Sandeep Kumar Pandey vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin.Secy. ...
2021 Latest Caselaw 7250 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

A.F.R.
 
Court No. - 18
 

 
Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 14055 of 2021
 

 
Petitioner :- Sandeep Kumar Pandey
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin.Secy. Nagar Vikas Vibhag & Anr.
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Rakesh Chandra Tewari
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
 

 
Hon'ble Abdul Moin,J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondents through video conferencing.

2. Present petition has been filed inter-alia aggrieved against the suspension order dated 12.01.2021, a copy of which is Annexure-1 to the writ petition, by which the petitioner has been placed under suspension.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that primarily four grounds have been taken while placing the petitioner under suspension which grounds do not stand scrutiny under the eyes of law and consequently the suspension order merits to be quashed.

4. So far as the first ground is concerned, it is contended that the petitioner has been placed under suspension on the ground that he continued to keep the important documents pertaining to starred questions in his possession. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has invited the attention of this Court towards the order dated 11.08.2020, a copy of which is Annexure-11 to the writ petition, whereby he contends that the duty pertaining to documents of starred questions had been given to Sri Afzal Farooqui, Senior Assistant, while the work of the petitioner in the said order itself only pertained to the election and reservation and thus prima facie the said charge cannot be levelled against the petitioner.

5. So far as the second charge is concerned, it has been contended in the suspension order that the petitioner has not decided the matters pertaining to Right to Information Act within the specified time.

6. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has again invited the attention of the Court towards the order dated 11.08.2020 to contend that the duty pertaining to Right to Information Act had been given to Sri Amit Srivastava, Principal Assistant and thus again the petitioner has no role in the matter.

7. So far as the third charge is concerned which pertains to having kept the applications of certain personnel whose application for transfer during the annual session 2019-2020 had been rejected, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner has already been punished for the same charge vide the punishment order dated 14.01.2020, a copy of which is Annexure-4 to the writ petition, and as such, he cannot be placed under suspension for the same charge.

8. So far as the fourth charge as has been levelled in the suspension order is concerned i.e. of having proceeded on leave without his application for leave being sanctioned, learned counsel for the petitioner concedes that once no order pertaining to rejection of his leave application had been communicated, yet at the same time, also not rejected, as such the petitioner had bonafidely proceeded on leave but he contends that even if the said charge is proved, the same would not entail imposition of a major punishment so as to justify the impugned suspension order.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary vs. Union of India and another reported in (2015) 7 SCC 291 to contend that the Apex Court has held that currency of the suspension order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the memorandum of charges/charge sheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee.

10. Placing reliance on the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that even this Court has held in a number of judgments more particularly in the case of Ram Ratan vs. State of U.P. and others in Writ Petition No.10276 (SS) of 2019 as well as the judgment in the case of Radheyshyam Yadav vs. State of U.P. and others in Writ Petition No.14023 (SS) of 2020, copies of which are Annexure-14 to the writ petition, that suspension order cannot continue beyond three months.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that once the suspension order is of 12.01.2021 and a period of almost six months have lapsed and no charge sheet has been served upon the petitioner consequently considering the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), the suspension order itself becomes vitiated in the eyes of law.

12. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The Court was of the view that the learned Standing Counsel for respondent State be granted a short time to seek instructions in the matter but the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri R.C. Tewari, insisted that time be not granted rather the matter should be decided on the basis of judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra). As such, the Court proceeds to decide the matter.

13. The petitioner has been placed under suspension vide order dated 12.01.2021 on four grounds as have already been indicated above. There could be an argument of three of the charges being frivolous but learned counsel for the petitioner has himself candidly admitted of the leave not having been sanctioned to the petitioner and he having proceeded on leave. This fact is specifically admitted in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the writ petition. In this view of the matter, the said charge alone is sufficient to place the petitioner under suspension for in case an employee gets unfettered discretion to go on leave without any leave having been sanctioned then both, the discipline of the office and accountability of the person, would suffer. However, this observation of the Court may not be treated as if this Court has given a finding on the charge levelled against the petitioner.

14. So far as the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) is concerned, though the Apex Court has categorically laid down that a suspension order should not continue beyond three months in case the charge sheet has not been served yet from a perusal of the said judgment, it comes out that the Apex Court was seized of the matter pertaining to an All India Service Officer namely a Defence Estate Officer belonging to All India Service of Indian Defence Estate Service. At first glance, it comes out that All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as '1969 Rules') shall be applicable with respect to All India Service Officers but when seen in the context of All India Services Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as '1951 Act' ), it comes out that as per the definition clause, 'All-India Service' means the service known as the Indian Administrative Service or the Indian Police Service. Sfter addition of Section 2-A in 1951 Act, the Indian Service of Engineers, Indian Forest Service and Indian Medical and Health Service have been included in 1951 Act. Thus, even though the Indian Defence Estate Service is an All-India Service yet once it is not included in 1951 Act consequently 1969 Rules shall not be applicable upon them rather it is the Central Civil Services (Class, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as '1965 Rules') which shall be applicable upon them.

15. Rule 10 of 1965 Rules deals with the suspension which, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced below:-

"10. Suspension. (1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the President, by general or special order, may place a Government servant under suspension-

(a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or

(aa) where, in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State; or

(b) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial:

Provided that, except in case of an order of suspension made by the Comptroller and Auditor - General in regard to a member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service and in regard to an Assistant Accountant General or equivalent (other than a regular member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service), where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the appointing authority, such authority shall forthwith report to the appointing authority the circumstances in which the order was made.

(2) A Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of appointing authority -

(a) with effect from the date of his detention, if he is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours;

(b) with effect from the date of his conviction, if, in the event of a conviction for an offence, he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding forty-eight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired consequent to such conviction.

EXPLANATION - The period of forty-eight hours referred to in clause (b) of this sub-rule shall be computed from the commencement of the imprisonment after the conviction and for this purpose, intermittent periods of imprisonment, if any, shall be taken into account.

(3) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government servant under suspension is set aside in appeal or on review under these rules and the case is remitted for further inquiry or action or with any other directions, the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force on and from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall remain in force until further orders.

(4) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government servant is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a Court of Law and the disciplinary authority, on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further inquiry against him on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was originally imposed, the Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the Appointing Authority from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders :

Provided that no such further inquiry shall be ordered unless it is intended to meet a situation where the Court has passed an order purely on technical grounds without going into the merits of the case.

[(5)(a) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-rule (7), an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so.]

(b) Where a Government servant is suspended or is deemed to have been suspended (whether in connection with any disciplinary proceeding or otherwise), and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him during the continuance of that suspension, the authority competent to place him under suspension may, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, direct that the Government servant shall continue to be under suspension until the termination of all or any of such proceedings.

(c) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule may at any time be modified or revoked by the authority which made or is deemed to have made the order or by any authority to which that authority is subordinate.

[(6) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall be reviewed by the authority competent to modify or revoke the suspension, before expiry of ninety days from the effective date of suspension, on the recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose and pass orders either extending or revoking the suspension. Subsequent reviews shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension. Extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty days at a time.]

[(7) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under sub-rules (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be valid after a period of ninety days unless it is extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of ninety days :

Provided that no such review of suspension shall be necessary in the case of deemed suspension under sub-rule (2), if the Government servant continues to be under suspension at the time of completion of ninety days of suspension and the ninety days period in such case will count from the date the Government servant detained in custody is released from detention or the date on which the fact of his release from detention is intimated to his appointing authority, whichever is later.]"

16. From perusal of the aforesaid rules, it comes out that Rule 10(5)(a) of 1965 Rules provides that an order of suspension shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the competent authority. Rule 10(6) of 1965 Rules provides that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall be reviewed by the competent authority before expiry of 90 days from the effective date of suspension, on the recommendation of the Review Committee and that subsequent reviews shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension. Further extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding 180 days at a time.

17. Rule 10(7) of 1965 Rules also provides that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under sub-rules (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be valid after a period of ninety days unless it is extended after review for a further period before the expiry of 90 days. However, from perusal of Rule 10(7) of 1965 Rules, it is apparent that an order of suspension passed against a Government Servant shall not be valid after a period of 90 days unless it is extended after a review for a further period. Thus, the rule itself contains specific stipulation of an order of suspension becoming invalid, if not extended, beyond three months.

18. So far as the rules pertaining to suspension of the State Government employees is concerned i.e. in the case of the petitioner, he would be governed by the provisions of the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as 1999 Rules). Rule 4 of 1999 Rules pertains to suspension of a State Government employee. The said rule does not contain any stipulation of the order of a suspension becoming invalid after 90 days or three months, rather Rule 4(8) of 1999 Rules itself stipulates that any suspension ordered or deemed to have been ordered shall continue to remain in force unless and until it is modified or revoked by the competent authority.

19. Thus, once the Apex Court was seized of a matter of suspension pertaining to All India Service Officer where the suspension rules themselves provided for initial order of suspension being invalid beyond three months and there being no such stipulation in the discipline and appeal rules governing the petitioner more particularly in 1999 Rules consequently it cannot be said that the judgment of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) would be applicable with respect to a State Government employee i.e. the petitioner.

20. In this regard, the Court may notice the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Deepak Bajaj vs. State of Maharashtra - AIR 2009 SC 628 wherein it has been held by the Apex Court that the judgment of a Court is not to be read mechanically as a Euclid's Theoram nor as if it was a statute rather ratio of any decision has to be understood in the background of the facts of that case.

21. For the sake of convenience, relevant observations of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced below:-

7. It is well settled that a judgment of a Court is not to be read mechanically as a Euclid's theorem nor as if it was a statute.

8. On the subject of precedents Lord Halsbury, L.C., said in Quinn vs. Leathem, 1901 AC 495 :

"Now before discussing the case of Allen Vs. Flood (1898) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all."

We entirely agree with the above observations.

9. In Ambica Quarry Works vs. State of Gujarat & others (1987) 1 SCC 213 (vide paragraph 18) this Court observed :

"The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said a long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what logically follows from it".

10. In Bhavnagar University vs. Palittana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 111 (vide paragraph 59), this Court observed :

"It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision".

11. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & another vs. N.R. Vairamani & another (AIR 2004 SC 4778), a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment this Court also observed :

"Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of the context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes".

(emphasis supplied)

12. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. vs. Horton (1951 AC 737 at page 761), Lord Mac Dermot observed :

"The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge".

13. In Home Office vs. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid Said, "Lord Atkin's speech ... is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition; it will require qualification in new circumstances, Megarry, J. in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed :

"One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament".

14. And in Herrington vs. British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said :

"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.

Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus :

Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo, J.) by matching the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.

Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path of justice clear of obstructions which could impede it."

(emphasis supplied)

15. The same view was taken by this Court in Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (K.V.), Mumbai vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 946 and in Government of Karnataka & Ors. vs. Gowramma & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 863.

22. In the case of Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. and another vs. N.R. Vairamani and another - (2004) 8 SCC 579, Apex Court has held as under:-

"Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. V. Horton (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:

"The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge."

In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech.....is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition it will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry, J in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said:

"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case."

Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.

The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus:

"Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive."

*** *** ***

"Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it."

23. Likewise, in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Smt. Raj Kumari and others - AIR 2008 SC 403, Apex Court has held as under:-

"11. Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judges decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See: State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors. (AIR 1968 SC 647) and Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors. (1996 (6) SCC 44). A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathem (1901) AC 495 (H.L.), Earl of Halsbury LC observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides.

12. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclids theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. V. Horton (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:

"The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge."

13. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid said, Lord Atkins speech.....is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances. Megarry, J in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament. And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said:

"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case."

14. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.

15. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus:

"Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive."

*** *** ***

"Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it."

24. From perusal of the aforesaid judgments in the cases of Deepak Bajaj (supra), Bharat Petroleum Corp. Ltd. (supra) and Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd. (supra) and the cases as have been referred to in the said judgments, it comes out that the broad principles of law as have been laid down by the Apex Court with regard to following of a precedent are primarily as under:-

(a) The ratio of any decision has to be understood in the background of the facts of that case;

(b) A little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision;

(c) The Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed;

(d) Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of the context;

(e) An additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases;

(f) Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper; and

(g) Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect.

25. Considering the aforesaid principles of law, it is apparent that the rules governing the suspension in the present case are at variance with the rules which were applicable in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) where there was a clear stipulation of a suspension order coming to an end after 90 days in case the suspension order was not extended. As regards the judgment of this Court in the cases of Ram Ratan (supra) and Radheyshyam Yadav (supra) passed by this Court, suffice to state that the said judgments were based on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) and once the judgment in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) itself is not applicable in the facts of the instant case consequently the judgments of Ram Ratan (supra) and Radheyshyam Yadav (supra) would also not be applicable. Thus, the Court does not find any merit in the writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.

Order Date :- 8.7.2021

A. Katiyar