In a significant procedural face-off over criminal defamation and trial strategy, the Gujarat High Court has stepped in to examine whether a political leader accused of defamatory statements can insist on being tried separately from a co-accused, raising pointed questions on “same transaction” trials, alleged prejudice to defence, and the limits of the Court’s inherent powers under criminal law.

The controversy began when a criminal complaint for defamation under Section 500 of the IPC was lodged by a university against the petitioner and another political leader, alleging that both had made defamatory statements during back-to-back press conferences questioning the Prime Minister’s degree soon after a High Court verdict in favour of the university. As the trial progressed before a metropolitan magistrate in Ahmedabad, the petitioner sought a separate trial, arguing that there was no allegation of conspiracy or common intention under Sections 34 or 120B of the IPC and that the acts attributed to each accused were distinct.

When both the trial court and the Sessions Court rejected this plea, the petitioner approached the High Court, claiming that a joint trial would seriously prejudice his defence.

Examining the record in detail, the High Court was unconvinced. The bench noted that the petitioner had raised the very same demand for separate trials in earlier proceedings, which had already been discarded, and held that the attempt amounted to reopening a settled issue. Tracing the sequence of events, the Court observed that immediately after the university secured relief against a CIC order on disclosure of the Prime Minister’s degree, both accused, senior leaders of the same political party, held press conferences on consecutive days and uploaded the videos on their respective social media handles.

This, the Court said, clearly indicated a coordinated course of action forming part of “the same transaction,” even if conspiracy provisions were not formally invoked. Rejecting the petitioner’s apprehension of prejudice as speculative, the bench recorded a sharp finding, “Except bare assertion, there is nothing on record to indicate as to what prejudice would be caused to the petitioner.” The Court further emphasised that when the evidence against co-accused is common, the law does not favour splitting trials merely on perceived disadvantage. 

Consequently, holding that the acts alleged arose from the same transaction and required a joint appreciation of evidence, the High Court dismissed the petition and declined to interfere with the orders refusing a separate trial.

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Siddharth Raghuvanshi