The Supreme Court recently settled the position regarding the commencement of the limitation period for filing appeals under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. In Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v. M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (SLP (C) No. 9580/2025), the Court, by judgment dated April 15, 2025, delineated the responsibilities of litigants in exercising vigilance post-judgment and examined the procedural obligations under the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) as amended for commercial disputes.
The litigation arose from a commercial claim instituted by M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) seeking recovery of approximately Rs. 26.59 crores against Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. (JUUNL) on the basis of an MSME Council award. The Commercial Court at Ranchi delivered judgment on October 9, 2023. JUUNL sought to appeal under Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, which prescribes a limitation period of sixty days. The appeal was, however, lodged after a delay of 301 days, with JUUNL seeking condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
By judgment dated February 14, 2025, the Jharkhand High Court dismissed the condonation application, finding no sufficient cause for the prolonged delay. Challenging this dismissal, JUUNL approached the Supreme Court, contending that limitation could not commence without the formal delivery of the judgment copy, invoking Order XX Rule 1 of the CPC as amended for commercial disputes.
The bench, comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan, dismissed JUUNL’s special leave petition, affirming the High Court's decision and providing detailed reasoning on the commencement of limitation under the commercial law regime.
Addressing JUUNL’s primary contention, that the absence of a judgment copy delayed the running of limitation, the Court rejected the argument that Order XX Rule 1 CPC imposes a mandatory obligation on courts to furnish judgment copies before limitation can run. The Court observed:
“We are afraid it is difficult for us to take the view that the provision referred to above is mandatory. It comes to this that till the Registry does not provide the copy of the judgment, though not demanded, the period of limitation would not commence from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment.”
The Court stressed that such a construction would fundamentally erode the Commercial Courts Act’s legislative aim of ensuring prompt adjudication of commercial disputes.
While JUUNL relied on precedents such as Housing Board, Haryana v. Housing Board Colony Welfare Association (1995) and Sagufa Ahmed v. Upper Assam Polywood Products Pvt. Ltd. (2021), the Supreme Court distinguished these authorities. It highlighted that in both cases, parties had actively sought copies of the judgment and encountered unavoidable delay. In contrast, the Court noted the petitioners’ inaction:
“In the present case we find that after the order in question came to be pronounced by the Commercial Court, Ranchi, the appellants herein during the limitation period did not bother to even inquire as to why the said order was not available. It was only eight-months after the pronouncement of the said order and almost 150-days after the expiry of the limitation period, that the realization suddenly dawned upon the appellants herein to apply for the certified copy.”
The Court thus rejected JUUNL’s attempt to shift the burden to the court registry, emphasizing the need for parties to act with vigilance.
Reinforcing the principle that litigants must actively safeguard their rights, the Court reiterated:
“One of the core tenets of the law of limitation is to enthuse diligence amongst parties as to their rights. The law of limitation cannot be read in such a manner whereby parties stop showing any modicum of regard for their own rights and on the pre-text of untimely communication continue to litigate without being vigilante themselves.”
The Court made it clear that the law does not accommodate litigants who, by their own neglect, allow statutory periods to elapse.
Turning to the issue of condonation, the Court referred to Government of Maharashtra v. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd. (2021), where it was clarified that while Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to commercial appeals, condonation is to be exercised exceptionally and not as a matter of course. The Court reiterated:
“Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule.”
Finding that JUUNL’s conduct did not merit an exception, the Supreme Court declined to condone the inordinate delay, thereby reinforcing the sanctity of limitation statutes in commercial litigation.
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