Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 21726 ALL
Judgement Date : 11 August, 2023
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:163692 Court No. - 91 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 47232 of 2019 Applicant :- Suresh Passwan And 3 Others Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- Mohd. Shoeb Khan Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Gajendra Pratap Singh Hon'ble Gajendra Kumar,J.
Heard learned counsel for the applicants, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the material available on record.
The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the applicant for quashing the entire proceeding as well as chargesheet dated 13.08.1998 of S.T. No.326 of 2002 arising out of case crime No.133 of 1998, under Sections 147, 148, 323, 324, 307, 504, 506 IPC, Police Station-Taraya Sujan, District-Kushi Nagar, which is pending in the court of Judicial Magistrate-Kushi Nagar.
The parties, out of their own free will, have settled their dispute amicably and in furtherance thereof, they have filed a compromise deed dated 27.09.2022 annexed with the Application sent by the court below in pursuance of the order dated 08.09.2022 passed by a co-ordinate Bench of this court in the present Application. The same is reproduced hereinunder:-
"Heard Mohd. Shoeb Khan, learned counsel for the applicants, Sri G.P. Singh, learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 and Sri Jhamman Ram, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record.
The instant application has been moved on behalf of applicants to quash the entire criminal proceeding of S.T. No. 326 of 2001 (State v. Suresh Passwan and others), arising out of Case Crime No. 133 of 1998, under Section 147, 148, 323, 324, 307, 504, 506 I.P.C., Police Station Taraya Sujan, District Kushinagar, pending in the court of Additional Sessions Judge/F.T.C. No. 1, District Kushinagar.
Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that trial of the case is pending since 2001 and statement of the accused persons although have been recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. but in the meantime applicants and opposite party no. 2 have compromised the matter in the year 2017 and compromise executed between them has been annexed as annexure no. 4 to the affidavit filed in support of application.
He next submitted that although present matter also relates to offence under Section 307 I.P.C. but from the perusal of the injury report of two injured persons, it is apparent that no offence under Section 307 I.P.C. is made out and even there is no x-ray report on record of any of the injured person on the basis of which it could be inferred that injuries sustained to them were dangerous to life.
He next submitted that applicants and opposite party no. 2 are step brothers and dispute between the parties are purely private in nature and therefore, they amicably settle their dispute for their peaceful future.
Learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance upon three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and others reported in [AIR 2019 SC 1290].
He next submitted that even at this advanced stage, proceeding pending against the applicants can be quashed on the basis of compromise executed between the parties and therefore, it is desirable to direct the court below to verify the compromise. He placed reliance on Apex Court judgment in the case of Ram Gopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2022 (118) ACC 318 SC.
Learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 also conceded that both the parties have already settled their dispute out of the court and matter has been compromised between them and opposite party no. 2 is also ready to appear before the court concerned for verification of compromise.
Learned A.G.A. is having no objection, if any such direction is given to the court below.
I have heard both the parties and perused the record of the case.
Although, the present matter relates to Section 307 I.P.C. which is of the year 2001 but both the parties have settled their dispute and injuries sustained to the injured Raju Paswan are on non vital parts of body and some of the injuries referred for x-ray but there is no x-ray report. Report of other injured person Manju shows that although she sustained head injury but in spite of the fact that her injury was also referred to x-ray but there is no x-ray report on record, therefore, in view of the law laid down by Apex Court in case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and others (Supra) and Ram Gopal (Supra), it is directed that both the parties shall appear before the court below on 26.09.2022 for verification of the compromise executed between them and shall file application in this regard along with certified copy of this order. If any such application is moved, then court below shall verify the compromise executed between the parties in accordance with law and shall submit its report to this Court.
List this case on 12.10.2022.
Till the next date of listing, further proceedings of the aforesaid case, shall remain stayed.
Office is directed to submit report on the date fixed in respect of verification report, if any, forwarded by the court below."
Learned counsel for the parties have not disputed the fact that the parties have settled their dispute amicably and they have filed compromise deed dated 27.09.2022 and the same has been verified by the trial Court, vide order dated 03.10.2023, a copy of which has been annexed in support of the Application.
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Others Vs. State of Gujarat and another, (2017) 9 SCC 641 has laid down the following guidelines with regard to quashing of criminal proceedings as well regarding compromise in criminal proceedings in paragraphs 16 to 16.10 of the judgement, which is quoted below:
"16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions.
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognizes and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8 and 16.9 above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012 (Ramgopal and Another Vs. The State of M.P.); 2021 SCC OnLine SC 834, has reiterated the guidelines regarding quashing of criminal proceedings in view of compromise. Following has been observed in paragraph 18-19:-
"18. It is now a well crystalized axiom that plenary jurisdiction of this Court to impart complete justice under Article 142 cannot ipso facto be limited or restricted by ordinary statutory provisions. It is also noteworthy that even in the absence of an express provision akin to Section 482 Cr.P.C. conferring powers on the Supreme Court to abrogate and set aside criminal proceedings, the jurisdiction exercisable under Article 142 of the Constitution embraces this Court with scopious powers to quash criminal proceedings also, so as to secure complete justice. In doing so, due regard must be given to the overarching objective of sentencing in the criminal justice system, which is grounded on the sub-lime philosophy of maintenance of peace of the collective and that the rationale of placing an individual behind bars is aimed at his reformation.
19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences 'compoundable' within the statutory framework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercise carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations."
(Emphasis supplied)
Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, submissions made by counsel for parties and upon the perusal of material on record, it appears that during pendency of the present application, parties have already settled their dispute voluntarily and amicably. Compromise so entered into by parties have been verified by learned Court below. This fact has not been denied by learned counsel for opposite parties. As such, on date, no difference exists between parties. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that no useful purpose shall be served by prolonging the proceedings of above mentioned cases. In view of compromise entered into by the parties, chances of conviction of accused applicants are also remote and bleak. Resultantly, continuation of proceedings would thus, itself cause injustice to parties. The instant trial would only entail loss of precious judicial time in a futile pursuit.
In view of above, the instant application succeeds and is liable to be allowed.
Accordingly, the entire proceeding as well as chargesheet dated 13.08.1998 of S.T. No.326 of 2002 arising out of case crime No.133 of 1998, under Sections 147, 148, 323, 324, 307, 504, 506 IPC, Police Station-Taraya Sujan, District-Kushi Nagar, which is pending in the court of Judicial Magistrate-Kushi Nagar is, hereby, quashed.
The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed.
Office is directed to send a copy of this order to the Court concerned through email/fax immediately for necessary compliance.
Order Date :- 11.8.2023
Ashutosh
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