B. S. Yadav & Ors Vs. State of Haryana & Ors [1980] INSC 207 (5 November 1980)
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BHAGWATI, P.N.
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
TULZAPURKAR, V.D.
SEN, A.P. (J)
CITATION: 1981 AIR 561 1981 SCR (1)1024 1980 SCC Supl. 524
CITATOR INFO:
R 1982 SC1244 (14) F 1984 SC 161 (52) R 1984 SC 850 (17) R 1985 SC1681 (5) F 1987 SC 415 (16,17) RF 1987 SC1832 (1) R 1988 SC 488 (9) D 1988 SC1153 (2)
ACT:
Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 235 and 309, proviso-scope of- Governor, if could make rules regulating conditions of service of judicial officers-If could retrospectively amend the rules-determination of inter se seniority of judicial officers and declaring that an officer has satisfactorily completed the period of probation, Governor if competent to do-period of probation if could be reduced in individual cases without exceptional circumstances justifying reduction.
Rule of rotation, if could be read into rule of quota of direct recruits and promotees-vacant post for promotees, if could be filled by confirmation of a direct recruit and vice versa.
HEADNOTE:
Exercising power under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution (which empowers the Governor to make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State) the Governor of Punjab, in consultation with the Punjab High Court, framed the Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963. The rules provide for the direct recruitment as well as appointment by promotion from the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial branch). Under rule 8(2), two third of the total number of cadre posts have to be manned by promoted officers and one-third by direct recruits. Under rule 10(1) direct recruits have to remain on probation for two years provided that the Government may, in exceptional circumstances, reduce the period of probation in consultation with the High Court. The period of probation of an officer can be extended by the Governor beyond the period of two years in consultation with the High Court but not so as to exceed a total period of three years. Rule 10(2) empowers the Governor to confirm in consultation with the High Court a direct recruit on a cadre post with effect from a date not earlier than the date on which he completes the period of probation. Rule 12 (now in force in Haryana) provides that the seniority of direct recruits and promoted officers shall be determined with reference to the respective dates of their confirmation.
Under the Punjab Rules as amended retrospectively with effect from April 9, 1976 'cadre post' means a permanent as well as a temporary post in the service. The inter se seniority of the members of the service is to be determined by the length of continuous service on a post in the service irrespective of the date of confirmation.
The three petitioners in the Haryana writ petitions were selected for recruitment to the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) in a competitive examination and after the formation of the State of Haryana, they were promoted in an officiating capacity to the Haryana Superior Judicial Service in 1967 and 1968. Respondent No. 3 who was a direct recruit to the Haryana Superior Judicial Service was appointed as a District and Sessions Judge on July 7, 1025 1970 and was confirmed in that post on July 7, 1972 on the completion of A two year probationary period. The three petitioners were confirmed as District and Sessions Judges with effect from July 8, 1972.
In the case of judicial officers of Punjab, although there were ten vacancies in the quota of promoted officers and an equal number of promoted officers were officiating for more than three years as Additional District and Sessions Judges, the High Court did not confirm the promotees in those vacancies but confirmed the promotees and the direct recruits by applying the rule of rotational Six direct recruits were given prior dates of confirmation in comparison with the promotees, as a result of which the confirmation of eight promotees was postponed. In the case of some direct recruits confirmation was given within a period of one year and four months though the period of probation was two years.
Rule 12 was amended retrospectively from April 9, 1976 by which seniority was to be determined by the length of continuous service on a post in the service irrespective of the date of confirmation Rejecting the plea of one of the direct recruits that the rules not only required the application of a rule of quota at the time of appointment but also required the application of a rule of rotation at the time of confirmation, the High Court held that rules 8 and 12 were independent of each other, that rotational system could not be implicitly read in the quota rule provided for by rule 8 and that members of the Superior Judicial Service were entitled to claim seniority strictly in accordance with the provisions of rule 12. The promotees complained that this decision rendered by the High Court in its judicial capacity was not being followed by the High Court in the discharge of its administrative duties and that seniority of the promotees and direct recruits must be fixed without applying the rule of rotation at the time of confirmation. It was also stated that after the amendment of rule 12 in 1976 although two vacancies of District and Sessions Judges arose on each of these occasions the High Court promoted a direct recruit treating the date of his confirmation as the criterion of seniority.
It was contended on behalf of the promotees in Haryana that the control which the High Court exercises under Art.
235 over the subordinate judiciary does not include the power to make rules regulating the condition of service of judicial officers but that since the power conferred on the Governor under the proviso to Art. 309 to make rules is legislative in nature the principle of independence of judiciary is not in any manner violated when the Governor makes the rules. On the other hand it was contended on behalf of the High Court that the control over the subordinate judiciary vested in the High Court by Art. 235 being exclusive in nature, the power to frame rules in regard to the seniority of judicial officers must reside in the High Court and not in the Governor.
It was contended on behalf of the promotees that the quota of 2: 1 provided for by rule 8 is applicable only at the time of initial recruitment and that there was no warrant for extending the application of that rule at the time of confirmation.
Partly allowing the Petitions;
HELD: There is no force in the contention that the Governor has no power to make rules of seniority of District and Sessions Judges. [1058B] 1026 On a plain reading of Arts. 235 and 309 of the Constitution it is clear that the power to frame rules regarding seniority of officers in the judicial service of the State is vested in the Governor and not in the High Court. The first part of Art. 235 vests the control over District Courts and courts subordinate thereto in the High Court. But the second part of that Article says that nothing in the article shall be construed as taking away from any person belonging to the judicial service of the State any right of appeal which he may have under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed under such law. Thus, Art. 235 itself defines the outer-limits of the High Court's power of control over the District Courts and courts subordinate thereto. In the first place, in the exercise of its control over the District Courts and subordinate courts it is not open to the High Court to deny to a member of the subordinate judicial service of the State the right of appeal given to him by the law which regulates the conditions of his service. Secondly, the High Court cannot, in the exercise of its power of control, deal with such person otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service which are prescribed by such law. [1052C] There is no power in the High Court to pass a law though rules made by the High Court in the exercise of power conferred upon it in that behalf may have the force of law.
Law which the second part of Art. 235 speaks of is law made by the Legislature. The clear meaning, therefore, of the second part of Art. 235 is that the power of control vested in the High Court by the first part will not deprive a judicial officer of the rights conferred upon him by a law made by the Legislature regulating his conditions of service. [1052G-H] Article 235 does not confer upon the High Court’s the power to make rules relating to conditions of service of judicial officers attached to District Courts and the courts subordinate thereto. Whenever it was intended to confer on any authority the power to make any special provision or rules including rules relating to conditions of service, the Constitution has stated so in express terms. For example the provisions contained in Articles 225, 227(2) & (3) and 229(1) & (2) confer powers on the High Court to frame rules for certain specific purposes. Art. 229(2) which is directly in point provides that subject to the provisions of any law made by Legislature of the State the conditions of service of officers of a High Court shall be made by the High Court.
The framers of the Constitution would not have failed to incorporate a similar provision in Art. 235 if it was intended that the High Courts should have the power to make rules regulating the conditions of service of judicial officers in the subordinate judiciary. [1053B-F] The power of control vested in the High Court by Art.
235 is expressly made subject to the law which the State Legislature may pass for regulating the recruitment and service conditions of judicial officers of the State. The framers of the Constitution did not regard the power of the State Legislature to pass laws regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of judicial officers as an infringement of the independence of the judiciary. The mere powers to pass such a law is not violative of the control vested in the High Court over the State judiciary. [1053H;
1054C] In order that there may be no vacuum until the passing of a law by the Legislature on the subject, the Constitution has made provision under the proviso to Art. 309 that until the State Legislature passes a law on the 1027 particular subject, it shall be competent to the Governor of the State to A make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of the judicial officers of the State.
The power exercised by the Governor under the proviso is thus a power which the Legislature is competent to exercise but has in fact not yet exercised. It partakes of the characteristics of the legislative, not executive, power. It is legislative power. [1054D-F] That the Governor possesses legislative power under the Constitution is incontrovertible. Just as under Art. 213 the Governor substitutes tor the Legislature because the Legislature is in recess so under the proviso to Art. 309 he substitutes for the Legislature because the Legislature has not yet exercised its power to pass an appropriate law on the subject. [1054G and 1055B-C] It is true that the power conferred by Article 309 is subject to the provisions of the Constitution but it is fallacious for that reason to contend that the Governor cannot frame rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of the Judicial officers of the State. Firstly, the power of control conferred upon High Courts by the first part of Article 235 is expressly made subject, by the second part of that Article, to laws regulating conditions of service of its Judicial officers. Secondly, the Governor, in terms equally express, is given the power by the proviso to Article 309 to frame rules on the subject. [1055B-C] A combined reading of Arts. 235 and 309 will yield the result that though the control over the subordinate courts is vested in the High Court the appropriate Legislature and until that Legislature acts the Governor of the State has the power to make rules regulating the recruitment and the conditions of service of judicial officers of the State. The power of the Legislature or of the Governor thus to legislate is subject to all other provisions of the Constitution like Arts. 14 and 16. [1055D-E] The second part of Art. 235 recognises the legislative power to provide for recruitment and the conditions of service of the judicial officers of the State. The substantive provision of Art. 309, including its proviso, fixes the location of the power. The opening words of Art.
309 limit the amplitude of that power. [1055F] Seniority is undoubtedly an important condition of service. The control vested in the High Court by the first part of Art. 235 is, therefore subject to any law regulating seniority as envisaged by the second part of that article.
The power to make such law is vested by Art. 309 in the Legislature and until it acts, in the Governor. Whether it is the Legislature which passes an Act or the Governor who makes rules regulating seniority, the end product is law within the meaning of second part of Art. 235. The Legislatures of Punjab and Haryana not having passed an Act regulating seniority of the respective State judicial officers, the Governors of the two States have the power to frame rules for that purpose under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution Such rules are subject to the provisions of the Constitution and to the provisions of any Act which the appropriate Legislature may pass on the subject. [1055G- H] The law passed by the Legislature or the rules made by the Governor can provide for general or abstract rules of seniority leaving it to the High Court to apply them to each individual case as and when the occasion arises. The power to legislate on seniority being subject to all other provisions of the Constitution cannot be exercised in a manner which will affect or be detrimental to the control vested in the High Court by Art. 235. [1056B-C] 1028 Though the Legislature or the Governor has the power to regulate seniority of judicial officers by laying down rules of general application, that power cannot be exercised in a manner which will lead to interference with the control vested in the High Court by the first part of Art. 235. In a word, the application of law governing seniority must be left to the High Court. The determination of seniority of each individual judicial officer is a matter which indubitably falls within the area of control of the High Court over the district courts and the courts subordinate thereto. For the same reason, though rules of recruitment can provide for a period of probation, the question whether a particular judicial officer has satisfactorily completed his probation or not is a matter which is exclusively in the domain or the High Court to decide. [1056E-F]] The independence of the judiciary has to be preserved.
at all costs. But at the same time the Legislature or the Governor cannot be deprived of their legitimate legislative powers under Art. 309. That power is subject to all other provisions of the Constitution which means that the power cannot be exercised in a manner which will lead to the violation of Arts. 14 or 16 or the pervasive ambit of the first part of Art. 235. Since the power conferred by Art.
309 is not absolute or untrammeled it will be wrong to test the validity of that power on the anvil of its possible abuse. [1057 A-B] High Court of Punjab and Haryana v. State of Haryana, [1975] 3 SCR 355, Union of India v. Justice S. H. Sheth, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 423., A. P. High Court v. Krishnamurthy, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 26 & State of Bihar v. Madan Mohan Prasad, [1976] 3 S.C.R. 110, referred to.
Rule 8 as its very heading shows, provides for a distinct condition of service with reference to a specific point of time, namely "recruitment to service". The language of the rule also indicates that the operation of this rule is confined to the stage of initial recruitment to the service either by promotion or by direct appointment from the Bar. [1063F] The reservation contemplated by rule 8 is intended to be made at the stage of initial appointment only by reserving two third of the total number of posts in the cadre for promotees and one third for direct recruits. A post which falls vacant in the quota of promotees cannot be filed by the confirmation of a direct recruit therein nor indeed can a promotee be confirmed in a post which is within the quota of direct recruits. [1063H] If this be the true construction of rule 8 the method of confirmation by rotation of direct recruits and promotees, regardless of whether the vacancy assigned to the particular officer falls within the quota of the class to which he belongs will be in contravention of that rule.
[1064B] 'Appointment' is not a continuous process. The process of appointment is complete as soon as a person is initially recruited to the service either by promotion or by direct recruitment and confirmation is not a part of the process of appointment. "Recruitment to the service" is a matter which falls within the power of the Governor under Art. 233 while "confirmation" is a matter of 'control' vesting in the High Court under Art. 235. The superimposition of rule 8, which fixes the quota at the stage of recruitment on the rules relating to confirmation and seniority is, therefore, contrary to the basic constitutional concepts governing judicial service. [1064C-D] 1029 The rule of rota cannot be read into the rule of quota.
In other words the ratio of 2: 1 shall have to be applied at the stage of recruitment but cannot on the language of the relevant rules be applied at the stage of confirmation.
[1066B] A K. Subraman v. Union of India, [1975] 2 SCR 979, N.K.Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, [1977] 1 SCR 1037 referred to.
Paramjit Singh Sandhu v. Ram Rakha, [1979] 3 SCR 584 held inapplicable.
The High Court was not justified in applying tho rule of rotation at the time of confirmation of the members of the superior judicial service who were appointed to that service by promotion and by direct recruitment. In the discharge of its administrative functions the High Court could not have failed to follow a judgment of its own special bench consisting of five Judges. [1066C-D] High Court of Punjab and Haryana v. State of Haryana, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 365, referred to.
On a proper interpretation of the rules, promotees are entitled to be confirmed in the vacancies which are available within their quota of two third, whether or not one third of the vacancies are occupied by confirmed direct recruits. Similarly direct recruits are entitled to be confirmed in vacancies which are available within their quota of one third whether or not two third of the vacancies are occupied by confirmed promotees. [1067D-E] The fairness which Arts. 14 and 16 postulate is that it a promotee is otherwise fit for confirmation and a vacancy falling within the quota of promotees is available in which he can be confirmed, his confirmation ought not to be postponed until a direct recruit, whether yet appointed or not, completes his period of probation and thereupon becomes eligible for confirmation. The adoption of this principle in the matter of confirmation will not, in practice, give any undue advantage to the promotees. [1067D-E].
In so far as the confirmation of respondents 6, 7 and 8 is concerned, in the absence of exceptional circumstances justifying the reduction of their normal probationary period of two years, the order of the High Court confirming he three respondents before they were normally due for confirmation cannot be upheld. The order is in clear violation of the guarantee of equal opportunity, by the petitioners were prejudiced and must for that reason be sel aside. [1067G-H] The power conferred by the proviso to rule 10(1) on the Governor is ex-facie bad because such a power directly impinges upon the control vested in the High Court by Art.
235 of the Constitution. If at all any authority could exercise such a power, it is the High Court and not the Governor. The rules must now be understood to mean that the High Court and not the Governor has the power of confirmation, that the normal period of probation of direct recruits is two years and that unless there are exceptional circumstances in regard to each individual case, a direct recruit cannot be confirmed from a date earlier than the date on which he has satisfactorily completed his probation of two years. The High Court is not free to fix any period of probation as it likes or to reduce the period of two years at its will and pleasure. [1068B-E] As regards The power of the Governor to amend a rule with retrospective effect, since he exercises a legislative power under proviso to Art. 309 it is open to him to give retrospective effect to the rules made under that provision.
But the date from which the rules are made to operate must be shown to bear 1030 either from the face of the rules or by extrinsic evidence reasonable nexus with the provisions contained in the rules, especially when the retrospective effect extends over a long period. In the instant case rule 12 which was amended retrospectively from April 9, 1976 by a notification dated December 31, 1976 is invalid because no such nexus is shown to exist. [1068F-H]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 4228-4230 of 1978 and 266 of 1979.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution) V. M. Tarkunde, O. P. Malhotra, K. N. Bhatt, Vijay Kumar Verma and R. C. Kathuria for the Petitioners in WPs 4228-4230/78.
Y. S. Chitale (Dr.), Lala Ram Gupta, C. R.Somashekharan, M. S. Ganesh, P. N. Jain and M. V. Goswami for the Petitioners in W.P. 266/79.
5. N. Kackar, S. N. Ashri, R. N. Sachthey and M. N.Shroff for Respondent 1 in WP 4228-4230/78.
Soli J. Sorabjee, and Hardev Singh for R. 2 in WPs 4228-30 of 1978 and 266/79.
F. S. Nariman, B. R. Tuli and R. S. Sodhi for RR 3-11 in WP 266/79.
Kuldip Singh, Prem Malhotra and R. S. Mongia for R. 3 in WPs 4228-30/78 and intervener.
A. K. Sen and Mrs. Urmila Kapoor for R. 1 in WP 266/79.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, C.J.-These Writ Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution involve the consideration of a two-fold controversy: first, as to the rules governing seniority between direct recruits and promotees appointed to the Superior Judicial Services of Punjab and Haryana and second, between the control over district courts and subordinate courts vested in the High Court by Art. 235 and the power conferred upon the Governor by the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution to make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed, inter alia, to the Judicial Service of the State.
We have two sets of Writ Petitions before us which involve identical points except for one material difference which we will mention later. Writ Petitions 4228 to 4230 of 1978 are filed by three judicial officers of the State of Haryana who are promotees, that is to say, who were promoted to the Superior Judicial Service of the State 1031 from the Haryana Civil Service (Judicial Branch).
Respondents 1 and 2 to those Writ Petitions are the State of Haryana and the High Court of Punjab and Haryana respectively. Respondent 3, Shri N. S. Rao, is a direct recruit, having been appointed from the Bar to the Haryana Superior Judicial Service. Writ Petition 266 of 1979 is filed by twenty-two promotees, that is to say, those who were promoted to the Punjab Superior Judicial Service from the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch). Respondents 1 and 2 to that petition are the State of Punjab and the High Court of Punjab and Haryana respectively. Respondents 3 to 11 were appointed directly from the Bar to the Punjab Superior Judicial Service.
Some of the more important grievances of the petitioners are that their seniority qua direct recruits is wrongly and unjustly made to depend upon the fortuitous circumstance of the date of their confirmation in the Superior Judicial Service; that even if a substantive vacancy is available, the confirmation of a promotee in that vacancy is postponed arbitrarily and indefinitely, that promotees are treated with an unequal hand qua direct recruits: for example, a promotee, despite his satisfactory performance and the availability of a substantive vacancy in which he can be confirmed, is continued in an officiating capacity until after a direct recruit completes his probation and is due for confirmation, and that, the High Court applies the principle of rotation as between promotees and direct recruits at the time of their confirmation when, in fact, that the relevant rules provide for is the application of a rule of quota at the time of their appointment.
These grievances of the promotees can best be understood in the light of the following facts: The three petitioners in the Haryana Writ Petitions were selected for recruitment to the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) after qualifying in a competitive examination. They were appointed as Subordinate Judges in 1950. By Act 3 of 1966, the State of Haryana came into existence on November li 1966. Petitioners 1 and 2-Shri B. S. Yadav and Shri V. P.Aggarwal- were promoted in an officiating capacity to the Haryana Superior Judicial Service on July 28 and October 7, 1967 respectively, while petitioner No. 3 Shri A. N.Aggarwal, was promoted similarly on March 27, 1968.
Respondent 3, Shri N. S. Rao who as a member of the Bar was working as a District Attorney, was appointed directly to the Haryana Superior Judicial Service with effect from July 7, 1970. The normal period of his two years' probation expired on July 7, 1972 but before the issuance of the orders of his confirmation, a complaint dated August 2, 1977 was received against him. That complaint was inquired into by a High Court Judge who, by his report of March 1973, held it to be unfounded. Respondent 3 1032 was thereupon confirmed by the High Court as a District and Sessions Judge with effect from March 30, 1973. By a notification dated May 4, 1973 that date was corrected to July 7, 1972 being the date on which Respondent 3 completed the two years' probationary period. By the same notification, the High Court confirmed the Petitioners and two other promotees as District and Sessions Judges with effect from July 8, 1972. Thus, the petitioners, who were officiating continuously in the Superior Judicial Service of the State as Additional District and Sessions Judges for two or three years prior to the appointment of Respondent 3 directly to that service, lost their seniority over him by being allotted a date of confirmation which was one day later than the date on which he completed his probationary period.
(A small digression will be permissible here. The Government of Haryana was unwilling to concede to the High Court the right to confirm a Judicial officer. It disregarded the High Court's order whereby Shri N. S. Rao was confirmed and passed an order reverting him to the post of a District Attorney which he was holding at the time of his appointment as a District and Sessions Judge. Rao filed a Writ Petition in the High Court to challenge the order of the Government. The High Court set aside his reversion on certain other grounds but it held by a majority (N. S. Rao v. State of Haryana that the power to confirm a direct recruit vested in the Governor and not in the High Court. A Constitution Bench or this Court reversed the view of the High Court and held by a unanimous judgment (High Court of Punjab and Haryana v. State of Haryana), that the power to confirm a District and Sessions Judge resides in the High Court and not in the Governor).
In the Punjab Writ Petition, the contesting parties are twenty-two promotees who have filed the writ petition and Respondents 3 to 11 who were appointed directly to the Punjab Superior Judicial Service. Petitioner No. 1, Shri Pritpal Singh, was promoted to that Service on November 12, 1969 when he was 44 years of age. Respondent 3, Shri J. S. Sekhon, was appointed directly to that Service on February 1, 1973 when he was 41 years of age. The former, though promoted to the Superior Judicial Service more than three years before the appointment of Respondent 3, was confirmed on February 3, 1975 which was one day later than February 2, 1975 on which date Respondent 3 was confirmed on the completion of his two years' probation. The grievance of Petitioner No. 1 is that a permanent vacancy was available on December 23, 1972 in which 1033 he could have been confirmed but the High Court marked time in order to enable Respondent 3 to complete his probation and gave to Petitioner 1 an arbitrary and artificial date of confirmation in order that he may not rank higher in seniority to Respondent 3.
The case of Petitioner 1 in the Punjab Writ Petition is illustrative of the grievance of the other petitioners.
Petitioners 2 to 6 were Promoted to the Superior Judicial Service between January 1972 and August 1972. Petitioner 7 was promoted in April 1973, Petitioners 8 to 10 in August 1974, Petitioners 11 to 16 in 1975, Petitioner 17 in 1976, Petitioners 18 to 20 in 1977 and Petitioners 21 and 22 in 1978. Respondents 4 and 5 were recruited directly in January 1973 and were confirmed in February 1975 on the completion of the probationary period. Their confirmation is open to no exception but, Petitioners 2 and 3 Shri Amarjit Chopra and Shri H. S. Ahluwalia who were promoted on January 16 and August 21, 1972 were confirmed on August 6 and August 7, 1975 respectively. The significance of these dates of confirmation becomes apparent in relation to the confirmation of respondents 6 and 7. Having been appointed directly to the Superior Judicial Service on the 1st and 2nd of April 1975, they were confirmed on the 2nd and 5th August 1976 respectively, which was even before they had completed their probationary period. Petitioners 2 and 3 who were promoted to the Superior Judicial Service roughly three years prior to the direct appointment of Respondents 6 and 7 were confirmed on the 6th and 7th August, 1976 which was three or four days later than the dates of confirmation allotted to Respondents 6 and 7. Petitioners 4 to 22 whose dates of promotion to the Superior Judicial Service range between August 1972 and July 1978 were not yet confirmed when the Writ Petition was filed on February 27, 1979.
Do the rules which apply to the members of the Superior Judicial Services of Punjab and Haryana warrant this course of action and how far are the rules valid ? For deciding these questions we must necessarily have a look at the relevant rules.
The recruitment to the Punjab Superior Judicial Service and the other conditions of service of the members thereof are regulated by the "Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963" as amended from time to time. These rules were originally framed by the Governor of Punjab in consultation with the Punjab High Court, in exercise of the powers conferred on the Governor by the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution. By that proviso, the Governor has the power to make Rules regulating the recruitment and the conditions of service of persons appointed to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State 1034 Rules 2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14 of the aforesaid rules which are relevant for the present purposes read as follows in so far as they are material:
Rule 2: Definitions.-(1) 'appointment to the service' means an appointment to a cadre post, whether on permanent, temporary or officiating basis, or on probation;
(2) 'cadre post' means a permanent post in the Service;
(6) 'member of the Service' means a person- (a) who immediately before the commencement of these rules, holds a cadre post, whether on permanent, temporary or officiating basis, or on probation; or (b) who is appointed to a cadre post in accordance with the provisions of these rules;
(7) 'Promoted officer' means a person- (a) who is not a direct recruit and is holding a cadre-post whether on permanent, temporary or officiating basis or on probation, immediately before the commencement of these rules; or (b) who is appointed to the Service by promotion from Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch).
Rule 4: Appointing Authority-All appointments to the Service shall be made by the Governor in consultation with the High Court.
Rule 8: Recruitment to service-(1) Recruitment to the Service shall be made- (i) by promotion from the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch); or (ii) by direct recruitment.
(2) of the total number of cadre-posts, two-third shall be manned by promoted officers and one- third by direct recruits:
Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall prevent the officiating appointment of a member of the provincial Civil Service (Judicial Branch) on any post which is to be filled up by direct recruitment, till a direct recruit is appointed.
Rule 9: Appointment of direct recruits.-(1) No person shall be eligible for direct recruitment unless he- (i) is not less than 35 years and not more than 45 years of age on the first day of January next following the year in which his appointment is made;
1035 (ii) has been for not less than 7 years an Advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for such appointment (2) No person who is recommended by the High Court for appointment under sub-rule (i) shall be appointed unless he is found physically fit by a Medical Board set up by the Governor and is also found suitable for appointment in all other respects.
Rule 10: Probation.-(1) Direct recruits to the Service shall remain on probation for a period of two years, which may be so extended by the Governor in consultation with the High Court, as not to exceed a total period of three years;
(2) on the completion of the period of probation the Governor may, in consultation with the High Court, confirm a direct recruit on a cadre-post with effect from a date not earlier than the date on which he completes the period of probation;
(3) If the work or conduct of a direct recruit has, in the opinion of the Governor, not been satisfactory he may, at any time, during the period of probation or the extended period of probation, if any, in consultation with the High Court, and without assigning any reason, dispense with the services of such direct recruits.
Rule 11: Reversion of promoted officers the work of E a promoted officer officiating on a cadre-post has, in the opinion of the Governor, not been satisfactory, he may, at any time during the period of officiation, in consultation with the High Court,- (i) revert him to his substantive post; or (ii) deal with him in such other manner as may be warranted by the terms and conditions of his substantive appointment.
Rule 12: Seniority-The seniority, inter se, of the substantive members of the Service, whether direct recruits of promoted officers, shall be determined with reference to the respective dates of their confirmation.
Provided that the seniority, inter se, of substantive members of the Service having the same date of confirmation shall be determined as follows:
(i) in the case of direct recruits the older in age shall be senior to the younger;
(ii) in the case of promoted officers, in accordance with the seniority in the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) as it stood immediately before their confirmation;
1036 (iii) in the case of promoted officers and direct recruits, the older in age shall be senior to the younger.
Rule 14: Selection Grades.-(1) The members of the Service shall be eligible for promotion, permanently or provisionally, to the following selection grade posts, carrying scales of pay specified against them: Two Selection Grade posts in the time scale of Rs. 1800- 100-2000; and Two Selection Grade posts at a fixed pay of Rs. 2,250.
(2) Promotion to the Selection grade posts shall be made on merit and suitability in all respects with due regard to seniority and no member of the Service shall be entitled as of right to suck promotion.
Appendix to the rules shows that the Punjab Superior Judicial Service consisted then of 20 posts: one Legal Remembrancer and Secretary to Government, Punjab, Legislative Department; 15 District and Sessions Judges; and 4 Additional District and Sessions Judges.
These rules were amended from time to time with or without the consultation of the High Court. The relevant amendments are these:
On February, 1966 the Governor of Punjab, in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution and all other powers enabling him in this behalf, promulgated the "Punjab Superior Judicial Service (First Amendment) Rules, 1966". By clause 2 of these rules the following proviso was added to sub-rule (1) of rule 10 of the 1963 Rules:
"Provided that the Governor may in exceptional circumstances or any case, after consulting the High Court, reduce the period or probation".
On December 31, 1976 the Governor of Punjab, in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution and all other powers enabling him in this behalf, made the "Punjab Superior Judicial Service (Second Amendment) Rules, 1976" in consultation with the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. These rules were given retrospective effect from April 9, 1976. Rule 2(2) of the 1963 Rules defined a 'cadre post' to mean a permanent post in the service. Clause 2 of the Second Amendment Rules substituted the following sub-rule (2) in rule 2 for the original sub-rule:
"2(2) 'cadre post' means a permanent or temporary post in the service .
1037 Rule 12 of the 1963 Rules provided that the seniority, inter se, of the substantive members of the Service, whether direct recruits or promoted officers, shall be determined with reference to the respective dates of their confirmation. Clause 3 of the Second Amendment Rules substituted the following rule for the original rule 12:
"12. Seniority.-The seniority, inter se, of the members of the service, shall be determined by the length of continuous service on a post in the Service irrespective of the date of confirmation;
Provided that in the case of two members appointed on the same date, their seniority shall be determined as follows:
(i) in the case of direct recruits, the older in age shall be senior to the younger;
(ii) a member recruited by direct appointment shall be senior to a member recruited otherwise; and (iii) in the case of members appointed by promotion, seniority shall be determined according to the seniority of such members in the appointments from which they were promoted." This is how the rules stand in so far as the State of Punjab is concerned. The State of Haryana came into existence on November 1, 1966 by Act 3 of 1966. The Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963, as amended up to November 1966 apply to the State of Haryana with the amendments made from time to time by the Governor of Haryana.
On March 17, 1971 certain formal amendments were made to the 1963 Rules by the Haryana First Amendment Rules, 1971. On April 21, 1972 the Governor of Haryana, in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and all other powers enabling him in that behalf, amended the 1963 Rules by the Haryana First Amendment Rules, 1972, with retrospective effect from April 1, 1970. By Clause 3 of the Amendment, the definition of "cadre post" in Rule 2(2) was amended to mean a post, whether permanent or temporary, in the service. Rule 8(2) of the 1963 Rules provided that the total number of cadre posts, two-third shall be manned by promoted officers and one-third by direct recruits. Clause 5 of the Amendment altered this ratio by providing that of the total number of posts, three-fourth shall be manned by promoted officers and one-fourth by direct recruits. Rule 12 governing seniority was amended by clause 6 in the same manner as in Punjab, that is to say, 1038 by providing that the seniority of the members of the service, whether direct recruits or promoted officers, shall be determined by the length of continuous service (in a post in the service irrespective of the date of confirmation. As an aside we may mention, though it has no direct relevance in the points under consideration, that on December 3, 1976 the Governor in the exercise of his constitutional and other power promulgated an amendment providing that:
"No person- (a) who has more than two children and has not got himself or herself or his or her spouse sterilized, or (b) who, having not more than two children, does not give an undertaking not to have more than two children.
shall be allowed to Join the Service." On September, 2, 1977 the Governor in the exercise of his constitutional and other powers further amended the 1963 Rules with retrospective effect from April 1, 1970. The definition of 'cadre post' in rule 2(2) was once again amended to mean "a permanent post in the Service".
Similarly, Rule 8(2) was amended for the purpose of restoring the quota between promotees and direct recruits.
Once again, two-third of the cadre posts were to be manned by promoted officers and one-third by direct recruits. Rule 12, which deals with seniority, was also amended so as to restore the original position by providing that the seniority of members of the Service will be determined with reference to the dates of confirmation. In short, the Haryana First Amendment Rules, 1977, which were given retrospective effect from April 1, 1970, superseded the amendments made by the Haryana First Amendment Rules, 1972 and restored the position as it obtained originally under the 1963 Rules, in regard to the definition of 'cadre post', the quota between promotees and direct recruits and the rule of seniority.
Ever since November 1, 1966 when the State of Haryana was formed, there has been a common High Court for the States of Punjab and Haryana called the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. Two separate High Courts were not created for these two States probably because of considerations of viability in regard to one of the States and the need to foster a spirit of national integration. But the fact of there being two separate Governors for the two States with independent powers under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution has made the task of the High Court difficult and unenviable. The Chief Justice and Judges of the Common High Court of the two States are faced with the predicament of applying one set or service rules to members of the Superior Judicial Service of one State and a totally different, 1039 and to a large extent opposite, set of rules to those of the other State. As the matter stands to-day, (and we mean what we say because there is no knowing when one or the other State will amend the rules and with what degree of retroactivity) under the Haryana First Amendment Rules, 1977, 'cadre post' means a permanent post in the Service.
Temporary posts are not cadre posts in Haryana. In Punjab, 'cadre post' means both permanent and temporary posts in the Superior Judiciary. The definition of 'cadre post' has a significant bearing on the fortunes and future of judicial officers. In Punjab, prior to the amendment made to the 1963 Rules on December 31, 1976 promotees alone used to be appointed, though on an officiating basis, to temporary posts in the Superior Judicial Service. Direct recruits were not appointed to temporary posts because temporary posts were outside the cadre and C. direct recruits were appointed to cadre posts only, in which they were entitled to be confirmed on the completion of the probationary period.
After the amendment, applications were invited for direct recruitment to temporary posts also with the result that promotees lost the opportunity of being appointed to those posts, though on an officiating basis. Respondents 9 to 11 in the Punjab writ petition were appointed directly in July 1977 to temporary posts of Additional District and Session Judges.
In regard to the rule of seniority, the position as it obtains in the two States is fundamentally different: In Punjab, under rule 12 as amended on December 31, 1976 with retrospective effect from April 9, 1976, seniority is determined by the length of continuous service on a post irrespective of the date of confirmation. In Haryana, rule 12 as it stood originally was revived with effect from April 1, 1976 with the result, that seniority of judicial officers in the Superior Judicial Service is determined with reference to the dates of confirmation. The High Court has to deal with one set of officers under its control on the basis that the date of confirmation is the correct criterion of seniority and with another set of officers, also under its control, on the basis that the length of continuous officiation in a post is the true test of seniority.
Whatever decision the High Court takes or is driven to take administratively in the matter of seniority of judicial officers becomes a bone of contention between the promotees and direct recruits. Sometimes, the administrative decision satisfies neither the one class nor the other, leading to a triangular controversy. The frequent amendments to the rules which are often given a long retrospective effect, as long as seven years, makes the High Court's administrative 1040 task difficult. And if the amendments are made either without consulting the High Court or against its advice, the High Court has a delicate task to perform because if it adheres to its opinion, it is accused of bias and if it gives up its stand, it is accused of being weak kneed and vacillating. The administrative decisions taken by the High Court in the instant cases from time to time have been assailed by members of the Judiciary on one or the other of these grounds. That is hardly conducive to the sense of discipline and the feeling of brotherhood which ought to animate the Judiciary. Surely, the State Governments of Punjab and Haryana could have saved the High Court from this predicament by evolving a common set of rules of seniority, at least in the name of national integration. There is nothing peculiar in the soil of Punjab and nothing wanting in the soil of Haryana to justify the application of diametrically opposite rules of service to the judicial officers of the two States. The territories comprised in these two States were at one time, and that too not in the distant past, parts of the territory of the same State of Punjab. The promotees, at any rate, who figure in these proceedings, all flowered on the soil of Punjab but are not told that their claim to seniority will depend upon whether they remained in Punjab or were allotted to Haryana.
This unfortunate position has arisen largely because of the failure of the State Governments to take the High Court into confidence while amending the rules of service. The amendments made in Punjab on December 3, 1966 with retrospective effect from April 9, 1976, including the amendment to rule 12 governing seniority, were made in the teeth of opposition of the High Court and indeed, in so far as the retrospective effect of the rules ii concerned, the amendment was made without consulting the High Court. In Haryana, rule 12 was amended in 1972 with retrospective effect from April 1, 1970 contrary to the advice of the High Court. The plain infirmity of that amendment could be that it was designed to operate to the detriment of one and only one judicial officer who was directly recruited to the Superior Judicial Service, namely, Shri. N. S. Rao, who is respondent No. 3 to the Haryana Petitions. The original rule 12 was, however, subsequently, restored by the State Government by yet another amendment dated September 4, 1977.
There was a change in the Government which evidently led to a change in the rules, as if service rules are a plaything in the hands of the Government. This only shows how essential it is for the Governors, though not as a constitutional requirement, to consult the High Court before framing rules under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Consultation, be it said is not to be equated with the formal process of asking the High Court what opinion it holds on a particular issue. Consultation is a 1041 meaningful prelude to the proposed action, whereby the High Court is afforded an opportunity to discuss the matter under consideration and to meet the Government's or Governor's reasons for the proposed action. In the instant case, the High Court could have made an effort to persuade one or the other Governor to see its point of view; or else, it could at least have impressed upon the two Governors the imperative need to adopt an identical pattern of rules for the two States which are blessed with a common High Court.
Little wonder then that the Superior Judicial Service of the two States was thrown into a state of turmoil and uncertainty. Neither promotees nor direct recruits felt secure about their existing rank or seniority because the rules were being amended from time to time, sometimes just to suit the convenience, sometimes to tide over a temporary crisis, sometimes to appease a class of officers who shouted louder and at least once in order to strike at an individual. The amendments to the rules led to a spate of representations from the members of the service to the High Court and human nature being what it is, Judicial Officers were not wanting who sought the intercession of the concerned State Government in order to advance the interests of an individual or the interest of a class. Once it was known that the Governor could ignore or defy the High Court while framing rules of service, the centre of power shifted from the Nyayalaya to the Mantralaya which is an undesirable state of affairs because thereby the very independence of the Judiciary is put in jeopardy.
Questions regarding confirmation, seniority and the equitable integration of direct recruits and promotees had plagued the High Court for nearly two decades, even before the separate State of Haryana was formed. These questions were further complicated by the changes brought about in the rules of 1963 by the respective State Governments of Punjab and Haryana. The case of Shri N. S. Rao, who is respondent 3 to the Haryana Writ Petition, is an eloquent illustration of the effect of the amendments made to the rules with retrospective effect. At the time when the Governor of Haryana amended the rules in 1972 with retrospective effect from April 1, 1970, Shri N. S. Rao was the only direct recruit in the Haryana Superior Judicial Service. He was appointed on probation on July 7, 1970. The amendment was given retrospective effect from April 1, 1970, as if to demote him and him alone.
In so far as the Haryana Writ Petitions are concerned sometime in February 1972 the Punjab and Haryana High Court took up the question of confirmation of some of the promotees, including the petitioners, against the permanent posts which fell within the quota 1042 of promotees out of the six permanent posts which were newly created w.e.f. January 18, 1972. Before the High Court could decide the question of confirmation of the promotees against the aforesaid posts, respondent 3 made a representation to the High Court on February 13, 1972 contending that the ratio of 2: 1 between the promotees and direct recruits had to be maintained at all stages, that is to say, not only at the time of appointment but at the time of confirmation also. The High Court appears to have postponed the confirmation of the promotees in response to respondent 3's representation. Later respondent 3 was confirmed with effect from July 7, 1972. Five promotees including the three petitioners were confirmed w.e.f. July 8, 1972, that is, a day after respondent 3 was confirmed. The Governor of Haryana refused to recognise the order of confirmation of respondent 3 passed by the High Court and he reverted the latter to the post of a District Attorney w.e.f. June 23, 1973. Respondent 3 challenged the order of his reversion by Writ Petition No. 2147 of 1973. The Petition was heard by a special Bench of five Judges of the High Court which set aside the order of reversion of respondent 3 but held by a majority that the order of respondent 3's confirmation passed by the High Court was invalid since the power to confirm a District & Sessions Judge was vested in the Governor and not in the High Court. The Judgment of the High Court is reported in Narendra Singh Rao v. State of Haryana(1). The view of the High Court regarding the power of confirmation was set aside by this Court by its judgment dated January 24, 1975 in High Court of Punjab and Haryana v. The State of Haryana.(2). It was held by this Court that the power to confirm a District and Sessions Judge resides in the High Court and not in the Governor.
Petitioner No. 1 then made representations to the High Court on February 12 and March 31, 1975 contending that recruitment to the Superior Judicial Service was governed by a rule of quota only and not also by the rule of rotation;
therefore, it was not open to the High Court to give an arbitrary date of confirmation to the promotees. Petitioners 2 and 3 also made similar representations. In the meanwhile the Governor of Haryana amended rule 12 by the Haryana First Amendment Rules 1972 providing that the seniority of the members of the Service, direct recruits or promoted officers, shall be determined by the length of the continuous service on a post in the service irrespective or the date of confirmation. In pursuance of that amendment, the High Court decided by an administrative order dated November 2, 1975 that the Petitioners were senior to 1043 respondent 3. It does not, however, appear to have taken any decision on the representations of the petitioners that the rule of rotation cannot be applied at the time of confirmation.
Aggrieved by the order of the High Court that the petitioners were senior to respondent 3 by reason of the amended rule 12, the latter filed yet another writ petition, No. 100 of 1977, in the High Court challenging the vires of the amended rule 12. During the pendency of that Writ Petition, the Governor of Haryana amended the rules again by a notification dated September 2, 1977 rescinding the amendment introduced to the rules in April 1972. The original rule 12 thus having been restored, the High Court dealt with respondent 3's writ petition on the basis that he had automatically become senior to the petitioners. The High Court therefore confined its judgement to the question of inter se seniority between respondent 3 and Shri J. M.
Tandon (now a Judge of the High Court). The representations of the petitioners appear to have been rejected by the High Court since on June 6, 1978 respondent 3 was granted the selection grade, presumably on the basis that he was senior to the petitioners. It is thereafter that the petitioners filed these writ petitions (4228 to 4230 of 1978) under Art.
32 of the Constitution, claiming the following reliefs:
(a) a writ of certiorari directing respondents 1 and 2 (the State of Haryana and the High Court of Punjab & Haryana respectively) to quash the order dated May 4, 1973 where by respondent 3 was confirmed w.e.f. July 7, 1972 and the order dated June 6, 1978 granting the selection grade to him;
(b) a writ of mandamus declaring rule 12 of the Rules as violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution; and (c) a writ of prohibition restraining respondents 1 and 2 from taking any action on the new seniority list or in pursuance of the orders dated May 4, 1973 and June 6, 1978.
This is the genesis of the controversy between the promotees and direct recruits in Haryana. In Punjab, matters were in no better shape, though it must be said to the credit of its Governor that no amendment was made with an evil eye on any individual Judicial Officer. In 1975, the Association of promoted officers made a representation to the State Government asking that in order to avoid arbitrary dates of confirmation being given to the promotees, continuous officiation in the service and not the date of confirmation should be accepted as the criterion of seniority, as was done in the case of 1044 other employees of the Punjab Government. The State Government forwarded that representation to the High Court for its comments but the High Court appears to have kept the matter pending with it for quite some time. Sometime in 1976, the State Government ultimately sent a draft notification to the High Court proposing an amendment to the Rules. It seems that the Government did not then convey to the High Court its intention to give retrospective effect to the proposed amendment. By that time, ten vacancies in the quota of promoted officers had become available and an equal number of promoted officers was officiating for more than three years as Additional District and Sessions Judges. The High Court, however, did not confirm the promotees in those vacancies. On the contrary, apprehending that the proposed amendment to rule 12 may be given retrospective effect, the High Court confirmed the promotees and the direct recruits by applying the rule of rotation. It issued a Notification dated August 25, 1976 which was published in the Punjab Government Gazette dated September 3, 1976, whereby Respondents 3 to 8 were given prior dates of confirmation in comparison with the promotees. The confirmation of eight promotees was evidently postponed. In the case of respondents 6 to 8, the period of probation of two years was reduced by the High Court substantially. Respondent 6, Shri B. S. Nehra, was appointed on probation on April 1, 1975 and was confirmed on August 2, 1976. Respondent 7, Shri T. S. Cheema, was appointed on probation on April 2, 1975 and was confirmed on August 5, 1976. Respondent 8 Shri J. S. Sidhu was appointed on April 11, 1975 and was confirmed with effect from August 8, 1976. Thus, these direct recruits were confirmed within a period of one year and four months after their appointment, though the normal period of probation is two years.
On the issuance of the Notification dated August 25, 1976, petitioner 1 addressed a representation to the High Court stating that he was officiating in the Superior Judicial Service with effect from November 12, 1969 and asking that he should be confirmed in the post which became available from December 23, 1972. He complained against the date of confirmation, February 3, 1975, allotted to him as arbitrary.
Rule 12 of the Rules was thereafter amended by the Governor of Punjab by a Notification dated December 31, 1976 which was given retrospective effect from April 9, 1976. By that amendment, Seniority was to be determined by the length of continuous service on a post in the service, irrespective of the date of confirmation. The direct recruits, respondents 4 to 9, addressed a representation to the High Court contending that their seniority as fixed by the High 1045 Court's Notification dated August 23, 1976, with reference to the respective dates of their confirmation, ought not to be disturbed. They also challenged the validity of rule 12.
For the purpose of considering those conflicting claims of promotees and direct recruits, the High Court constituted a sub-committee consisting of three Judges, S. S. Sandhawalia (now Chief Justice), Bhopinder Singh Dhillon and Gurnam Singh, JJ. The Committee gave an oral hearing on February 7, 1979 to the representatives of the promotees and direct recruits. The High Court, however, has not readjusted the seniority of the promotees and direct recruits in the light of amended rule 12.
It is interesting that before the Sub-Committee heard the representatives of the promotees and direct recruits, a Full Bench of five Judges of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, delivered its judgment on December 13, 1977 in Civil Writ 100 of 1977 which was filed by Shri N. S. Rao, who is respondent 3 in the Haryana petition. By the aforesaid judgment which is reported in AIR 1978 (P and H) 234, the High Court rejected the plea of Shri Rao that the rules not only required the application of a rule of quota at the time of appointment but they also required the application of a rule of rotation at the time of confirmation. At page 240 of the report appears the conclusion of the High Court to the effect that rules 8 and 12 were independent of each other, that rotational system could not be implicitly read in the quota rule provided for by rule 8 and that members of the Superior Judicial Service were entitled to claim seniority strictly in accordance with the provisions of rule 12. The grievance of the promotees is that this decision which was rendered by the High Court in the exercise of its judicial functions is not being followed by the High Court in the discharge of its administrative duties. After the amendment of rule 12 by the Notification dated December 31, 1976, two vacancies of District and Sessions Judges arose and on each of these occasions the High Court promoted a direct recruit, treating the date of his confirmation as the criterion of seniority. In the quarterly Gradation and Distribution list of officers of the Judicial Department which the High Court publishes, the inter se seniority has been shown according to the dates of confirmation and not in accordance with the amended rule 12.
One of the grievances of the promotees is that the High Court amended the quarterly Gradation List in compliance with the amendments made by the Governor of Haryana in rule 12 but it did not amend the Gradation List of the Punjab Officers in compliance with the amended rule 12.
1046 This, according to the petitioners, has deeply affected their sense of security, contentment and well-being. It is said that eight more vacancies arose within the quota of promotees after the High Court issued the Notification dated August 25, 1976 but the promotees, who were officiating for a period of more than three years, have not yet been confirmed in those posts.
One of the other grievances of the petitioners is that the High Court acted upon the amendment made by the Governor of Punjab on December 31, 1976 in the definition of 'cadre post' by appointing direct recruits to temporary posts in the Superior Judicial Service. It however ignored the other amendment effected by the same Notification, namely, amendment to rule 12, under which continuous officiation is the test of seniority.
Being aggrieved by the Gradation List prepared by the High Court, the promotees in Punjab have filed Writ Petition 266 of 1979 in this Court claiming the following reliefs:
(i) an appropriate writ or direction quashing the impugned notification dated 25th August, 1976;
(ii) a writ of mandamus directing the High Court to discharge its constitutional obligation to redetermine the, seniority i
