Satish Chandra Trivedi vs State Of U.P. And 4 Others
2023 Latest Caselaw 708 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

?Court No. - 34
 

 
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 37612 of 2022
 

 
Petitioner :- Satish Chandra Trivedi
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 4 Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Jai Prakash Tripathi,Shalvin
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C
 

 
Hon'ble Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J.

There is no dispute that arms license of petitioner was cancelled in 2014 due to pendency of two criminal cases viz., Case Crime No. 162 of 2007 under Section 392 of I.P.C. and Case Crime No. 128A of 2008 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. and 3(1)(10) SC/ST Act, Police Station- Maudaha, District- Hamirpur. During pendency of appeal, in Case Crime No. 128A of 2008 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. and 3(1)(10) SC/ST Act, petitioner was granted acquittal by granting benefit of doubt, however, petitioner is still facing trial in Case Crime No. 162 of 2007 under Section 392 of I.P.C.

Sri Jai Prakash Tripathi, learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment passed by Coordinate Bench in Writ C No. 32274 of 2019, Suneel vs. State of U.P. and 2 others decided on 03.02.2020, wherein it is held that petitioner therein was involved in a sole criminal case wherein he was granted acquittal, therefore, relief was granted as well as he also submits that in above referred offence, licensee arm was not used.

Learned Standing Counsel for State has vehemently opposed and submitted that even nature of acquittal is relevant as well as petitioner is still facing trial in one criminal case and there are specific finding against petitioner that it was necessary for security of public peace and public safety to revoke arm license.

Issue in regard to consideration of nature of acquittal was considered by this Court in Indrajeet Singh vs. State of U.P. and others, 2021(10) ADJ 471 wherein Court has held that -:

"14. The nature of acquittal i.e. honorable acquittal or acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt are terminologies not mentioned in the Criminal Procedure Code. However, the Apex Court has discussed these terminologies in Deputy Inspector General of Police and another v. S.Samuthiram, 2013 (1) SCC 598, relevant paragraph 24 of which is reproduced below:

''24. The meaning of the expression 'honourable acquittal' came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal, (1994) 1 SCC 541. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal Court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions 'honourable acquittal', 'acquitted of blame', 'fully exonerated' are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression 'honourably acquitted'. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.'' (Emphasis Added)

The Apex Court in a recent case of State of Rajasthan and others v. Love Kush Meena, 2021 SCC Online SC 252, has also observed in this regard: Relevant paragraph 15 of which is mentioned hereinafter:

15. It is pointed out that various nuances arising in this judgment has been considering even in the subsequent judgments. In Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration and others v. Pradeep Kumar and another, (2018) 1 SCC 797, a two Judge Bench of this Court dealt with the expression ''honourable acquittal''. It was opined that acquittal in a criminal case was not conclusive for suitability of the candidate concerned and it could not always be inferred from an acquittal or discharge that the person was falsely involved or has no criminal antecedents. Thus, unless it is an honourable acquittal, the candidate cannot claim the benefit of the case. No doubt, it was mentioned by relying on the earlier judgment of this Court in Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598, that while it was difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression ''honourable acquittal'', an accused who is acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused....''

15. Considering the scheme to grant, refuse, suspension and revocation of arms licence under the Act, 1959 and the subjective satisfaction of the licensing authority on the basis of material available after taking into consideration various factors mentioned in Sections 13,14 and 17 of the Act, 1959 and also medical certificate, threat perception, genuine requirement, no objection, police report, antecedent verification report, undertaking for safe storage of fire-arms etc., by way of filling of requisite forms prescribed under schedule of Arms Rule, 2016 subject to restrictions provided under Rules 32 and 112 etc., the important considerations while granting or revoking the arms licence is likelihood or actual misuse of fire-arm and it is important for the licensing authority to take appropriate decision considering the factors mentioned above including the nature of acquittal to form a reasoned opinion whether to refuse, grant, suspend or revoke the licence. The nature/manner of acquittal is very relevant factor in disciplinary proceedings as well as in selection on various posts such as police, judiciary and army etc. As referred above, antecedent verification report is also a very important consideration to grant or to refuse arms licence, such report includes general behaviour of the applicant and his involvement in the criminal cases etc.

16. The words ''public peace and public order'' are normally considered to maintain peace and order at public at large. However, there may be instances where though the immediate danger may be to an individual, but it may have threat to the public at large. For example a fire-arm licensee entered inside the house of a neighbour and threatened him or undertook blank firing by licensed weapon or otherwise, though it may be itself be violative or not violative of conditions fire-arm license, but this act is not only a threat to an individual, but is definitely likely to cause disturbance of public peace and public order to public at large, therefore, in these circumstances for security of public peace or for public order, the licensing authority may suspend or revoke the arms licence under Section 17 (3) of the Act, of 1959. Similarly, a person/licensee who is involved in a case of murder or attempt to murder or any offence affecting human body or any other serious offence, there may be likelihood of breach of public peace or public order.

17. The words used in Section 17 (3) (b) of the Act, 1959 is ''deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety'' i.e. in order to secure public peace or for public safety, the licensing authority if deems necessary, may suspend or revoke the licence. It is not necessary that actual disturbance of public peace or public safety may take place to revoke or suspend the arms licence. The licensing authority on the basis of material available, if deems necessary for security of public peace or for public safety may revoke the arms licence. Therefore, at this stage subjective satisfaction of the licensing authority comes into picture and if the licensing authority finds that due to certain act whether it is affecting to an individual or public at large, may for the security of public peace or for public safety, may suspend or revoke the arms licence. This is a precautionary measure, therefore, it is not necessary that actual disturbance of public peace or public safety may occur. Therefore, even the criminal antecedent of the licensee are very important factor for consideration for granting license. In these circumstances, even pendency of a criminal case involving serious offence may be sufficient to suspend or revoke the arms licence. Similarly, even after the acquittal, the nature of acquittal may be an important factor to consider whether there may be a likelihood of disturbance of public peace and safety especially in cases where the offences are against the State, offence against public tranquillity, offences affecting human body, offences affecting life, and sexual offences etc.

18. The licensing authority is in the field, therefore, is the best judge who can assess the situation on the basis of material which are before him. Such an assessment cannot be substituted by this Court which is no way connected or does not have any inkling of situations. This Court cannot undertake any exercise to determine the facts leading to the subjective satisfaction of the licencing authority on the basis of situation then existing, except there are material to show as to how the satisfaction is perverse or based on no material. (See Jagat Pal Singh v. State of U.P., 1997 (34) ACC 499).

19. There must be subjective satisfaction of the licensing authority that the licensee is not fit to continue holding of licence. If the licensing authority is satisfied of the fact that a continued existence of fire-arms licence with a person charged with various offence may endanger security of public peace and public safety then revocation of licence under Section 17 cannot be said to arbitrary or without jurisdiction. (See 1999 SCC Online Pat 206, (1999) 3 PLJR 203, Tej Narayan Singh v. State of Bihar and others.)

20. In view of above discussion, the issue under consideration is decided in following terms. The arms licence suspended/cancelled on the ground of pendency of a criminal case/cases against the licensee, the subsequent acquittal itself be not a sole ground for restoration of the arms licence, but the nature of acquittal would still remain a ground for consideration to continue with the suspension/cancellation particularly where the offences are against the State, offence against public tranquillity, offences affecting human body, offences affecting life, and sexual offences etc."

In present case, petitioner was involved in two criminal cases. During appeal, petitioner was granted acquittal in one of cases arising out of Case Crime No. 128A of 2008 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. and 3(1)(10) SC/ST Act by granting benefit of doubt. So far as other criminal case is concerned which is arising out of Case Crime No. 162 of 2007 under Section 392 of I.P.C, petitioner is facing trial.

As held in Indrajeet (supra), nature of acquittal is also a relevant factor to decide whether or not arm license may be revoked, considering it to be a privilege, not a right.

There is a specific finding against petitioner that authority deemed it necessary for security of public peace and public safety to revoke license and only on ground that petitioner was granted acquittal in one of cases, said subjective satisfaction cannot be interfered, when acquittal was based on grant of benefit of doubt as well as petitioner is still facing trial in other case. The facts of Suneel (supra) are distinguishable.

In these circumstances, I do not find any illegality or irregularity in impugned order.

Accordingly, petition stands dismissed.

Order Date :- 9.1.2023

Nirmal Sinha/P. Pandey