In a significant advisory opinion delivered on a Presidential Reference under Article 143, the Supreme Court has held that it has no constitutional authority to prescribe timelines for the President or Governors to decide on granting assent to Bills under Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution.
A Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice BR Gavai, along with Justices Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, PS Narasimha and AS Chandurkar, ruled that judicially creating a doctrine of “deemed assent” upon the expiry of time would amount to an impermissible encroachment into the executive domain, violating the separation of powers.
The Bench observed that treating delayed action as automatic assent would effectively result in the Court substituting the constitutional role of the Governor or the President. “Any concept of deemed assent after a judicially fixed deadline is nothing but a judicial takeover of executive functions,” the Court stated.
However, the Court acknowledged that prolonged, unexplained, or indefinite delays can be subject to limited judicial review, permitting the Court to direct the constitutional authority to take a decision within a reasonable time—withoutentering into the merits of the Bill.
Background:
The reference was sent by President Droupadi Murmu in May, shortly after the Apex Court’s ruling in the Tamil Nadu Governor case, where a two-judge Bench had prescribed timelines for the President and Governors to act on Bills. Several States, including Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Punjab, and West Bengal, argued that the reference was unnecessary since the issues had already been addressed.
During the hearing, the Bench questioned whether Governors can indefinitely withhold Bills without returning them to the legislature, remarking that such a scenario would place the functioning of elected governments “at the mercy of the Governor”.
Attorney General R. Venkataramani and Solicitor General Tushar Mehta opposed judicial timelines, asserting that such directions would violate federal balance and interfere with discretionary constitutional functions. In contrast, senior advocates representing several States supported judicial intervention to prevent executive inaction.
Key Constitutional Questions:
Q1. Options available to a Governor under Article 200
The Court reaffirmed that Article 200 grants the Governor three constitutionally recognised courses of action when a Bill is presented. The Governor may grant assent and allow the Bill to become law, may withhold assent but only by sending the Bill back to the Legislature for reconsideration, or may reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President.
Significantly, the Court rejected the Union’s argument that a Governor may remain passive and withhold assent without returning the Bill. The Bench made it clear that such prolonged silence would amount to executive inaction and would undermine the functioning of democratically elected legislatures. The Constitution requires the Governor to act; indefinite withholding is not a permissible option.
Q2. Whether the Governor acts on aid and advice under Article 200
Interpreting the expression “in his opinion” in Article 200, the Court held that while the Governor is generally bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers, the Constitution grants him limited discretionary authority at this specific stage.
This discretion is not unfettered, it exists only for determining whether the Bill should be returned to the Legislature or reserved for the President. Beyond this narrow window, the Governor remains a constitutional head bound by ministerial advice.
Q3. Justiciability of the Governor’s discretion under Article 200
Ordinarily, decisions of the Governor under Article 200 are not subject to judicial review, as they fall within the scope of constitutional discretion.
However, the Court drew an important distinction: when there is prolonged, arbitrary, or unexplained inaction, the judiciary may issue a limited mandamus, directing the Governor to make a decision within a reasonable timeframe.
The Court made it clear that such intervention does not question the merits of the Governor’s decision, it merely ensures that the constitutional process is not stalled indefinitely.
Q4. Effect of Article 361 on judicial review
Article 361 protects the Governor from being answerable to any court for actions taken in the exercise of their powers. Yet, the Court clarified that this immunity does not place the office of the Governor beyond scrutiny. While the Governor cannot be summoned personally, the institutional functioning of the Governor’s Office can be examined where there are allegations of unreasonable delay or constitutional breakdown. Thus, the shield of Article 361 is not a license for inaction.
Q5, 6 & 7. Can Courts fix timelines for Governors or the President?
The Court made an emphatic and unanimous declaration that the framers of the Constitution intentionally left Articles 200 and 201 flexible, without prescribing any rigid timelines. It held that Courts cannot impose deadlines, create a doctrine of “deemed assent,” or enforce any judicially fixed timeframe on the President or the Governors. According to the Court, introducing such timelines would effectively amount to rewriting the Constitution, an exercise that the judiciary is neither empowered nor permitted to undertake.
Q8. Whether the President must seek the Supreme Court’s opinion whenever a Bill is reserved
The Court clarified that the President is not required to consult the Supreme Court for every Bill reserved under Article 201. The President may decide independently, based on subjective constitutional satisfaction. Only in exceptional cases of constitutional ambiguity or national importance does the President have the discretion to seek the Court’s opinion under Article 143.
Q9. Whether decisions under Articles 200/201 can be reviewed before a Bill becomes law
The Court held that decisions under Articles 200 and 201 are not justiciable at the pre-enactment stage. Judicial review becomes available only after the Bill transforms into an enacted law, when its validity can be examined on established constitutional grounds. Pre-assent actions, therefore, lie outside the Court's supervisory jurisdiction.
Q10 & 11. Can Article 142 be used to substitute the role of the Governor or President?
The Court made it clear that the answer is an unequivocal no. It held that Article 142 cannot be used to create any doctrine of deemed assent, nor can it be applied to substitute or override the constitutional decision-making authority of the President or the Governor. The Court further clarified that Article 142 does not empower the judiciary to introduce or enforce judicial timelines within constitutional processes.
The Court stressed that executive functions cannot be judicially assumed or overwritten, even under the expansive powers of Article 142.
In its final opinion, the Supreme Court categorically held that courts cannot prescribe deadlines for the President or Governors while dealing with Bills under Articles 200 and 201. It rejected the possibility of “deemed assent” and confirmed that Article 142 cannot be used to substitute or override constitutional roles assigned to executive authorities. The Court reiterated that limited judicial review is available only in cases of extraordinary delay, and even then, only to direct expeditious decision-making, not to dictate the nature of the decision.
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