On 29th October 2020 the Supreme Court of India in the case of State Of Rajasthan Vs. Heem Singh comprising of a double Bench Judge of Justices DY Chandrachud and Indira Banerjee reiterated that order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent official had been acquitted of the criminal charge.

Factual Background

Heem Singh was appointed as a Constable in the police service of Rajasthan in 1992. In August 2002, he was named in an FIR in a murder case, and later a charge sheet was filed under Sections 302, 201, and 120B. During the pendency of the criminal trial, a memorandum was issued to him followed by a charge-sheet, convening disciplinary proceedings under the provisions of Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control, and Appeal) Rules 1958. Sessions Court acquitted him and the co-accused, giving them the benefit of doubt. The disciplinary enquiry on the charge of murder proceeded with much the same evidence. It finally concluded that conclusion that though he had been given the benefit of doubt in the criminal trial, the charges against him stood established. He was thus dismissed from service.

The Rajasthan High Court dismissed his writ petition challenging the dismissal order, The Division Bench granted the respondent reinstatement in service with no back wages for the seventeen years that elapsed since his termination.

Submissions on behalf of the Appellant

Mr. Ashish Kumar, AAG appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that:

(i)        In a disciplinary enquiry involving a charge of misconduct, the test is whether the charge is established on a ‘preponderance of probabilities’ unlike in a criminal trial where the prosecution has to establish their case ‘beyond reasonable doubt’;

(ii)       While exercising judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution against the findings in a disciplinary enquiry the court cannot reappreciate the evidence in the manner of an appellate court, and so long as the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence, no interference is warranted;

(iii)      The High Court has failed to ascribe adequate weight to the orders in the disciplinary proceedings: the order dated 11 December 2003 pursuant to departmental proceedings; the order dated 17 June 2005 of the Inspector General of Police exercising appellate powers, and the order dated 29 August 2008 in review proceedings passed by the Home Department; and

On the above grounds, it was urged that the High Court has transgressed the limitations on its power of judicial review in allowing the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the Single Judge, and in interfering with the disciplinary penalty imposed by the appellants.

Submissions on behalf of the respondent

On the other hand, Mr. Jasmeet Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted that:

(i)        The departmental enquiry was concluded in violation of the rules governing the enquiry. All the orders in the disciplinary enquiry were based on the examination-in-chief of an alleged eye-witness, PW1 Jodh Singh while ignoring that his deposition was completely demolished in the course of the cross-examination;

(ii)       Since the alleged crime took place outside the scope of service, it was incumbent upon the department to place reliance on the entire record of the Sessions trial in which the respondent was acquitted. The departmental enquiry is based on a selective examination of the records of the Sessions Court;

(iii)      The entire evidence on record would demonstrate that the respondent was not even remotely connected with the murder of Bhanwar Singh; and

(iv)      There is a “minor charge” against the respondent of availing of three days extra casual leave without informing the superior officer. On this charge, it has been submitted that:

(a) The grant of additional casual leave was approved upon his joining duties by the superior officer and the charge was duly modified to state that the approval was taken by misrepresenting facts; the respondent was alleged to have concealed his involvement in the crime of murder;

(b) If the charge of being involved in the murder is not established, this charge will cease to exist; and

(c) Even assuming, without conceding, that the respondent was guilty of taking casual leave without informing the superior, he was never guilty of such conduct in the past and the leave was taken because of the death of his brother-in-law.

Court Analysis

The Bench noted: Whether on the basis of the evidence, the respondent could have been implicated in the conspiracy to commit the murder of Bhanwar Singh is one aspect of the matter. Evidently, direct evidence to sustain a charge of conspiracy is difficult to come by even in the course of a criminal trial. Quite independent of this is the issue of whether the connection of the respondent with the circumstances leading to the death of Bhanwar Singh affected his ability to continue in the State police force without affecting its integrity and reputation. The latter aspect is the one on which the judgment of the Division Bench is found to be deficient in its reasoning.

In the present case, we have an acquittal in a criminal trial on a charge of murder. The judgment of the Sessions Court is a reflection of the vagaries of the administration of criminal justice. The judgment contains a litany of hostile witnesses, and of the star witness resiling from his statements. Our precedents indicate that acquittal in a criminal trial in such circumstances does not conclude a disciplinary enquiry.

In Southern Railway Officers Association v. Union of India, this Court held:

“37. Acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The High Court did not say that the said fact had not been taken into consideration. The revisional authority did so. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent official had been acquitted of the criminal charge.”

Also, the Court noted that Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram, it was held that unless the accused has an "honorable acquittal" in their criminal trial, as opposed to an acquittal due to witnesses turning hostile or for technical reasons, the acquittal shall not affect the decision in the disciplinary proceedings and lead to automatic reinstatement.

In the present case, the respondent was acquitted of the charge of murder. The circumstances in which the trial led to an acquittal have been elucidated in detail above. The verdict of the criminal trial did not conclude the disciplinary enquiry. The disciplinary enquiry was not governed by proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by the rules of evidence that governed the criminal trial. True, even on the more relaxed standard which governs a disciplinary enquiry, evidence of the involvement of the respondent in a conspiracy involving the death of Bhanwar Singh would be difficult to prove. But there are, as we have seen earlier, circumstances emerging from the record of the disciplinary proceedings which bring legitimacy to the contention of the State that to reinstate such an employee back in service will erode the credibility of and public confidence in the image of the police force.

Judgment

the direction of the Division Bench for reinstatement was set aside. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court directed that the cessation from service will notionally take place on the respondent completing minimum qualifying service. The direction of the High Court that the respondent shall not be entitled to back wages was upheld. The retiral dues of the respondent shall be computed and released on this basis within a period of three months. 37 The appeal was allowed in the above terms. No order as to costs was passed.

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Anshu Prasad