Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. & Anr Vs. Union of India & Ors [1988] INSC 179 (20 July 1988)
Mukharji, Sabyasachi (J) Mukharji, Sabyasachi (J) Rangnathan, S.
CITATION: 1988 AIR 1708 1988 SCR Supl. (1) 493 1988 SCC (4) 324 JT 1988 (3) 78 1988 SCALE (2)53
CITATOR INFO : E&D 1991 SC 855 (46,48)
ACT:
Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1971-Whether the Act to the extent it had been extended to premises belonging to or taken on lease by a Corporation established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by Central Government was ultra vires or beyond legislative power of Parliament to extend the applicability of the Act to such premises-Determination of question involved.
HEAD NOTE:
The first appellant in this appeal, a private limited company, occupying a portion of the premises belonging to the United Commercial Bank, claimed to be the tenant of the Bank, but this was not admitted by the respondent Bank. The Bank alleged that the appellant company had been allowed to occupy a portion of the Bank's premises as licensee in consideration of certain accountancy and secretarial services rendered to the Bank. The Bank had issued a notice of eviction to the appellant company under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 ('the 1956 Act'). Subsequently, the Bank issued a notice to the appellants under the Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1971 ('the 1971 Act') which is an Act of the Parliament. The appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court, agitating the question whether the impugned Act which provides for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises belonging to or taken on lease by a corporation established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government was ultra vires as it was beyond the legislative power of the Parliament to extend the applicability of the said Act to such premises. The appellants were interested in denying the legislative power of Parliament in so far as it purported to extend the applicability of the 1971 Act to the premises belonging to or taken on lease by public sector corporations. Their argument went to the extent of urging that only the State legislatures and not Parliament were competent to legislate on a topic of landlord-tenant relationship in respect of land and buildings.
According to the appellants, the provisions of 1956 Act were squarely applicable and should have been resorted to by the Bank for evicting them.
494 The appellants contended that a legislation of the type of West A Bengal Land (Eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1962 (1962Act), which was on the pattern of the 1971 Act, would fall within the legislative field exclusively open to the State Legislatures and that the 1971 Act was ultra vires the Parliament in so far as it purported to affect the appellants' rights.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: Per Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.
His Lordship agreed with Ranganathan, J. that the appeal should be dismissed. His Lordship preferred the view of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. Bhilai, A.I.R. 1980 M.P. 106 to the view of the Bombay High Court in Miscellaneous Petition No. 458/79- Elliot Waud Hill (P) Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corpn. This Court had in this Case proceeded on the short question whether the impugned Act which provides for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises to the extent it had been extended to premises belonging or taken on lease by a corporation established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government, was ultra vires or beyond the legislative power of the Parliament to extend the applicability of the Act to such premises. [498D- G] There was no dispute, as emphasised by Ranganathan, J., as to whether the premises in question or of this type was a public premises. For the purpose of this appeal, once it was held that the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised occupants) Act was intra vires the Parliament, no further issue between the parties survived. It was not necessary to consider whether the provisions of the 1971 Act even if intra vires would pervail upon the provisions of the State Legislation. For the purpose of this appeal, it was unnecessary to express any view on the amplitude and scope of Article 254 of the Constitution. [498H; 499A-B] It had to be taken that the legislation in question must be under stood in its pith and substance, and so understood, the Act in question in this case is in respect of transfer of property other than agricultural land and as such falls in Entry 6 of List III of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution. It is clear from the decision of this Court in Indu Bhusan Bose v. Rana Sundari Devi and Anr., [1970] 1 S.C.R. 443 and the subsequent decision in V. Dhanapal Chettiarv. YesodaiAmmal, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 334 that the subject matter of housing accommodation and control thereof falls within the purview of concurrent list. In that view 495 of the matter, it could not be convassed that the 1971 legislation in question was beyond the competence of the legislature. [499C-E] Per S. Ranganathan, J.
The present agrument of the appellants might not have been open to them if the premises of the Bank could be said to be premises belonging to the Union Government In that case, the legislation to the extent it governs such premises can be said to fall under Entry 32 of List I as one covering the "property of the Union". Though, the premises being situated in Calcutta any legislation under that entry in regard thereto would be subject to State Legislation, the state Legislation can only govern "save in so far as Parliament by law otherwise provides." Parliament having provided otherwise by the 1971 Act, that Act will prevail over the 11/56 and 1962 Acts. Though the Bank was a corporation wholly owned and controlled by the Government, it had a distinct personality of its own and its property could not be said to be the property of the Union. The position was beyond the pale of controversy after the decision of this Court in Bacha F.Guzdar v. C.I.T., [1955] 1 S.C.R. 876; State trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. C.T.O., [1964] 4 S.C.R. 99, and many other cases. lt was not possible for the respondents to support the legislation qua the premises under Entry 32 of List I. [505A-D] Entry 32 of List I being out of the way, the appellants contended that the legislation squarely regularly fell under Entry 18 of List II. A question as to the interpretation of Entry 18 (or its predecessor, Entry 21 of the Provincial List under the Government of India Act, 1935) had arisen before the Federal Court and Privy Council, and also was considered in some decisions of this Court, which, except in the case of Indu Bhusan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 443, were not helpful in deciding the issue before the Court. In respect of Indu Bhushan's case, while the respondents contended that the ruling concluded the issue in their favour, the appellants urged that it could not be taken as a decision that the house tenancy legislation could not come under Entry 18 of List II. [505E; 506B-C; 513C] It was true that the decision in Indu Bhushan's case ultimately turned on the wider interpretation of Entry 2 of List I favoured by this Court, nevertheless, the judgment contains a specific discussion of the terms of Entry 21.
Indu Bhushan must be taken to have expressed a view that premises tenancy legislation in so far as it pertains to houses and buildinYs is referable not to Entry 18 of List II but to entries 6,7 496 and 13 of List III. The decision of the larger Bench of this Court in V. Dhonpal Chettier v. Yesodai Ammal, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 334, also reinforced the same line of thinking. The discussion and ratio of Dhanpal Chettier fall into place only on the view that by that time it was taken as settled law that State house control legislations were referable to the legislative powers conferred by the Concurrent List.
[513C; 520D-E] Entry 18 should be given as wide a construction as possible consistent with all the other entries in all the three legislative Lists. There is no reason why the first topic dealt with by the entry, viz. land, should be narrowly interpreted. lt should be understood as including all types of land, rural or urban, agricultural or non-agricultural, arid, cultivated, fallow or vacant, What is 'land' can be gathered from the other words of the entry which attempt a paraphrase. It is not possible to interpret this entry as encompassing within its terms legislation on the relationship of landlord and tenant in regard to houses and buildings. All the legislation coming up for consideration in the present case are referable to entries in the concurrent List and the topic of legislation is not referable to Entry 18 of List II. The provisions of the 1971 Act, in so far as they were made applicable to the premises of the respondent Bank, are intra vires and valid. [520F-H; 525E] Once it was held that the 1971 Act is infra vires the Parliament, no further issue between the parties survived.
There was some discussion r. before this Court as to whether the provisions of the 1971 Act, even if intra vires, would prevail against the provisions of the State legislations.
This case is clearly governed by the primary rule in Article 254(1) of the Constitution under which the law of Parliament on a subject in the concurrent List prevails over the State Law. Article 254(2) of the Constitution is not attracted because no provision of the State Acts (enacted in 1956 and 1962) were repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law of Parliament of existing law. Even if the provision of the main part of Article 254(2) can be said to be somehow applicable, the proviso, read with Article 254(1), reaffirms the supremacy of any subsequent legislation of Parliament on the same matter even though such subsequent legislation does not in terms amend, vary or repeal any provision of the State Legislation. The provisions of the 1971 Act will, therefore, prevail against those of the State Acts and were rightly invoked in this case by she respondent Bank. [525F; 529C-E] There was no substance in the appellants' contention that the provision in the 1971 Act appointing one of the officers of the respondent Bank as the Estate officers was violative of Article 14. [529F] 497 The appeal failed.
L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. Bhilai, A.I.R. 1980 M.P. 106; Elliot Waud Hill (P) Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation Miscellaneous Petiton No. 458/79 before Bombay High Court; Indu Bhusan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi and Anr.. [1970] 1 S.C.R. 443; A.C. Patel v. Vishwanath Chadda, ILR 1954 Bombay 434; V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yasodai Ammal, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 836; Bacha P. Guzdar v. C.I.T., [1955] 1 S.C.R. 876; State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. C.T.O [1964] 4 SCR 99; A.P. State Raod Transport Corporation v. I.T.O., [1964] 7 SCR 17; Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State, [1969] 3 S.C.R. 995; Vidarbha Housing Board v. I.T.O., [1973] 92 I.T.R. 430; Western Coalfields Ltd. v. Special Area Development Authority, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 1; Manohar v. C.G. Deasi, AIR 1951 Nag. 33; Raman Dass v. State, AIR 1954 All. 707; Darukhanawala v. Khemchand, ILR 1954 Bom, 546; M. Karuna v. State, AIR 1955 Nag 153, Kewalchand v. Dashrathlal, ILR 1956 Nag 618; Sukumar Dutta v. Gaurishankar, [1964] 69 CWN 833; Raval & Co. v. Ramachandran, AIR 1967 Mad. 57;Mangtulal v. Radhey Shyam, AIR 1953 Pat. 14; Milap Chand v. Dwarakadas, AIR 1964 Raj 252; Rama Sundari v. Indu Bhusan, AIR 1967 Cal. 355; Nawal Mal v. Nathu Mal, AIR 1962 Raj. 193; Bapalal & Co. v. Thakur Das, AIR 1982 Mad. 309; Vnited Province v. Atiga Begum, [1940J F.C.R. 110; Megh Raj v. Allan Rakhia, AIR 1947 PC 72; Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 748; Manaklal Chhotalal v. M.G. Makwana & Ors., [1967] 3 SCR 65; Babu Jagtanand Sri Satyanarayanji, ILR 40 Patna 625; Union of India v. Valluri S. Chaudhary, [1979] 3 SCR 802, State v. Peter, [1980] 3 SCR 290, 292; Jaisingh Jairam Tyagi v. Maman Chand, [1980] 3 S.C.R. 224; Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v. State, [1983] 3 S.C.R. 130; Dhillon's case, [1972] 2 S.C.R. 33; Jain Ink Manufacturing Co. v. LIC, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 498 and Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State, [1955] S.C.R. 799, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal NO 900 of 1987 From the Judgment and order dated 12.2.1987 of the Calcutta High Court in Matter No. 676 of 1978.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Anil Mitra, P.H. Parekh, D. Chandfachud, S.C. Ghosh and R.K. Dhil1on for the Appellants.
K. Parasaran Attorney General for Union of India.
498 K.N. Bhat, A. Subba Rao and Miss Madhu Moolchandani for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. I had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment proposed to be delivered by my learned Brother Ranganathan, J. It is, however, necessary to add a few sentences. I was reluctant to take up this matter as it arises out of a decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta. That decision was occasioned by a reference made by the Chief Justice of that High Court on a reference made by me to the Chief Justice sitting singly in that Court. In the High Court I had not expressed any view on the contentions urged. In those circumstances both the parties requested me to take up the matter. It was in these circumstances that I became a party to this judgment. I agree with my learned Brother that the appeal should be dismissed and the order he proposes to make as to costs.
It is not necessary in view of the facts and circumstances of the case to refer in detail to the reasons.
I would, however, make it clear that I prefer the view of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. Bhilai, AIR 1980 MP 106. I would prefer this view in preference to that of the F. Iearned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Miscellaneous Petition No. 458/79 Elliot Waud Hill (P) Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corpn. Further, it is necessary to reiterate that in this case we have proceeded on the short question canvassed before the Division Bench of the High Court out of which this appeal arises, i.e., whether the impugned Act which provides for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises to the extent it has been extended to premises belonging or taken on lease by a corporation established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Govt. is ultra vires or beyond the legislative power of the Parliament to extend the applicability of the Act to such premises. It is only this question which was mooted before the High Court and required consideration by us under Article ,136 of the Constitution.
It is, therefore, not necessary to express any view on any other aspect of the matter.
Furthermore, as has been emphasised by my learned Brother there was no dispute as to whether the premises in the present appeal is a public premises. Therefore, the question whether the premises in question or of this type is a public premises is not an aspect into which we were required to go.
499 For the purpose of this appeal once it is held that the Public Premises (Eviction. Of Unauthorised occupants) Act, 1971 is intra vires the Parliament, no further issue between the parties survive because no other contention was raised before the Division Bench of the High Court and also in this appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, no other issue can be canvassed. It is, therefore, not necessary, in my opinion, to consider whether the provisions of 1971 Act even if intra vires would prevail upon the provisions of the State legislation. Hence, for the purpose of this appeal it is unnecessary to express any view on the amplitude and scope of Article 254 of the Constitution.
Indu Bhusan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi & Anr., [1970] 1 SCR 443 is a decision of five learned Judges of this Court affirming the Calcutta view which held that the legislation in question in that case was to be found in Entries 6, 7 & 13 of List III of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution and neither in Entry 18 of II Schedule nor in Entry 3 of II Schedule of the Constitution. It rejected the Bombay view expressed in ,4. C. Patel v. Vishwanath Chadda, ILR 1954 Bom. 434. Respectfully, it has to be taken that the legislation in question must be understood in its pith and substance and so understood the Act in question in the instant case, is in respect of transfer of property other than agricultural land and, as such, falls in Entry 6 of List III of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution. It is clear from the said decision and the subsequent decision reaffirming the same view in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, [1980] 1 SCR 334 that the subject-matter of housing accommodation and control thereof falls within the purview of concurrent list. In that view of the matter, it cannot in my opinion, be canvassed that the 197 1 legislation in question was beyond the competence of the legislature.
With these observations I agree with respect with my learned Brother that the appeal should be dismissed without any order as to cost S. RANGANATHAN, J. The first appellant is a private limited company. The company is occupying a portion of premises No. 18, Russel Street, Calcutta. The premises belong to the United Commercial Bank, a statutory corporation constituted under the Banking Companies (Acquisition & Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. The appellant company claims to be the tenant of the Bank but this is not admitted by the respondent Bank. The Bank alleges that the appellant company, when somewhat differently constituted, had been allowed to occupy a portion of the Bank's premises as licensee in consideration of 500 certain accountancy and secretarial services which it was required to render to the Bank. It appears that sometime in 1975 the respondent Bank issued a notice of eviction to the appellant company under Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1956 Act'). Subsequently, however, the Bank issued a notice dated 4.2.1977 to the appellants under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1971 Act'), which is an Act of Parliament. The appellants thereupon filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court being Matter No. 676 of 1978.
Though several contentions appear to have been raised in the writ petition, the judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated 12th February, 1987, (which is the one presently under appeal) records that "the only question which has been mooted and agitated before us is whether the impugned Act which provides for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises to the extent it has been extended to premises belonging or taken on lease by a corporation established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government is ultra vires as it was beyond the legislative power of the Parliament to extend the applicability of the said Act to such premises." Though the appellants are interested only in denying the legislative power of Parliament in so far as it purports to extend the applicability of the 1971 Act to premises belonging to or taken on lease by what may be described as public sector corporations, the contention as urged is somewhat broader. The argument goes to the extent of urging that only the State legislatures, and not Parliament, is competent to legislate on the topic of landlord tenant relationships in respect of land and buildings. This has been the principal contention addressed to us by Dr. Chitale appearing on behalf of the appellants.
The 1971 Act received the assent of the President on 23rd August, 1971 but it is deemed to have come into force on the 16th day of September, 1958 for certain 'historical' reasons which are not relevant for our purposes. The Act provides for the eviction of 'unauthorised occupants from public premises and for certain incidental matters. S. 2(c) defines premises' to mean 'any land or any part of a building and to include garden, grounds and outhouses appurtenant to the building or fittings affixed thereto'.
The expression 'public premises' has been defined in Section 2(e) of the Act. This definition is in three parts. Sub- clause ( 1) of clause (e) takes in premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government, as well as premises placed by that Government under the control of either House of Parliament for providing residential 501 accommodation to the members of the staff of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament. Sub-clause (3) of clause (e) takes in premises belonging to certain local authorities in the Union Territory of Delhi. Sub-clause (2) of clause (e) brings in premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, various kinds of bodies, such as Universities, Institutes of Technology, Board of Trustees of Major Port Trusts and the Bhakra Management Board. It takes in any premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, a Government company or its subsidiary. It also takes in-and this is what we are concerned with here-premises of "any corporation (not being a company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 or a local authority) established by or under a Central Act and onwed or controlled by the Central Government". There is no dispute that the premises in question in the present appeal is "public premises" within the meaning of the Act.
The Act contemplates the appointment of an Estate officer who is a high placed officer of the Government or of the relevant statutory authority in respect of public premises controlled by that authority. The Act enables the Estate officer to call upon "unauthorised occupants" of public premises (meaning persons occupying such premises without authority or continuing in occupation after the authority to do so has expired or has been determined for any reason) to show cause why they should not be evicted and to proceed to evict them, if need be, after considering the cause, if any, shown by the persons concerned in response to a notice served on them. It also contains powers to remove unauthorised constructions, demolish unauthorised constructions, dispose of property left on public premises by unauthorised occupants, require payment of rent or damages in respect of public premises and so on. An order passed by the estate officer, under the provisions of the Act, is appealable, the appellate authority being the District Judge or such other judicial officer of not less than 10 year's experience as a District Judge and subject to the above right of appeal, the orders passed by the estate officer are final. Section 15 bars the jurisdiction of Courts to entertain any suits or proceedings in respect of, inter alia, the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of public premises. This, broadly, is the outline of the 1971 Act. Before proceeding to deal with the contentions urged before us, it is necessary to refer to two more enactments, which have a bearing on the topic of discussion before us.
It has been mentioned earlier that the Bank had served a notice on the appellants under the 1956 Act. This Act, which received the H 502 assent of the President on 30th March, 1956, is on the pattern of the lease and rent control legislation prevalent in various States. It regulates, inter alia, the matter of eviction of tenants of buildings situated in Calcutta and certain important cities and localities of the State where there is scarcity of housing accommodation. It is not necessary to set out the provisions of this Act except one.
Under the second proviso to section 1(3) the Act is not to apply to (a) any premises belonging to any local authority, (b) any premises belonging to or requisitioned by Government and (c) any tenancy created by Government in respect of any premises taken on lease by Government. The premises in the present case does not fall within any of these categories and, according to the appellants before us, the provisions of 1956 Act were squarely applicable and should have been resorted to by the Bank for evicting them. This is one.
The other relevant statute is the West Bengal Public Land (Eviction of Unauthorised occupants) Act, 1962, (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1962 Act'). This legislation is on the same pattern as the 1971 Act, a pattern which appears to have been in existence in various States, conferring special powers on statutorily named officers to evict unauthorised occupants of public premises.
The definitions of 'land', 'public land' and 'unauthorised occupation' contained in sections 2(2), 2(7) and 2(8) are so wide as to leave no doubt that the premises belonging to the Bank would be within the scope of the said Act and that proceedings for eviction of the appellants could also be initiated by the Collector under that Act. It thus appears that the procedure for the eviction of the petitioners will be governed by the 1971 Act as well as either or both of the State Acts and the question is, which of these will prevail? The appellants urge that a legislation of this type will fall within the legislative field exclusively open to the State legislatures and that the 1971 Act is ultra vires Parliament in so far as it purports to affect the appellants' rights.
It will be convenient, at this stage, to set out all the relevant entries in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution that may have a bearing on the discussion before us along with the corresponding entries under the 7th Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935. These are:
CONSTITUTION 1935 ACT
List I-Union List List I-Federal List ENTRY 3 ENTRY 2 Delimitation of cantonment Naval, military and air force works;
503 areas, local self-government local self-government in cantonment in such areas, the consti- areas, the constitution and powers tution and powers within within such areas of cantonment such areas of cantonment authorities, the regulation of house authorities and the regula- accommodation in such areas, and the tion of house accommodation delimitation of such areas.
including the control of rents in such areas. ENTRY 10 ENTRY 32 Works, lands and buildings vested Property of the Union and in, or in the possession of, His the revenue therefrom, but Majesty for the purposes of the as regards property situated Dominion (not being naval, military in a State* * * subject to or air force works), but? as regards legislation by the State, save property situate in a Province, in so far as Parliament by law subject always to Provincial otherwise provide. legislation, save in so far as Dominion law otherwise provides, and, as regards property in an Acceding State held by virtue of any lease or agreement with that State, subject to the terms of that lease or agreement.
ENTRY 43: ENTRY 33:
Incorporation7 regulation Corporations, that is to say, the and winding up of trading incorporation, regulation and corporations, including winding-up of trading corporations, banking, insurance and including banking, insurance and financial corporations hut financial corporations, but not not including co-operative including corporations owned or societies. controlled by an Acceding State and carrying on business only within that State or co-operative societies, and of corporations, whether trading or not, with objects not confined to one unit, ENTRY 44: but not including universities.
Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corpora- tions, whether trading or not, with objects not confined to one State, but not including universities.
504 LIST II--STATE LIST LIST II--PROVlNClAL LIST ENTRY 18: ENTRY 21:
Land, that is to say, rights Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenun in or over land, land tenures, including the relation of including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer collection of rents; transfer, and alienation of agricultural alienation and devolution of land; land improvement a agricultural land; land agricultural loans; improvement and agricultural colonization. loans; colonization; courts of Wards; encumbered and attached estates; treasure trove.
List 111--CONCURRENT LIST LIST 111--CONCURRENT LIST ENTRY 5: ENTRY 7:
Marriage and divorce; infants, Wills, intestacy, and succession, and minors; adoption; wills save as regards agricultural intestacy and succession; land.
joint family and partition;
all matters in respect of which parties in judicial proceedings were immedia- tely before the commencement of this Consti- tution subject to their personal law.
ENTRY 6: ENTRY 8:
Transfer of property other Transfer of property other than agricultural land; than agricultural land; regis- registration of deeds and tration of deeds and documents. documents.
ENTRY 7: ENTRY 10:
Contracts, including part Contracts, including partnership, ship, agency, contracts of agency, contracts of carriage, carriage, and other special and other special forms of forms of contracts, but not contracts,but not including including contracts relating contracts relating to agricultural land. to agricultural land.
505 One thing may be made clear at the outset. The present argument may not have been open to the appellants if the premises of the bank could be said to be premises belonging to the Union Government. In that case, the legislation to the extent it governs such premises can be said to fall under entry 32 of List I as one covering the "property of the union". Though, the premises being situated in Calcutta, any legislation under that entry in regard thereto would be subject to State legislation, the State legislation can only govern "save in so far as Parliament by law otherwise provides". Parliament having provided otherwise by the 1971 Act, that Act will, it can be said, prevail over the 1956 and 1962 Acts. It is, however, common ground before us that though the Bank is a corporation wholly owned and controlled by the Government, it has a distinct personality of its own and its property cannot be said to be the property of the Union. The position, indeed, is beyond the pale of controversy after the decisions of this Court in Bacha.
F.Guzdarv. C. r. T., [1955] 1 S.C.R. 876; State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. C.T.O.,[1964] 4 S.C.R. 99; A.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. I.T.O. [1964] 7 S.C.R. 17; Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State, [1969] 3 S.C.R. 995; Vidarbha Housing Board v. I. T. O.,[1973] 92 I.T.R. 430 and Western Coalfields Ltd. v. Special Area Development Authority, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 1. It is, therefore, not possible for the respondents to support the legislation, qua the premises in question, under Entry 32 of List I.
Entry 32 of List I being out of the way, Dr. Chitale, appearing on behalf of the appellants, contends that the legislation squarely falls under Entry- 18 of List II. He points out that judicial decisions have given the word `land' in Entry 18 a very wide interpretation so as to comprehend not only land of all types-rural or urban, agricultural or non-agricultural, vacant or built up-but also `buildings' put up thereon. Since the entry specifically includes the relationship of landlord and tenant, there can be no doubt that tenancy legislations pertaining to land and buildings derive their authority from Entry 18. He referred in this context inter alia, to Manohar v. C. Desai, AIR 1951 Nag 33; A. C. Patel v. Vishwanath Chadda, ILR 1954 Bom 434, Raman Doss v State, AIR 1954 ALL 707; Darukhanawala v. Khemchand, ILR 1954 Bom. 546; M. Karuna v. State, AIR 1955 Nag. 153; Kevalchand v. Dashrathlal, I.L.R. 1956 Nag. 618; Sukumar Dutta v. Gauriskanker, [1964] 69 CWN 833; Raval & Co. v. Ramackandran, AIR 1967 Mad. 57 and a detailed and comprehensive judgment of Parekh J. in Elliot Waud and Hill P. Ltd. v. L.I.C., [1980] Bom. C.R. 590 Which we are informed is pending consideration on appeal, before a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court. We do not, however, propose to discuss 506 these cases at length firstly, because there is a contrary line of decisions also vide Mangtulal v. Radheshyam, AIR 1953 Pat. 14; Milap Chand v. Dwarakadas, AIR 1954 Raj. 252; Nawal Mal v. Nathu Mal, AIR 1962 Raj 193, Rama Sundari v. Indu Bhushan, AIR 1967 Cal 355; L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., AIR 1980 M.P. 106 and Bapalal & Co. v. Thakur Das, AIR 1982 Mad. 309 and the judgment presently under appeal and secondly, because a question as to the interpretation of Entry 18 (or its predecessor, Entry 21 of the Provincial List under the Government of India Act, 1935, (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1935 Act') had arisen before the Federal Court and the Privy Council and some of the above judgments have also been considered in certain earlier decisions of this Court. It would, therefore, be appropriate to refer to these decisions:
(1) The earliest of the decisions relevant in this context is the decision of the Federal Court in United Provinces v. Atiga Begum, [1940] F.C.R. 110. That case was concerned with the interpretation of Entry 21 of List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935.
It raised the issue of the validity of the United Provinces Regularisation of Remissions Act (14 of 1938). In view of an unprecedented fall in the prices of agricultural produce, the United Provinces Government directed a remission in the rents payable by tenants to their landlords. But this remission was declared by the High Court to be unauthorised and inoperative as being in contravention of the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926. The Provincial Legislature, therefore, passed the impugned Act which precluded any question as to the validity of the orders of remission being raised in courts. This Act was held by a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court to be ultra vires the Legislature. The Provincial Government appealed to the Federal Court. The Federal Court held that the legislation was clearly governed by Entry 21. The learned Chief Justice observed:
"The subjects dealt with in the three legislative lists are not always set out with scientific definition. It would be practically impossible for example to define each item in the Provincial List in such a way as to make it exclusive of every other item in that List, and Parliament seems to have been content to take a number of comprehensive categories and to describe each of them by a word of broad and general import. In the case of some of these categories such as "Local Government", "Education", "Water", "Agriculture" and "Land", the general word is amplified and explained by a number of example or illustrations, some of 507 which would probably on any construction have been held to fall under the more general word, while the inclusion (of) others might not be so obvious.
Thus "Courts of Wards" and 'treasure-trove' might not ordinarily have been regarded as included under the head "Land", if they had not been specifically mentioned in item no 21. I think, however, that none of the items is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense and that each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. I deprecate any attempt to enumerate in advance all the matters which are to be included under any of the more general descriptions; it will be sufficient and much wiser to determine each case as and when it comes before this Court. " The Court then proceeded to hold that, if the Provincial Legislature could legislate in respect of collection of rents, it must also have the power to legislate with respect to any limitation on the power of a landlord to collect rents, that is to say, with respect to the remission of rents as well as to their collection.
(2) The next decision, on certain observation in which Dr. Chitale placed considerable reliance is that of the Privy Council in Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia, AIR 1947 PC 72.
In that case the question was whether the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, an Act of the Punjab Legislature, was void as being ultra vires of the Punjab Legislature. The Act applied to mortgagees in possession of certain lands.
The expression 'land' was defined as "land which is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and is occupied or let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture" and included, inter alia, "the sites of buildings and other structures on such lands." The object of the impugned Act was the relief of mortgagors by giving them restitution of the mortgaged premises on conditions more favourable than those under the mortgage deed and by providing for a procedure before the Collector which was more summary than that before the ordinary Courts. The contention before the Privy Council, on behalf of the Punjab Province, was that the provisions of the impugned Act were traceable to item 21 supplemented, it need be, by item 2 of the Provincial Legislative List of the 1935 Act. The appellants, on the other hand, contended that the impugned Act went beyond the limits of the Legislative powers of the Province under list II and could not be supported by invoking the 508 powers of the Province under List III (i.e. Entries 4, 7, 8 and 10 corresponding to Entries 13, 5, 6 and 7 of List III under the Constitution). It was pointed out that certain provisions of the impugned Act were repugnant to the provisions of the Indian Contract Act and the Code of Civil Procedure . The Judicial Committee came to the conclusion that the legislation was clearly covered by Entry 21 in List III. In so holding, they observed:
"The key to item 21 is to be found in the opening word "land". That word is sufficient in itself to include every form of land, whether agricultural or not. Land indeed is primarily a matter of provincial concern. The land in each Province may have its special characteristics in view of which it is necessary to legislate, and there are local customs and traditions in regard to land holding and particular problems of provincial or local concern which require provincial consideration. It would be strange if the land in a province were to be broken up into separate portions some within and some outside the legislative powers of the province. Such a conflict of jurisdiction is not to be expected. Item 21 is part of a constitution and would on ordinary principles receive the idest construction, unless for some reason, it is cut down either by the terms of Item 21 itself or by other parts of the constitution which has to be read as a whole. As to Item 21 "land", the governing word is followed by the rest of the item, which goes on to say, "that is to say".
These words introduce the most general concept- "rights in or over land." "Rights in land" must include general rights like full ownership or leasehold or all such rights. "Rights over land" would include easements or other collateral rights, whatever form they might take. Then follow words which are not words of limitation but of explanation or illustration, giving instances which may furnish a clue for particular matters;
thus there are the words "relation of landlord and tenant and collection of rents." These words are appropriate to lands which are not agricultural equally with agricultural lands. Rent is that which issues from the land. Then the next two sentences specifically refer to agricultural land, and are to be read with item 7, 8 and 10 of List
3. These deal with methods of transfer or alienation or devolution which may be subject to federal legislation but do not concern the land itself, a sphere in which the provincial and federal powers are con- 509 current, subject to the express exception of the specific head of agricultural land which is expressly reserved to the provinces. The remainder of Item 21 specifies important matters of special consequence in India relating to land. The particular and limited specification of agricultural land proves that "land" is not used in Item 21 with restricted reference to agricultural land but relates to land in general.
Item 2 is sufficient to give express powers to the provinces to create and determine the powers and jurisdiction of Courts in respect of land, as a matter ancillary to the subject of item 21.
It is next necessary to consider the terms of the impugned Act, which it is said is ultra vires of the Province, and compare them with the terms of the constitution just quoted. But before that is done, it may be observed that there is no express provision in the constitution referring by name to mortgages, though mortgages are of particular importance in India as a subject of ordinary business life and of litigation and of legislation. But a constitution does not generally deal with particular transactions or types of transactions, and mortgages of land would, in their Lordships' judgment, as a matter of construction, properly fall under Item 21 in so far as they are mortgages of land, though in certain aspects they include elements of transfer of property and of contract. But they form a type of transaction which may properly be regarded as sui generis, incidental to land and included within Item 21 except in so far as they fall within Items 8 and 10 of List 3 which again contain an express exception in the case of agricultural land. Their Lordships cannot accept the view that so important a subject as mortgages was left out of the Constitution and merely left to the Governor General's powers under s. 104, Constitution Act as a residual subject. So far as land at least is concerned, Item 21 would include mortgages as an incidental and ancillary subject.
The impugned Act, as already explained, has the main purpose of giving relief to mortgagors by enabling them to obtain restitution of the mortgaged lands on terms less onerous than the mortgage deeds require. It is limited to existing mortgages of land as defined in s. 3, effected prior to 8.6.1901. That definition restricts it to land "occupied or 510 let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture". The addition of the word "pasture" has been relied on as extending the scope of the Act beyond agriculture, but pasture is certainly "land" within Item 21 or Item 3. It may have been mentioned ex abundanti cautela but in any case it is sufficiently allied to agriculture generally to be treated as a species of agricultural land or at least as land occupied or let for purposes subservient to agriculture and as such within the general scope of an Act dealing with agricultural land. Section 3 of the Act goes on, it is true, to give a number of specific types of land which are included, but they are all governed by the controlling words of sub.s.(1) which limits the whole Act to agricultural land in the sense already stated. Thus head (b) of sub s (1) of s. 3, must be read as referring to an estate or holding in the only class of land with which the Act deals. The same is true of all the other heads in the sub-section, dues, rent, water rights, occupancy, trees, all come within the category of rights in or over land within Item 21 List 3, and all are governed by the same controlling reference to agriculture or agricultural purposes. This reading of the section is supported by the qualification of trees as trees standing on such land, that is agricultural land. Section 7 and 8 of the impugned Act embody its main substantive provisions for the refief of mortgagors and need not be repeated here. The rest of the Act deals with ancillary matters like procedure which fall within the powers given by Item 2 and also by Item 21.
If, as their Lordships think, the impugned Act is limited to agricultural land, items, 7, 8 and 10 of List III do not affect the position at all since agricultural land is excluded in these entries. But, in any event, the Act does not deal with wills or transfer of property at all; it does certainly deal with mortgages but, as their Lordships have already stated, mortgage though not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, are properly to be classed not under the head of contracts, but as special transactions ancillary to the entry of "land" (3) The next decision of this court to which our attention is drawn is the decision of this court in Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] (Suppl. 1) SCR 748. The poini in controversy in this decision 511 was the constitutional validity of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (10 of 1953) as amended by Act 11 of 1955, which sought to provide for the security of land tenure and other incidental matters. The impugned Act admittedly dealt with holdings as defined in the Punjab Revenue Act, 1887. It limited the area which might be held by a land owner for the purpose of self cultivation and released surplus area to be utilised for resettling ejected tenants. Section 18 conferred upon tenants the right to purchase from the land owners the lands held by them and thus themselves to become the land owners at prices which would be below the market value. The land owners affected by the impugned Act contended that under Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution the State Legislature was incompetent to enact a law limiting the extent of land to be held by a land owner and that the provisions of the impugned Act contravened their fundamental rights. On the question of the legislative competence the Court made the following observations:
"At the outset, it is necessary to deal with the question of legislative competence, which was raised on behalf of some of the petitioners, though not on behalf of all of them. This argument of want of legislative competence goes to the root of the impugned Act, and if it is well-founded, no other question need be gone into. It has been argued that Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, should not be read as authorising the State Legislature to enact a law limiting the extent of the land to be held by a proprietor or a landowner. Entry 18 is in these words:" " 18. Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization." "It will be noticed that the Entry read along with Art. 246(3) of the Constitution, has vested exclusive power in the State to make laws with respect to "rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant ..
". The provisions of the Act set out above, deal with the landlord's rights in land in relation to his tenant, so as to modify the landlord's rights in the land, and correspondingly, to expand the tenant's rights therein. Each of the expressions "rights in or over land" and "land 512 tenures", is comprehensive enough to take in measures of reforms of land tenures, limiting the extent of land in cultivating possession of the land-owner, and thus, releasing larger areas of land to be made available for cultivation by tenants.
Counsel for some of the petitioners who challenged the legislative competence of the state Legislature, were hard put to it to enunciate any easily appreciable grounds of attack against Entry 18 in List II of the Seventh Schedule. It was baldly argued that Entry 18 aforesaid was not intended to authorise legislation which had the effect of limiting the areas of land which could be directly held by a proprietor or a land-owner.
It is difficult to see why the amplitude of the words "rights in or over land" should be cut down in the way suggested in this argument." In support of its conclusion, the Court referred to the decisions United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum, [1940] FCR 110 and Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia, AIR 1947 PC 72.
4. We may next refer to the decision in Manaklal Chhotalal v. M.G. Makwana & Ors. [1967] 3 SCR 65. The question here arose in the context of the Bombay Town Planning Act. A scheme drafted by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation after following the procedure prescribed under the Act was sanctioned by the State Government. As a result of this the petitioners were allotted a much smaller extent of land than they originally owned within the city of Ahmedabad and they were also directed to pay certain sums as their share of contribution. The petitioners challenged the competence of the State Legislature to enact the legislation in question. The Court upheld the legislation by reference to Entry 18 of List II as well as Entry 20 of List III ("Economic and Social planning"). Reviewing the provisions of the Act in question, the Court came to the conclusion that the legislation in question could be said to be a legislation in regard to land. Various aspects dealt with in the Act, according to the Court, could be considered to deal with land and accordingly, competence of the State Legislature to enact the measure in question could be found in Entry 18.
5. Indu Bhusan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi, [1970] 1 SCR 443 is a decision of five Judges of this Court and was rendered on an appeal from the Calcutta case cited earlier.
The question for consideration 513 was whether the act of a rent controller in fixing fair rent for certain premises within the cantonment area of Barrackpore was valid. The claim of the respondent-owner was that the appellant was not entitled to the protection of 1956 Act since "regulation of house accommodation including the control of rents" in cantonment areas was the subject matter of Entry 3 of the federal list under the 1935 Act.
The State legislature, it was therefore argued, could not competently extend the 1956 Act (applicable in other parts of the State) to the cantonment areas. This plea was upheld.
However, one of the contention raised on behalf of the appellants was that the power of Parliament under Entry 3 of List I does not extend to regulating the relationship between landlord and tenant as that power vests in the State Legislature either under Entry 18 of List II or Entries Nos. 6, 7 and 13 of List III. In support of this contention reliance was placed on a decision of the Bombay High Court in A.C. Patel v. Vishwanath Chada, ILR 1954 Bombay 434, referred to earlier. In that case, the Bombay High Court was concerned with the applicability of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act (No. 57) of 1947 to contonment areas. The Court first expressed the opinion that Act was referrable to Entry 21 of the List II of the 1935 Act. Relying upon the English Interpretation Act applicable to interpret the 1935 Act, the Court held that the word 'land' in that entry would include buildings also so as to confer jurisdiction on the Provincial Legislature to legislate on relations between landords and tenants of buildings. Then the Court expressed the view that the legislation could not be said to be one dealing with house accommodation. The Supreme Court was, however, clear that the legislation was covered by the language of Entry 2 of the Federal List. However, appropos the first aspect of the High Court's decision, the Supreme Court observed:
"We have felt considerable doubt whether the power of legislating on relationship between landlord and tenant in respect of house accommodation or buildings would appropriately fall in Entry 21 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, or in the corresponding Entry.
18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. These Entries permit legislation in respect of land and explain the scope by equating it with rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents. It is to be noted that the relation of landlord and tenant is mentioned as being included in land tenures and the expression "land tenures" would not, in our opinion, appropriately cover tenancy of buildings or of house accommodation. That expression is 514 Only used with reference to relationship between landlord and tenant in respect of vacant lands. In fact,. leases in respect of non agricultural property are dealt with in the Transfer of Property Act and would much more appropriately fall within the scope of Entry 8 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act read with Entry 10 in the same List or within the scope. Entry 6 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution read with Entry 7 in the same list leases and all rights governed by leases, including the termination of leases and eviction from property leased, would be covered by the field of transfer of property and contracts relating thereto. However, it is not necessary for us to express any definite opinion in this case on this point because of our view that the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas is clearly covered by the Entries in List I. In the Constitution, the effect of Entry 3 of List I is that Parliament has exclusive power to make laws in respect of the matters contained in that Entry, notwithstanding the fact that a similar power may also be found in any Entry in List II or List III. Article 246 of the Constitution confers exclusive power on Parliament to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I, notwithstanding the concurrent power of Parliament, and the State Legislature, or the exclusive power of the State Legislature in Lists III and II respectively. The general power of legislating in respect of relationship between landlord and tenant exercisable by the State Legislature either under Entry 18 of List 11 or Entries 6 and 7 of List 111 is subject to the overriding power of Parliament in respect of matters in List I, so that the effect of Entry 3 of List I is that, on the subject of relationship between landlord and tenant insofar as it arises in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas, Parliament alone can legislate and not the State Legislature .. In the view, we are unable to affirm the view of the Bombay High Court in A. Patel's case, which is based on the interpretation that Entry ' in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government to India Act only permitted laws to be made for requisitioning of property, acquiring of property and allocation of property only." The Court then proceeded to consider the decision in Darukhanawala 515 v Khemchand, ILR 1954 Bom 544; Kewalchand v. Dashrathlal, ILR 1956 Nag. 618; Babu Jagtanand Sri Satyanarayanji ILR 40 Patna at 625 and expressed the view that all these cases had placed a narrow interpretation on the expression "regulation of house accommodation" used in the relevant entry of the Union List. Having said this, the Court concluded:
"On the other hand, the Rajasthan High Court in Nawal Mal v. Nathu Lal, ILR II Rajasthan 421; held that the power of the State Legislature to legislate in respect of landlord and tenant of buildings is to be found in Entries, 6, 7 and 13 of List lll of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and not in Entry 18 of List ll, and that power was circumscribed by the exclusive power of Parliament to legis- late on the same subject under Entry 3 of List I. That is also the view which the Calcutta High Court has taken in the judgment in appeal before us. We think that the decision given by the Calcutta High Court is correct and must be upheld." (6) Dr. Chitale also placed considerable reliance on Union of India v. Valluri B. Chaudhary, [1979] 3 SCR 802 which dealt with the validity of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976. Counsel for the appellant relied, in particular, upon the procedure adopted by Parliament in enacting this piece of legislation. The legislatures of eleven States considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parliament for the imposition of a ceiling on urban property for the country as a whole. They passed resolutions under Art. 252(1) of the Constitution authorising Parliament to legislate on this topic.
Parliament, accordingly, enacted the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. In the first instance, the Act covered the eleven States which had passed the above resolutions. Subsequently, the Act was adopted by resolution passed by the legislatures of six more States. The primary object and purpose of the Act was the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in 'urban agglomerations', the acquisition by the Government of such land in excess of the prescribed ceiling, the regulation of construction of buildings on such land and matters connected therewith. All this was done with a view to prevent the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein, and with a view to bring about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomeration to subserve the common good in furtherance of the Directive Principles enunciated in Art. 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. The controversy before the Court 516 turned mainly on the construction of Articles 251 and 252 of the Constitution and certain allied questions. Dr. Chitale, however, laid em phasis on three important aspects of this legislation and decision. The first was the language of the resolutions passed by the States in this context, which appear to have been on the same lines and one of which is set out in the judgment. They contained the following paragraphs:
"Whereas this Assembly considers that there should be a ceiling on Urban Immovable Property And whereas the imposition of such a ceiling and acquisition of urban immovable property in excess of that ceiling are matters With respect to which Parliament has no power to make law for the State except as provided in Articles 249 and 250 of the Constitution of India" (underlining added) The second was the preamble to the legislation in question.
After setting out the long title to the Act and the object and purpose of the legislation in terms already described, the preamble to the Act contains the following para:
"And whereas Parliament has no power to make laws for the State with respect to the matters aforesaid except as provided in Articles 249 and 250 of the Constitution." The third was the following passage from the judgment:
"We are afraid this contention cannot be accepted.
It is not disputed that the subject matter of Entry 18 List II of the Seventh Schedule i.e. land covers 'land and buildings' and would, therefore, necessarily include vacant land. The expression 'urban immovable property' may mean 'land and buildings' or 'buildings or land'. It would take in lands of every description i.e. agricultural land, urban land or any other kind and it necessarily includes vacant lands." (underlining added) Stopping here for a brief review of the above decisions, it will be seen that except for Indu Bhushan's case which will be discussed later, the other rulings are not helpful in deciding the issue before us. Atiqa Begum and Atma Ram concerned a legislation that clearly pertained to 517 land-in fact, land governed by systems of land tenure prevalent in the States of Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. In Allah Rakhia, the impugned Act was limited to agricultural land and, since the items in the concurrent list excluded such land, was covered by Entry 21. In Maneklal, the legislation primarily concerned land, though not agricultural land, for, as observed in State v. Peter, [1980] 3 SCR 290 at p. 292, "land is at the base of all development". It is not quite certain that the provisions of the Act also affected buildings, but if indeed any buildings were affected, that was only incidental. As pointed out by the Court, the primary target of the legislation was only urban land, the ways and means of developing it and proper utilisation of land situate within the municipal limits.
These decisions no doubt establish two propositions: ( 1) The opening word 'land' in entry 18 is not restricted to agricultural land as are the latter portions of it. It would cover all types of land-rural or urban, agricultural or non- agricultural, vacant fallows or pastures. (2) The words which follow 'land' only make it clear that the legislative entry takes in not merely the tangible immovable property one normally describes as land but also all kinds of intangible rights or interests, in or over, land in the broad sense explained above. The phrases which follow the words "rights in or over land" in the entry are illustrative and are not restrictive. They only make it clear that the legislative entry takes in not merely the tangible immovable property one describes as land but also all kinds of intangible rights or interests, in or over, land in the broad sense explained above. But none of the decisions contain any support for the further proposition that the legislative entry should be so interpreted as to cover houses and buildings as well as the relationship of landlord and tenant in regard thereto or the collection of rents there from. We are unable to agree with Dr. Chitale that this further proposition emerges from the decision in Union of India v. Valluri B. Chaudhary, [1979] 3 SCR 802. The Urban Land Ceiling Act also was a legislation primarily intended to deal with vacant lands. If one scans the provisions of the Act it is clear that the theme of the Act was only to place a ceiling on vacant lands in cities or what we call urban agglomerations and to ensure equitable distribution of such urban vacant lands. The pith and substance of the legislation was with regard to urban land and its provisions in respect of buildings were incidental to the main objective of the urban land ceiling. In this context, it is perhaps not without significance that as against the proposal of the States for a ceiling on 'urban immovable.
property' Parliament restricted the legislation to vacant land. In the light of these circumstances the declaration in the preamble to the Act is basically correct that the pith and substance of the legislation was 'land' and this is exclusively within the State's legislative domain by 518 virtue of Entry 18 of List II. We do not also agree with the counsel that the passage extracted from the judgment reflects a decision of the Court that land includes 'lands and buildings'. It proceeds on a concession to that effect.
That apart, the context of the above observation is also interesting. The Court was dealing with a contention that the resolution of the States had authorised Parliament to impose a ceiling on urban immovable property and that the legislation imposing a ceiling on urban land was on a different subject and thus contrary to the resolution. The Court, rejecting this argument, pointed out that si
