Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P.And Another vs Smt.Sunita And Another on 23 March, 2023
Bench: Kaushal Jayendra Thaker
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Reserved on: 21.02.2023
Delivered on: 23.03.2023
Court No. - 44
Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 339 of 1996
Appellant :- State Of U.P.And Another
Respondent :- Smt.Sunita And Another
Counsel for Appellant :- P.K.Bisaria,SC
Counsel for Respondent :- W.H.Khan,Poorva Agarwal,Punit Kumar Gupta,Puneet Kumar Gupta
Hon'ble Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker,J.
1. Heard Sri Saurav Srivastava, learned counsel for the State-appellants and Shri Puneet Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for the claimant-respondents. Perused the record.
2. This appeal has been preferred by appellants against the judgment and award dated 09.02.1996 passed by Special Judge/Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Banda (hereinafter referred to as, 'Tribunal') in Motor Accident Claim Petition No.180/70 of 1992 of 2016 whereby the claimants were awarded compensation Rs.1,98,000/- with 12% per annum rate of interest.
3. The brief facts as culled out from the record are that on 20.05.1992, an accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of Maruti Gysy UP 32 E 4890 which belongs to the information department with the Motor Cycle driven by the deceased consequently the driver of the Motorcycle UP E 9650. In this accident, deceased sustained grievous injuries due to which he died on the spot.
4. As the issue of negligence is raised by State of U.P. the same would have to be decided as to who was negligent whether the deceased had contributed in the accident having taken place, which has to be evaluated on the facts and circumstances of the case.
5. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed.
6. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently.
7. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection.
8. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands V/s. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. 'Hit and run' cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all.
9. These provisions (sec.110A and sec.110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was 'new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies.
10. In the light of the above discussion, this Court is of the view that even if courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well settled and, therefore, court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew V/s. State of Punjab, 2005 0 ACJ(SC) 1840).
11. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part the other side.
12. While going through the judgment of the tribunal, the learned tribunal has given a categorical finding that the vehicle owned by the appellant was being driven in a rash and negligent manner. This Court does not find any infirmity in the same and hence the issue of negligence is decided against the appellants herein.
13. The tribunal has rightly considered that the driver of the vehicle No. UP 32 E 4890 belonging to the department was driving in rash and negligent manner and that is how the accident occurred.
14. As far as compensation is concerned, while going through the judgment, it is very clear that the tribunal has not considered to grant any amount under the head of future loss of income. The income and the multiplier are also not as per judgments which were treated as precedent in the year of decision. This Court does not find any infirmity in the judgment so as to call for interference.
15. In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed.
16. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated.
17. The amount be paid to the claimants-respondents forthwith by the tribunal.
Order Date :- 23.03.2023
A.N. Mishra
