The Author, Ayesha Adyasha and Mehak Dhiman 2nd year, BBA.LLB students at Alliance University, Bangalore.

INTRODUCTION

The major idea lying behind Section 52 is that in a suit, which is still pending in terms of its determination, the status quo should be maintained and therefore it should remain unaffected by the act of any of the parties to the suit. It makes it expressly clear that during a case wherein the dispute between any of the events is in regards to the right of any immovable property, such assets cannot be transferred by using any of the parties to the fit which as a end result might also affect the rights of the opposite party concerned in the dispute. This principle does not get eliminated after the dismissal of the suit. After the dismissal of the litigation and earlier than filling of the appeal, the ‘lis’ maintains to exist and consequently the defendant may be prevented from transferring the property to the prejudice of the plaintiff. The explanation to the Section makes it quite clear that the lis shall be deemed to have started from the date whilst the plaint will be supplied in the court and shall continue to exist until the time such proceeding has been decided and a final order or decree has been obtained accompanied with complete satisfaction or discharge of such degree or order.

1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM

Sec 52 of the Transfer of Property Act creates only a right to be enforced to avoid a transfer made pendent lite because such transfers are not void but voidable and that too at the option of the affected party to the proceeding, pending which the transfer is affected. Thus the effect of the doctrine of lis pendens is not invalidate or avoid the transfer, but to make it subject to the result of the litigation. But, such an application of the Doctrine is not universal in nature. There are certain instances where this Doctrine cannot get applied.

1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW

The common-law doctrine of lis pendens says, if property was the subject of litigation, the defendant-owner could transfer all or part of his or her interest in the property during the course of litigation, but not to the detriment of the rights of the plaintiff. In other words, a third party purchaser pendent lite is bound by the judgment of the court as though he or she is a party to the suit. This principle is based on the maxim “pendente lite nihil innovetur” meaning nothing new should be introduced into a pending litigation. In the Indian Law, S. 52 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 reads, “During the pendency in any court… of any suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the right of any other party thereto…” Therefore the property, which is in dispute, should not either be sold or otherwise dealt in by any party to the dispute pendent lite. But, if at all the transfer has taken place, the law does not wipe off the sale by invalidating it but only renders the purchaser subservient to the court’s decision.[1]

This principle of lis pendens underlying the object of section 52 is to maintain the status quo unaffected by the act of parties to the pending litigation. But while the principle contained in this section ought to be in accordance with equity, good conscience and justice, the same is lacking to a certain extent resulting not just in disturbance in its intended equitable and just foundations, but also in serious practical troubles to bona fide purchasers of property pendent lite.[2]

1.4 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

This research paper talks about the Doctrine of Lis Pendens as embedded in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 under Section 52. The paper also analyses how Sec 52 can be used both as a sword and a shield, depending on such facts. It encompasses the one hundred and fifty-seventh Law Commission Report regarding the above mentioned Section and its amendment. It also talks about various conditions for the application of the doctrine and certain exceptions where this doctrine is not applicable.,,

1.5 METHODOLOGY

The doctrinal method was followed for conducting a research on this topic. Various books were referred to, and so were many websites and journal articles, for a clear view on the research paper. Cases referred were taken from case law search engines like SCC Online and Casemine.

1.6 RESEARCH QUESTION

  • In which cases does the applicability of this Doctrine fail?

1.6.1  HYPOTHESIS 

There are many exceptions, backed up by cases, which show that this Doctrine is not applicable universally.

CONCEPT OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIS PENDENS

The doctrine of lis pendens is a very old doctrine and finds operation in the English Common Law. Under this doctrine, judgments regarding immovable properties were regarded as overriding any transfer made by the parties during pendency of the litigation. Later on this doctrine was also adopted by equity for a better and more regular administration of justice.The word lis means an action or a suit or litigation, while the word pendens denotes pending. Hence, the words lis pendens primarily suggest a pending suit or a pending litigation. This doctrine of lis pendens is best expressed in the maxim- “pendente lite nihil innovature”, which says that nothing new should be introduced during the pendency of litigation. In the case of Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. v. Sri Nath Singhji Deo[3], a theatre was attached in execution of a decree against its owner. During attachment, the owner leased the theatre to M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. It was held by the Supreme Court that the lease was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens.

The principle underlying this doctrine is that during the pendency of any suit regarding title of a particular property, no new interest should be created in respect of that property. Creation of a new interest or a title counts as a transfer of property. Hence, the doctrine of lis pendens prohibits the transfer of property which has pending litigation. The doctrine is based upon the position that the decision of the court is pending upon the parties to the suit and also on those who derive the title during the pendency of the suit. The maxim “pendent lite nihil innovator" is a rule which is based upon the prerequisite for final adjudication and also on the just ground that it will be impossible to bring a suit to a successful termination if the alienation is permissible during the pendency of the suit. This doctrine is embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which says –

“During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government, of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the court and on such terms as it may impose.

 Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force.”[4]

BASIS OF THE DOCTRINE

The basis of this doctrine is ‘necessary’ rather than ‘notice’. This doctrine is clearly based on notice as a pending suit is regarded as constructive notice of the fact of disputed title of the property under litigation. Therefore any person dealing with that property pending litigation must be bound to abide by the decision of the Court. But, the correct view is that this doctrine is founded on necessity. For proper adjudication it is essential that in case of a pending suit regarding title of a property, the litigants should not be permitted to take decision regarding that property themselves and alienate the disputed property. Therefore, lis pendens is based on necessity and as a matter of public policy it prevents the parties from disposing off a disputed property in such manner as to interfere with the Court’s proceedings. Where a litigation regarding the right of a particular estate is pending between a plaintiff and a defendant, the necessities of mankind require that the decision of the Court in the suit shall be binding on both the litigating parties as well as those who derive title under them by transfer made pending the suit whether such alienees did or did not have any notice of the pending proceedings. There could be no certainty that those would ever come to an end if not for this.[5] A mortgage or sale made before the final decree to someone who had no awareness of the pending proceedings could usually render a brand new in shape necessary and so indeterminable litigation might be the result.[6]

Turner, L.J., while explaining the basis of this doctrine in Bellamy v Sabine[7] observed that:

It is, as I think, a doctrine common to the Courts both of law and Equity and rests as I apprehend, on the foundation that it would plainly be impossible for any action or suit could be brought to a successful termination, if alienation pendente lite were permitted to prevail. The plaintiff would be liable in every case to be defeated by the defendants alienating before the judgment or decree, and would be driven to commence his proceedings de novo, subject again to be defeated by the same course of proceedings.”[8]

The Indian Courts are also of the same view that the basis of this doctrine enshrined under Section 52 is the necessity for final adjudication and public policy, not the doctrine of notice.[9]  The doctrine of lis pendens has been fully expounded by the Privy Council in this case of Faiyaz Hussain Khan v Prag Narain[10] where their lordships quote with approval of Lord Justice Turner in Bellamy’s case. It has been held that the foundation for the doctrine does not rest upon notice; it rests solely upon necessity- the necessity that neither party should alienate the property in dispute so that you can affect his opposite parties [11].

ESSENTIALS

It was held in the case of Clifford George Pinto v M.R. Shenava & Ors[12] that Section 52 would apply in a case where the sales are made by way of private negotiations and during the pendency of suit. This doctrine does not annul the alienation by a party to the suit, but only renders it subservient to the rights of the parties to the litigation. The power of the bar under Section 52 is however subject to the power of the Court to exempt the suit property from the operation of Section 52 subject to such conditions it may impose. That means the Court in which such a suit is pending can, in appropriate cases, permit a party to alienate the property which is the subject-matter of the suit without being subjected to any rights of the other party by imposing terms it deems fit, as decided in the case of Vinod Seth v Devinder Bajaj [13]. Following are the essential condition to be fulfilled for the application of doctrine of lis pendens as provided in the Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882:

  • There must be a pendency of suit or proceeding- This doctrine only applies when the property transferred during the pendency of a suit or a proceeding. Under the Explanation added by the Amending Act 20 of 1929, the pendency of a suit begins from the date when the plaint is presented or institution of proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction. Pendency of suit or proceeding is that period during which a suit remains before a court for its final clearance. The pendency of suit begins from the date on which the plant is presented and terminates on the date when final decree is passed by the Court. Still there lies a question as to how long can the “pendency” of a suit continue. It was held that there could hardly be said to be active prosecution if after filing the plaint, plaintiff had taken no steps to effect service of summons, or if after a decree dismissing his suit, he took no steps to file an appeal. The amendment section omits the words “active prosecution” and adds explanation to make it clear. The lis pendens extends right upon the conclusion of the litigation including the appellate stages and execution proceedings. Therefore, this section applies to transfers made during the pendency of execution proceedings, as held in the case of Thakur Prasad v Gaya Prasad[14].
  • The suit or proceeding must be pending before a court of competent jurisdiction- This doctrine would not be valid if the plaint is presented in a wrong Court and a transfer takes place during such pendency. The suit or the proceeding during which the property is transferred, must be pending before a court which has the competent jurisdiction. For example, where the property is situated outside the jurisdiction of the Court, it cannot pass a valid decree so as to effect a transfer of property made with pending litigation.
  • A right to immovable property is involved directly or specifically in the suit- Another condition for applicability of the doctrine is that the suit should involve a valid question of right to immovable property. The suit should be regarding the title or interest of that property. This doctrine has no applicability where the question involved in the suit or proceeding does not relate to the title or interest in an immovable property.

Illustration- Where there is a pending suit between a landlord and a tenant regarding payment of rent, and the landlord transfers his property during that time, the transfer shall not be affected in any manner by the doctrine of lis pendens because the suit was not regarding the title or interest of an immovable property, it was regarding the payment of rents.

  • The suit or proceeding must not be collusive in nature- Doctrine of lis pendens is inappropriate if the suit is collusive in the nature. A suit is collusive if it was instituted with a mala fide intention i.e., in which there is a fraudulent secret understanding between the plaintiff and the defendant that the suit would not be contested with a view to defeat the rights of the transferee of either parties. The transferee is not bound by the suit where a property is transferred during the pendency of collusive suit. However, if any suit was bona fide at the beginning, but during pendency of suit there is a secret agreement between the parties in form of negotiation; in that cases lis pendens is applicable. Therefore, it is clear that the rule of lis pendens does not apply to a collusive suit or a suit in which the decree is obtained by fraud or collusion, as held in the case of Awadesh Prasad v Belarani[15]. In Nagubai v B. Sham Rao[16], Venkatarama Aiyyar, J., while explaining the distinction between a collusive and a fraudulent proceeding, observed: “ In such (collusive) proceeding a claim put forward is fictitious, the contest over it is unreal, and the decree passed therein is a mere mask having the similitude of a judicial determination and worn by the parties with the object of confounding third parties. But when a proceeding is alleged to be fraudulent, what is meant that the claim made therein is untrue, but the claimant has managed to obtain the verdict of the court in his favor and against his opponent by practicing fraud on the court…. While in a collusive proceeding the contest is a mere sham, in a fraudulent suit it is real and earnest.”[17]
  • The property in dispute must be alienated or otherwise dealt with by any party to suit- During pendency of the litigation, the property must be alienated or otherwise dealt with by any of the parties in a suit. Such a transfer includes sale, exchange, lease and mortgage. Thus, during pendency of a suit if the undecided property is sold or given lease or mortgaged both by the plaintiff or the defendant, this doctrine shall apply and the alienation would be the subject to the judgment of Court. It was held in the case of Rambhadra v Daulu[18] that the doctrine does not apply where the transfer was made, during the suit, by a person who was not a party to the suit at the time of the transfer but who was subsequently made a party in a case on that point.

The word transferred refers to sales, mortgages, leases and exchanges. The words “otherwise dealt with” include surrender, release or a partition. But an adoption of pendent lite is not taken to be dealing with property.[19]

  • The transfer must affect the rights of the other party to litigation- The last condition for the applicability of doctrine of lis pendens is that the transfer during which pendency must affect the right of any other party to the suit as it does not apply to a case where the parties are ranged on the same side. This principle is intended to safeguard the parties to litigation against transfers by their opponents, so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein.

Illustration- A sues B in respect of a house in B’s possession. B sells the house to a certain person C during the pendency of the suit. A’s suit is decreed. The transfer to C is voidable and A’s right to take the house is not affected.[20]

It is evident that the doctrine, as stated in Section 52, applies not merely to actual transfers of right which are the subject-matter of litigation but to other dealing with it “by any part to the suit or proceeding, so as to affect the right of any other party thereto”. Hence, it could be urged that where it is not a party to the litigation but an outside agency, such as the tax collecting authorities of the Government, which proceedings against the subject-matter of litigation, without anything done by a litigating party, the resulting transaction will not be hit by Section 52.[21]

    1. EFFECT OF THIS DOCTRINE

The effect of Section 52 is not to wipe out a sale pendent lite altogether. It only operates as a bar to the extent of right title and interest that may be determined in favor of the other party. In other words, the essence of this Section is that a transaction made during the pendency of a suit by a party to the suit cannot prejudice the interest of the other party. Therefore, the sale in the instant case in favor of the review applicant will be valid to the extent it does not affect the right of the opposite party, if any, determined or to be determined in title suit, as held in the case of Usha Rani banik v Haridas Das[22].[23]

DOCTRINE OF LIS PENDENS AS A SWORD AND SHIELD BOTH

The right contemplated under Section 52 can be used, undoubtedly, as a sword as well as a shield. This depends on the following factors- who is the affected party, what right or interest is to be transferred and how is such transfer likely to affect any party to the lis pendens. It can be used as a shield between the same parties in a subsequent or the same proceeding. Any person who wants to use this doctrine as a sword must first establish his right to do so when in any subsequent proceeding any objection is raised regarding his claim to do so. If the transfer was not avoided by any of the parties to the pervious or earlier proceeding who was likely to be affected, the transferee can claim that the right to avoid the transfer has been lost. In order to claim that such transfer is void according to Section 52, one has to establish that it has affected the rights of another party to the suit. If a party challenges alienation on the ground of this doctrine, it has to establish that such transfer was made knowingly with a view to affect or defeat the rights of the defendant or the plaintiff.

                    It was held in the case of Rajendra Singh v Santa Singh[24] that it is intended by this doctrine to strike at attempt of parties to a suit to curtail the jurisdiction of the Court by private dealings which may remove the subject matter of litigation from the power of the court to decide a pending dispute and frustrate its decree.[25]

RELIEF FROM DOCTRINE OF LIS PENDENS

Relief from lis pendens being discretionary relief, it will depend on several circumstances such as the nature of the plaintiff’s case and the defense, the nature of property, market and the circumstances of the defendants. If the Courts are certain on the affidavits and the pleadings regarding a very strong possibility that the plaintiff will lose the matter even if all the evidence was led by the parties, it will be a very important factor, possibly conclusive for granting relief. The Court will also have to consider the inconvenience and injustice that is likely to be caused to the defendants if the relief is not granted, and weigh it carefully against the inconvenience and injustice that is likely to be caused to the plaintiff if the relief from lis pendens is granted.

It was held in the case of Smt. Sayar Bai v Smt. Yashoda Bai[26] that when a party to the suit tries to alienate a larger interest in the immovable property than the possession, that transfer would be hit by this doctrine and such a transferee would still be a representative-in-interest of the judgment-debtor in execution of the decree passed against the predecessor-in-interest of the transferor.[27]

In the case of Khemchand Chandra Choudhary v Vishnu Hari Patil[28] it was said that a transferee pendente lite of an interest will be bound to an extent regarding his or her interest in the suit. The right of transferee to be heard before any order is made is recognized in Rule 10 of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He can also prefer an appeal against an order made in the proceedings provided he does so with the leave of the Appellate Court where he is not already brought on record. Further it was also contended that an heir or a legatee or a transferee can participate in the proceedings even though they don’t have their names in the decree and they cannot be turned out if they apply t the court to be impleaded as parties. It was held in the case of Ramji das v Laxmi Kumar & Ors.[29] that the right to avoid transfer during a pending litigation is a voidable right and that if the transfer is not avoided by any party to the litigation then the transferee can claim that nothing has survived to be enforced and that such right has been lost.

 

  1. RESEARCH QUESTION

In which cases does the applicability of this Doctrine fail?

It has been often observed that innocent parties to a legal case face difficulty as they cannot freely transfer the property in dispute during the pending suit as he or owner or seller is likely to get much less than the market value of the property owing to the pendency of the suit even if buyers are available in market. Further, the objective of lis pendens would get defeated where dishonest litigators merely to coerce the other party file cases with respect to immovable property of the other, and thus enjoy the bar under Section 52. Owing to such circumstances an exception to this bar is also laid down in Section 52 which states that with the authorization of the court the owner of the property may transfer the property on such terms and conditions as the court may deem fit and proper based on facts of the case. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vinod Seth v Devinder Bajaj[30] has reinstated this position of law.

In this case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court exempted the property of the respondent from operation of the bar under Section 52 during the pendency of civil suit. The suit was originally filed by the builder before Delhi High Court, seeking specific performance of an oral agreement to reconstruct premises/property of the owner. The court found that prima-facie the builder’s chances to succeed in the case appeared to be remote and suit was based on specific performance of an oral agreement which was difficult for the court to supervise. Prior to the matter reaching the Supreme Court, the Hon’ble High Court also observed that the owners were likely to suffer considerably merely owing to the pendency of the suit. In this case while little is at stake for the builder while pursuing the present suit, the owners as aforesaid would suffer, even if they ultimately succeed. Courts cannot be silent speculators to the parties being put on such unequal footing and therefore the Hon’ble High Court directed the builder to give an undertaking for paying compensation in the event of failure of the suit, as the pendency of the suit interfered with the owners right to enjoy or deal with the property. The plaintiff/builder challenged the said order of the Hon’ble High Court before the division bench, and the same was dismissed. Thereafter, the builder approached the Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court appreciated the novel and innovative direction given by the High Court, and exempted the suit property from operation of the bar under Section 52 by directing the owner to provide reasonable security and thereby granting the owner the liberty to deal with his property in any manner, despite the pendency of the suit. The said judgment is a precedent for cases where the immoveable property has been put under cloud of pending litigation and chances of the plaintiff succeeding are minute.[31]

It is not the law that the doctrine of lis pendens would be applicable in every case. Rather there are many instances where this doctrine does not apply. For instance, a private sale by a mortgagee in exercise of power conferred by mortgage deed is not affected by the doctrine of lis pendens embodied in the section and the sale is valid, though made during the pendency of a redemption suit filed by the mortgagor This doctrine also does not apply to the cases of review or to the cases where the transferor alone is affected. This doctrine fails to be applied to an order passed against an intervener in execution a proceeding as the proper remedy in such cases is a suit under Order 21 Rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It also does not apply to suits which are collusive, which is an essential to this doctrine. It does not apply to a friendly suit or to a case where there is misdescription of property involved. The doctrine of lis pendens does no longer apply to the case of a person who, throughout the pendency of a loan in shape obtains a mortgage of the belongings, in consideration for money paid via him and used by the mortgagor to pay off the suit mortgage. This doctrine sees no applicability in yearly leases and such other acts as are either the vital or the normal affordable incidents of a meantime beneficial enjoyment. Further, this doctrine does not apply to cases regarding a transfer pending litigation by a person who is not a party to such litigation, non-public properties other than the chattel interests in land, where the parties to the alienation are on the same side, transfer affected by Court decree with pending litigation and where alienations are not inconsistent with the rights which may be recognized through the decree in the litigation.

In Amarnath v. Deputy Director of Consolidation[32], it was held that party is said to be a party to the suit if the judgment is likely to affect the proportion of such a party and the decision would be obligatory on him too. Thus when A, B and C are brothers and C is residing in a city while A and B are residing jointly. A files a suit for partition and does not implead either C or his father X.

Though X and C are not any parties to the suit, yet the subject matter of the suit is the same and neither X nor C can legally and validly alienate his share to a third party. In such case the ultimate decree is very much likely to affect the shares of X and C too. Thus, there may be a case wherein a party may not be locked in a civil suit or proceeding as a valid party to the suit; yet such a party may be affected by the judgment/decree in such a litigation.

In Fayaz Husain Khan v. Prag Narain[33], a mortgagee sued to enforce his loan, but before the summons was served, the mortgagor affected a subsequent loan. The previous mortgagee continued his suit and obtained a sale order from the court, without making the consequent mortgagee a party to the suit. It was held that the sale ceased the succeeding mortgagee’s right to redeem the preceding mortgagee.

The questions whether lis pendens applies during pendency of suit by wife claiming maintenance from husband and suit property was charged with liability and whether a family member buying that property during lis pendens is affected by Section 52 arose in the case of Karupanna Gounder v Rasammal[34] where the court held that it was a personal suit and property being purchased by a family member is not hit by Section 52.[35]

CONCLUSION

It can be concluded that the doctrine of lis pendens and its principles of public policy as enshrined under Section 52 of The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 are in compliance with Justice, Equity and Good Conscience as they rest upon a foundation which is equitable and just, i.e., alienations of properties having pending litigation or suit cannot be allowed to prevail as it will be impossible to bring that suit to a successful termination. It only postulates a condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the Court.[36]

                                    It has the doctrine of necessity as its basis rather than the doctrine of notice. For the administration of justice, it is far vital that at the same time as any suit is pending in a court of law concerning title of the property, the litigant must not be allowed to take decision themselves and alienate or transfer the disputed property. Hence, Section 52 of The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 plays a vital role to ensure that justice is well served to the deserved and that no person’s right is curbed by another to his own satisfaction and will.

  1. BIBLIOGRAPHY
    1. CASES REFERRED
  • Amarnath v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1985 All 169
  • Awadesh Prasad v Belarani, ILR 33 Pat. 389.
  • Bellamy v Sabine (1857) 1 Dec. & 566.
  • Clifford George Pinto v M.R. Shenava & Ors, AIR 2005 Kant 167.
  • Faiyaz hussain Khan v Prag Narain, (1907) 29 All. 389.
  • Gangubai v Pangubai , A.I.R. 1939 Bom. 493.
  • Govinda Pillai v Aiyyappan Krishnan, AIR 1957 Ker. 10.
  • Karupanna Gounder v Rasammal, AIR 2007 Mad. 101.
  • Khemchand Chandra Choudhary v Vishnu Hari Patil, AIR 1983 SC 124
  • Nagubai v B. Sham Rao, (1956) SCR 451
  • Rajendra Singh v Santa Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2537.
  • Rambhadra v Daulu, 27 bom. L.R. 38.
  • Ramji das v Laxmi Kumar & Ors, AIR 1987 MP 78
  • Sanjay Verma v Manik Roy, AIR 2007 SC 1332.
  • Smt. Sayar Bai v Smt. Yashoda Bai, AIR 1983 Raj. 161
  • Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. v. Sri Nath Singhji Deo A.I.R. 1975 SC 1810.
  • Thakur Prasad v Gaya Prasad, 20 All. 349.
  • Usha Rani banik v Haridas Das, AIR 2005 Gau. 1.
  • Vinod Seth v Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1.
    1. BOOKS REFERRED
  • DrGP Tripathi, The Transfer of Property Act (17th edn, Central Law Publications 2011) 
  • DrRK Sinha, The Transfer of Property Act (12th edn, Central Law Agency 2011) 
  • SN Shukla, Transfer of Property Act (29th edn, Allahabad Law Agency 2016)
    1. SITES REFERRED
  • Alba law offices, 'Doctrine of lis pendens ' (Legally India, 20 September 2016)  accessed 25 March 2020
  • Artis, 'Doctrine Of Lis Pendens : A Critical Evaluation' (Artismccom)  accessed 24 March 2020
  • Ina Pant, 'Doctrine of lis pendens ' (Legal Bites, 16 September 2019)  accessed 28 March 2020
  • Law corner, 'Doctrine of lis pendens ' (Lawcornerin, 16 November 2018)  accessed 27 March 2020
  • Pratheek Maddhi Reddy, Indian Law On Lis Pendens: Hassles And Solutions, International Journal of Law and Legal Jurisprudence Studies :ISSN:2348-8212:Volume 3 Issue 2 accessed on 6th February, 2020.
  • Urwashi Ahuja, 'Doctrine of lis pendens ' (Law Times Journal, 18 May 2019)  accessed 27 March 2020
    1. ARTICLES REFERRED
  • Sunil Tyagi, 'Pending litigation not always a cloud over property title' (Zeusfirmin, 11 July 2015)  accessed 30 March 2020

[1] Pratheek Maddhi Reddy, Indian Law On Lis Pendens: Hassles And Solutions, International Journal of Law and Legal Jurisprudence Studies :ISSN:2348-8212:Volume 3 Issue 2 accessed on 6th February, 2020.

[2] Ibid

[3] Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. v. Sri Nath Singhji Deo A.I.R. 1975 SC 1810.

[4] Section 52, The Transfer of Property Act,1882

[5] DrRK Sinha, The Transfer of Property Act (12th edn, Central Law Agency 2011) 190

[6] Gangubai v Pangubai , A.I.R. 1939 Bom. 493.

[7]Bellamy v Sabine (1857) 1 Dec. & 566.

[8] Supra n5

[9] Faiyaz hussain Khan v Prag Narain, (1907) 29 All. 389.

[10] Ibid

[11] Govinda Pillai v Aiyyappan Krishnan, AIR 1957 Ker. 10.

[12] Clifford George Pinto v M.R. Shenava & Ors, AIR 2005 Kant 167.

[13] Vinod Seth v Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1.

[14] Thakur Prasad v Gaya Prasad, 20 All. 349.

[15] Awadesh Prasad v Belarani, ILR 33 Pat. 389.

[16] Nagubai v B. Sham Rao, (1956) SCR 451

[17] DrGP Tripathi, The Transfer of Property Act (17th edn, Central Law Publications 2011) 245

[18] Rambhadra v Daulu, 27 bom. L.R. 38.

[19] SN Shukla, Transfer of Property Act (29th edn, Allahabad Law Agency 2016) 145

[20] Ibid

[21] Supra n17

[22] Usha Rani banik v Haridas Das, AIR 2005 Gau. 1.

[23] Supra n19

[24] Rajendra Singh v Santa Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2537.

[25] Supra n19

[26] Smt. Sayar Bai v Smt. Yashoda Bai, AIR 1983 Raj. 161

[27] SN Shukla, Transfer of Property Act (29th edn, Allahabad Law Agency 2016) 149

[28] Khemchand Chandra Choudhary v Vishnu Hari Patil, AIR 1983 SC 124

[29] Ramji das v Laxmi Kumar & Ors, AIR 1987 MP 78

[30] Vinod Seth v Devinder Bajaj, 2010 8 SCC 1

[31] Sunil Tyagi, 'Pending litigation not always a cloud over property title' (Zeusfirmin, 11 July 2015)  accessed 30 March 2020

[32] Amarnath v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1985 All 169

[33] Fayaz Husain Khan v. Prag Narain, (1907) 29 All 339

[34] Karupanna Gounder v Rasammal, AIR 2007 Mad. 101.

[35] DrGP Tripathi, The Transfer of Property Act (17th edn, Central Law Publications 2011) 250

[36] Sanjay Verma v Manik Roy, AIR 2007 SC 1332.

Picture Source :

 
Ayesha Adyasha and Mehak Dhiman