State Of U.P. Thru. Secy. Geology ... vs M/S Awasthi Traders,Banda Thru. ...
2022 Latest Caselaw 10204 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

Reserved
 
Court No. - 19
 

 
Case :- CIVIL MISC REVIEW APPLICATION No. - 148 of 2022
 

 
Applicant :- State Of U.P. Thru. Secy. Geology And Mining,Lucknow And Others
 
Opposite Party :- M/S Awasthi Traders,Banda Thru. Its Proprietor Shri Susheel Chandra
 
Counsel for Applicant :- C.S.C.
 

 
Hon'ble Rajeev Singh,J.

1. Heard Shri J.N. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel/Special Counsel assisted by Shri Abhinav N. Trivedi, learned Chief Standing Counsel for the review applicants/State.

2. The present application has been filed seeking review of the judgment and order dated 10th June, 2022 passed by this Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 4491 of 2021 (M/s Awasthi Traders Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.) to the effect that the directions contained in para 29 of the order may be deleted. A further prayer has been sought to modify the paragraph 29 of the order to the effect that review applicants may be permitted to conduct the enquiry.

3. Learned counsel for the review applicants submitted that vide order dated 10.06.2022, this Court while allowing Writ Petition (C) No. 4491 of 2021, in para 29 of the judgment directed to the Director, Central Bureau of Investigation to register F.I.R. treating the application of the writ petitioner (respondent herein), as a complaint and investigate the issue relating to filing of Writ Petition (C) No. 11143 of 2020 at Allahabad High Court as well as Revision No. 133 (R)/SM/2020 filed before the State Government by some imposter.

Submission of the learned counsel for the applicants is that the said direction has been passed without there being any material on record or any plausible reason to doubt the sincerity, integrity and fairness of the State Government and, therefore, the direction for investigation in the matter by CBI may be reviewed. While placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of K.V. Rajendran Vs. CBCID, (2013) 12 SCC 480, learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the Court could exercise its constitutional powers for transferring investigation from the State Investigating Agency to any other independent Agency like CBI, only in rare and exceptional circumstances. It has further been submitted that the aforesaid view was reiterated and affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bimal Gurung Vs. Union of India, (2018) 15 SCC 480. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the State Government is willing to order for enquiry into the allegation of filing writ petition before High Court at Allahabad as well as revision before the State Government by imposter. It has also been submitted that State Government was never permitted to get the issue of filing frivolous and proxy petition to be inquired into and, therefore, a direction for conducting the investigation by CBI may be reviewed. Learned counsel for the applicant has, thus, requested that any Agency of the State Government may be directed to inquire into the matter.

4. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the review petitioner and gone through the record as well as order dated 10.06.2022 passed in Writ Petition (C) No. 4491 of 2021 along with other relevant documents.

5. Writ Petition (C) No. 4491 of 2021 was filed seeking the following prayers.

"1. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari, quashing the order dated 22.01.2021 passed by the respondent no. 1 in Revision No. 106 (R)/SM/2020, as contained in Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition.

2. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari, quashing the order dated 07.12.2020 passed by the respondent no. 1 in Revision No. 133 (R)/SM/2020, as contained in Annexure No. 2 to the writ petition.

3. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari, quashing the order dated 30.05.2020 passed by the respondent no. 3, as contained in Annexure No. 17 to the writ petition.

4. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari, quashing the advertisement dated 02.06.2020 to the extent it relates to serial no. 6, as contained in Annexure No. 19 to the writ petition.

5. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari, quashing the order Letter of Intent dated 19.06.2020 and permit (after summoning the same in original) issued in favour of the respondent no. 5, as contained in Annexure No. 24 to the writ petition.

6. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent no. 3 to allow the petitioner to undertake mining activity in pursuance to the lease deed dated 06.11.2018 in respect of area Khand No. 29/1 situated in Village Bakchhakhadar, Tehsil Maudaha, District Hamirpur."

6. The said writ petition was decided on merit vide order dated 10th June, 2022, and admittedly, the review applicants/State Government is not aggrieved by the judgment of this Court on merit. Rather, the only grievance raised in the present review application is with regard to the direction issued to the Director, Central Bureau of Investigation for registering F.I.R. and conducting investigation for the charge of filing of Writ Petition (C) No. 11143 of 2020 (M/s. Awasthi Traders Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.) at Allahabad High Court and Revision No. 133 (R)/SM/2020 (M/s. Awasthi Traders Vs. District Magistrate, Hamirpur & Anr.) before the revisional authority by the imposter. The Director, CBI is also directed by the said order to submit a report by 05.12.2022.

The sole grievance of the review applicant is that any State Agency may be authorised to conduct the investigation for the aforesaid allegation, in place of Central Bureau of Investigation.

7. Indeed, the issue of filing of a writ petition before this Court as well as revision before the State Government by some imposter, is a serious issue and after going through the entire record of the writ petition along with its enclosures as also considering all the aspects of the matter as well as the gravity of offence, the direction to register an F.I.R. and conduct the inquiry by the CBI was issued by this Court vide order dated 10th June, 2022. Further, indisputably the order under review was passed after hearing the learned counsel for both the parties, at length.

8. The judgements relied by the learned counsel for the review applicant passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of K.V. Rajendran (supra) and Bimal Gurung (supra) are having no relevancy in the present case, as in the present case, the allegation is of filing of a writ petition by some imposter before the High Court as well as a revision before the State Government.

9. In civil proceedings, an application for review is entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is as under:

''1.Application for review of judgment.--(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved--

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order."

Apparently, the present review application does not fulfil any of the aforesaid conditions. The words "any other sufficient reason" have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram Vs. Neki, [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos Vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, [AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520] to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd., [(2013) 8 SCC 337 : JT (2013) 8 SC 275].

10. Moreover, it is also worthy to be noticed the scope of review. It is well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of judgments that the jurisdiction and scope of review is not that of an appeal and it can be entertained only if there is an error apparent on the face of the record. The review, as per the settled principle by the Apex Court as well as this Court, is to the effect that the review is not a disguise appeal. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma Vs. Mayawati reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320, after taking note of various judgment, summarized the principles related to review of an order/judgment. The relevant paras reads as under:-

"12. This Court has repeatedly held in various judgments that the jurisdiction and scope of review is not that of an appeal and it can be entertained only if there is an error apparent on the face of the record. A mere repetition through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered grounds or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. This Court in Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib [(1975) 1 SCC 674 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 305 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 184 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 200] held as under: (SCC p. 675, para 1)

"1. Mr Daphtary, learned counsel for the petitioners, has argued at length all the points which were urged at the earlier stage when we refused special leave thus making out that a review proceeding virtually amounts to a rehearing. May be, we were not right in refusing special leave in the first round; but, once an order has been passed by this Court, a review thereof must be subject to the rules of the game and cannot be lightly entertained. A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. The very strict need for compliance with these factors is the rationale behind the insistence of counsel's certificate which should not be a routine affair or a habitual step. It is neither fairness to the court which decided nor awareness of the precious public time lost what with a huge backlog of dockets waiting in the queue for disposal, for counsel to issue easy certificates for entertainment of review and fight over again the same battle which has been fought and lost. The Bench and the Bar, we are sure, are jointly concerned in the conservation of judicial time for maximum use. We regret to say that this case is typical of the unfortunate but frequent phenomenon of repeat performance with the review label as passport. Nothing which we did not hear then has been heard now, except a couple of rulings on points earlier put forward. May be, as counsel now urges and then pressed, our order refusing special leave was capable of a different course. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality."

13. In a criminal proceeding, review is permissible on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. A review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. In Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(1980) 2 SCC 167 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 222], this Court, in paras 8 and 9 held as under: (SCC pp. 171-72)

"8. It is well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so: Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1965 SC 845]. For instance, if the attention of the Court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing, the Court will review its judgment: Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta [(1971) 3 SCC 189 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 279] . The Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice: O.N. Mohindroo v. District Judge, Delhi [(1971) 3 SCC 5] . Power to review its judgments has been conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that power is subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the rules made under Article 145. In a civil proceeding, an application for review is entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record (Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever the nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except ''where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility': Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib[(1975) 1 SCC 674 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 305 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 184 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 200].

9. Now, besides the fact that most of the legal material so assiduously collected and placed before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General, who has now been entrusted to appear for the respondent, was never brought to our attention when the appeals were heard, we may also examine whether the judgment suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. Such an error exists if of two or more views canvassed on the point it is possible to hold that the controversy can be said to admit of only one of them. If the view adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a possible view having regard to what the record states, it is difficult to hold that there is an error apparent on the face of the record."

14. Review of the earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. This Court in Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon v.Union of India [1980 Supp SCC 562 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 381] held as under: (SCC p. 566, para 12)

"12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib[(1975) 1 SCC 674 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 305 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 184 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 200] this Court observed: (SCC p. 675, para 1)

''1. ... A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. ... The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.'"

15. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. This Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715] held as under: (SCC pp. 718-19, paras 7-9)

"7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. [AIR 1964 SC 1372] this Court opined: (AIR p. 1377, para 11)

''11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an "error apparent on the face of the record". The fact that on the earlier occasion the court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an "error apparent on the face of the record", for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.'

8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury [(1995) 1 SCC 170] while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [(1979) 4 SCC 389] this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ''reheard and corrected'. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ''an appeal in disguise'."

16. Error contemplated under the Rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. This Court, in Lily Thomas v.Union of India [(2000) 6 SCC 224 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1056] held as under: (SCC pp. 250-53, paras 54, 56 & 58)

"54. Article 137 empowers this Court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides:

''1.Application for review of judgment.--(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved--

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order.'

Under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review lies except on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record in criminal cases. Order 40 Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that after an application for review has been disposed of no further application shall be entertained in the same matter.

56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment.

58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been pleaded in the review petition or canvassed before us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case [Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 569] . It is not the case of the petitioners that they have discovered any new and important matter which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at the time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised before us were in fact addressed for and on behalf of the petitioners before the Bench which, after considering those pleas, passed the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case [Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 569] . We have also not found any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring a review. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the judgment. The only arguments advanced were that the judgment interpreting Section 494 amounted to violation of some of the fundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for reviewing the judgment. The words ''any other sufficient reason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC' must mean ''a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule' as was held in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520]. Error apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa [AIR 1954 SC 440] , this Court held that such error is an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque [AIR 1955 SC 233], it was held: (AIR p. 244, para 23)

''23. ... It is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error cease to be mere error, and become an error apparent on the face of the record? The learned counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated.

Mr Pathak for the first respondent contended on the strength of certain observations of Chagla, C.J. in--Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat Borough Municipality [ILR 1953 Bom 191 : AIR 1953 Bom 133], that no error could be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it was not self-evident and if it required an examination or argument to establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. But there must be cases in which even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also differ, and an error that might be considered by one Judge as self-evident might not be so considered by another. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case.'

Therefore, it can safely be held that the petitioners have not made out any case within the meaning of Article 137 read with Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules and Order 47 Rule 1 CPC for reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case [Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 569]. The petition is misconceived and bereft of any substance."

17. In a review petition, it is not open to the Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Conclusion arrived at on appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. This Court in Kerala SEB v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd.[(2005) 6 SCC 651] held as under: (SCC p. 656, para 10)

"10.... In a review petition it is not open to this Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. The learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise."

18. Review is not rehearing of an original matter. The power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. This Court in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. [(2006) 5 SCC 501], held as under: (SCC pp. 504-505, paras 11-12)

"11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases.

12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of ''second innings' which is impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be granted."

19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction.

Summary of the principles

20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

20.1. When the review will be maintainable:

(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;

(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

(iii) Any other sufficient reason.

The words "any other sufficient reason" have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520] to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [(2013) 8 SCC 337 : JT (2013) 8 SC 275]

20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:

(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review

(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.

11. In view of the aforesaid facts and discussions, there is no illegality in the order passed by this Court. The review application, accordingly, fails and stands dismissed.

12. Bench Secretary is directed to handover the original records to the learned Standing Counsel, forthwith.

August 16, 2022

VKS