Hori Singh vs State Bank Of India Thru Its ...
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

AFR
 
Reserved
 
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 30241 of 2016
 
Petitioner :- Hori Singh
 
Respondent :- State Bank Of India Thru Its Chairman And Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Sameer Kalia
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Sudeep Seth, Jitendra Narain Mishra
 

 
Hon'ble Dinesh Kumar Singh, J.

1. The present writ petition has been filed seeking quashing of the orders dated 5.6.2015, 16.12.2015 and 29.7.2016 (Annexure Nos.1, 2 and 3 to the writ petition) passed by the disciplinary authority, appellate authority and the reviewing authority.

2. The disciplinary authority on conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, imposed penalty of removal from service and the said order of removal from service was affirmed in appeal as well as in review.

3. The disciplinary proceedings were instituted against the petitioner for alleged acts of omission and commissions of serous irregularities committed by him during his tenure as Branch Manager, Derapur Branch between 2.1.2012 to 27.4.2013. Sum and substance of the charge against the petitioner was gross irregularities in sourcing, disbursement and follow up of credit facilities sanctioned to 8 borrowing units and 20 Prime Minister Rojgar Yojna and the Chief Minister Rojgar Yojna Loans and thus, exposing bank to substantial loss of Rs.2,95,45,786/- plus interest.

4. The disciplinary inquiry was held under the provisions of the State Bank of India Officers Service Rules, 1992 (for short ''Rules, 1992'). Charge sheet contains 26 allegations against the petitioner. The inquiry officer found 22 allegations proved, 3 were not proved and 1 was partly proved. After submissions of the charge sheet, the petitioner was afforded opportunity to submit his response to the charge sheet. The disciplinary authority afforded opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner and, thereafter, passed the impugned punishment order dated 5.6.2015 of removal from serviced.

5. Thereafter, petitioner filed a departmental appeal on 1.8.2015. The appellate authority gave a detailed consideration to the submissions made by the petitioner and affirmed the punishment order of removal from service vide order dated 16.12.2015. Petitioner, thereafter, filed a review petition on 1.2.2016 against the appellate order. The reviewing committee consisting of three officers, dismissed the review petition vide impugned order dated 29.7.2016. The reviewing committee also held that the penalty imposed on the petitioner was commensurate with the gravity of the lapses committed by the petitioner and there was no scope to modify the punishment order.

6. Sri Sameer Kalia, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that as per Rule 68(2) of Rules, 1992, the presenting officer was reacquired to prove the charges against the petitioner. The presenting officer did not prove the charges during the course of inquiry. The documents relied upon in the departmental inquiry, were not proved by examining the witnesses in support of them. He has, therefore, submitted that when the documents were not proved, which were relied upon in support of the charges, whole inquiry got vitiated.

7. It has been further submitted that besides the petitioner, other employees were also charge-sheeted in respect of the same allegations. However, other employees of the bank were let off with minor penalty. It has also been submitted that one Sri S.L. Nathan was the sanctioning authority of the loans, but he was let off with minor penalty. He has relied upon Rule 68(6) of Rules, 1992 to submit that when there were allegations against the two officers, joint inquiry should have been conducted, but in this case separate inquiries were held for the petitioner as well as for S.L. Nathan.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that there was no financial loss caused to the bank with respect to the defaulter borrowers and, therefore, the charge of causing financial losses to the tune of Rs.2,95,45,786/- is wholly untenable and the punishment of removal from service awarded to the petitioner is highly disproportionate to the alleged misconduct against the petitioner.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that nature of departmental inquiry is a quasi judicial proceeding. Mere production of documents is not enough, but the contents of the documentary evidence has to be proved by examining the witnesses. It is further submitted that even if the petitioner did not deny the documents produced during the course of the departmental inquiry, it was the duty of the bank/presenting officer to prove the documents by examining the witnesses. In the present case, the documents were not proved independently by examining the witnesses and, therefore, admission of the petitioner would not amount that documents were proved as required and, therefore, the punishment order passed by the disciplinary authority considering the charges proved against the petitioner, is wholly untenable and the impugned orders are liable to be set aside.

10. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the cases of Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank and others, (2009) 2 SCC 570 and State of U.P. and others Vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772: AIR 2010 SC 3131.

11. On the other hand, Sri Jitendra Narain Mishra, learned counsel for the bank has submitted that petitioner was the Branch Manager of Derapur Branch and during his tenure, loans were disbursed in gross violation of the banking practices and procedure. Due diligence was not observed. The bank interest was compromised and that resulted into the losses of Rs.2,95,45,786/-.

12. He has further submitted that under Rule 50(4) of Rules, 1992, every officer is required to take at all times all possible steps to ensure and protect the interests of the bank and he should discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence. He should not do anything, which is unbecoming of an officer. He has also submitted that Rule 67 of Rules, 1992 prescribes the major penalties, which include, inter alia, removal from service besides dismissal and compulsory retirement.

13. The manner in which the departmental inquiry is to be conducted, is provided under Rule 68(2) of Rules, 1992, which reads as under :-

"68. (2) .............................

(xiii) On the date fixed for the inquiry, the oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charge are proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of the Bank. The witnesses produced by the Presenting Officer shall be examined by the Presenting Officer and may be cross-examined by or on behalf of the officer. The Presenting Officer shall be entitled to re-examine his witnesses on any points on which they have been cross-examined, but not on a new matter without the leave of the Inquiring Authority. The Inquiring Authority may also put such questions to the witnesses as it thinks fit.

(xiv) Before the close of the case in support of the charges, the Inquiring Authority may, in its discretion, allow the Presenting Officer to produce evidence not included in the charge-sheetor may itself call for new evidence or recall or re-examine any witness. In such case, the officer shall be given opportunity to inspect the documentary evidence before it is taken on record,or to cross-examine a witness who has been so summoned. The Inquiring Authority may also allow the officer to produce new evidence, if it is of the opinion that the production of such evidence is necessary in the interest of justice.

(xv) W hen the case in support of the charges is closed, the officer may be required to state his defence, orally or in writing, as he may prefer. If the defence is made orally, it shall be recorded and the officer shall be required to sign the record. In either case, a copy of the statement of defence shall be given to the Presenting Officer.

(xvi) The evidence on behalf of the officer may then be produced. The officer may examine himself as a witness in his own behalf, if he so prefers. The witnesses, if any, produced by the officer shall then be examined by the officer and may be cross-examined by the Presenting Officer. The officer shall be entitled to re-examine any of his witnesses on any points on which they have been cross-examined, but not on any new matter without the leave of the Inquiring Authority.

(xvii) The Inquiring Authority may, after the officer closes his evidence, and shall if the officer has not got himself examined, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the officer to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.

...................................."

14. Learned counsel for the Bank has further submitted that the departmental inquiry was conducted strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Rules, 1992 with complete compliance of the principles of natural justice. It is further submitted that petitioner never disputed the documentary evidence produced by the presenting officer in support of the charges. The petitioner accepted the genuineness and authenticity of the documents at the commencement of the inquiry. The petitioner did not lead any evidence to controvert the contents of the documents and neither he disputed the contents of the documents relied on by the presenting officer in support of the charges. He has also submitted that once the documents were not denied, there was no requirement for examining the witnesses to prove the contents of the documents inasmuch as admitted facts need not be proved by examining the witnesses. It is, therefore, submitted that the inquiry officer had not committed any illegality as alleged or otherwise.

15. It has further been submitted that there is no weight in the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that listed prosecution documents were required to be proved by oral evidence though their authenticity and genuineness had not been disputed or denied by the petitioner. It is the discretion of the presenting officer to produce oral and documentary evidence to prove the charges, but if the documents filed in support of the charges remain un-rebutted and in fact accepted, then submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that even admitted documents were required to be proved by leading oral evidence, is belied of any legal basis. It is also submitted that whole charges were based on the documentary evidence and those documents were not denied and rather admitted by the petitioner and, therefore, there was no requirement for the presenting officer to lead oral evidence in support of the charges/allegations.

16. It is also important to note here that if the presenting officer in support of the charges, is relying on the documentary evidence, then authenticity/genuineness or their denial/rebuttal is to be done by the delinquent officer at the commencement of the inquiry. It is again reiterated that petitioner had not disputed the documents or the contents thereof. The petitioner was given full opportunity to examining the witnesses, who brought the documents, however, It was denied by him. Therefore, challenge of the admitted documents later on by the petitioner, can not be sustained in the eyes of law.

17. Learned counsel for the bank has further submitted that each of the allegations/charges against the petitioner got proved on the basis of the un-rebuttal/admitted documents. The inquiry officer prepared the inquiry report after carefully examining the listed documents, prosecution and defence exhibits, written brief/arguments of the presenting officer, reply as well as the defence documents produced by the petitioner during the course of the inquiry. The defence representative was given full opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses produced during the course of the inquiry as per the Rules, 1992, which was denied by him. Therefore, contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the documents relied upon by the inquiry officer, were not proved, has no basis and is liable to be rejected.

18. The disciplinary authority after considering the inquiry report, response of the petitioner and after giving him opportunity of hearing, had recorded his independent finding against each of the allegations in his order dated 5.6.2015. The disciplinary authority has carefully examined the entire record of the case and applied his independent mind. The disciplinary authority under Rule 68(3)(ii) of Rules, 1992 is required to give reason for his finding, only if he disagrees with the finding of the inquiry officer. In the present case, the disciplinary authority had agreed with the finding recorded by the inquiry officer and, therefore, there was no requirement to give reasons. Rule 68(3)(ii) of Rules, 1992 reads as under :-

"68. (3) (i) x x x x

(ii) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiring Authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge; if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose."

19. Learned counsel for the bank has further submitted that there was complete compliance of the principles of natural justice during the course of departmental inquiry and before passing the punishment order dated 5.6.2015. The petitioner's departmental appeal was duly considered and after detail consideration, the appellate authority found no merits in the appeal. The appellate authority applied his independent mind on passing the appellate order dated 16.12.2015. It is also submitted that there is no substance in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the bank did not suffer any loss because of the misdeeds and acts of omission and commission of the petitioner during his tenure as Branch Manager, Derapur Branch.

20. Learned counsel for the bank has further submitted that after settlement of claims from the Credit Guarantee Fund Trust for Micro and Small Enterprises (CGTMSE) to the tune of Rs.109.04 Lakhs, the bank was still exposed to a substantial loss of 186.42 Lakhs. The decree issued by the Debt Recovery Tribunal in favour of the bank was not a guarantee for full recovery of the loss to which the bank was exposed. The petitioner did not conduct any pre-sanction survey as it was required before sanctioning the loan and this fact got proved before the inquiry officer by inspection register relating to various accounts, which finds mention at serial no.29 of the minutes of the inquiry proceedings dated 19.9.2014. The petitioner had completed the pre-sanction survey reports without visiting the work places/residence of the borrowers and he prepared bogus survey reports. It is further submitted that the quantum of punishment of removal from service awarded to the petitioner, is just and proper and no interference is called for from this Court with the quantum of punishment.

21. It has also been submitted that the reviewing committee in detail order, had upheld the order of the appellate authority. The reviewing committee had also examined all the records and did not find any error committed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority and thus, upheld the order of punishment of removal from service.

22. Learned counsel for the bank has also submitted that there is no substance in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner was subjected to any discrimination inasmuch as the charges levelled against S.L. Nathan were different from the charges levelled against the petitioner. Nature of duties of the petitioner and S.L. Nathan were also different. The petitioner can not draw similarity with the case of S.L. Nathan as S.L. Nathan was charged with different charges. The petitioner was charge-sheeted for committing serous irregularities of sourcing, disbursement and follow up of credit facilities sanctioned to 8 borrowing units and 20 Prime Minister Rojgar Yojna and the Chief Minister Rojgar Yojna Loans and causing financial loss to the bank, while S.L. Nathan was charged with separate charges. He has, therefore, submitted that writ petition is without any merit and substance and is liable to be dismissed.

23. I have considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as by the learned counsel for the bank and perused the record of the writ petition.

24. The only argument which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that even if the petitioner did not deny the documents submitted in support of the charges by the presenting officer, it was the duty of the presenting officer to prove the contents of the documents by examining the witnesses and since the witnesses have not been examined to prove the contents of the documents, the charges against the petitioner did not get proved and, therefore, the punishment order, appellate order and the order passed in review are liable to be quashed.

25. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Roop Singh Negi (supra). In paragraph 14 of the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court held as under:-

"14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial function. The charges leveled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence."

26. In the present case, it is not a confession of the petitioner made before the police officer, which was relied on by the inquiry officer or the evidence collected during the course of investigation by the police officer against him. Here in the present case, the presenting officer brought documentary evidence in support of the charges, which were admitted by the petitioner and, therefore, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Roop Singh Negi (supra) has no relevance to the facts of the case.

27. It is well settled that in a domestic inquiry strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act are not applicable. The evidence which has probative value of reasonable nexus and credibility, can be placed reliance in support of the allegations. Section 56 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that admitted facts need not be proved.

28. Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and another Vs. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491 in paragraph 4 of the judgement while dealing with standard of proof and evidence applicable in the domestic inquiry, held as under :-

"4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. Ail materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding,even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below mis-directed themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The 'residuum' rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passengers from American jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair common-sense way as men of understanding and wordly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a ending is certainty available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the flying squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge leveled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground."

29. The right of cross-examination accrues in disciplinary proceedings if the statement of a person, who has testified, is in dispute. If there is no dispute regarding the documents and the facts, in such a case there is no requirement for cross-examination. When on the question of facts there was no dispute, no real prejudice would be caused to a party aggrieved by an order, by absence of any formal opportunity of cross -examination per se does not invalidate or vitiate the decision arrived at fairly.

30. Supreme Court in the case of K.L. Tripathi Vs. State Bank of India and others, (1984) 1 SCC 43 in paragraph 32 held as under:-

"32. The basic concept is fair play in action administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial. The concept fair play in action must depend upon the particular lis, if there be any, between the parties. If the credibility of a person who has testified or given some information is in doubt, or if the version or the statement of the person who has testified, is, in dispute, right of cross-examination must inevitably form part of fair play in action but where there is no lis regarding the facts but certain explanation of the circumstances there is no requirement of cross-examination to be fulfilled to justify fair play in action. When on the question of facts there was no dispute, no real prejudice has been caused to a party aggrieved by an order, by absence of any formal opportunity of cross-examination per se does not invalidate or vitiate the decision arrived at fairly. This is more so when the party against whom an order has been passed does not dispute the facts and does not demand to test the veracity of the version or the credibility of the statement."

31. It is also not in dispute that charges in a disciplinary proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt. Though the inquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, but he is not required to observe the strict adherence of the Indian Evidence Act. The inquiry officer requires to arrive at a conclusion upon analysing the documents/evidence before him regarding preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record.

32. Supreme Court in the case of M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India and others, (2006) 5 SCC 88 in paragraph 25 of the judgment held as under :-

"25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidences to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial, i.e., beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with."

33. The bank employee/bank officer must perform his duty with absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty, so that the confidence of the public/depositors is not impaired in the bank. The banking system is backbone of the Indian economy and financial establishment of the country. An officer who is found to have been involved in financial irregularities while preforming his function as bank officer, can not be let off even if there is minor infarction in the inquiry report. In the departmental inquiry standard of proof is not that of a criminal case i.e. beyond reasonable doubt. In departmental proceedings, the proof is merely the preponderance of probabilities. It is well settled that departmental proceeding can proceed even though a person is acquitted when the acquittal is other than honourable.

34. Supreme Court in the case of General Manager (Operations), State Bank of India and another Vs. R. Periyasamy (2015) 3 SCC 101 in paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 17 held as under:-

"11. It is interesting to note that the learned Single Judge went to the extent of observing that the concept of preponderance of probabilities is alien to domestic enquiries. On the contrary, it is well known that the standard of proof that must be employed in domestic enquiries is in fact that of the preponderance of probabilities. In Union of India Vs. Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618 this Court held that a disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial and thus, the standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. This view was upheld by this Court in State Bank of India & ors. Vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde, (2006) 7 SCC 212. More recently, in State Bank of India Vs. Narendra Kumar Pandey, (2013) 2 SCC 740, this Court observed that a disciplinary authority is expected to prove the charges leveled against a bank-officer on the preponderance of probabilities and not on proof beyond reasonable doubt.

12. Further, in Union Bank of India Vs. Vishwa Mohan, (1998) 4 SCC 310, this Court was confronted with a case which was similar to the present one. The respondent therein was also a bank employee, who was unable to demonstrate to the Court as to how prejudice had been caused to him due to non-supply of the inquiry authorities report/findings in his case. This Court held that in the banking business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every bank employee and in particular the bank officer. If this were not to be observed, the Court held that the confidence of the public/depositors would be impaired. Thus in that case the Court set-aside the order of the High Court and upheld the dismissal of the bank employee, rejecting the ground that any prejudice had been caused to him on account of non-furnishing of the inquiry report/findings to him.

13. While dealing with the question as to whether a person with doubtful integrity ought to be allowed to work in a Government Department, this Court in Commissioner of Police New Delhi & Anr. Vs. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685, held that while the standard of proof in a criminal case is proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is merely the preponderance of probabilities. The Court observed that quite often criminal cases end in acquittal because witnesses turn hostile and therefore, such acquittals are not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not stand on par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full-fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. The long standing view on this subject was settled by this Court in R.P. Kapur Vs. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787, whereby it was held that a departmental proceeding can proceed even though a person is acquitted when the acquittal is other than honourable. We are in agreement with this view.

17. We also find it difficult to understand the justification offered by the Division Bench that there was no failure on the part of the respondent to observe utmost devotion to duty because the case was not one of misappropriation but only of a shortage of money. The Division Bench has itself stated the main reason why its order cannot be upheld in the following words, "on reappreciation of the entire material placed on record, we do not find any reason to interfere with the well considered and merited order passed by the learned Single Judge."

35. The scope of judicial review in departmental proceedings is very limited. This Court can interfere only if the inquiry was deficient either procedurally or otherwise.

36. It is also well settled that the Court must be slow in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by a departmental authority on the basis of evidence. If the findings are supported by evidence and are reasonable, the Courts are not to interfere with the disciplinary inquiry.

37. Supreme Court in the case of Allahabad Bank and others Vs. Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 in paragraph seven of the judgment held as under:-

"7. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions at the bar. It is true that a writ court is very slow in interfering with the findings of facts recorded by a Departmental Authority on the basis of evidence available on record. But it is equally true that in a case where the Disciplinary Authority records a finding that is unsupported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which no reasonable person could have arrived at, the writ court would be justified if not duty bound to examine the matter and grant relief in appropriate cases. The writ court will certainly interfere with disciplinary enquiry or the resultant orders passed by the competent authority on that basis if the enquiry itself was vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice, as is alleged to be the position in the present case. Non-application of mind by the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority, non-recording of reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at by them are also grounds on which the writ courts are justified in interfering with the orders of punishment. The High Court has, in the case at hand, found all these infirmities in the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. The respondent's case that the enquiry was conducted without giving a fair and reasonable opportunity for leading evidence in defense has not been effectively rebutted by the appellant. More importantly the Disciplinary Authority does not appear to have properly appreciated the evidence nor recorded reasons in support of his conclusion. To add insult to injury the Appellate Authority instead of recording its own reasons and independently appreciating the material on record, simply reproduced the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. All told the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority have faltered in the discharge of their duties resulting in miscarriage of justice. The High Court was in that view right in interfering with the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority."

38. While dealing with the scope of the Court to interfere with the finding of fact recorded in a departmental inquiry on the basis of the evidence available on record, similar view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and others Vs. Phulpari Kumari, (2020) 2 SCC 130 in paragraph 6 of the judgement, which reads as under:-

"6. The criminal trial against the Respondent is still pending consideration by a competent criminal Court. The order of dismissal from service of the Respondent was pursuant to a departmental inquiry held against her. The Inquiry Officer examined the evidence and concluded that the charge of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the Respondent was proved. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court committed an error in reappreciating the evidence and coming to a conclusion that the evidence on record was not sufficient to point to the guilt of the Respondent.

6.1 It is settled law that interference with the orders passed pursuant to a departmental inquiry can be only in case of ''no evidence'. Sufficiency of evidence is not within the realm of judicial review. The standard of proof as required in a criminal trial is not the same in a departmental inquiry. Strict rules of evidence are to be followed by the criminal Court where the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, preponderance of probabilities is the test adopted in finding the delinquent guilty of the charge.

6.2 The High Court ought not to have interfered with the order of dismissal of the Respondent by re-examining the evidence and taking a view different from that of the disciplinary authority which was based on the findings of the Inquiry Officer."

39. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find that the disciplinary authority, appellate authority or the reviewing committee had committed any error while awarding the punishment of removal from service to the petitioner. This Court holds that the disciplinary inquiry was conducted strictly in accordance with law and there was no requirement to prove the documents, which were admitted by the petitioner, by examining the witnesses. Further, when the petitioner has himself denied to cross-examine the witnesses, there was no further requirement to lead the evidence by the presenting officer.

40. This Court does not find that there has been any procedural infarction or violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner. Banking business is of faith and trust of the general public. The bank officials and employees discharge very important function in dealing with the public money. They have fiduciary duty towards the customers. The bank officials/employees are required to perform duties with utmost devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty. If an official discharges his function with dishonesty, acting in a manner of unbecoming a bank officer, this Court should not interfere in the punishment of dismissal from service of such an official.

41. Considering the facts of this case, this Court finds that the act of misconduct are serious enough to justify the punishment of removal from service of the petitioner.

42. In view thereof, this Court does not find any substance in the present writ petition, which is hereby dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

(Dinesh Kumar Singh, J.)

Order Date: 16th March, 2022

Rao/-