M/S Hindalco Industries Ltd. vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others
2019 Latest Caselaw 1330 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

AFR
 
Reserved
 
Court No. - 36
 
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 37298 of 2018
 
Petitioner :- M/S Hindalco Industries Ltd.
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Sunil Kumar Tripathi
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Jamal Ahmad Khan
 

 
Hon'ble Mrs. Sunita Agarwal,J.

The award dated 03.05.2018 passed by the Presenting Officer, Labour Court, Mirzapur published on 18.08.2018 on the notice board, is under challenge in the present petition. The dispute referred to the labour court vide reference dated 31.01.2008 and was registered as Adjudication Case No.126 of 2008. Reference made to the labour court is as follows:-

"क्या सेवायोजको द्वारा अपने श्रमिक श्री बृजराज राम पुत्र स्व0 आर0 जे0 राम की सेवाएं दिनांक 16.02.2004 से समाप्त किया जाना उचित तथा/अथवा वैधानिक है? यदि नहीं, तो संबंधित श्रमिक क्या हितलाभ/क्षतिपूर्ति/अनुतोप पाने का अधिकारी है एवं अन्य किस तिथि व अन्य विवरण सहित।"

The labour court while upholding the enquiry conducted against the workman found that the punishment awarded to the workman was excessive i.e. disproportionate to the misconduct proved against him. It has thus modified the order of dismissal dated 14.02.2004 to direct the reinstatement of the workman with 25% of back wages and continuity of service.

Learned counsel for the petitioner-employer vehemently submits that the charges against the workman were of indiscipline, disobedience and threatening to his senior officer with dire consequence. This act of the workman comes within the meaning of gross misconduct and as such the labour court was not justified in modifying the punishment so to interfere in the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority in dismissing the workman after acceptance of the enquiry report.

The reference made by the labour court to Clause 21 of the Certified Standing Order to hold that the misconduct proved, if not repeated conduct, would not be treated as habitual misconduct of the workman and hence the punishment of dismissal could not have been inflicted on the workman, is on a misreading of the said provision.

Explanation to Clause 21 of the Certified Standing Order of the M/s Hindalco Industries Ltd. has been placed before this Court to submit that in most of the cases, single incident of misconduct is punishable and only in some cases of minor nature, repeated misconduct of "habitual nature" has been made punishable. The Explanation of "habitual" misconduct attached to Clause 21 of the Standing Order is only in relation to misconduct, commission of which in habitual manner, has been categorized as misconduct. The labour court has arbitrarily interfered in the punishment ignoring the gross misconduct of the workman in threatening his superior at his residence. The charges were of serious acts of insubordination, disorderly behavior, which could not have been ignored by taking aid of explanation to Clause 21 of the Certified Standing Order. Insubordination and indiscipline are serious acts of misconduct and cannot be ignored. The labour court acted arbitrarily in substituting its opinion in place of the opinion drawn by the disciplinary authority and illegally reduced punishment on the ground that the misconduct regarding threatening of superior was committed by the workman outside the factory premises and further that no FIR was lodged of the said incident.

The said reason to substitute the punishment when the charge of threatening had been proved in the enquiry by the statement of the officer/supervisor himself, who was threatened by the workman, cannot be based on sound principles of law.

Reliance is placed upon the judgements of the Apex Court in M.L. Singla Vs. Punjab National Bank reported in 2018 SCC Online 1585 SC 1585, Management of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Vs. M. Mani reported in 2018 (1) SCC 285, West Bokaro Colliery (Tisco Ltd.) Vs. Ram Pravesh Singh reported in 2008 (3) SCC 729, Mulchandani Electrical & Radio Industries Ltd. Vs. Workmen reported in 1975 (4) SCC 731 and U.B. Gadhe & others Vs. Gujrat Ambuja Cement (P) Ltd. reported in 2007 (13) SCC 634, U.P. State Road Transport Corpn. Vs. Subhash Chandra Sharma & others reported in 2000 (3) SCC 1163, Rolston John Vs. Central Government Industrial, Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court & others reported in 1995 Supp (4) SCC 549 and Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic) Bhopal Vs Santosh Kumar Seal & others reported in 2010 (6) SCC 773 to submit that the discretion conferred on the labour court to reduce the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority, in exercise of power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act' 1947 (hereinafter referred as Act' 1947), is limited to the extent to the cases where the labour court is satisfied that the punishment inflicted by the management is wholly and shockingly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. Ordinarily, the labour court cannot interfere to reduce the quantum of punishment. The power under Section 11-A of the Act' 1947 has to be exercised judiciously and the labour court or the Industrial Tribunal is not supposed to interfere casually. Mere use of the word "disproportionate" or "grossly disproportionate" in the order of the Industrial Tribunal or the labour court by itself, will not be sufficient. To support its conclusion, the Tribunal or the Court, as the case may be, has to give reasons. The power under Section 11-A of the Act' 1947 has to be exercised within the parameters of law as mere possession of power itself is not sufficient. Any exercise of power which is not in accordance with law cannot be said to be judicious or due exercise of power. The labour court cannot be guided by sympathy or its notions to exercise the power under Section 11-A of the Act to reduce the punishment. It is vehemently contended that it was necessary for the labour court to draw a conclusion and record the same in the order that the punishment was "shockingly disproportionate" to the nature of the charges found proved, before it could proceed to reduce the punishment.

It is further submitted that the charge of threat given by the workman to his superior was found proved, which is nothing but an act of subversion of discipline and cannot be taken lightly. It was a serious misconduct on the part of the workman whether committed inside the premises or outside the precincts of the establishment, the same could not be ignored by the labour court. The Standing Order leaves no room to say that the act committed outside the precincts of the establishment, though resulted in subversion of discipline, can be ignored.

Further by placing judgements of the Apex Court, it is submitted that where disciplinary enquiry has been found fair and proper, the labour court has no jurisdiction to enter into the merits of the punishment and further that even in case of illegal dismissal, where there is long gap between the date of termination and the date of reinstatement, compensation in lieu of the reinstatement was justified. In its limited scope of interference in the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, it was not legally permissible for the labour court to interfere and reduce the punishment.

Attention of the Court is invited to sub clause (y) of Clause 21 to submit that an act of willful insubordination or disobedience whether alone or in combination with other act of misconduct, is serious.

Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, defended the impugned award for the reasoning given therein and submits that Section 11-A confers wide power on the labour court to examine each case and to see whether the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority was justifiable and to interfere to reduce the same, in case, it finds that the punishment is disproportionate to the charge proved against the workman. Reference has been made to the judgement of the Apex Court in Management, Lokashikshana Trust No.2, Bangalor Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court & another reported in 2000 (86) FLR 612 to submit that the award of the labour court directing reinstatement of workman taking part in illegal strike was upheld by the Apex Court and 60% of the back wages was awarded. Reliance is also placed on the other judgement in Senapathy Whiteley Ltd. Vs. Karadi Gowda & another reported in 2000 (85) FLR 414 to submit that the powers of the labour court under Section 11-A are wide and in case of any such opinion formed by the labour court in exercise of power under Section 11-A, it would not be justifiable for the High Court to modify the order of the labour court in exercise of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The reference has been made to the judgement of M/s. Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd Vs. Krishna Kant Pandey reported in 2015 (144) FLR 607 to submit that the finding returned by the labour court are not lightly interfered by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The power of judicial review under the said provision is limited and as the High Court cannot act as a court of appeal, it cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the labour court. The High Court is not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence or re-appreciating the same.

Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

The legal position pertaining to the powers conferred on the labour court under Section 11-A of the Act' 1947 is fairly well settled. There is no quarrel with the preposition of law that the labour court in exercise of its wide jurisdiction under Section 11-A can draw a different conclusion to award lesser punishment, in the given facts and circumstances of a particular case. However, in a case where two views are possible on the evidence on record, the Industrial Tribunal or the labour court should be very slow in coming to a conclusion other than the one arrived at by the disciplinary authority, by substituting its opinion in place of the opinion of the disciplinary authority. Reference may be made to the judgement of Apex Court in Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Management reported in 1973 (1) SCC 813. At the same time, the jurisdiction of the High Court in judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is limited to interfere in the findings of fact arrived at by the labour court.

At the same time, in a case, where disciplinary enquiry is found fair and proper, the labour court while upholding the enquiry can also look into the quantum of punishment to see whether the punishment of dismissal is commensurate with the charges proved or it requires any interference by it under Section 11-A of the Act' 1947. The jurisdiction of the labour court or the industrial tribunal in this regard is wide and there is no rigid formula that in all such cases where the disciplinary enquiry is found illegal, the labour court would uphold the punishment without applying its own independent mind and would not look into the proportionality of the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority. On the scope of Section 11-A of the Act' 1947, It has been observed by the Apex Court in U.B. Gadhe & others (supra) in paragraph nos.13, 18 & 19 as under:-

"13. After the amendment of Section 11-A, the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, had ample power to decide the question relating to quantum of punishment. Decisions relied upon by the High Court either related to a stage where amendment to Section 11-A was not there or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution'). The situation is different in cases in which Section 11-A of the Act can apply.

18. The High Court, as noted above, has not considered the case in the background of Section 11-A of the Act. Under Section 11-A, wide discretion has been vested in the Tribunal in the matter of awarding relief according to the circumstances of the case, whereas in the writ jurisdiction it is extremely limited.

19. It is not necessary to go into in detail regarding the power exercisable under Section 11-A of the Act. The power under said Section 11-A has to be exercised judiciously and the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be, is expected to interfere with the decision of a management under Section 11-A of the Act only when it is satisfied that punishment imposed by the management is wholly and shockingly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. To support its conclusion, the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be, has to give reasons in support of its decision. The power has to be exercised judiciously and mere use of the words 'disproportionate' or 'grossly disproportionate' by itself will not be sufficient.

In recent times, there is an increasing evidence of this, perhaps well-meant but wholly unsustainable, tendency towards a denudation of the legitimacy of judicial reasoning and process. The reliefs granted by the Courts must be seen to be logical and tenable within the framework of the law and should not incur and justify the criticism that the jurisdiction of the Courts tends to degenerate into misplaced sympathy, generosity and private benevolence. It is essential to maintain the integrity of legal reasoning and the legitimacy of the conclusions. They must emanate logically from the legal findings and the judicial results must be seen to be principled and supportable on those findings. Expansive judicial mood of mistaken and misplaced compassion at the expense of the legitimacy of the process will eventually lead to mutually irreconcilable situations and denude the judicial process of its dignity, authority, predictability and respectability. [See: Kerala Solvent Extractions Ltd. v. A. Unnikrishnan and Anr. [1994 (1) SCALE 631)].

Though under Section 11-A, the Tribunal has the power to reduce the quantum of punishment, it has to be done within the parameters of law. Possession of power is itself not sufficient; it has to be exercised in accordance with law."

Needless to say that the power and discretion conferred under Section 11-A has to be exercised judicially with due care and circumspection and in a case where it is found that there is necessity or desirability to interfere with the punishment imposed and or if the employer does not justify the punishment on the circumstances brought before it, it can interfere. The discretion in any case, should not be exercised in a casual manner.

In the light of the said legal position with regard to the power of the labour court under Section 11-A of the Act' 1947 vis-a-vis power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, it is found that the disciplinary enquiry was held to be fair and proper by the labour court. However, two charges which were proved against the workman had been taken note of by the labour court to reduce the punishment in its own discretion. The question in the present petition is whether the facts and circumstances of the case, call for any interference in the discretionary power exercised by the labour court.

In the instant case, the first charge against the workman as indicated in the charge sheet dated 23.02.2002 was that on 13.02.2002, while he was deputed in "B-shift", he had refused to discharge the duties of "Bottam Feeder", assigned to him by the shift In-charge namely Sri Anand Kumar Shukla and further that the workman remained absent from duty for about 8 hours.

The second charge in the charge sheet dated 12.03.2002 was that on 10.03.2002, after the workman was suspended for the act of disobedience dated 13.02.2002 reported by his superior, he went to the house of Sri Anand Kumar Shukla, the Shift Foreman alongwith one another person and threatened him with dire consequence.

The labour court having taken note of Clause 21 of the certified Standing Order held that the absence of the workman from duty was a solitary act. It was not a repeated act of negligence of duty and the workman cannot be said to be habitual absentee. It has further noticed that though the charge of threatening to superior at his residence is proved but since it was an act outside the precincts of the establishment, and further no criminal complaint had been lodged against the workman, it was not such a "serious misconduct" which would warrant punishment of dismissal.

The said opinion drawn by the labour court based on the reading of the Clause 21 of the certified Standing Order, cannot be said to be an arbitrary exercise of power or being in excess of the discretion vested in it under Section 11-A of the Act.

There is no dispute that the act of the workman in threatening his superior at his residence is an act subversive of discipline and cannot be ignored, but noticing that it was a solitary act, committed once under rage, as the workman was suspended on the complaint of his superior Sri Anand Kumar Shukla, the labour court cannot be said to have erred in substituting its opinion by drawing a conclusion that the punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to the gravity of the charges proved.

The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 does not find any reason to interfere on the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that no finding has been returned by the labour court of the punishment of dismissal being "shockingly disproportionate" to the charges proved. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the judgement relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner as noted herein itself shows that there is no strict or rigid rule, in as much as, each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances brought before the Court, keeping in view of the statutory power conferred on the labour court.

In the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, there were grave charges of consuming liquor while on duty and the allegation of assault by the workman etc. which were found proved. In each case cited before the Court, the Apex Court while holding that the labour court should not ordinarily interfere in the quantum of punishment, had examined the facts and circumstances of that case, to arrive at the conclusion that interference of the labour court in reduction of punishment was warranted or not, and held that in the nature of gravity of charges therein being serious, it ought not to interfere. The Apex Court has, thus, formed opinion, in each case relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, that the opinion drawn by the labour court that the punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to the gravity of the charges was not based on judicious approach and contrary to the sound principles of law, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case.

In the instant case, such an opinion cannot be formed.

In view of the above discussion, the judgements relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case.

Lastly, a careful reading of the Clause 21 of the Certified Standing Order indicates that an act of habitual absence or an act of negligence or neglect of work, if repeated, is an act or omission which would amount to a misconduct. There is no doubt about the fact that willful disobedience or insubordination is an act of misconduct under Clause 21 (y) of the Certified Standing Order but taking note of the fact that the labour court has substituted the punishment of dismissal in order to give a chance to the workman to improve himself, this Court in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not find any justification to take a different view.

For the above, no interference is warranted.

The present petition is found devoid of merits and hence dismissed.

Order Date :- 15.3.2019

Himanshu