Allahabad High Court

State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief ... vs Sri Santosh Kumar Yadav , Sub ... on 6 October, 2023

Bench: Attau Rahman Masoodi, Om Prakash Shukla





HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-LKO:65239-DB
 
Court No. - 1
 

 
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 7093 of 2023
 

 
Petitioner :- State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Home Govt. Of U.P. Civil Secrt. Lko. And Another
 
Respondent :- Sri Santosh Kumar Yadav , Sub Inspector , Civil Police
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- C.S.C.
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Puneet Saxena
 

 
Hon'ble Attau Rahman Masoodi,J.

Hon'ble Om Prakash Shukla,J.

(1) This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the State authorities/petitioners, assailing the legality of the judgment/order dated 25.01.2022 passed by the State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as 'Tribunal'), whereby Claim Petition No. 578 of 2019 filed by the claimant/respondent against the order of reversion dated 03.06.2015 and the order dated 30.07.2018 rejecting his representation, was allowed and both the orders dated 03.06.2015 and 30.07.2018 impugned in the claim petition were quashed with the following directions :-

"Petitioner is entitled for all the service benefits withheld on account of impugned punishment, however, he will not be entitled to get the backwages from 17-06-2010 till 13-10-2014 when the order of punishment was set-aside by Hon'ble High Court."

(2) In nutshell, the facts of the case are that the claimant/respondent was appointed as Sub-Inspector in Uttar Pradesh Provincial Armed Constabulary (U.P.P.A.C.) in the year 2001. The respondent, while posted in district Faizabad, was proceeded against the charge of bigamy. This charge was inquired into and the Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated 04.01.2006. Thereafter, a show cause notice was issued to the claimant/ respondent, to which he submitted his reply. Ultimately, an order of punishment dated 21.11.2006 was passed, dismissing the claimant/respondent from service under sub-rule 4 (1) (a) (i) of Rule 14 (1) of the U.P. Subordinate Police Officers (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1991.

(3) Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of punishment/dismissal dated 21.11.2016, the claimant/respondent filed a departmental appeal, which was allowed vide order dated 25.01.2007 inter alia on the ground that the claimant/respondent had not been informed of the entire charges and consequently the inquiry was vitiated and as such a direction was issued to initiate inquiry from the stage of issuance and/or information of the entire charge-sheet to the claimant/respondent.

(4) Pursuant to the aforesaid appellate order dated 25.01.2007, amended charge-sheet was issued to the claimant/respondent. In response thereto, claimant/respondent submitted his reply and he participated in the inquiry. Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated 10.12.2018. A show cause notice dated 06.01.2019 was issued to the claimant/respondent, to which he submitted a reply on 05.05.2009. Ultimately, the punishment order of dismissal was passed against the claimant/respondent on 17.06.2010.

(5) Against the aforesaid order of dismissal dated 17.06.2010, the claimant/respondent filed writ petition No. 4667 (S/S) of 2010 before this Court, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment/order dated 18.03.2011. This order dated 18.03.2011 was challenged by the claimant/respondent in Special Appeal No. 290 of 2011. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, vide judgment/order dated 13.10.2014, while allowing the said appeal, had set-aside the judgment/order dated 18.03.2011 as well as the order of punishment/dismissal dated 17.06.2010 and remitted the matter to the Inspector General of Police to decide the matter again after considering the reply dated 05.05.2009 submitted by the claimant/respondent within three months from the date of production of a certified copy of the order before him. It was also provided that any benefits consequential or otherwise arising out of this judgment shall be available only after the decision by the authority.

(6) Pursuant to the aforesaid judgment/order dated 13.10.2014, the matter was again considered by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, who, vide order dated 03.06.2015, disposed of the appeal, reverting the claimant/respondent minimum of pay-scale for a period of three years. The claimant/respondent, thereafter, preferred a representation against the aforesaid order of punishment/ reversion dated 03.06.2015, which was rejected by the State Government vide order dated 30.07.2015.

(7) Feeling aggrieved by both the aforesaid orders i.e. order of punishment/reversion dated 03.06.2015 and the order dated 30.07.2015, rejecting his representation, the claimant/ respondent had filed Claim Petition No. 578 of 2019 before the Tribunal. The learned Tribunal, vide judgment/order dated 25.01.2022, while allowing the claim petition, quashed the orders dated 03.06.2015 and 30.07.2015 with a further direction as enumerated in paragraph-1 hereinabove. It is this judgment/order dated 25.01.2022, which has been challenged in the instant writ petition.

(8) Heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record available before this Court in the instant writ petition.

(9) Learned Standing Counsel representing the State authorities/ petitioners herein drawing our attention to the reasoning recorded by the learned Tribunal has argued that learned Tribunal, while allowing the claim petition, has merely observed that the disciplinary authority, while passing the punishment order, himself noted that the departmental proceedings suffer from material procedural flaws, therefore, there was no occasion to revert the claimant/respondent. This technical flaw in the order of disciplinary authority led to allowing the claim petition, which according to the learned Counsel for State is erroneous. It is argued that in a situation of such irregularity, the Tribunal ought to have remitted the matter back to the disciplinary authority.

(10) Per contra, learned Counsel representing the claimant/ respondent has supported the impugned judgment/order dated 25.01.2022 passed by the learned Tribunal and has contended that the disciplinary authority, while passing the punishment order of reversion, had gone through the relevant records and found that there were legal, procedural and factual defects in the enquiry, however, instead of remitting the matter for fresh enquiry from the stage it stood defective, the disciplinary authority himself chose not to remit the matter back and passed the punishment order of reversion dated 03.06.2015. In this backdrop, the learned Tribunal has rightly observed that once the enquiry is found to be defective and suffering from legal and procedural defects, the punishment of reversion could not have been imposed based on the defective enquiry. Thus, there is no perversity in the impugned judgment/order passed by the learned Tribunal allowing the claim petition. The writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

(11) Having regard to the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties and going through the record available before us in the instant writ petition, we find that this is second round of litigation. Apparently, in the first round of litigation, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide judgment/order dated 13.10.2014 passed in Special Appeal No. 290 of 2011, while setting aside the judgment/order dated 18.03.2011 passed by the learned Tribunal in the earlier round, had also set aside the order of punishment/dismissal dated 17.06.2010 and had remitted the matter back to the Inspector General of Police to decide the matter again after considering the reply dated 05.05.2009. The disciplinary authority having considered the reply dated 05.05.2009 submitted by the claimant/respondent pursuant to the direction of this court and after analyzing the record found that the enquiry was suffering from legal, procedural and factual defects. However, the disciplinary authority instead of ordering fresh enquiry, chose to award the punishment of reversion dated 03.06.2015. This Court finds that the learned Tribunal, appreciating the aforesaid facts, came to the conclusion that once it is found that enquiry was defective and was not in consonance with Rule 14, then, only course open for the punishing authority was either to remit the matter for re-enquiry or set-aside the punishment. The punishing authority rather adopted a queer procedure unknown to service Jurisprudence. The punishing authority firstly had stated that the claimant/respondent shall be reinstated from the date of the punishment of reversion dated 03.06.2015, which according to the learned Tribunal was erroneous as the claimant/respondent had already stood reinstated in service in view of the judgment/order dated 13.10.2014 (supra). In this background, the learned Tribunal recorded the findings that punishment order could have been passed from the date of order but shifting the date of reinstatement to 03.06.2015 from 17.06.2010 is not at all permissible in law. The Tribunal has also returned a finding that once inquiry is found to be defective and suffering from legal, procedural and factual defects, punishment could not have been imposed as findings of guilt cannot be read in such a defective enquiry.

(12) Having gone through the material available on record and the reasoning recorded by the learned Tribunal, we are of the view that the reasoning assigned in the impugned judgment/order is convincing and does not leave any scope for this Court to interfere in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.