sec. 209 of the Act will commence to run from the date of demand for possession and not from the date of vesting."
"83. If an occupancy tenant was ejected or died without leaving any heir or surrendered the holding he ceased to have any interest whatsoever in the land and no question of his subtenant or licensee continuing in possession with his consent could naturally arise. He was completely obliterated from the scene. The same is not the position of a usufructuary mortgagee as is clear from the foregoing discussion. The status of the mortgagee is, substituted from usufructuary mortgagee to simple mortgagee subject of course to the statutory restrictions created by Sec. 6(h) He continues to be a secured creditor. His continuance in possession even after the date of vesting is not dis-favoured by the Legislature, except that his possession will not be as usufructuary mortgagee. Even the mortgagor who had given his consent is not completely obliterated from the scene so that he ceases to have any interest in the land as is the case will an occupancy tenant, after his being ejected or dying without leaving any heir or surrendering the holding. Here fresh rights of bhumidhar are created in favour of the mortgagor in that very land in place of the earlier rights which vested in the State and the mortgagor gets a simultaneous right--so to speak without any hiatus to take or retain possession over that very land as bhumidrar over which the usufructuary mortgagee was in possession as such till the date of vesting and continues in possession even thereafter even though not "as such". It is in this context that the nature of his possession after the date of vesting has to be considered and on such consideration it does not appear that his possession becomes per se adverse after the date of vesting."
"86. My answer to the two questions referred to above is, therefore, as follows:--
(1) The possession of the mortgagee whose right have extinguished under Sec. 14(1) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act on or after the date of vesting is not per se adverse but is permissive.
(2) The period of limitation for a suit under Sec. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would commence to run not from the date of vesting but from the date of demand for possession.
87.R.L. Gulati, J.:-- I agree.
88.By the Court. In view of the majority opinion the questions referred to this Bench are answered as follows:--
(1) The possession of the mortgagee whose rights have extinguished under Sec. 14(1) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act on or after the date of vesting is not per se adverse but is permissive.
(2) The period of limitation for a suit under Sec. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would commence to run not from the date of vesting but from the date of demand for possession.
89.Questions answered."
(III) Pratap Singh alias Babu Ram and another vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Mainpuri and others, (2000) 4 SCC 614 :
"13. Section 14(1) purports to abolish all the rights of the mortgagee in possession of an estate or a share therein with effect from the date of vesting. It specifically provides that a mortgagee in possession shall cease to have any right to hold or possess land in such estate. Sub-section (1), however, operates subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) as is evident from the opening words of sub-section (1). Sub-section (2) provides that if the land, which was the subject-matter of the mortgage referred to in sub-section (1), was in the personal cultivation of the mortgagee on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, then, if such land was "sir" or "khudkasht" land of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage, the said land shall be deemed to be "sir" or "khudkasht" of the mortgagor for purposes of Section 18. The implication of this provision is that even if the land was in the cultivatory possession of the mortgagee, on the date of vesting, it would be treated, fictionally, "sir" or "khudkasht" of the mortgagor, provided the land, on the date of the mortgage, was the "sir" or "khudkasht" of the mortgagor. The immediate effect of this deeming provision would be that the mortgagor would acquire "bhumidhari" rights in respect of that land under Section 18 of the Act. Thus, the overall effect of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 is that the rights of a mortgagee come to an end with effect from the date of vesting and the mortgagor becomes "bhumidhar" of that land under Section 18 of the Act. To put it differently, the encumbrance created by the mortgagor comes to an end as the land vests in the State free from encumbrance but the rights of the mortgagee to recover mortgage money is preserved as it is provided in Section 6(h) that it can be recovered from the "substituted security" under Section 73 of the Transfer of Property Act.
14. We may point out that "bhumidhari" rights, acquired by the mortgagor under Section 18, are new rights created under the Act after the land in which such rights have been acquired had vested in the State free from all encumbrances. This land, notwithstanding that it was the subject-matter of mortgage prior to the date of vesting, would not be treated as "substituted security" within the meaning of Section 73 of the Transfer of Property Act and a mortgage decree, if any, cannot be executed against that land. (See: Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd. [AIR 1961 SC 1790 : (1962) 2 SCR 441])
15. The next and immediate question which crops up is the question relating to the status of the mortgagee in respect of that land. Even though the mortgagee was in cultivatory possession of the land on the date of vesting, his rights under the mortgage qua that land come to end as that land vests in the State subject to the condition that if the land, on the date of the mortgage was "sir" or "khudkasht" land of the mortgagor, the latter, namely the mortgagor would become a "bhumidhar" under Section 18.
16. If in these circumstances, the mortgagee continues to remain in possession in spite of his rights having come to an end by the force of law, what would be the character of his possession; whether the possession would immediately become "hostile" to that of the mortgagor who has acquired "bhumidhari" rights under Section 18, or the mortgagee would be treated to be continuing in possession for and on behalf of the mortgagor. It is, at this stage, that the words used in Entry 30 relating to suits under Section 209 of the Act as set out in Appendix III to the Rules made under the ZA&LR Act become relevant. In column 3 meant for "Description of suit, application and other proceeding", the words used are: "Suit for ejectment of a person taking or retaining possession of the land unlawfully and for damages." These words contemplate a suit for ejectment of a person who has taken possession unlawfully or continues to retain that possession unlawfully. In the case of possessory or usufructuary mortgage, possession is delivered to the mortgagee. Delivery of possession to the mortgagee is a sine qua non of such a mortgage. It is delivered in terms of the mortgage by the mortgagor of his own volition to the mortgagee. The mortgagee gets possession over the land only because it has been delivered to him in terms of the mortgage deed which equally binds him. The entry into possession of the mortgagee in these circumstances cannot be said to be unlawful. Once the possession was delivered to the mortgagee lawfully by the mortgagor himself, the further retention of that possession by the mortgagee would obviously be with the consent of the mortgagor and the mortgagee shall be treated to be retaining the possession for and on behalf of the mortgagor till the mortgage is redeemed. The character of possession of the mortgagee who was lawfully inducted into possession by the mortgagor, does not change at any stage and it continues to be lawful possession."
(Emphasis in original)
12. In the present case, there are concurrent findings that redemption did not take place. Mortgage amount was neither legally deposited nor it was returned to the petitioner and, therefore, he remained in possession and as held in Pratap Singh alias Babu Ram and another(supra) , the rights of a mortgagee come to end from date of vesting and his possession was 'permissive' in character and not adverse to the interest of the mortgager, therefore, petitioner would not get status of more than an 'Asami'.
13. In present case, the respondents (mortgagee) remained in possession over the land in dispute with the leave of mortgagor (owner) and, therefore, they could not get status of Bhumidhar. There possession only remained permissive in nature. Since respondents are recorded in class 9, therefore, they could get status 'Asami' only, as held by Appellate and upheld by Revisional Authority.
14. In view of above discussion, there is no illegality or irregularity in the impugned orders, therefore, writ petition is dismissed.
Order Date : 03.01.2024
P. Pandey
