Allahabad High Court
Daya Sagar Yadav vs State Of ... on 22 February, 2021
Bench: Chandra Dhari Singh
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
?Court No. - 20
Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 4899 of 2021
Petitioner :- Daya Sagar Yadav
Respondent :- State Of U.P.Thru.Prin.Secy.Women & Child Welfare & Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Manoj Kumar Sahu,Amar Nath Tripathi
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
Hon'ble Chandra Dhari Singh,J.
In effect, the petitioner seeks issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing respondent no.2 to decide representation of the petitioner dated 06.08.2017, which is appended with the petition as Annexure - 1.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Jeep Driver in Pay Scale 950-20-1150 through appointment letter dated 18.06.1991 on adhoc basis. Thereafter, services of the petitioner was regularised. It is submitted that a charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner wherein charge against the petitioner was unauthorised absence from duty. Resultantly, the petitioner was suspended from service on 17.11.2004. It is further submitted that inquiry report dated 18.04.2007 was provided to the petitioner through letter dated 10.11.2008 and reply was sought. The petitioner submitted his reply. Thereafter, respondent no.2 passed an order on 31.12.2008 by means of which minor penalties i.e. stoppage of annual increment of salary for one year and adverse entry in service records of the petitioner were imposed and the petitioner was directed to be reinstated in service to join at Sant Kabir Nagar.
Learned counsel has submitted that in pursuance of order dated 31.12.2008, the petitioner joined at Sant Kabir Nagar w.e.f. 03.01.2009. However, the petitioner's salary during the period of suspension was not given to him inspite of several representations.
Per Contra, learned counsel for the State has submitted that the petitioner is claiming salary for the suspension period i.e. 17.11.2004 to 31.12.2008 after thirteen years. No justification has been given for not approaching the Court at the relevant time. It is settled law that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. The instant petition is nothing but gross misuse of process of law and the same may be dismissed.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
From perusal of the record, it is apparent that by way of filing the instant petition, the petitioner is claiming salary for the suspension period i.e. 17.11.2004 to 31.12.2008 after a lapse of thirteen years. No justification has been given for not approaching the Court at the relevant time.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in 2009 (2) SCC 479, S.S. Balu and another vs. State of Kerala & others pleased to observe as under:
"It is also well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". The Government Order was issued on 15.01.2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal there against, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage."
Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of NDMC v. Pan Singh reported in (2007) 9 SCC 278 held as under:
"16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322).
17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 524 and M.R. Gupta v. Union of India, (1995) 5 SCC 628).
18. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India this Court held: ((2007) 9 SCC p. 277, paras 9-10)
"9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore. There is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition has been dismissed for delay alone. (See also State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik, (1976) 3 SCC 579).
"10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. It wold depend upon the fact of each case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years. The High Court did not examine whether on merit the appellant had a case. If on merits it would have found that there was no scope for interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition on that score alone."
In view of the above, this Court do not find any good reason to interfere with the matter after the lapse of about thirteen years.
Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of delay.
Order Date :- 22.2.2021
nishant/-
