State Of U P vs Chief Controlling Revenue ...
2021 Latest Caselaw 8270 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

AFR 
 
Court No. - 42
 
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 11012 of 2021
 
Petitioner :- State Of U P
 
Respondent :- Chief Controlling Revenue Authority At Allahabad And Another
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Rajiv Kumar Shukla
 

 
Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Birla,J.

1. Heard learned Standing Counsel for the petitioner.

2. This petition has been filed by the State of U.P. through Principal Secretary, Stamps and Registration challenging the order dated 5.7.2017 passed by respondent no. 1, Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Allahabad.

3. A perusal of the order indicates that huge amount is involved in the present case. Impugned order is being challenged on several grounds.

4. Stamp reporter has reported the latches of 1267 days in filing the present petition.

5. Such huge lacthes have been explained in paragraph nos. 3 to 10 of the petition which reads as under:

"3. That since the impugned order under challenge has been passed by the respondent no. 1 dated 5.7.2017 and it has not been challenged by the petitioner well within time as the Commissioner Stamps at U.P. Allahabad after considering the impugned order dated 5.7.2017 forwarded a letter dated 17.7.2017 to A.I.G. Stamps, Etawah regarding filing the writ petition before this Hon'ble Court and in the aforesaid letter it has been stated that prima facie the learned Chief Controlling Revenue Authority has ignored and overlooked the confidential report, spot inspection, evidence and submission advanced by the State counsel thereafter A.I.G. Stamps at once take congnizance of the aforesaid matter and directed to the Sub Registrar, Etawah dated 22.7.2017 to proceed for filing writ petition before Hon'ble High Court at Allahabad. In this regard the copy of the letter dated 17.7.2017 forwarded by Commissioner to A.I.G. Stamps, Etawah is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No. 1 to this writ petition.

4. That thereafter the Sub Registrar, Etawah send a requesting letter dated 4.9.2017 to A.D.G.C. District Etawah asking for his opinion and the learned A.D.G.C. District Etawah has given his opinion on 11.9.2017 to Sub Registrar Etawah to file writ petition before Hon'ble High Court Allahabad. In this regard the copy of the letter dated 11.9.2017 is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No. 2 to this writ petition.

5. That after getting the opinion from A.D.G.C. District Etawah for filing the writ petition before Hon'ble High Court at Allahabad the District Magistrate, Etawah send a letter dated 26.9.2017 to the Commissioner Stamps, Board of Revenue at Allahabad for seeking permission from the Government/ Administration. In this regard the copy of the letter issued by the District Magistrate, Etawah seeking permission from State Authorities dated 26.9.2017 is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No. 3 to this writ petition.

6.  That the District Magistrate, Etawah again dispatched a letter dated 16.7.2020 to A.I.G. Stamps District Etawah as well as a reminder dated 20.7.2020 for filing the writ petition before Hon'ble High Court at Allahabad. In this regard the copy of the letter dated 16.7.2020 as well as reminder dated 20.7.2020 are being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No. 4 to this writ petition.

7. That the Special Secretary and Additional Law Advisor U.P. Government forwarded a letter to the Chief Standing counsel High Court Allahabad for filing writ petition before Hon'ble High Court Allahabad. In this regard the copy of the letter dated 26.10.2020 is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No. 5 to this writ petition.

8. That thereafter a letter dated 2.11.2020 has been sent to Commissioner Stamps U.P. Prayagraj by Special Secretary U.P. Admin in regard with sanction of U.P. Administration for filing writ petition before Hon'ble High Court Allahabad vide letter dated 1.12.2020 directing A.I.G. Stamps District Etawah to proceed for filing writ petition before Hon'ble High Court Allahabad. In this regard the copy of the letter dated 2.11.2020 and 1.12.2020 are being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No. 6 to this writ petition.

9. That thereafter A.I.G. Stamps District Etawah send a letter dated 17.2.2021 to Chief Standing Counsel High Court Allahabad for filing writ petition in the aforesaid matter. In this regard the copy of the letter dated 17.2.2021 forwarded by A.I.G. Stamps District Etawah to Chief Standing Counsel of this Hon'ble Court for filing writ petition is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No. 7 to this writ petition.

10. That in view of the aforesaid facts, the delay in filing the writ petition is not deliberate and intentional but is procedural and as such is deserves to be condoned by this Hon'ble Court and the writ petition is also deserves to be heard on merits so that justice may be done otherwise the petitioner shall suffer irreparable loss and injury."

(emphasis supplied)

6. It is, thus, submitted that there was no deliberate delay on part of the authority concerned and that the delay was purely procedural in nature.

7. This practice of challenging order in higher court with delay has been deprecated by Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and other vs. Bherulal, 2020 (10) SCC 654 wherein the Apex Court refused to condone the delay of 663 days and held that such action on part of the State authority is merely to obtain order of dismissal to save their skin. The Apex Court has further held as under :

3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the Government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government (Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107). This position is more than elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 563 where the Court observed as under:

"12) It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

13) In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red- tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay." Eight years hence the judgment is still unheeded!

6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorized earlier as "certificate cases". The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the concerned officer responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straight away counsels appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.

8. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, we consider appropriate to impose costs on the petitioner- State of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand) to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited in four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officers responsible for the delay in filing the special leave petition and a certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time.

(emphasis supplied)

8. The same view has been taken in a very recent judgment of Apex Court in the case of Government of Maharasthra (Water Resource Department vs. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd.,

2021 SCC online SC 233, where in paragraph nos. 57, 58, 59, 60 and 61, the Apex Court has held as under:

57. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression "sufficient cause" is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides, the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. This Court, in Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, has held:

"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)

10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".

11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)

12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:

"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence." An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches.

(See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)

14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

58. Likewise, merely because the government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 ["Postmaster General"], as follows:

"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few."

59. The decision in Postmaster General (supra) has been followed in the following subsequent judgments of this Court:

i) State of Rajasthan v. Bal Kishan Mathur, (2014) 1 SCC 592 at paragraphs 8-8.2;

ii) State of U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav, (2014) 2 SCC 422 at paragraphs 2-3;

iii) State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 at paragraphs 11-13; and

iv) State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 at paragraphs 3-4.

60. In a recent judgment, namely, State of M.P. v. Chaitram Maywade, (2020) 10 SCC 667, this Court referred to Postmaster General (supra), and held as follows:

"1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the same thing again and again and the conduct seems to be incorrigible. The special leave petition has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal with such inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654] in terms of our order dated 15-10-2020.

2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again except to record what are stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the Government Advocate was approached in respect of the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine HP 1632] and the Law Department permitted filing of the SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17 months' time to decide whether the SLP had to be filed or not. What greater certificate of incompetence would there be for the Legal Department!

3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look into the aspect of revamping the Legal Department as it appears that the Department is unable to file appeals within any reasonable period of time much less within limitation. These kinds of excuses, as already recorded in the aforesaid order, are no more admissible in view of the judgment in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v.

Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]

4. We have also expressed our concern that these kinds of the cases are only "certificate cases" to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue. The object is to save the skin of officers who may be in default. We have also recorded the irony of the situation where no action is taken against the officers who sit on these files and do nothing.

5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, the wastage of judicial time involved, we impose costs on the petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited within four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time. We have put to Deputy Advocate General to caution that for any successive matters of this kind the costs will keep on going up."

61. Also, it must be remembered that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is no right in the appellant to have delay condoned. This was felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762 as follows:

"It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by s. 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the Court is dealing with applications made under s. 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of ss. 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of s. 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under s. 5 without reference to s. 14."

(emphasis supplied)

9. A reference may also be made to judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of State of Odisha vs. Sunanda Mahakud, 2021 SCC online SC 384, wherein the Apex Court has held has under:

3. "There is no doubt that these are cases including the present one where the Government machinery has acted in a inefficient manner or it is a deliberate endeavour. In either of the two situations, this court ought not to come to the rescue of the petitioner. No doubt, some leeway is given for Government inefficiency but with the technological advancement now the judicial view prevalent earlier when such facilities were not available has been over taken by the elucidation of the legal principles in the judgment of this Court in the Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. - (2012) 3 SCC 563. We have discussed these aspects in SLP [C] Diary No.9217/2020, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bheru Lal decided on 15.10.2020 and thus, see no reason to repeat the same again.

4. In the present case, the State Government has not even taken the trouble of citing any reason or excuse nor any dates given in respect of the period for which condonation is sought. The objective of such an exercise has also been elucidated by us in the aforesaid judgment where we have categorized such cases as "certificate cases".

5. The object of such cases appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say nothing could done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is mere completion of formality to give a quietus to the litigation and save the skin of the officers who may be at fault by not taking action in prescribed time. If the state government feels that they have suffered losses, then it must fix responsibility on concerned officers for their inaction but that ironically never happens. These matters are preferred on a presumption as if this Court will condone the delay in every case, if the State Government is able to say something on merits. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, we consider appropriate impose costs of Rs.25,000/- to be deposited with the Supreme Court Advocates On Record Welfare Fund. The amount be deposited in four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officers responsible for the delay in filing both the Writ Appeal and the Special Leave Petition and a certificate of recovery be also filed in this Court within the same period of time.

6. The Special Leave Petition(s) is/are dismissed as time barred in terms aforesaid"

(emphasis supplied)

10. Regard may also be made to a recent judgment of the Apex Court dated 04.02.2021, whereby the Apex Court has dismissed the Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s). 19846/2020, Union of India v. Central Tibetan Schools Admin, which was preferred with the delay of 532 days from the date of rejection of restoration application and 6616 days from the date of original order.

11. Reference may be made to a division bench judgment of this Court rendered in the case of State of U.P. v. Khushnoor Khan, 2021 SCC Online All 164, wherein this Court in paragraph nos. 12, 13, 14, 17 and 20 held has under :

12. Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again has not only expressed words of caution in respect of casual manner in which the State Authorities approach the Courts without any plausible ground for condonation of delay but has even counselled the State Authorities in this regard. Regard may be had at this juncture to the latest pronouncement made by Hon'ble Supreme Court on 04.02.2021 while dismissing the Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s). 19846/2020, Union of India v. Central Tibetan Schools Admin. The Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, which was preferred with the delay of 532 days from the date of rejection of restoration application and 6616 days from the date of original order and made certain observations are quoted below:

"We have heard learned Additional Solicitor General for some time and must note that the only error which seems to have occurred in the impugned order is of noticing that it is not an illiterate litigant because the manner in which the Government is prosecuting its appeal reflects nothing better! The mighty Government of India is manned with large legal department having numerous officers and Advocates. The excuse given for the delay is, to say the least, preposterous. We have repeatedly being counselling through our orders various Government departments, State Governments and other public authorities that they must learn to file appeals in time and set their house in order so far as the legal department is concerned, more so as technology assists them. This appears to be falling on deaf ears despite costs having been imposed in number of matters with the direction to recover it from the officers responsible for the delay as we are of the view that these officers must be made accountable. It has not had any salutary effect and that the present matter should have been brought up, really takes the cake!"

13. In the case of Central Tibetan Schools Admin (supra) while observing that the appellant therein had approached the Court in casual manner without any cogent ground for condonation of delay, Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to the cases of Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd., reported in [(2012) 3 SCC 563] and also the case of Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, reported in [(2010) 8 SCC 685 : AIR 2010 SC 3043]. Relevant extract of the said judgment in the case of Central Tibetan Schools Admin (supra) runs as under:

"In this behalf, suffice to refer to our judgment in the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bheru Lal [SLP [C] Diary No. 9217/2020 decided on 15.10.2020] and The State of Odisha v. Sunanda Mahakuda [SLP [C] Diary No. 22605/2020 decided on 11.01.2021]. The leeway which was given to the Government/public authorities on account of innate inefficiencies was the result of certain orders of this Court which came at a time when technology had not advanced and thus, greater indulgence was shown. This position is no more prevalent and the current legal position has been elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd. - (2012) 3 SCC 563. Despite this, there seems to be a little change in the approach of the Government and public authorities.

14. In the case of Living Media India Ltd. (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed the advancement in modern technology and observed that the claim of seeking condonation of delay on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. In the said case, it was further observed by Hon'ble Apex Court that all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities need to be informed that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for delay, there is no need to accept usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process.

17. When we examine the explanation of delay of 1730 days in filing the review petition from the date of judgment dated 19.04.2016 which has been sought to be reviewed and delay of 1335 days from the date of dismissal of Special Leave Petition on 05.07.2017, what we find is that the State has once again sought shelter in usual slow pace of State machinery in preparation of office notes, movement of files, non-availability of certain necessary information, non-availability of concerned officials/officers etc. The said explanation cannot be said to be sufficient in view of the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Living Media India Ltd. (supra). The State while seeking condonation of delay in this case has gone even to the extent of taking ground of certain "unavoidable" and "unspoken" circumstances. In our considered opinion such "unavoidable" and "unspoken" circumstances cannot be taken shelter of to claim condonation of delay in approaching the Courts. In fact the course adopted by the State in preferring the review petition reflects gross negligence and inaction which in our considered opinion cannot be said to be bona fide. We are aware that a liberal view needs to be adopted by the Courts to advance substantial justice. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, what we find is that the approach of the State all along has been casual and that of manifest negligence. As observed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Living Media India Ltd. (supra), law of limitation binds every one including the Government.

20. In the light of the discussions made above, the review petition fails and is hereby dismissed on the ground of delay."

(emphasis supplied)

12. It may further be mentioned that High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of State of M.P. v. Ramprakash Tyagi, MANU/MP/0566/2021 while relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Bheru Lal (supra) refused to condone the delay of 967 days. Same view was taken by High Court of Jammu & Kashmir in the case of JK Economic Reconstruction Agency v. Kamal Builders, MANU/JK/0252/2021.

13. Coming back to the explanation submitted for such huge latches, a perusal of the quoted paragraphs of the petition clearly indicate that apart from whatever has been stated, annexure no. 3 to the petition is a letter dated 26.9.2017 written by the District Magistrate  Etawah to the State authority. Next letters are dated 16.7.2020 reminder written by District Magistrate, Etawah to Assistant Commissioner, Stamps, Etawah and letter dated 20.7.2020 written by Assistant Commissioner, Stamp to Commissioner, Stamp, U.P. (annexure no. 4 to the petition). It is, therefore, clear that for almost two years and ten months the matter was not at all pursued, even if, for the sake of arguments, the other explanation regarding so called 'procedural delay' is accepted, the explanation so submitted before this Court to explain such huge lathces, is not acceptable. 

14. In view of the discussion made herein above, I find that the latches have not been sufficiently explained. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed on the ground of latches.

15. Registrar General of this Court as well as learned Standing Counsel are directed to send a copy of the order to the Chief Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh for necessary action against the persons responsible for such delay and for issuing a word of caution to the authority concerned to remain cautious in future.

Order Date :- 20.7.2021

Kuldeep