Ram Milan vs Kripa Shanker And Others
2023 Latest Caselaw 21496 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 


Reserved 
 
Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-LKO:53100
 
Court No. - 19
 

 
Case :- SECOND APPEAL No. - 191 of 1992
 

 
Appellant :- Ram Milan
 
Respondent :- Kripa Shanker And Others
 
Counsel for Appellant :- S.K.Mehrotra,I.D. Shukla,M.L.Yadav,S.A. Husain,S.P. Singh,Vibhanshu Srivastava
 
Counsel for Respondent :- S.K.Srivastava,A. Abbas,A.K. Tewari,A.K. Tiwari,Ayush Chaudhary,Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary
 

 
Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh,J. 

1. Heard Sri Vibhanshu Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Rakesh Chaudhary, learned counsel for the respondents.

2. The instant second appeal was admitted on the substantial questions of law framed in the memo of appeal as (a) (b) and (d) and they read as under:-

(a) Whether the finding recorded in appeal that the compromise dated 20.09.1970 regarding the family arrangement already arrived at reducing the share of Sri Ram Prasad in the property in dispute was not admissible in evidence for want of registration, is contrary to the well settled view of this Hon'ble Court and is illegal ?

(b) Whether the findings recorded in appeal that the photostat copy of the family settlement dated 20.09.1970 was not admissible in evidence in the present suit is illegal in view of the fact established on the record that the other family arrangements had been admitted by Sri Ram Prasad in his written statement filed in the earlier suit no. 192 of 1971 having been accepted by him and the said suit was having been decided on the basis of the compromise in which the above family settlement had been admitted?

(d) Whether the decree passed by the trial court was illegally reversed in appeal by the appellate court below without reversing the finding recorded by the trial court that the situation of the share of Ram Prasad falling in the middle of the above plot established that Ram Prasad had accepted lesser area in the above plot and that the above compromise had been effectively acted upon, withour reversing the finding of the trial court?

3. Briefly, the facts giving rise to the instant appeal are being noticed hereinafter first:-

4. Sri Ram Lal and Kripa Shankar, the original plaintiffs, filed a suit in the Court of Munsif Hawali, Faizabad registered as R.S. No. 273 of 1981 seeking a decree of injunction restraining the defendant nos. 1 to 4 from interfering in the possession of the plaintiffs.

5. It was pleaded that the property in dispute relates to Plot No. 65 measuring 11 Biswa and 8 dhur situate in village Berwari Khand, Pargana Amisan, Tehsil and District Faizabad which was located on the western side of the road from Gosainganj Bazar to Sorva. It was also pleaded that initially the property, the subject matter of the suit was of Ram Prasad son of Sahai and Sarju Prasad, Jagannath, Ram Shankar, Jamuna Prasad and Badri Prasad.

6. It was stated that the property initially belonged to Ram Chandra Sahu who was survived by his two sons, Ram Samujh Sahu and Sri Sahai Sahu. Sri Sahai Sahu was survived by his only son Ram Prasad whereas Ram Samujh Sahu had five sons namely Sarju Prasad, Jamuna Prasad, Badri Prasad, Ganga Prasad and Jagannath. Thus, Sri Ram Prasad had half share in plot no. 65 whereas the other half was with the five brothers as noticed above.

7. At present, the plainiffs and the defendants nos. 5 to 8 are the purchasers of half share of Ram Prasad whereas the defendants no. 1 to 4 are the purchasers from Sarju Prasad. The dispute arose on account of the fact that the plaintiffs and the defendants no. 5 to 8 claiming to have purchased half share of Ram Prasad were in the process of raising constructions over their land whereas the same was resisted by the defendants nos. 1 to 4 who are the successors in interest having purchased the share of Sarju Prasad.

8. The defence of the defendant nos. 1 to 4 was that a family arrangement had been arrived at between Ram Prasad and the five sons of Ram Samujh. In tems whereof, Ram Prasad had relinquished part of his share which was reduced to 3 biswa and 16 dhur instead of 5 biswa and 14 dhur. It was also stated that Sri Sarju Prasad had instituted a suit for injunction wherein a compromise decree was passed on 01st November, 1972 wherein Ram Prasad had acknowledge the family settlement including the reduction of his share.

9. It was also pleaded as defence that in light of the family settlement and the consent decree of the year 1972, Ram Prasad did not have 5 biswa and 14 dhur rather his share was now limited to 3 biswa and 16 dhur and the plaintiffs could only purchase that area which was with Ram Prasad and as such they were trying to encroach upon the land belonging to the defendants which was in excess of the area of Ram Prasad and the sale deed selling larger area was not correct and the plaintiffs could not have a better right than what their predecessor had.

10. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the Trial Court framed seven issues, however, the relevant ones are noticed hereinafter:-

(i) Whether the plaintiff no. 1 is the owner in possession of the area of the property shown in the site plan with letters Va, La, Ga, Gha, Dha?

ii) whether the plaintiff no. 2 is the owner in possession of the property shown in the site plan with the letters ya, ra, la, va, sa?

(iii) Whether the defendants no. 1 to 4 are the owners of the property shown by letters in the site plan va, la, ga, gha, dha in the site plan?

(iv) Whether the defendant no. 9 is the owner in possession of the property shown by letters ya, ra, la, va in the site plan?

(v) Whether Ram Prasad and his vendees are bound by the family settlement and if so its effect?

11. The Trial Court primarily considered the important issue as to whether the plaintiffs and their predecessors namely Ram Prasad were bound by the family settlement and it returned a finding that the family settlement was binding and Ram Prasad only had a share of 3 Biswa 16 Dhur and he could not have transferred more area in plot no. 65.

12. While dealing with the other issues, the Trial Court recorded the possession as well as the ownership in respect of the parties only to the extent of the area purchased by them from Sri Sarju Prasad whereas in so far as the plaintiffs are concerned, their area was confined only to 3 biswa and 16 dhur. With the aforesaid, the suit was dismissed by means of judgment and decree dated 24.01.1983. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal under Section 96 C.P.C. which was registered as Regular Civil Appeal No. 59 of 1983 and the Lower Appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and decreed the suit by means of judgment and decree dated 17.12.1991. While doing so, the Lower Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the alleged family settlement which was reduced in writing and was placed on record as Exhibit-5 was a photocopy and unregistered document, hence, could not be treated as cogent evidence and ignored the same.

13. The Lower Appellate Court also noticed that the consent decree dated 01st November, 1972 passed in Regular Suit No. 192 of 1971 was also not binding for the reason that it did not clearly indicate the terms of the compromise as emanating from the family settlement rather only a passing reference was made to the family settlement of 20th September, 1970 apart from the fact that it was not also indicated whether it was signed by Ram Prasad.

14. Thus, with the aforesaid findings and noticing that the family settlement required registration, hence, in absence of the registration and the photocopy not being admissible, the rights of Ram Prasad could not be affected, accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the suit was decreed.

15. The defendants no. 1 to 4 have approached this Court in the present second appeal and Sri Vibhanshu Srivastava, learned counsel for the -defendants-appellants vehemently argued that the approach of the Lower Appellate Court was per-se against the law. He submits that a family settlement could be oral and there is no compulsion that it requires registration.

16. He further submits that the document which was produced on record as Exhibit-5 was merely a memorandum which did not require registration. Even, if at all, it was a photocopy but the fact remains that a suit was filed by Sri Sarju Prasad wherein Ram Prasad had also consented and a compromise decree was passed in Regular Suit No. 192 of 1971 which also refer to the said family settlement and the said decree was placed on record which clearly established the family settlement and in terms thereof it was not open for the Lower Appellate Court to have ignored the effect of the consent decree which even otherwise creates an estopple against Ram Prasad and his successors.

17. It is thus urged that despite the facts were largely admitted between the parties, the approach of the Lower Appellate Court in reversing the findings of the Trial Court are against the law and merely it has been done on the ground that the family settlement brought on record was unregistered and that the consent decree could not bind the parties.

18. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Khushi Ram and Others Vs. Naval Singh and others, 2021 SCC Online SC 128, Korukonda Chalapathi Rao and Others Vs. Korukonda Annapurna Sampath Kumar; 2021 SCC Online SC 847 and Compac Enterprises India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Beant Singh; 2021 (3) SCC 702.

19. Sri Rakesh Chaudhary, learned counsel for the respondents has refuted the aforesaid submissions and has urged that apparently the alleged family settlement dated 20th September, 1970, a photocopy of which was brought on record as Exhibit-5 suffered from two disabilities. First it was a photocopy and before the same could be taken in evidence, the necessary ingredients to admit a photocopy as secondary evidence in terms of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was required to be fulfilled which has not been done. For the aforesaid reasons, the said document was inadmissible.

20. Even otherwise, it is urged that if the said document is noticed, even then it would be found that it is not memorandum of family settlement rather it is the family settlement itself by means of which the rights of the respective parties was affected for the first time and in view thereof the said document required registration and in absence thereof the second disability accrued and the document was rightly ignored.

21. Sri Chaudhary, learned counsel for the respondents further submits that in so far as the consent decree is concerned, the same did not clearly indicate that it referred to the family settlement or that the rights accruing therefrom have been incorporated. It only makes a passing reference without referring to the stipulations, rights and obligations which may have accrued from the said family settlement and in absence thereof a mere consent decree cannot create rights or abridge them. It is also urged that the said consent decree does not indicate that it was signed by Ram Prasad.

22. It is also urged that even otherwise, the said family settlement was never acted upon, inasmuch as, despite the alleged settlement having taken place, the shares of the parties were never brought in tune with the settlement nor it was ever recorded in any revenue records and till the very end, it remained in the name of Ram Prasad who had half share in Plot No. 65 which has validly been transferred in favour of the plaintiffs and in this view of the matter, there is no error committed by the Lower Appellate Court, accordingly, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

23. In support of his submissions, Sri Chaudhary relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in Kale and Others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others; 1976 (3) SCC 119; Ripudaman Singh Vs. Tikka Maheshwar Chand, 2021 (39) LCD 1665; J. Yashoda Vs. K. Shobharani, 2007 (5) SCC 730.

24. Before adverting to the respective submissions, it will be first necessary to take a glace at the decisions cited by the respective parties.

25. Sri Vibhansu Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the decision of Khushi Ram (Supra) wherein the Apex Court dealing with the question as to whether a decree passed in a civil suit requires registration and after considering the provisions of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 held that the decree if it relates to the subject matter of the suit, it was not required to be registerd under Secion 17 (2) (vi) of the Registration Act, 1908 and thus it was covered by the exclusionary clause.

26. The other question which was referred to the Apex Court regarding the family settlement, the Apex Court after relying upon the celebrated decision of the Apex Court in Kale Vs. DDC (supra) held that the propositions laid in Kale Vs. DDC (supra) was still binding and thus the Court is required to take a broad approach while dealing with family settlements, however, what needs to be seen in the said case that the issue was whether the parties could be treated as a family in order to enter into a family settlement and it is in the aforesaid context that the said decision was rendered.

27. In Korukonda (supra), the Apex Court noticing the earlier decisions on the issue of family settlement and requirement of its registration held that in case a document is in the nature of memorandum evidencing a family settlement already entered into and having been prepared as record so that there are no confusion in future, it need not be stand or register, however, where there has been a partition then there may be no scope for invoking the concept of antecedent rights as such then such a document would require registration.

28. The decision of Compac Enterprises (supra) relates to a consent decree wherein it has been held by the Apex Court that the consent decree are intended to create estoppel by judgment against the parties thereby putting an end to the future litigations, however, this is not an absolute formulation and a consent decree would not serve as an estoppel where the compromise was vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or mistake.

29. As far as the decisions cited by Sri Chaudhary are concerned in Kale Vs. DDC (supra), the Apex Court has noticed the various nuances relating to the family settlement which are undobtedly followed till today and shall be appropriately considered while dealing with the respectful submissions of the parties.

30. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon a decision of Ripu Daman (supra) which is also in respect of an issue as to whether a compromise decree in respect of land which is not the subject matter of suit but is part of the settlement between the family members required compulsory registration and after noticing the provisions of Section 17 of The Registration Act, 1908 and other decisions of the Apex Court held that the compromise decree which declares a pre-existing rights and does not by itself create a new right or title in the property does not require registration, however, if the decree were to create a right for the first time or title or interest in the immovable property then it would require registration.

31. In J. Yashoda (supra), the Apex Court dealing with the Section 65 of The Evidence Act, 1872 has held that as a general rule, secondary evidence is admissible only in the absence of primary evidence and the law requires a proper explanation for absence of the primary evidence only then the secondary evidence can be admitted.

32. In the backdrop of the aforesaid propositions of law cited by the respective parties and noticing the questions of law required to be answered, it would be apposite to consider the effect of the family settlement filed as Exhibit-5 and the effect of the consent decree dated 01.11.1972 which is Exhibit-2.

33. First and foremost, it will be relevant to notice what is a family settlement and how the same is to be construed and for the aforesaid purpose, the decision of the Apex Court in Kale Vs. DDC (supra) would be helpful and the relevant paragraphs of the said decision are being noticed hereinafter for ready reference:-

9........By virtue of a family settlement or arrangement members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about complete harmony and goodwill in the family. The family arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves and would be enforced if honestly made. In this connection, Kerr in his valuable treatise Kerr on Fraud at p. 364 makes the following pertinent observations regarding the nature of the family arrangement which may be extracted thus:

"The principles which apply to the case of ordinary compromise between strangers do not equally apply to the case of compromises in the nature of family arrangements. Family arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves, and will be enforced if honestly made, although they have not been meant as a compromise, but have proceeded from an error of all parties, originating in mistake or ignorance of fact as to what their rights actually are, or of the points on which their rights actually depend."

The object of the arrangement is to protect the family from long-drawn litigation or perpetual strifes which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family. Today when we are striving to build up an egalitarian society and are trying for a complete reconstruction of the society, to maintain .and uphold the unity and homogeneity of the family which ultimately results in the unification of the society and, therefore, of the entire country, is the prime need of the hour. A family arrangement by which the property is equitably divided between the various contenders so as to achieve an equal distribution of wealth instead of concentrating the same in the hands of a few is undoubtedly a milestone in the administration of social justice. That is why the term "family" has to be understood in a wider sense so as to include within its fold not only close relations or legal heirs but even those persons who may have some sort of antecedent title, a semblance of a claim or even if they have a spes successionis so that future disputes are sealed for ever and the family instead of fighting claims inter se and wasting time, money and energy on such fruitless or futile litigation is able to devote its attention to more constructive work in the larger interest of the country. The courts have, therefore, leaned in favour of upholding a family arrangement instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds. Where the courts find that the family arrangement suffers from a legal lacuna or a formal defect the rule of estoppel is pressed into service and is applied to shut out plea of the person who being a party to family arrangement seeks to unsettle a settled dispute and claims to revoke the family arrangement under which he has himself enjoyed some material benefits. The law in England on this point is almost the same. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 17, Third Edition, at pp. 215-216, the following apt observations regarding the essentials of the family settlement and the principles governing the existence of the same are made:

"A family arrangement is an agreement between members of the same family, intended to be generally and reasonably for the benefit of the family either by compromising doubtful or disputed rights or by preserving the family property or the peace and security of the family by avoiding litigation or by saving its honour.

The agreement may be implied from a long course of dealing, but it is more usual to embody or to effectuate the agreement in a deed to which the term "family arrangement" is applied.

Family arrangements are governed by principles which are not applicable to dealings between strangers. The court, when deciding the rights of parties under family arrangements or claims to upset such arrangements, considers what in the broadest view of the matter is most for the interest of families, and has regard to considerations which, in dealing with transactions between persons not members of the same family, would not be taken into account. Matters which would be fatal to the validity of similar transactions between strangers are not objections to the binding effect of family arrangements."

10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions:

"(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family;

(2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence;

(3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary;

(4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable;

(5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same;

(6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement."

34. After the aforesaid propositions is noticed, it would indicate that even in Khushi Ram (supra), the Apex Court while dealing with the second question relating to family settlement has relied upon the aforesaid decision of Kale Vs. DDC (supra).

35. For the moment, if the objections raised by Sri Chaudhary regarding admissibility of Exhibit-5 being a photocopy is ignored for the time being and the document Exhibit-5 is seen, it would indicate that it is a family settlement which was arrived at between the parties wherein the respective shares have been indicated and demarcated. It also states that the shares have been demarcated in terms of this family settlement and thus it would be clear that it does not in any manner record a past transaction or a settlement which has been arrived at rather in order to sink the disputes, the parties had entered into this settlement and they have re-adjusted their shares. This document Exhibit-5 in view of the propositions that if the family arrangement is reduced into writing containing the terms and recitals of the family arrangement made under the document then such a document would require registration, as evident from the propositions laid down by the Apex Court in Kale vs. DDC (supra) in paragraph 10 (4) becomes applicable.

36. It is not disputed that Exhibit-5 is a photocopy. It is also not disputed that Sarju Prasad who was examined as D.W. 1 did not lay down any foundation for the loss or absence of the original document of the family settlement. Apparently, the provisions of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which has been noticed by the Apex Court in J. Yashoda (supra) in paragraph nos. 8 and 9 are relevant to be noticed at this stage and reads as under:-

"8. Essentially, secondary evidence is an evidence which may be given in the absence of that better evidence which law requires to be given first, when a proper explanation of its absence is given. The definition in Section 63 is exhaustive as the section declares that secondary evidence "means and includes" and then follow the five kinds of secondary evidence.

9. The rule which is the most universal, namely, that the best evidence the nature of the case will admit shall be produced, decides this objection. That rule only means that, so long as the higher or superior evidence is within your possession or may be reached by you, you shall give no inferior proof in relation to it. Section 65 deals with the proof of the contents of the documents tendered in evidence. In order to enable a party to produce secondary evidence it is necessary for the party to prove existence and execution of the original document. Under Section 64, documents are to be provided (sic proved) by primary evidence. Section 65, however permits secondary evidence to be given of the existence, condition or contents of documents under the circumstances mentioned. The conditions laid down in the said section must be fulfilled before secondary evidence can be admitted. Secondary evidence of the contents of a document cannot be admitted without non-production of the original being first accounted for in such a manner as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the section. In Ashok Dulichand v. Madahavlal Dube [(1975) 4 SCC 664] it was inter alia held as follows : (SCC pp. 666-67, para 7)

"7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the order of the High Court in this respect calls for no interference. According to clause (a) of Section 65 of Evidence Act, secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in Section 66, such person does not produce it. Clauses (b) to (g) of Section 65 specify some other contingencies wherein secondary evidence relating to a document may be given, but we are not concerned with those clauses as it is the common case of the parties that the present case is not covered by those clauses. In order to bring his case within the purview of clause (a) of Section 65, the appellant filed applications on 4-7-1973, before Respondent 1 was examined as a witness, praying that the said respondent be ordered to produce the original manuscript of which, according to the appellant, he had filed photostat copy. Prayer was also made by the appellant that in case Respondent 1 denied that the said manuscript had been written by him, the photostat copy might be got examined from a handwriting expert. The appellant also filed affidavit in support of his applications. It was however, nowhere stated in the affidavit that the original document of which the photostat copy had been filed by the appellant was in the possession of Respondent 1. There was also no other material on the record to indicate that the original document was in the possession of Respondent 1. The appellant further failed to explain as to what were the circumstances under which the photostat copy was prepared and who was in possession of the original document at the time its photograph was taken. Respondent 1 in his affidavit denied being in possession of or having anything to do with such a document. The photostat copy appeared to the High Court to be not above suspicion. In view of all the circumstances, the High Court came to the conclusion that no foundation had been laid by the appellant for leading secondary evidence in the shape of the photostat copy. We find no infirmity in the above order of the High Court as might justify interference by this Court."

37. Apparently, for the aforesaid reasons, in absence of any foundation in terms of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, the said document per-se was not admissible in evidence. If the evidence of D.W. 1 Sri Sarju Prasad is taken at a glance, it would indicate that he admitted that in terms of the alleged family settlement no entry was made in any Government records or revenue records. A number of questions regarding its execution were answered in the negative which also does not give credence to the acting upon of the alleged family settlement.

38. Thus, the issue involved in the instant appeal regarding registration of a family settlement is answered accordingly in light of the decision of the Apex Court in Kale Vs. DDC (supra) and applying the same to the instant case, it would indicate that by virtue of the said document which otherwise was not admissible but that family settlement for the first time was reduced in writing and by virtue of the said document, the parties re-adjusted their shares and as noticed above, it required registration.

39. Coming to the issue of the consent decree, it will be relevant to notice that the consent decree was brought on record as Exhibit-2. It indicates that the suit was decided in terms of the compromise which shall form part of the decree and from the perusal thereof the consent decree does not specifically relate to the family settlement. The only reference is that in terms of the family agreement dated 20.09.1970 and the compromise the parties have resolved their disputes and each of the parties have removed their unauthorized possession and have handed over the same to the plaintiffs, however, what is conspicuously absent is that the the said compromise does not bear the signatures of Ram Prasad who is said to be the defendant no. 1 in the said suit bearing No. 192 of 1971.

40. Apparently, as a proposition of law, a consent decree does create an estoppel against the parties subject to the condition that it is not vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or mistake but at the same time it also needs to be seen that if the decree creates rights for the first time then the decree requires registration but if it declares a pre-existing right then it does not require registration as held by the Apex Court in Ripudaman Singh (supra).

41. Apparently, in absence of any clarity, in respect of the consent decree, it may create an estoppel but at the same time the language of the consent decree and the terms indicate that it was in respect of removal of the possession but it does not clarify as to what property, what was the area which was under the respective unauthorized occupation which has been restored, therefore, in absence of clarity and no proper evidence led to connect the said consent decree and that it has been signed by Ram Prasad, hence, it would not come to the aid of the defendants-appellants.

42. As far as the third question regarding reversal of the finding is concerned, this Court finds that the finding recorded by the Trial Court in itself is based on an inadmissible document. The findings were apparently perverse, hence, the Appellate Court taking notes of the aforesaid has set aside the same even though not specifically setting aside one particular finding, accordingly, there does not appear to be any error which may persuade this Court to interfere under Section 100 C.P.C.

43. In light of the aforesaid discussions, this Court is clearly of the view that the appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 17.12.1991 passed in Regular Civil Appeal No. 59 of 1983 is affirmed. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. The record of the court below shall be returned expeditiously.

Order Date :- 10th August, 2023

Asheesh