Allahabad High Court

Sanjeeva Kumar Singh vs State Of U.P. Thru Addl. Chief ... on 12 December, 2023

Author: Rajesh Singh Chauhan

Bench: Rajesh Singh Chauhan





HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-LKO:81687
 
A.F.R.
 
Reserved on 17.11.2023
 
Delivered on 12.12.2023
 
Court No. - 4
 
(C.M. Application (I.A.) No. 05 of 2022)
 
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 30782 of 2018
 
Petitioner :- Sanjeeva Kumar Singh
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru Addl. Chief Secy.Basic Lko. And Ors.
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Sm Singh Royekwar,Sumeet Tahilramani
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Ajay Kumar
 

 
Hon'ble Rajesh Singh Chauhan,J.

1. Heard Sri Anil Pratap Singh, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Sri Indrajeet Shukla, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the Applicant / opposite parties in the writ petition and Sri S.M. Singh Royekwar, learned counsel for the writ petitioner / respondents in the present application.

2. Admittedly, the writ petition bearing Service Single No. 30782 of 2018 (Sanjeev Kumar Singh vs. State of U.P. and others) has already been decided finally on 27.5.2019 but the State opposite parties have filed the application under the title of "Application for Leave to Pass Final Order In Disciplinary Proceedings Against The Petitioner In Terms Of Directions Contained in Judgment And Order Dated 27.5.2019" on 29.7.2022.

3. For disposal of the aforesaid application it would be necessary to reproduce the final order dated 27.5.2019 herein below:

"Heard learned counsel for the parties.

The precise submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that by means of order dated 20.5.2018 the petitioner was placed under suspension and this Court vide order dated 17.11.2018 was pleased to stay the suspension order. Thereafter, vide order dated 28.2.2019 the petitioner was reinstated in service. However, no posting order was passed. On 10.5.2019 the posting order was issued by the opposite party. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that he was issued charge-sheet on 13.11.2018 and he submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on 5.2.2019.

As per learned counsel for the petitioner after the order dated 28.2.2019 the petitioner was paid subsistence allowance for the suspension period and has been paid salary w.e.f. 28.2.2019 till 10.5.2019. Further after stay order being passed by this Court the petitioner was paid part of subsistence allowance and thereafter after the reinstatement order he has been paid the entire subsistence allowance.

The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that when the suspension order was withdrawn by the opposite parties in compliance of the order dated 17.5.2018 of this Court then the petitioner is legally entitled for the arrears of salary for suspension period. He has also submitted that the petitioner should have been paid salary w.e.f. 17.11.2018 till 28.2.2019 but he has been paid salary w.e.f. 28.2.2019 and has been paid subsistence allowance till 28.2.2019 which was not proper since this Court has granted interim order on 17.5.2018. He has further submitted that since he has already submitted his defense to the charge-sheet, therefore, the direction for conclusion of departmental inquiry may be issued within time frame.

The aforesaid submission of learned counsel for the petitioner finds force.

Since the suspension order of the petitioner has been withdrawn, therefore, the opposite parties are directed to pay arrears of salary for the suspension period excluding the payment which has been made to the petitioner in the name of subsistence allowance for the suspension period even till 28.2.2019 with promptness. The opposite parties are also directed to conduct and conclude the departmental inquiry strictly in accordance with law following the principles of natural justice with expedition preferably within a period of 8 weeks from today and thereafter the final order may be passed, if so required within further period of one month. In any case the final order in the matter may be passed on or before 31.8.2019 inasmuch as the petitioner has filed reply to the charge-sheet on 5.2.2019.

If no final order is passed within aforesaid stipulated period i.e. 31.8.2019 and the disciplinary authority may pass final order but after seeking prior leave from this Court.

Since no counter affidavit has been filed in the present matter but in the wake of aforesaid developments, the writ petition is being decided finally at the admission stage in view of the aforesaid terms. "

4. Notably, while disposing of the aforesaid writ petition finally the direction was issued to the opposite parties to conduct and conclude the departmental inquiry strictly in accordance with law following the principles of natural justice with expedition preferably within a period of 8 weeks from today and thereafter the final order may be passed, if so required within further period of one month.

5. The further direction was issued to the effect that in any case the final order in the matter may be passed on or before 31.8.2019. The further direction was issued that if no final order is passed within stipulated period i.e. 31.8.2019, the disciplinary authority may pass final order but after seeking prior leave from this Court.

6. By means of aforesaid application, however, the leave to pass final order in the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner in terms of the order of this court has been prayed, but it has nowhere been indicated as to why no such application has been filed on or before 31.8.2019 when the period had expired to pass any final order. Even no such application has been filed till 29.7.2022. It has been averred in the application that after making some correspondences with Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commissioner (herein after referred to as UPPSC) with affect from 22.2.2020 (Annexure A-8) till 10.08.2020 (Annexure A-11), the disciplinary authority passed a final punishment order against the petitioner on 24.12.2020 by imposing the punishment of stoppage of three increments permanently invoking the Rule 51(7) of U.P. Sachivalaya Anudesh -1982 (Annexure A-12 and A-13).

7. So from the perusal of the aforesaid averment of the application it is an admitted position that without seeking prior leave from this Court on or before 31.8.2019 the disciplinary authority preferred to proceed against the petitioner imposing major punishment on 24.12.2020. In the aforesaid application the plausible and cogent reasons have not been shown as to why before taking leave from the Court in terms of the order dated 27.5.2019 the final order has been passed after expiry of substantial period.

8. The paper-book reveals that against the aforesaid application the learned counsel for the petitioner has filed a detailed objection on 24.1.2023 indicating therein that in view of the facts and circumstances of the issued in question the State opposite parties may not be granted leave to take action against the petitioner for the reason that the punishment order dated 24.12.2020 had been assailed before the U.P. Public Service Tribunal by filing claim petition and the petitioner had also filed contempt petition before this Court bearing Contempt Misc. Case No. 2320 (C) of 2019. Further, when the contempt court issued a notice to the opposite party asking as to why the punishment order has been passed in derogation of the final order dated 27.5.2019 (supra), the punishment order dated 24.12.2020 had been withdrawn by the disciplinary authority / Government on 6.4.2022. Even after withdrawal of the punishment order on 6.4.2022 no such application has been filed promptly as the same has been filed after about four months i.e. on 25.7.2022. Even after filing the aforesaid application on 25.7.2022 no application for listing has been filed by the State authorities seeking early disposal of the aforesaid application. However, on 10.5.2023 the application was listed and the direction was issued to list on 24.5.2023. On 24.5.2023 the case was fixed for next date i.e. 25.5.2023. On 25.5.2023 the Additional C.S.C. has argued the aforesaid application and learned counsel for the writ petitioner has opposed the arguments. As a matter of fact after filing the aforesaid application on 25.7.2022 the application was heard first time on 25.5.2023 and the following order has been passed which reads as under :

"(C.M. Application/I.A. No.5 of 2022)

1. Heard Sri S.P. Singh, learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondents/ applicant of the present application, which is an application for leave to pass final order in disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner in terms of directions contained in judgment and order dated 27.05.2019 and Sri S.M. Singh Royekwar, learned counsel for the writ petitioner.

2. For disposal of the aforesaid application, the order dated 27.05.2019 is necessary to be reproduced, which is as under:-

"Heard learned counsel for the parties.

The precise submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that by means of order dated 20.5.2018 the petitioner was placed under suspension and this Court vide order dated 17.11.2018 was pleased to stay the suspension order. Thereafter, vide order dated 28.2.2019 the petitioner was reinstated in service. However, no posting order was passed. On 10.5.2019 the posting order was issued by the opposite party. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that he was issued charge-sheet on 13.11.2018 and he submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on 5.2.2019.

As per learned counsel for the petitioner after the order dated 28.2.2019 the petitioner was paid subsistence allowance for the suspension period and has been paid salary w.e.f. 28.2.2019 till 10.5.2019. Further after stay order being passed by this Court the petitioner was paid part of subsistence allowance and thereafter after the reinstatement order he has been paid the entire subsistence allowance.

The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that when the suspension order was withdrawn by the opposite parties in compliance of the order dated 17.5.2018 of this Court then the petitioner is legally entitled for the arrears of salary for suspension period. He has also submitted that the petitioner should have been paid salary w.e.f. 17.11.2018 till 28.2.2019 but he has been paid salary w.e.f. 28.2.2019 and has been paid subsistence allowance till 28.2.2019 which was not proper since this Court has granted interim order on 17.5.2018. He has further submitted that since he has already submitted his defense to the charge-sheet, therefore, the direction for conclusion of departmental inquiry may be issued within time frame.

The aforesaid submission of learned counsel for the petitioner finds force.

Since the suspension order of the petitioner has been withdrawn, therefore, the opposite parties are directed to pay arrears of salary for the suspension period excluding the payment which has been made to the petitioner in the name of subsistence allowance for the suspension period even till 28.2.2019 with promptness. The opposite parties are also directed to conduct and conclude the departmental inquiry strictly in accordance with law following the principles of natural justice with expedition preferably within a period of 8 weeks from today and thereafter the final order may be passed, if so required within further period of one month. In any case the final order in the matter may be passed on or before 31.8.2019 inasmuch as the petitioner has filed reply to the charge-sheet on 5.2.2019.

If no final order is passed within aforesaid stipulated period i.e. 31.8.2019 and the disciplinary authority may pass final order but after seeking prior leave from this Court.

Since no counter affidavit has been filed in the present matter but in the wake of aforesaid developments, the writ petition is being decided finally at the admission stage in view of the aforesaid terms."

3. As per the aforesaid order, the State-respondents will have to conclude the departmental inquiry within a period of eight weeks from the order dated 27.05.2019 and thereafter, the final order was to be passed, if it was so required, within a period of one month. This Court fixed the date for 31.08.2019 indicating therein that the final order would be passed on or before 31.08.2019. As per the aforesaid order, if the final order is not passed on or before 31.08.2019, for passing final order, the disciplinary authority shall seek prior leave of the Court.

4. The departmental inquiry was concluded and show cause notice dated 13.06.2019 was issued to the petitioner to submit his explanation within a period of fifteen days. As per learned counsel for the petitioner, show cause notice along with inquiry report was received to the petitioner on 02.07.2019. Since page nos.9, 10 & 17 of the inquiry report were missing and page nos.2, 4, 5, 20 & 22 were not legible, therefore, the petitioner preferred a representation dated 03.07.2019 through registered post to the disciplinary authority making request that the legible copy of the inquiry report, more particularly page no.9, 10 & 17 as well as 2, 4, 5, 20 & 22 be provided to him, so that he may submit his explanation to the show cause notice. As per Sri Royekwar, no decision was taken on such letter, therefore, the petitioner preferred another representation dated 20.07.2019 to the disciplinary authority through registered post with the same request. When no suitable action was taken, the petitioner again preferred representations dated 01.08.2019 & 28.08.2019 through registered post but to no avail. However, vide letter dated 02.09.2019, the petitioner was provided legible copy of the inquiry report. Just after receiving the legible copy of the inquiry report, the petitioner submitted his explanation on 03.10.2019. Sri Royekwar has submitted that had the legible copy of the inquiry report been provided to the petitioner on his representation dated 03.07.2019, the explanation would have been filed well in time and the final order would have been passed within the time frame so prescribed by this Court vide order dated 27.05.2019. Further, the final order was passed on 24.12.2020 awarding punishment to the petitioner. Sri Royekwar has submitted that aforesaid final order was passed in violation of the order being passed by this Court dated 27.05.2019 inasmuch as the aforesaid order was passed without seeking prior leave of the Court. As per Sri Royekwar, the aforesaid order has been assailed by the petitioner by filing claim petition before the State Public Services Tribunal but in the meantime, contempt petition of the petitioner was pending consideration before this Court wherein explanation was sought from the State-respondent as to why the impugned punishment order dated 24.12.2020 has been passed without seeking prior leave of the Court, the disciplinary authority has withdrawn the punishment order dated 24.12.2020 vide order dated 06.04.2022. On account of the aforesaid reason, the claim petition filed by the petitioner before the State Public Services Tribunal rendered infructuous.

5. Sri Royekwar has submitted that in the instant case, the State-respondent has committed apparent error time and again; firstly, the proper inquiry report has not been provided to the petitioner; secondly, on his representation dated 03.07.2019, legible copies of the inquiry report have not been provided, legible copies have been provided vide letter dated 02.09.2019 after expiry of stipulated time i.e. 31.08.2019. Thereafter, final order has been passed on 24.12.2020 without seeking leave of the Court; thereafter, during pendency of the contempt petition, the punishment order has been withdrawn on 06.04.2022 and thereafter application for clarification has been filed on 29.07.2022. The aforesaid callous approach of the authority concerned clearly discloses the malafide intention to harass the petitioner, therefore, as per Sri Royekwar, the present application for leave of the Court may be rejected and the authorities may be directed to provide all consequential benefits to the petitioner for which he is entitled.

6. Sri S.P. Singh, learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel has submitted that since he will have to seek instructions on the aforesaid aspect, which has been considered by this Court in this order, therefore, he may be given some reasonable time.

7. However, Sri Royekwar has opposed the aforesaid request by submitting that the present petitioner has been suffering since 20.05.2018 when he was placed under suspension and about five years' period has passed, no final decision has been taken in his case, resultant thereof his promotional benefits have not been given and he has not been promoted on the next higher post on which his batch-mate and juniors have been promoted.

8. On the request of Sri S.P. Singh, learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel, the case is listed on 10.07.2023 to enable him to seek complete instructions in the matter but in the meantime, admissible promotional benefits may be given to the petitioner and if his batch-mate and juniors to him have been promoted to the next higher post, such promotion may be considered on adhoc basis subject to the final decision in the present application. If, in the meantime, any sealed cover procedure has been adopted, such sealed cover shall be opened."

9. In the aforesaid order, I have noticed the fact that before taking prior leave from the Court the punishment order has been passed against the petitioner. It has also been noticed that the delay has been committed on the part of the inquiry officer / disciplinary authority inasmuch as the petitioner has not been provided the proper copy of the inquiry report as some pages were missing and despite couple of request being made by the petitioner he was provided those copies at the belated stage. However, immediately after receiving the legible papers of the inquiry report on 2.9.2019 the petitioner submitted his explanation on 3.10.2019. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner has intimated the Court that as soon as the petitioner received the copy of inquiry report on 2.7.2019 he immediately preferred a representation on the next date i.e. 3.7.2019 seeking the legible copies of those papers. Further, had the legible copies of the papers been provided to the petitioner immediately after the representation dated 3.7.2019, the explanation would have been filed well in time and final order would have been passed within time, so stipulated by this Court vide order dated 27.5.2019. Sri Royekwar has further submitted that even after submitting his explanation on 3.10.2019, the punishment order has been passed on 24.12.2020 i.e. after about 14 months. The aforesaid punishment order was withdrawn on 6.4.2022 after filing of the contempt petition before this Court and claim petition before the U.P. Public Service Tribunal.

10. Sri Royekwar has also drawn attention of this Court towards C.M. Application No. 114110 of 2019 i.e. "Application for Clarification / Modification/ Issuing Appropriate Directions" wherein the petitioner has prayed that the direction may be issued to the authorities to make payment of arrears of salary for the suspension period and the petitioner be also paid his regular salary and the opposite parties be also directed to supply the missing pages and complete legible pages of the inquiry report to the petitioner.

11. In the aforesaid application the petitioner has requested that since the opposite parties are deliberately and intentionally delaying the inquiry proceedings, therefore, they may likely to approach this Court seeking extension of time on or before 31.8.2019, so that application, if filed,may be treated disregard to the direction issued by this Court. In the aforesaid application the petitioner has requested that looking into the facts and circumstances of the issue in question he may be provided complete justice and his harassment, so committed by the opposite parties, may be directed to be stopped. The aforesaid application has been disposed of by this Court vide order dated 26.9.2019 which reads as under :

"(C.M. Application No.114110 of 2019)

Heard Sri S.M. Singh Royekwar, learned counsel for the petitioner/ applicant.

By means of this application, learned counsel for the petitioner has sought clarification/ modification of the direction being issued by this Court on 27.5.2019.

By means of order dated 27.5.2019, this Court has granted time to the disciplinary authority to pass any final order by 31.8.2019 and if the disciplinary authority does not pass any such order by 31.8.2019, he may pass such order but after seeking prior leave from this Court.

Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that neither the final order has been passed on or before 31.8.2019 nor any leave has been prayed by the disciplinary authority to the best of the knowledge of the petitioner as no such application has been filed in this writ petition.

Therefore, in view of the above, it is observed that if the disciplinary authority could not pass any appropriate order on or before 31.8.2019, he could have filed application seeking leave, failing which the benefit of the order dated 27.5.2019 would definitely be extended to the petitioner. No order extending time for passing final order can be passed in this application.

Accordingly, the application is disposed of. "

12. While disposing of the aforesaid application this Court has taken cognizance of the fact that no final order has been passed on or before 31.8.2019, however, the liberty was given to the disciplinary authority / inquiry officer to file appropriate application seeking leave from the Court, failing which the benefit of the final order dated 27.5.2019 would be extended to the petitioner.

13. Notably, despite the aforesaid order dated 26.9.2019 having been passed the disciplinary authority / inquiry officer has not filed any application seeking extension of time and admittedly such application has been filed on 29.7.2022 i.e. after about two years and ten months.

14. Sri Indrajeet Shukla, learned Addl. C.S.C. has informed the Court that the petitioner has been given all consequential service benefits and pursuant to the inquiry report only the final decision has to be taken by the disciplinary authority. Admittedly, the aforesaid consequential service benefits have been given to the petitioner after 25.5.2023 when this Court heard the aforesaid application and passed a detailed order; even the appearance of the responsible competent authorities was directed and responsible authorities were present before the Court and the affidavit of compliance was filed on 17.8.2023.

15. Sri Shukla, learned Addl. C.S.C. has mainly placed reliance of the judgment of Full Bench of this Court in re: Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi vs. The New India Assurance Company Limited & others, (2014) 6 All LJ 662 (FB) referring para 2 and 19 thereof. By means of para 2 the Full Bench has formulated the questions which have been referred for determination and by means of para 19 the answers thereof have been indicated. Precisely, the question before the Full Bench was that as to whether if an inquiry proceeding is not concluded within time frame fixed by the Court and it concludes without seeking extension from the Court then on such ground the entire proceedings as well as punishment order passed would vitiate in terms of earlier judgment of this Court in re: P.N. Srivastava. Secondly, whether the law laid down by the Division Bench in re: P.N. Srivastava (supra) is a good law in view of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Suresh Chandra as well as Union of India vs. Satendra Kumar Sahai.

16. Sri Shukla, learned Addl. C.S.C. has fairly stated that though the application for seeking extension of time has not been filed within time but since the aforesaid application has been filed and looking into the seriousness of the issue in question the final order should have been passed on the basis of inquiry report considering the explanation of the petitioner in the interest of justice. He has also submitted that the Full Bench had itself observed that in an appropriate case it would be open to the Court to extend the time suo-moto in order to ensure that serious charge of misconduct does not go unpunished leading to serious detriment to the public interest. Sri Shukla has further submitted that looking into the seriousness of the charges the U.P.P.S.C. had recommended twice that instead of imposing the punishment of withdrawing three increments of the petitioner permanently he should be removed from service but the disciplinary authority was of the opinion that instead of punishment of removal the three increments should have been stopped with cumulative effect. Since the punishment order has been withdrawn, therefore, on the allegations wherein the punishment order was passed, the petitioner should not be absolved and shall not remain scott-free; at least a major punishment is required to be passed against him, therefore, the present application should have been allowed and liberty may be given to the disciplinary authority to pass appropriate order against the petitioner strictly in accordance with law by concluding the disciplinary proceedings.

17. Sri Royekwar, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the manner under which the present application has been filed by the State authorities may not be appreciated and the said application may be dismissed at the threshold, in view of the facts and circumstances and his submissions submitted before this Court but so far as the submission of learned Addl. C.S.C. regarding seriousness of the charges are concerned he has drawn attention towards Annexure A-12 of the application of the State opposite parties which is an office order dated 24.12.2020 issued by the Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Basic Education analyzing all the three charges levelled against the petitioner vide para 6 of the aforesaid order. In para 6 of the aforesaid order dated 24.12.2020 the Additional Chief Secretary has categorically indicated that so far as charge no. 1 is concerned which provides that incompetent Assistant Teachers, who were not having required qualification, have been appointed by the petitioner. The authority has stated that after verification of the document it emerged that those Assistant Teachers have been appointed by the District Selection Committee wherein the petitioner was also one of the member and as soon as the petitioner came to know that those Assistant Teachers were not having proper qualification and documents and those documents were fictitious, the petitioner had lodged the F.I.R. against those Assistant Teachers and did not permit them to submit their joining, resultant thereof no loss of government exchequer occurred, therefore, the petitioner may be held responsible only to take some more due care and precaution. So far as charge no. 2 is concerned which is relating to forged and fictitious appointment letters, on verification it has been found that on those forged and fictitious appointment letters neither there are any signatures of the petitioner nor those appointment letters were issued from the office of the petitioner, rather those appointment letters were prepared by the candidates themselves and as soon as this fact came into the notice of the petitioner he immediately lodged F.I.R. against all those candidates / Assistant Teachers, resultant thereof none of them could withdraw their salary. The only lapse on the part of the petitioner is that had names of those teachers been published those teachers would not have tried to submit their joining. So far as the charge no. 3 relating to permission to accept joining of those erring teachers is concerned, it is clear that the petitioner has not permitted to submit their joining rather some Principals of some educational institutions have permitted to submit the joining of some erring teachers. Therefore, the Additional Chief Secretary has opined that looking into the aforesaid charge against the petitioner the recommendation of Public Service Commission to impose major punishment upon the petitioner is not proper as it would be an excessive punishment, so if the need be the three increments of salary of the petitioner may be withheld for the reason that being a Basic Education Officer and Member Secretary of the District Selection Committee he should have taken some more care and precaution and due diligence. Therefore, Sri Royekwar has stated that the seriousness of the charges, so exhibited by the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel is not proper, rather he is trying to exaggerate the charges contrary to the subjective satisfaction of the appointing authority / disciplinary authority itself. Therefore, the aforesaid submission of learned Additional C.S.C. is not liable to be accepted. Hence, Sri Royekwar has requested that the aforesaid application may be dismissed.

18. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

19. Learned Addl. C.S.C. as well as learned counsel for the writ petitioner are placing reliance of the judgment of Bull Bench of this Court in re: Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi (supra) inasmuch as learned Addl. C.S.C. has stated that the Hon'ble Full Bench has stated that this Court can extend the time on the application, if the charges are serious and such extension of time has to be considered in the interest of justice balancing both the need for expeditious conclusion of the inquiry in the interest of fairness and the office administration, which is, as per him is applicable in the present case. Whereas, the learned writ petitioner has submitted that the order of the Court may not be taken so lightly or may not be taken for granted and if the Full Bench has opined that the time may be extended on an application filed by the authority concerned looking into the seriousness and gravity of the charges, at least such application should have been filed on or before the date which has been stipulated by the Court and since the aforesaid aspect has not been adhered by the opposite parties, therefore, the aforesaid application may be dismissed at the threshold.

20. Since I had occasion to deal such aspect in a case of Gopal Chandra Sinha vs. State of U.P. & others, (2005) 3 UPLBEC 2929 and (Atma Singh vs. U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. through M.D. and ors. ) in re: Service Single No. 11867 of 2020 connected with Service Single No. 12047 of 2021 (Atma Singh vs. U.P. State Bridge Corp. Ltd. and ors.), therefore, I would like to refer some relevant paragraphs of those judgments. It has been informed at the Bar that both the aforesaid judgments have not been assailed before the superior court and have attained finality. Para 30 to 32 in re: Gopal Chandra Sinha (supra) is being reproduced herein below :

"30. The Full Bench of this Court has given its dictum on two issues, which are relevant for the adjudication of the present issue. The Hon'ble Full Bench in re: Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi vs. The New India Assurance Company Limited and others reported in [2014 (32) LCD 405] has answered the questions in reference. Vide para-2, the question so referred before the Full Bench have been indicated as under:-

"2. The following questions have been referred in the order of the learned Single Judge for determination by the Full Bench:-

(a) Whether if an inquiry proceeding is not concluded within a time frame fixed by a court and concluded thereafter, without seeking extension from the Court then on the said ground the entire inquiry proceeding as well as punishment order passed, is vitiated in view of the judgment in the case of P.N. Srivastava; and

(b) Whether the law as laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of P.N. Srivastava that if an inquiry proceeding is not concluded within a time frame as fixed by a Court, it stands vitiated is still a good law in view of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chandra as well as a judgment dated 27.07.2009 of a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1056 (SB) of 2009 (Union of India and others Vs. Satendra Kumar Sahai and another)."

31. This Court has answered the aforesaid question vide para-19 of the judgment, which is being reproduced here-in-below:-

"19. In view of the above discussion, we now proceed to answer the questions which have been referred to the Full Bench.

(A) Question No. (a): We hold that if an enquiry is not concluded within the time which has been fixed by the Court, it is open to the employer to seek an extension of time by making an appropriate application to the court setting out the reasons for the delay in the conclusion of the enquiry. In such an event, it is for the court to consider whether time should be extended, based on the facts and circumstances of the case. However, where there is a stipulation of time by the Court, it will not be open to the employer to disregard that stipulation and an extension of time must be sought;

(B) Question No. (b): The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chandra (supra) as well as the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satyendra Kumar Sahai (supra) clearly indicate that a mere delay on the part of the employer in concluding a disciplinary enquiry will not ipso facto nullify the entire proceedings in every case. The court which has fixed a stipulation of time has jurisdiction to extend the time and it is open to the court, while exercising that jurisdiction, to consider whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained. The court can suitably extend time for conclusion of the enquiry either in a proceeding instituted by the employee challenging the enquiry on the ground that it was not completed within the stipulated period or even upon an independent application moved by the employer. The court has the inherent jurisdiction to grant an extension of time, the original stipulation of time having been fixed by the court itself. Such an extension of time has to be considered in the interests of justice balancing both the need for expeditious conclusion of the enquiry in the interests of fairness and an honest administration. In an appropriate case, it would be open to the Court to extend time suo motu in order to ensure that a serious charge of misconduct does not go unpunished leading to a serious detriment to the public interest. The court has sufficient powers to grant an extension of time both before and after the period stipulated by the court has come to an end."

32. In the light of the aforesaid judgment of Hon'ble Full Bench of this Court, I am of the considered view that since the Disciplinary Authority has not filed any application before this Court seeking extension of time, which was granted vide judgment and order dated 14.09.2005, therefore, conducting the enquiry against the petitioner in defiance of the judgment and order dated 14.09.2005, is per se illegal and void ab initio. Had any appropriate application been filed before this Court for seeking extension of time, the Court could have considered and decided the same but this occasion did not come before the Court for the reason that no such application was filed and the Disciplinary Authority has taken the dictum of this Court for granted, which shall not be permissible in any circumstances. No one can be permitted to take the judgment and order of the Courts for granted. Since vide answer No.B, the Full Bench of this Court was of the view that this Court may grant suo-motu extension if the charges are so serious, but in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the issue in question, such suo-motu extension of time cannot be granted for the reason that instead of three months period to conclude the enquiry against the petitioner with effect from 14.09.2005, the final order has been passed on 08.04.2019, i.e. after about thirteen years and seven months.

21. Paragraph nos. 24 to 27 in re: Atma Singh (supra) are being reproduced herein below :

"24. Before the Full Bench in re:- Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi (supra) two questions were referred for adjudication which have been indicated in para 2 of the judgment as under:-

"2. The following questions have been referred in the order of the learned Single Judge for determination by the Full Bench:-

"(a) Whether if an inquiry proceeding is not concluded within a time frame fixed by a court and concluded thereafter, without seeking extension from the Court then on the said ground the entire inquiry proceeding as well as punishment order passed, is vitiated in view of the judgment in the case of P.N. Srivastava; and

(b) Whether the law as laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of P.N. Srivastava that if an inquiry proceeding is not concluded within a time frame as fixed by a Court, it stands vitiated is still a good law in view of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chandra as well as a judgment dated 27.07.2009 of a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1056 (SB) of 2009 (Union of India and others Vs. Satendra Kumar Sahai and another)."

25. The Full Bench in Para 19 was pleased to answer those questions as under:-

"19. In view of the above discussion, we now proceed to answer the questions which have been referred to the Full Bench.

(A) Question No. (a): We hold that if an enquiry is not concluded within the time which has been fixed by the Court, it is open to the employer to seek an extension of time by making an appropriate application to the court setting out the reasons for the delay in the conclusion of the enquiry. In such an event, it is for the court to consider whether time should be extended, based on the facts and circumstances of the case. However, where there is a stipulation of time by the Court, it will not be open to the employer to disregard that stipulation and an extension of time must be sought;

(B) Question No. (b): The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chandra (supra) as well as the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satyendra Kumar Sahai (supra) clearly indicate that a mere delay on the part of the employer in concluding a disciplinary enquiry will not ipso facto nullify the entire proceedings in every case. The court which has fixed a stipulation of time has jurisdiction to extend the time and it is open to the court, while exercising that jurisdiction, to consider whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained. The court can suitably extend time for conclusion of the enquiry either in a proceeding instituted by the employee challenging the enquiry on the ground that it was not completed within the stipulated period or even upon an independent application moved by the employer. The court has the inherent jurisdiction to grant an extension of time, the original stipulation of time having been fixed by the court itself. Such an extension of time has to be considered in the interests of justice balancing both the need for expeditious conclusion of the enquiry in the interests of fairness and an honest administration. In an appropriate case, it would be open to the Court to extend time suo motu in order to ensure that a serious charge of misconduct does not go unpunished leading to a serious detriment to the public interest. The court has sufficient powers to grant an extension of time both before and after the period stipulated by the court has come to an end."

26. The crux of the decision of Full Bench of this Court is that where there is a stipulation of time by the Court, it will not be open to the employer to disregard that stipulation unless the time is extended by the Court itself on the application of the department. In the present case, admittedly, no such application for extension of time has been moved by the department and despite taking cognizance of the fact that this Court vide judgment and order dated 13.11.2019 has stipulated maximum period of four months to pass final order considering the enquiry report and such period of four months was being expired on 23.04.2020, if the letter of the Chief Project Manager is taken into account (Annexure no.20 to the second writ petition) or on 24.03.2020 if the date of registered post dated 19.11.2019 intimating the order dated 13.11.2019 is taken into account giving advantage of five days of service of the registered post. In any case, the final order must have been passed on or before 23.04.2020 after conclusion of the departmental enquiry but the final order has been passed on 02.06.2021 (Annexure No.1) awarding punishment of recovery and censure entry to the petitioner.

27. In view of what has been considered above, the impugned order dated 02.06.2021 passed by the Managing Director which is contained as Annexure No.1 to the writ petition is not sustainable in the eyes of law being illegal, arbitrary and unwarranted viz a viz violative of the direction being issued by the Full Bench of this Court in re:- Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi (supra). "

22. This has been my considered opinion that if the Court has directed the competent authority to conclude the proceedings or to pass any appropriate order on or before any particular date, those proceedings must be concluded or orders must be passed on or before the period stipulated by the Court. If in any case the appropriate order could not be passed for any unavoidable or compelling reasons / circumstances, an appropriate application should have been filed before the Court apprising those unavoidable and compelling circumstances seeking further time to pass final order in an issue in question inasmuch as the specific mandamus being issued by the Court fixing any cut off time / date, such mandamus may not be taken so lightly or taken for granted by the authority concerned. The majesty of law may not be compromised and the sanctity of the judgment / order of this Court must be considered and followed in its letter and spirit. If the authorities are permitted to take the judgment / order of the Court lightly or taken for granted and no strict order against such attitude of the authorities is passed, the authority would habitually be avoiding those directions.

23. In the present case this Court vide order dated 27.5.2019 has not only issued mandamus directing to conclude the departmental inquiry and pass final order within a period of one month but also fixed cut off date as 31.8.2019 and issued further direction that if the final order is not passed within aforesaid stipulated period i.e. 31.8.2019, the disciplinary authority may pass final order after seeking leave from the Court but in the present case admittedly, no final order could be passed on or before 31.8.2019 and no application for seeking extension of time could be filed on or before 31.8.2019. Not only the above, when the petitioner has himself filed an application seeking clarification / modification of the order dated 25.7.2019 apprising that the departmental inquiry was not proceeding properly and despite the stipulated time having been lapsed on 31.8.2019 no appropriate application has been filed for seeking extension of time, this Court vide order dated 26.9.2019 has observed that if the departmental inquiry could not be concluded on or before 31.8.2019, the State authority may file application for seeking leave, however, making it clear that without filing such application the benefit of order dated 27.5.2019 would be extended to the petitioner but no such application has been filed even after 26.9.2019. In a gross disobedience and derogation of the order dated 27.5.2019 the final punishment order has been passed on 24.12.2020 and when the contempt petition was filed before this Court and claim petition was filed before the U.P. Public Service Tribunal; contempt notices issued then the punishment order had been withdrawn on 6.4.2022. Even no such application was filed immediately after 6.4.2022, rather the same has been filed on 25.7.2022.

24. For the repetition sake, notably instead of filing an appropriate application on or before 31.8.2019 or immediately after 26.9.2019 (supra) when this Court has observed that such application can be filed otherwise the benefit of order dated 27.5.2019 would be extended to the petitioner, the opposite party / disciplinary authority has passed final punishment order on 24.12.2020. However, the punishment order had been withdrawn on 6.4.2022 after the issuance of contempt notices but no such application was filed immediately.

25. Therefore, in view of the facts and circumstances of the issue in question and also having regard to the orders being passed by this Court and the dictum of Full Bench in re: Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi (supra), I do not find any good ground to grant leave to the State authorities / disciplinary authority to pass final order in the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner as the aforesaid application is not only misconceived but also the same has been filed in a sheer illegal, arbitrary, unwarranted manner and in a gross disobedience of the direction of this Court, besides, the manner under which this application has been filed may not be appreciated as it clearly appears that the aforesaid application is misuse of the process of the law, so the application is liable to be dismissed.