Recently, the Supreme Court quashed an FIR under Sections 376, 420, 504 and 506 IPC, where the appellant was accused of sexual exploitation based on false promises of marriage. The Court observed that, "In a situation where physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the physical relationship without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact”.
Brief Facts:
In the present case, the appellant sought to quash an FIR registered against him under Sections 376, 420, 504, and 506 of the IPC, alleging sexual exploitation under false promises of marriage over several years. The FIR also included claims of financial assistance, threats, and subsequent harassment by the complainant. The complainant alleged that the appellant exploited her by making false promises of marriage, which he later failed to fulfill. However, the appellant argued that the relationship was consensual and spanned several years without any demand for marriage by the complainant. It was further contended that the nature of the relationship was akin to an extramarital affair, where the complainant maintained a physical relationship without insisting on marriage, indicating the absence of any such promise. The High Court dismissed the appellant's plea, emphasizing that allegations under Section 376 IPC warranted thorough investigation.
Contentions of the Petitioner:
The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant challenged the validity of an FIR accusing him of rape, arguing that the relationship with the complainant was consensual and spanned several years without any prior complaint. It was contended that the allegations surfaced only after the appellant declined further financial assistance and refused to marry the complainant. Further, the counsel emphasized that the complainant’s behaviour and prolonged engagement contradicted the claims of coercion, highlighting the absence of protests or timely complaints. The State opposed the plea, asserting the need for a thorough investigation, while the complainant did not contest the matter directly.
Contentions of the Respondent:
The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent contended that the issue of whether the relationship between the parties was consensual or not is a matter of fact that should be determined during the investigation and trial. It was argued that this is not a case where the Court should interfere with the criminal process already initiated against the appellant. Therefore, the decision of the Bombay High Court to refuse the quashing of the FIR was justified and did not warrant any interference.
Observations of the Court:
The Court made several significant observations regarding the nature of the relationship between the appellant and the complainant, addressing allegations under Section 376 IPC (rape), Section 420 IPC (cheating), and other related offences. The court highlighted that a promise to marry, even if made initially, cannot automatically amount to a false promise without clear evidence of deceit. The court stated, “Available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term 'misconception of fact', the fact must have an immediate relevance”. The court emphasized that Section 90 IPC cannot be invoked to excuse the actions of the complainant in its entirety or fasten criminal liability on the accused unless there is assurance that the accused had no intention to marry from the very beginning.
The Court noted that while the promise to marry might have been made initially, “there may be occasions where a promise to marry was made initially but for various reasons, a person may not be able to keep the promise to marry. If such promise is not made from the very beginning with the ulterior motive to deceive her, it cannot be said to be a false promise to attract the penal provisions of Section 375 IPC, punishable under Section 376 IPC”. The court further observed that the complainant continued her physical relationship with the appellant for nearly a decade without raising any objections, which does not support the claim of a false promise. “Even assuming that the appellant had made the promise since 2008 when they met for the first time, the fact that they remained unmarried for a long period till 2017 without there being any protest or objection by the complainant, does not indicate the intention at the initial stage itself to make the promise falsely to marry the complainant”.
The Court found the complainant’s allegations of a false promise of marriage unlikely, noting that the prolonged physical relationship without protest indicated mutual consent. The Court emphasized that a genuine claim of non-fulfilment of a promise to marry should have been raised promptly, and the long duration of the relationship without insistence on marriage pointed to a consensual rather than deceptive bond.
Furthermore, the court questioned the credibility of the complainant's claims, highlighting the implausibility of her consent is based on a misconception of fact after nine years of consensual involvement. The delayed allegations, which coincided with the cessation of financial support, were seen as a possible motivator for the complaint.
Furthermore, the Court highlights, “In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or consideration. A woman may have reasons to have physical relationship other than the promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal marital ties. Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the physical relationship without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact”.
The court cautioned against criminalizing long-term consensual relationships that turned sour, as it could unjustly drag individuals into criminal proceedings, stating, “It is evident from the large number of cases decided by this Court dealing with similar matters as discussed above that there is a worrying trend that consensual relationships going on for prolonged period, upon turning sour, have been sought to be criminalised by invoking criminal jurisprudence”.
The decision of the Court:
The Court found that no prima facie case had been made out under Section 376 IPC for rape, Section 420 IPC for cheating, or any other offences under Section 504 and 506 ICP. Consequently, the Court quashed the FIR and set aside the impugned judgment, granting relief to the appellant. The Court made it clear that the quashing of the FIR would not prevent the complainant from seeking other legal remedies.
Case Title: Mahesh Damu Khare v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.
Case No.: 2024 Latest Caselaw 735 SC
Coram: Justice B.V Nagarathna, Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
Advocate for Petitioner: Adv. Gunnam Venkateswara Rao (AOR), Mrunal Dattatraya Buva, Dhairyashil Salunkhe
Advocate for Respondent: Adv. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande
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~Siddharth Raghuvanshi
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