Ravi @ Golu vs State Of U.P. And Another
2023 Latest Caselaw 23560 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


?Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:174001
 
Court No. - 91
 

 
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 14149 of 2021
 

 
Applicant :- Ravi @ Golu
 
Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another
 
Counsel for Applicant :- Santosh Kumar Verma
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
 

 
Hon'ble Gajendra Kumar,J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the applicant, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the material available on record.

2. The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the applicants for quashing the entire proceedings of the criminal case No.55 of 2020 (State Vs. Ravi @ Golu) arising out of case crime No.417 of 2020, under Sections 354, 506 IPC and Section 7/8 of POCSO Act, Police Station-Jalaun, District-Jalaun on the basis of compromise deed dated 31.03.2021.

3. The parties, out of their own free will, have settled their dispute amicably and in furtherance thereof, they have filed a compromise deed dated 31.01.2021 annexed as Annexure No.6 to the affidavit filed on behalf of opposite party no.2. Thereafter, this Court, vide order 13.08.2021, has sent the said compromise deed to the trial court with a direction to get the same verified and submit a report.

4. Learned counsel for the parties have not disputed the fact that the parties have settled their dispute amicably and they have filed compromise deed dated 31.01.2021 and the same has been verified by the trial Court, vide order dated 29.04.2022, a copy of which has been annexed in support of the Application.

5. On the other hand, learned AGA for the State has opposed the contention aforesaid and submits that proceedings of serious offences like murder or rape etc. cannot be quashed, however, he has fairly admitted that matter has amicably been settled between the parties on the basis of compromise.

6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perusal of record, It is pertinent to refer paragraph nos.12, 16 and 17 of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court passed in Criminal Appeal No.1217 of 2022 (Kapil Gupta Vs. State of NCT of Delhi and another) dated 10.08.2022. The same is reproduced hereinunder:

"12. No doubt that the learned ASG is right in relying on various judgments of this Court which reiterate the legal position that in heinous and serious offences like murder or rape, the Court should not quash the proceedings. It will be relevant to refer to paragraph 29.5 to 29.7 of the judgment of this Court in the case of Narender Singh versus State of Punjab1, which read thus:

29.5 While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6 Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7 While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.?

16. In both the cases, though the charge sheets have been filed, the charges are yet to be framed and as such, the trial has not yet commenced. It is further to be noted that since the respondent No.2 herself is not supporting the prosecution case, even if the criminal trial is permitted to go ahead, it will end in nothing else than an acquittal. If the request of the parties is denied, it will be amounting to only adding one more criminal case to the already overburdened criminal courts.

17. In that view of the matter, we find that though in a heinous or serious crime like rape, the Court should not normally exercise the powers of quashing the proceedings, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and in order to give succour to Respondent No. 2 so that she is saved from further agony of facing two criminal trials, one as a victim and one as an accused, we find that this is a fit case wherein the extraordinary powers of this Court be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings"

7. It can thus be seen that Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly held that though the Court should be slow in quashing the proceedings wherein heinous and serious offences are involved, the High Court is not foreclosed from examining as to whether there exists material for incorporation of such an offence or as to whether there is sufficient evidence which if proved would lead to proving the charge for the offence charged with. The Apex Court has also to take into consideration as to whether the settlement between the parties is going to result into harmony between them which may improve their mutual relationship.

8. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that it is also relevant to consider as to what is stage of the proceedings. It has been observed that if an application is made at a belated stage wherein the evidence has been led and the matter is at the stage of arguments or judgment, the Court should be slow to exercise the power to quash the proceedings. However, if such an application is made at an initial stage before commencement of trial, the said factor will weigh with the court in exercising its power.

9. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, submissions made by counsel for parties and upon the perusal of material on record, it appears that during pendency of the present application, parties have already settled their dispute voluntarily and amicably. Compromise so entered into by parties have been verified by learned Court below. This fact has not been denied by learned counsel for opposite parties. As such, on date, no difference exists between parties. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that no useful purpose shall be served by prolonging the proceedings of above mentioned cases. In view of compromise entered into by the parties, chances of conviction of accused applicants are also remote and bleak. Resultantly, continuation of proceedings would thus, itself cause injustice to parties. The instant trial would only entail loss of precious judicial time in a futile pursuit.

10. In view of above, the instant application succeeds and is liable to be allowed.

11. Accordingly, the entire proceedings of impugned cognizance order dated 23.02.2023 and chargesheet dated 25.08.2022 as well as entire criminal proceedings of criminal case No.36 of 2023 arising out of case crime No.215 of 2022, under Sections 363, 366, 376 IPC and Section 4 of POCSO Act, Police Station-Karari, District-Kaushambi is, hereby, quashed.

12. The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed.

13. Office is directed to send a copy of this order to the Court concerned through email/fax immediately for necessary compliance.

Order Date :- 28.8.2023

Ashutosh