Satya Pal Singh And Another vs Ranjeet Singh Sirohi And Another
2019 Latest Caselaw 1939 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

A.F.R.
 
Court No. - 59
 

 

 
Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 386 of 1979
 

 
Appellant :- Satya Pal Singh And Another
 
Respondent :- Ranjeet Singh Sirohi And Another
 
Counsel for Appellant :- B.D. Tripathi,C.L. Pandey,D.P. Maheshwari,G.N. Verma,K.R. Sirohi,Rahul Sahai,Y.K. Singh
 
Counsel for Respondent :- V.K. Gupta,Ashok Kumar Pandey,K.K.Chaturvedi,Kaushal Kishor,M.K.Gupta,Manoj Kumar Singh,Pankaj Agarwal,Siddharth,V.S. Chaudhary,Atul Dayal
 

 
Hon'ble Surya Prakash Kesarwani,J.

1. Heard Sri Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for defendant Nos.2 and 3 (vendees) and Sri Atul Dayal along with Sri Manoj Kumar Singh, learned counsels for the plaintiff-respondent No.1.

Facts

2. Briefly stated facts of the present case are that an agreement to sale dated 01.01.1974 of the disputed agricultural land was executed by the defendant No.1/ respondent No.2 Rajendra Singh in favour of the plaintiff-respondent No.1 Sri Ranjeet Singn. In the aforesaid agreement to sale, the last date fixed for performance of the contract was 30.06.1975. However, instead of executing a sale deed for performance of the aforesaid agreement to sale, the defendant respondent No.2 executed registered sale deed in favour of the defendants-appellants Satya Pal Singh and Ravinder Singh whereby he sold the disputed property to them. On coming to know this fact, the plaintiff-respondent No.1 issued a notice and, thereafter, filed O.S. No.133 of 1978 (Ranjeet Singh vs. Rajendra Singh and others). In paragraph-12 of the plaint, the plaintiff respondent has specifically stated that on 01.07.1978 and 02.07.1978 (Saturday and Sunday), the court was closed due to summer vacation and as such the plaint was presented on 03.07.1978. In the aforesaid suit, the trial court framed eight issues. The present appeal is being pressed only with respect to the findings recorded on issue Nos.5 and 6. The issues framed by the trial court are reproduced below:

"1. Whether the defendant no.1 agreed to sell the property in dispute for Rs.30,000/- on 1-1-74 and executed the agreement in favour of the plaintiff?

2. Whether the defendant no.1 received Rs.20,000/- as earnest money from the plaintiff on 1-1-74?

3. Whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to get the sale deed executed and to pay the balance of consideration?

4. Whether the defendant no.1 has committed the breach of agreement?

5. Whether the defendant nos.2 and 3 are bonafide purchasers for consideration and without notice? If so, its effect?

6. Whether the suit is time barred?

7. Whether the suit is not maintainable?

8. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?"

3. The issue Nos.1 and 2 were decided in favour of the plaintiff and it was held that the defendant No.1 did receive Rs.20,000/- as earnest money from the plaintiff-respondent and executed a registered agreement to sale in favour of the plaintiff on 01.01.1974. The issue No.3 was also decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. The issue Nos.4 and 5 have been decided together and it has been held that the defendant Nos.2 and 3 had purchased the disputed property without notice of the agreement dated 01.01.1974 but it could not be established that the purchase was for consideration. It was also held that the defendant No.1, committed breach of the agreement to sale dated 01.01.1974. Issue No.6 has been answered in negative and it has been held that the suit is not barred by time. Issue No.7 has been answered in affirmative holding that the plaintiff is entitled to enforce specific performance in respect of the land sold by the defendant No.1 to defendant Nos.2 and 3. Issue No.8 has also been answered in favour of the plaintiff.

4. Learned counsel for the defendants-appellants has pressed this appeal only the findings recorded on issue Nos.5 and 6. Therefore, relevant facts having bearing on issue Nos.5 and 6 are being noted.

5. Issue No.6 was "whether the suit is time barred". Undisputedly, in view of provisions of Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Limitation Act'), limitation of three years from the date fixed for the performance of the contract i.e. upto 01.07.1978 was available to the plaintiff to file the suit for specific performance under Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act 1963'). The suit was filed on 03.07.1978. It was specifically mentioned in paragraph 12 of the plaint that on 01.07.1978 and 02.07.1978 (Saturday and Sunday), the court was closed due to summer vacation and, therefore, the plaint is being presented on 03.07.1978. This paragraph was replied by the defendant No.1 in paragraph-12 of the written statement merely stating that para No.12 is not admitted. The defendant Nos.2 and 3/ appellants herein also filed a written statement in which they made the same averment as was made by the defendant No.1 while replying paragraph-12 of the plaint. However, in additional plea (para No.11), they stated that suit was filed on 3rd July 1978 which is time barred.

6. With regard to the issue No.5, the relevant facts are that in their written statement, the defendant Nos.2 and 3/ appellants herein stated in paragraph-12 that they have paid the entire consideration of Rs.48,000/- to purchase the disputed property. In his examination in chief, the defendant No.1 (vendor) Sri Rajendra Singh (DW-2) has stated that he sold the disputed property measuring about 50 bighas in village Nawada on 29th March, 1975 to the defendant Nos.2 and 3 and the deal was finalized about 4-5 days before the execution of the sale deed. He stated that sale consideration was received on the day of execution of sale deed at the residence. However, in his cross-examination, he stated that the deal was finalized at the shop of the defendant No.2 at Saharanpur and since he was in need of money and as such he took the entire consideration in cash on the same day. He further stated that no receipt was given for the advance money received. He also stated that "r; :0 48][email protected]& lgkjuiqj vius ?kj :ddj cSukek fy[kus dpgjh vk;s :i;s bUgksaus esjs edku ij fn;k FkkA ;g ckr xyr gS fd :i;k nqdku ij fn;k gks ?kj gh ij :i;k fn;k FkkA ml :i;s dks ml fnu ;k mlds ckn dgha cSad esa ugh tek fd;kA lR;iky flag us dgk fd cSukek fy[k tk; rks :i;k ns nsaxsA eSaus :i;s ogha ekaxsA". The DW-3 (defendant No.2)/ appellant No.1 herein has stated that he paid the consideration of Rs.48,000/- to the defendant No.1. He explained the source of money to be Rs.18,000/- from sale of tractor, Rs.10,000/- advance money against tractor and Rs.27,000/- was taken from the brother. He admitted that in his cross-examination that he has no receipt for sale of tractor or advance against the tractor. He shown ignorance that from whom he purchased the tractor or to whom he sold it.

7. The trial court decreed the suit by the impugned judgment dated 27.08.1979 and the impugned decree dated 08.09.1979. Aggrieved with this judgment and decree, the defendant- appellants (vendees) have filed the present appeal.

Submission of the Defendant-Appellants:-

8. Learned counsel for the defendant appellants (vendee) submits as under:

(i) In view of provisions of Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the limitation for filing the suit was available only upto 01.07.1978. Since the suit was filed on 03.07.1978 and as such the suit was barred by limitation. Consequently, the suit deserves to be dismissed on the ground of limitation.

(ii) The issue No.5 was decided by the trial court without noticing the relevant facts and evidences. The defendant No.1 (vendor) has admitted receipt of consideration of Rs.48,000/- for executing the sale deed dated 29.03.1975 and the defendant Nos.2 and 3 (vendees) have admitted the payment of said consideration to the defendant No.1. Therefore, there was no occasion for the trial court to draw any other inference by meticulously scrutinizing the evidences led by the parties.

(iii) Once the trial court recorded a finding of fact on issue No.4 that the defendant Nos.2 and 3 (vendees) were having no knowledge of the agreement to sale dated 01.10.1974, the only conclusion which should have been drawn is that the defendant Nos.2 and 3/ appellants herein are the bona fide purchaser of the disputed property falling under the exception carved out in Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act.

(iv) Undisputedly, the sale deed dated 29.3.1975 is a registered sale deed bearing endorsement and certification of the Registrar under Section 58 read with Section 60 of the Registration Act and, therefore, there is presumption that the consideration as mentioned in the sale deed was passed on by the vendee to the vendor. Therefore, in the absence of any denial of receipt of consideration by the vendor, the court below was not justified to record the findings that no consideration was passed on. Admission is the best evidence as provided under Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act. Reliance is placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Avtar Singh and Ors. Vs. Gurdial Singh and Ors. 2007 (1) AWC 434 SC (para 7) and a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Ajodhya Prasad Bhargava Vs. Bhawani Shanker Bhargava and Anr. AIR 1957 (All-F.B.) 1 (Para 57)

Submission of the plaintiff-respondent:-

9. Sri Atul Dayal, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent refers to paragraphs 11, 19 and 23 of the written statement filed by the defendants appellants and the evidence of DW-2, DW-3 and DW-4 and submits as under:

(i) The specific averment made in paragraph-11 of the plaint that the court was closed on 1st and 2nd July, 1978 due to summer vacation, was not specifically denied by the defendants appellants. No evidence was led by the defendants-appellants to disprove this fact. The trial court has recorded a clear finding of fact that on 1st and 2nd July, 1978, the court was closed due to summer vacation, therefore, the first reopening day after the summer vacation was 3rd July, 1978 on which date, the suit was filed. Therefore, the suit was filed well within limitation as provided under Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

(ii) The defendants appellants could not prove payment of consideration. Detail findings of fact in this regard has been recorded by the trial court, which is based on consideration of own evidence of DW-2 and DW-3. Therefore, in the absence of any consideration, the sale deed dated 29.03.1975 cannot be said to be result of a bona fide transaction. Since the exception contained in Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is limited to a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith, and since it has been established that no money was paid by the defendants-appellants, therefore, the exception carved out in Section 19(b) of the Act, shall not be applicable to the defendants-appellants. The suit for specific performance has been lawfully decreed by the court below by the impugned judgment.

10. In support of his submission, Sri Dayal has relied on the judgments in the case of Ram Milan vs. Jagdish and others, 2014 (1) AWC 465 (All.) (Para-17 to 20), K. Nanjappa vs. R.A. Hameed and others., AWC 2015 (5) 4942 (SC) (Para-21 to 23), Satya Jain vs. Anis Ahmed Rushdie, (2013) 8 SCC 131 (Para-25) and Laxman Tatyaba Kankate vs. Taramati Harishchandra Dhatrak, (2010) 7 SCC 717 (Paras-15 to 17).

Discussion and Findings

11. I have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. So far as the question of suit to be barred by limitation is concerned, suffice it to mention that the suit was filed on 3.7.1978 with a clear averment in paragraph 12 of the plaint that on 01.07.1978 and 02.07.1978 (Saturday and Sunday), the court was closed due to summer vacation and, therefore, the plaint is being presented on 03.07.1978. No evidence was led that the court was not closed on 1st and 2nd July 1978. On the other hand, the court below has recorded a clear finding of fact that Court was closed on 1st and 2nd July, 1978 due to summer vacation. Under the circumstances, I find that the court below has not committed any error of law or fact to record the finding that the suit was not barred by limitation.

12. The second question relating to issue No.5 as to whether the defendant nos.2 and 3 (appellants herein) are bonafide purchasers for consideration and without notice, is concerned, I find that the court below has recorded two sets of findings in this regard. The court below has found that the plaintiff-respondent no.1 could not prove that the defendants-appellants were having notice of the agreement to sale dated 1.1.1974. Since cross objection of the plaintiff-respondent no.1 has already been rejected by this Court by order dated 6.3.2019 on the ground of limitation, therefore, I do not find any good reason to take any other view. I find that the defendants-appellants were not having notice of the agreement to sale dated 1.1.1974. The second part of the finding with regard to the exception provided in Clause (b) of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the court below has held that the defendants-appellants have failed to prove payment of money in good faith to the defendant no.1 (vendor).

13. Before I proceed to examine the rival submissions of the learned counsels for the parties on the aforesaid issue no.5 of the suit, it would be appropriate to reproduce the findings recorded in this regard in the impugned judgment as under:

"In the result on the basis of the relevant material existing on the record it may be stated that the purchase made by the defendants 2 and 3 was without notice of the agreement to sell dated 1-1-74.

This, however, is not the end of the matter. The question regarding consideration for the sale dated 29-3-75 is equally material. As per recital in the deed of sale, it was executed for consideration of Rs. 48,000/- The deed of sale is registered no doubt but admittedly no part of the consideration whatever passed between the parties before the Sub Registrar. The question naturally arises as to why should not the amount have been paid to the defendant no.1 by the defendant no.2 before the Sub Registrar in case the intention was to pay the whole of it as mentioned in the deed of sale. The evidence over this point on the defendant's side is extremely untrust worthy. The defendant no.1 Rajendra singh began by contending that he needed the money urgently and hence he took it the same day when he talked about the sale with the defendant no.2 at the shop of the latter. As the cross-examination proceeded ahead, the defendant no.1 deviated and said that the money was paid to him by the defendant no.2 at his residence on the day when the sale was to be executed. He denied that the same was paid at the shop of the defendant no.2 thus contradicting himself. In the written statement the plea taken by the defendant no.1 significantly was that in view of the law and order situation prevailing at Saharanpur it was not considered safe to bring in the money at the Registrar's office, vide paragraph 17 B, Curiously enough similar averment was made by defendant 2 and 3 in paragraph 13 B of their written statement filed on the same day. A complete go by was, however, given to that averment in the course of evidence both by defendant 1 and 2. Instead the defendant no.1 opted to say that he needed the money urgently with a view to pay of certain persons. He was questioned regarding those alleged payments but he feigned inability to give even broad details thereof. The amount he stated was not deposited by him at the Bank either. He went on to say that the defendant no.2 had said that he would pay the money after the sale has been executed which suggests that the defendant no.2 was conscious of his legal rights. It does not appear that there came about anything compelling subsequently to lead the defendant no.2 to pay the entire sum to defendant no. 1 at the later's residence in Saharanpur taking the amount from his house at chander Nagar before the sale was made and even without obtaining any receipt in token of the same. The defendant no.2 Satyapal Singh found it difficult on his part to account for the accumulation of the large amount of Rs.48000/- He thought fit to say that he received Rs. 18000/- by selling a second hand tractor to some one and another sum of Rs. 10000/- by way of earnest money from some body for the purchase of a tractor and that he received Rs. 27000/- from the father of the defendant no.3. In the ordinary course of events one should expect accounts being maintained by a person dealing with such large amounts in the usual course of business. The defendant no. 2 however found it convenient to say that no accounts were being maintained by him. He admitted, however, that he has had accounts with the bank. Undoubtedly the best course in the situation for any bonafide transaction would have been to make payment through a cheque. That will have been safe also for both the parties besides ensuring acknowledgement of the receipt of the amount. The explanation attempted by the defendant no.2 namely, that operation through cheque is inconvenient and time consuming has only to be stated to be rejected. I am also not prepared to believe that he would have undertaken the risk involved in parting with the entire sum without obtaining the deed of sale or even a receipt by way of acknowledgement. D.W.4 Niranjan singh who claims to have accompanied the defendant no.2 at the time of the making of the payment fails to inspire confidence in face of the preponderance of imporbabilities discussed above. Learned counsel for the defendant's submitted that the defendant no.1 would not have made sale without consideration. That does not suffice in itself. We may not be left to speculate. The transferees have the burden laid upon them to establish that the transaction was for consideration to the amount and in the manner referred to in the deed of sale upon which they relied. The defendant no.1 was obviously not acting in good faith. He had opted to make the sale despite having executed the agreement earlier in favour of the plaintiff. In the circumstances the possibility of under hand dealings as between the defendant no.1 on the one side and the defendant no.2 on the other can not be ruled out. Upon the mere basis that there will have been some consideration passed, We cannot jump to the conclusion ignoring the evidence discussed above that the defendant no.2 made payment of Rs. 48000/- as alleged by him to the defendant no.1 at the letter's residence before the execution of the deed of sale.

Accordingly I find that he purchase made by the defendant's 2 and 3 is shown to have been made without notice of the agreement dated 1-1-74 but is not established that the same was for consideration as alleged by the defendants 2 and 3 and also that the defendant no.1 committed breach of the agreement dated 1-1-74 executed in favour of the plaintiff. The issues are decided accordingly."

14. The findings recorded by the court below in the impugned judgment as extracted above, is based on evidences. No part of consideration was paid by the defendants-appellants (vendee) to the defendant-respondent no.2 (vendor) before the Sub-Registrar. The defendant-respondent no.2 (vendee) firstly contended that he urgently needed the money and he took it the same day when he talked about the sale with the defendant no.2/appellant no.1 at his shop, but in his cross-examination he deviated and stated that the money was paid to him by the defendant no.2/appellant no.1 at his residence on the day when the sale deed was to be executed. He denied the payment at the shop of the defendant no.2. Thus, he contradicted himself with regard to time and place of payment of alleged consideration. Not only this while during his examination he shown the cause for taking money to be urgent need but in the written statement and the defendant Nos.2 and 3 had stated that in view of the law and order situation prevailing at Saharanpur it was not considered to bring the money at Registrar's office. Thus, they completely deviated from the averments made in their written statement and instead the defendant no.1/respondent no.2 herein stated that he urgently needed the money with a view for payment to certain purpose. During his cross-examination, he failed to given even broad details in this regard. It was also not the case of the defendant that on receipt of the alleged consideration he deposited it in a bank. Such a huge consideration was allegedly paid by the defendants-appellants to the defendant no.1/respondent no.2 herein without any receipt in token of the same or acknowledgement before the sale deed was executed. The defendant no.2 (vendee) could also not prove source/accumulation of the large amount of consideration as discussed in the impugned judgment. The alleged money transaction between the defendants with respect to the sale in question was not routed through bank. Thus, the defendants-appellants could not establish that the consideration as specified in the sale deed dated 29.3.1975 was paid to the defendant no.1/respondent no.2 herein. Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1963, specifically provides that except as otherwise provided by this Chapter (Chapter II), specific performance of a contract may be enforced against (a) either party thereto or (b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract.

15. I fully concur with the conclusion reached by the court below in the impugned judgment that it is not established that the sale was for consideration by the defendant no.1 to the defendant nos. 2 and 3/appellants herein. It would also be relevant to mention that undisputedly the defendant no.2 is the brother in law of the defendant no.1 and the defendant no.3 is the nephew of the defendant no.2.

16. The scope of interference in first appeal with the findings of fact recorded by the trial court and the discretion under Section 20 exercised by it, has been explained by Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Prakash Vs. B.R. Sampath Kumar (2015) 1 SCC 597, as under:

"17. The principles which can be enunciated is that where the plaintiff brings a suit for specific performance of contract for sale, the law insists a condition precedent to the grant of decree for specific performance that the plaintiff must show his continued readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract in accordance with its terms from the date of contract to the date of hearing. Normally, when the trial court exercises its discretion in one way or other after appreciation of entire evidence and materials on record, the appellate court should not interfere unless it is established that the discretion has been exercised perversely, arbitrarily or against judicial principles. The appellate court should also not exercise its discretion against the grant of specific performance on extraneous considerations or sympathetic considerations. It is true, as contemplated under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, that a party is not entitled to get a decree for specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. Nevertheless once an agreement to sell is legal and validly proved and further requirements for getting such a decree is established then the Court has to exercise its discretion in favour of granting relief for specific performance."

(Emphaisis supplied by me)

17. Applying the ratio of aforequoted judgment in the present set of facts, I find that execution of agreement to sale dated 1.1.1974 was legal and valid and it was proved. Continued readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract in accordance with the terms from the date of contract to the date of hearing was proved by the plaintiff-respondent no.1. The findings recorded in this regard have not been even assailed by the defendants-appellants before this Court. The court below has exercised the discretion after appreciation of entire evidences and materials on record. Therefore, no case has been made out by the defendants-appellants that the findings recorded by the trial court in the impugned judgment is perverse, arbitrary or against judicial principles. Therefore, I do not find any good reason to interfere with the impugned judgment.

18. The judgment relied by learned counsel for the defendants-appellants are of no help to him inasmuch as the endorsement and certification of the Registrar under Section 58 and Section 60 of the Registration Act, is not an irrebutable presumption but it is rebutable one which has been rebutted in the present set of facts on the basis of evidences on record.

19. In Thomson Press (India) Limited Vs. Nanak Builders and Investors Private Limited and others (2013) 5 SCC 397 (para 33, 57.1 and 57.2), Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

"33. At this juncture, we would also like to refer Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act which reads as under:

"19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title. - Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be

enforced against-

(a) either party thereto;

(b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract;

(c) any person claiming under a title which, though prior to the contract and known to the plaintiff, might have been displaced by the defendant;

(d) when a company has entered into a contract and subsequently becomes amalgamated with another company, the new company which arises out of the amalgamation;

(e) when the promoters of a company have, before its incorporation, entered into a contract for the purpose of the company and such contract is warranted by the terms of the incorporation, the company:

Provided that the company has accepted the contract and communicated such acceptance to the other party to the contract."

From the bare reading of the aforesaid provision, it is manifest that a contract for specific performance may be enforced against the parties to the contract and the persons mentioned in the said section. Clause (b) of Section 19 makes it very clear that a suit for specific performance cannot be enforced against a person who is a transferee from the vendor for valuable consideration and without notice of the original contract which is sought to be enforced in the suit.

57.1 The appellant is not a bona fide purchaser and is, therefore, not protected against specific performance of the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant owners in the suit."

(Emphaisis supplied by me)

20. The conclusion reached by me have also supported by the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in R.K. Mohammed Ubaidullah and others Vs. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab (D) By Lrs. And others 2000)6 SCC 402 (para 14), which is reproduced below:

"14Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title. - Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract

may be enforced against -

(a)either party thereto;

(b)any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract;

(c)-(e).........."

As can be seen from Section 19 (a) and (b) extracted above specific performance of a contract can be enforced against (a) either party thereto and (b) any person claiming under him by a title arising subsequent to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract. Section 19(b) protects the bona fide purchaser in good faith for value without notice of the original contract. This protection is in the nature of exception to the general rule. Hence the onus of proof of good faith is on the purchaser who takes the plea that he is an innocent purchaser. Good faith is a question of fact to be considered and decided on the facts of each case. Section 52 of the Penal Code emphasizes due care and attention in relation to the good faith. In the General Clauses Act emphasis is laid on honesty."

(Emphaisis supplied by me)

21. The "burden of proof" and "payment of consideration in good faith" to bring his case within the exception of clause (b) of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, was heavily upon the defendants-appellants which they completely failed to discharged. Section 19(b) protects a bonafide purchaser in good faith for value and without notice of the original contract. This protection is in the nature of exception to the general Rule. Hence the onus to prove of good faith and payment of consideration was on the purchaser i.e. the defendants-appellants herein which they failed to discharge.

22. The immunity provided in Clause (b) of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is available to such sale of immovable property where the transferee has acquired title for valuable consideration, in good faith and without notice of prior agreement to sale. As a matter of fact, it has been found by the trial court, and I also concur with those findings; that the defendants-appellants (transferees) have completely failed to prove the payment of valuable consideration.

23. For all the reasons stated above, I do not find any merit in this appeal. Consequently, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

Order Date :- 29.03.2019/vkg