Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined multiple FIRs under a state’s anti-conversion law, focusing on issues of complainant competence, repeated FIRs, and the balance between religious freedom and misuse of criminal law.
Brief Facts:
The case arose from a series of criminal proceedings under a state conversion law, centring on allegations of mass religious conversions conducted at a local church. Multiple complaints were registered, some by individuals claiming to be directly affected, others by organisational representatives, alleging that a large number of people from the majority community were being induced, coerced, or lured to change their faith, often through offers of gifts, cash, employment, or social benefits, and through tampering of official identity documents. Chargesheets were eventually filed for offences under the conversion law as well as under penal provisions related to cheating, forgery, and incitement of communal enmity. The matter ultimately reached higher judicial forums due to disputes over the legality of registering multiple complaints in relation to the same core incident, the competence of complainants as per statutory requirements, and the presence or absence of evidence supporting the allegations, all in a highly charged and sensitive local context.
Contentions of the Petitioners:
The counsel for the Petitioners argue that neither direct nor circumstantial evidence points to any conspiracy among the accused parties to commit the offences. According to the Petitioner, mass conversion is not established as a criminal offence within the relevant statute, and the original complaint was invalid since it was lodged by an individual not authorized by the statutory provision. The counsel for the Petitioner assert that the principle against multiple complaints for the same occurrence, recognized by higher courts, should apply, rendering repeated complaints void. Some petitioners claim roles as professionals entirely unrelated to the alleged conversion event, and others profess no involvement in the religious community accused. The Petitioners highlight inconsistencies and delays in complaint registration, suggesting ulterior motives and asserting an abuse of the criminal process. Invoking constitutional and statutory powers, the Petitioners contend that relief is warranted because continuation of the proceedings would result in injustice, regardless of the stage reached in investigation or prosecution.
Contentions of the Respondents:
The counsel for the Respondent asserts that the Petitioners should have first sought relief from the appropriate lower court before approaching the highest court, as is customary. The Respondents argue that the complaints and chargesheets allege cognizable offences based on fraud, coercion, and document tampering. From their perspective, the law does not bar police investigation on the basis of information received from any source, and the authority for initiating such investigations is not limited by the technical status of a complainant. The Respondents emphasize the seriousness of the alleged conversions and the societal interest in curbing coercive or fraudulent religious change. The respondent argued that registration of multiple complaints was justified since each revealed distinct facts or named different victims. The counsel for the Respondent further argues that constitutional challenges to the conversion law are not the subject of these proceedings and that the petitioners have not presented credible grounds for quashing the criminal process.
Observation of the Court:
The Court observed that the right to profess, practice, and propagate religion is a fundamental aspect of personal liberty and conscience, enshrined under Articles 21 and 25 of the Constitution. This liberty protects the innermost sphere of individual autonomy, which includes the freedom to adopt or renounce a faith of one’s choice. The Court emphasised that allowing unrelated third parties to initiate criminal proceedings on conversion matters “would amount to an impermissible intrusion into this protected sphere of individual freedom and would open the door to frivolous or motivated litigations, thereby diluting the constitutional guarantees of personal liberty and freedom of religion.”
Regarding the statutory scheme under the un-amended Section 4 of the U.P. Conversion Act, the Court noted that “any aggrieved person” seems broad but is substantially limited by subsequent categories such as parents, siblings, or other relatives by blood, marriage, or adoption. The judgment stated “Any aggrieved person would be a person but is personally aggrieved by his or her fraudulent conversion be it an individual or in a mass conversion ceremony. Any interpretation to the contrary would render the remainder of Section 4 after the words “any aggrieved person” wholly redundant and also render the Section itself completely meaningless.” Thus, only those close to the converted person possess locus standi to lodge FIRs concerning unlawful conversion.
On judicial powers to quash criminal proceedings, the Court explained that High Courts have broad powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C to “The power to quash criminal proceedings is guided by the principle of preventing the abuse of the process of law or miscarriage of justice, and of securing the ends of justice” It clarified that “nothing in the Cr.P.C. limits or affects the inherent powers of the High Court to make orders to give effect to any order under the Cr.P.C., or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The powers vested can even be exercised suo motu to secure the ends of justice.” The Court stressed courts’ duty to intervene when continuation of proceedings would cause injustice, even if the technical elements of an offence prima facie appear present.
In Bhajan Lal v. State of Haryana the Court made it abundantly clear that the High Courts in exercise of their extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., should act with a view to prevent abuse of process of any court or secure the ends of justice.
Further in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala the court observed that all other information made orally or in writing after the commencement of the investigation into the cognizable offence disclosed from the facts mentioned in the first information report and entered in the station house diary by the police officer or such other cognizable offences as may come to his notice during the investigation, will be statements falling under Section 162 CrPC. No such information can properly be treated as an FIR and entered in the station house diary again, as it would in effect be a second FIR and the same cannot be in conformity with the scheme of CrPC.
The Court also referred to the factual matrix of the case, highlighting several FIRs registered for alleged mass conversions involving inducements like cash, jobs, and medical treatment, often presented as symptoms of coercion or undue influence. It analysed the legal competence of complainants and the validity of multiple FIRs pertaining to the same incidents, elaborating on procedural and evidentiary considerations as part of the wider context of the constitutional rights involved.
The decision of the Court:
The Supreme Court, in its decision, upheld the quashing of certain FIRs that were either filed by incompetent complainants or were multiple FIRs relating to the same incident, deeming them an abuse of the criminal process. FIRs based on mala fide investigations or flimsy material were quashed to prevent harassment, while FIRs disclosing serious offences were allowed to proceed. The Court emphasised safeguarding against misuse of criminal law while ensuring genuine offences are effectively prosecuted.
Case Title: Rajendra Bihari Lal and Anr. Versus State of Uttar Pradesh and Others
Case No.: Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 123 of 2023
Citation: 2025 Latest Caselaw 1009 SC
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj Misra
Counsel for the Petitioner: Adv. Payoshi Roy, Adv. Siddhartha, Adv. S. Prabu Ramasubramanian, Adv. Bharathimohan M., Adv. V. Swetha, AOR Vairawan A.S., AOR Vikash Chandra Shukla, Adv. Aishvary Vikram, Adv. Lakshya Siddheshwar Pandey, and Adv. Isha Barshiliya. Also present were Sr. Adv. Mukta Gupta, Adv. Manish Gandhi, AOR Dhiraj Abraham Philip, Adv. Febin Mathew Varghese, Adv. Nitya Gupta, Adv. Namrata Mohapatra, and Adv. Achalika Ahuja. Representing other parties were Sr. Adv. Siddhartha Dave, Adv. Jemtiben A.O., and AOR Pallavi Sharma. The bench also heard submissions from Sr. Adv. Rebecca M. John, Sr. Adv. Siddharth Agarwal, Sr. Adv. C.U. Singh, Adv. Sanbha Rumnong, Adv. M.F. Philip, Adv. Lija Merin John, AOR Purnima Krishna, Adv. Karamveer Singh Yadav, and Adv. Togin M. Babichen.
Counsel for the Respondent: Attorney General for India R. Venkataramani, , along with AOR Adarsh Upadhyay, Adv. Divyanshu Sahay, Adv. Amit Singh, Adv. Aman Pathak, Adv. Ajay Prajapati, Adv. Ameyavikrama Thanvi, Adv. Oorjasvi Goswami, Adv. Kartikay Aggarwal, Adv. Pallavi Kumari, Adv. Shashank Pachauri, and AOR Nidhi.
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