With vs Parmanand Yadav
2025 Latest Caselaw 1233 UK

Uttarakhand High Court

With vs Parmanand Yadav on 22 July, 2025

Author: Manoj Kumar Tiwari

Bench: Manoj Kumar Tiwari

                                                          2025:UHC:6440-DB



HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
             Special Appeal No.1061 of 2017
                                  With
 Delay Condonation Application (CLMA/16548/2017)


                           22 July, 2025

State of Uttarakhand and Others                             --Appellants

                               Versus

Parmanand Yadav                                           --Respondent
------------------------------------------------------------------- ---
Presence:-
Mr. Susheel Kumar     Vashishtha,   learned    Standing    Counsel   for   the
State/appellants.
Mr. Mohd. Shaify, learned counsel holding brief of Mr. Aditya Kumar Arya,
learned counsel for the respondent.
------------------------------------------------------------------- ---
Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.
Hon'ble Subhash Upadhyay, J.

(Per: Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.)

                           JUDGMENT

There is delay of 200 days in filing this special appeal.

2. Objection to the delay condonation application has not been filed by the respondent. For the reasons indicated in the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application, the same is allowed and the delay in filing this special appeal is condoned.

3. State has filed this intra-court appeal challenging judgment dated 01.05.2017 rendered by learned Single Judge in WPSS No.774 of 2017. By the said order, writ petition filed by respondent challenging

2025:UHC:6440-DB termination order dated 02.06.2016 was allowed and authorities of education department were directed to reinstate respondent (writ-petitioner) with all consequential benefits, within six weeks.

4. The judgment passed by learned Single Judge impugned in this appeal is reproduced below:-

"Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the present lis is squarely covered by the judgment rendered by this Court in WPSS No.618 of 2016 and analogous matters on 28.03.2017.

Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of in terms of the judgment cited hereinabove. The impugned termination order is quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits within a period of six weeks from today.

However, liberty is reserved to the respondents to proceed with the matter in accordance with law."

5. Learned State Counsel submits that writ petition filed by respondent was decided in terms of judgment dated 28.03.2017 rendered in WPSS No.618 of 2016. He submits that by a common judgment dated 28.03.2017, as many as eight writ petitions filed by teachers, whose service was terminated on the ground that they secured appointment based on forged educational certificates, were decided in which leading case was WPSS No.1152 of 2016; out of these eight writ petitions, WPSS No.618 of 2016 was also decided by the common judgment dated 28.03.2017. He further submits that the judgment as rendered in WPSS No.1152 of 2016, was set aside by Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 13.02.2019 rendered in SPA No.384 of 2017 and SPA No.385 of 2017. Operative portion of the judgment rendered by Division

2025:UHC:6440-DB Bench in SPA No.384 of 2017 and SPA No.385 of 2017 is extracted below:-

"12. We consider it appropriate, in such circumstances, to set-aside the order under appeal, and to restore the writ petitions to file. The learned Single Judge shall examine whether failure, to furnish a copy of the inquiry report to the delinquent employee, has caused them prejudice, and whether it would result in the finding recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, and the punishment imposed on the delinquent employee, being set-aside."

6. Learned State Counsel thus submits that since Division Bench of this Court has set aside the judgment rendered in WPSS No.618 of 2016, therefore, impugned order dated 01.05.2017, which relies on the aforesaid judgment, also deserves to be set aside. He further submits that respondent was not qualified for appointment as Assistant Teacher (Government Primary School) as he was not having Basic Teachers Course (in short "BTC") Certificate and he secured appointment based on forged BTC Certificate. He submits that the allegation that respondent was not BTC qualified was confirmed when his certificate was sent for verification to Deputy Registrar, Examination Regulatory Authority, U.P.

7. Learned State Counsel relied upon judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R. Vishwanath Pillai Vs. State of Kerala and Others, reported in (2004) 2 SCC 105 and also placed reliance on judgment rendered by this Court in WPSS No.254 of 2023 for contending that since respondent had secured appointment as Teacher by playing fraud, therefore, he is not entitled to protection under Article 311 of the

2025:UHC:6440-DB Constitution of India. Relevant extracts of paragraph nos.12 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced below:

"12....

"Where an appointment in a service has been acquired by practising fraud or deceit, such an appointment is no appointment in law, in service and in such a situation Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted at all."

8. Learned State Counsel has also referred to another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar and Others Vs. Kirti Narayan Prasad reported in (2019) 13 SCC 250. Paragraph nos.14 of the said judgment is reproduced below:

"16. In the instant cases, the writ petitioners have filed the petitions before the High Court with a specific prayer to regularise their service and to set aside the order of termination of their services. They have also challenged the report submitted by the State Committee. The real controversy is whether the writ petitioners were legally and validly appointed. The finding of the State Committee is that many writ petitioners had secured appointment by producing fake or forged appointment letter or had been inducted in government service surreptitiously by the Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer concerned by issuing a posting order. The writ petitioners are the beneficiaries of illegal orders made by the Civil Surgeoncum-Chief Medical Officer. They were given notice to establish the genuineness of their appointment and to show-cause. None of them could establish the genuineness or legality of their appointment before the State Committee. The State Committee on appreciation of the materials on record has opined that their appointment was illegal

2025:UHC:6440-DB and void ab initio. We do not find any ground to disagree with the finding of the State Committee. In the circumstances, the question of regularisation of their services by invoking para 53 of the judgment in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] does not arise. Since the appointment of the petitioners is ab initio void, they cannot be said to be the civil servants of the State. Therefore, holding disciplinary proceedings envisaged by Article 311 of the Constitution or under any other disciplinary rules shall not arise."

(emphasis supplied)

9. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Meghmala & others Vs. G. Narasimha Reddy & others, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 383, while laying down the consequences of fraud by a party, held as under:

"28. It is settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an order/office by making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent authority, such order cannot be sustained in the eye of the law. "Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal." (Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [(1994) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1994 SC 853] .) In Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley [(1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502 : (1956) 1 All ER 341 (CA)] the Court observed without equivocation that :

(QB p. 712) "No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything."

29. In A.P. State Financial Corpn. v. GAR ReRolling Mills [(1994) 2 SCC 647 : AIR 1994 SC 2151] and State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu [(1994) 2

2025:UHC:6440-DB SCC 481 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 676 : (1994) 27 ATC 116] this Court observed that a writ court, while exercising its equitable jurisdiction, should not act as to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud as the courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith.

"Equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to evade law."

30. In Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Bros. [(1992) 1 SCC 534 : AIR 1992 SC 1555] it has been held as under : (SCC p. 553, para 20)

"20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct."

31. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh [(2000) 3 SCC 581 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 726 : AIR 2000 SC 1165] this Court observed that "Fraud and justice never dwell together" (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries.

32. The ratio laid down by this Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played fraud or made misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud. (See Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi [(1990) 3 SCC 655 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 520 : (1990) 14 ATC 766] , Union of India v. M. Bhaskaran [1995 Supp (4) SCC 100 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 162 : (1996) 32 ATC 94] , Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Girdharilal Yadav [(2004) 6 SCC 325 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 785] , State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash Babulalsing

2025:UHC:6440-DB Parmar [(2007) 1 SCC 80 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 5] , Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. v. Coal Tar Refining Co. [(2007) 8 SCC 110 : AIR 2007 SC 2798] and Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar [(2009) 8 SCC 751 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929] .)

33. Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an egregious nature would vitiate the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The expression "fraud" involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. [Vide Vimla (Dr.) v. Delhi Admn. [AIR 1963 SC 1572 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 434] , Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 550] , State of A.P. v. T. Suryachandra Rao [(2005) 6 SCC 149 : AIR 2005 SC 3110] , K.D. Sharma v. SAIL [(2008) 12 SCC 481] and Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir [(2008) 13 SCC 170 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 272] .]"

10. Similarly, in the case of Regional Manager, Central Bank of India Vs. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir & others, reported in (2008) 13 SCC 170, Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with the case, where a person had obtained appointment on the basis of a false caste certificate, and it was held that fraud vitiates everything and, therefore, if a person has continued to work on the post for over 20 years, even then, having obtained appointment on the basis of false and forged caste certificate, cannot claim any equity or benefit on that basis. Paragraph nos.14, 15, 16, 17 & 18 of the said judgment are extracted below:

2025:UHC:6440-DB "14. Similarly, the plea regarding rendering of services for a long period has been considered and rejected in a series of decisions of this Court and we deem it unnecessary to launch an exhaustive dissertation on principles in this context. It would suffice to state that except in a few decisions, where the admission/appointment was not cancelled because of peculiar factual matrix obtaining therein, the consensus of judicial opinion is that equity, sympathy or generosity has no place where the original appointment rests on a false caste certificate. A person who enters the service by producing a false caste certificate and obtains appointment to the post meant for a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or OBC, as the case may be, deprives a genuine candidate falling in either of the said categories, of appointment to that post, and does not deserve any sympathy or indulgence of this Court. He who comes to the Court with a claim based on falsity and deception cannot plead equity nor the Court would be justified to exercise equity jurisdiction in his favour.

15. An act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due, tantamounts to fraud. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter. (See R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala [(2004) 2 SCC 105 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 350] , Bank of India [(2005) 7 SCC 690 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 1011] , BHEL [(2007) 5 SCC 336 :

(2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 152] , Derry v. Peek [(1889) 14 AC 337 : (1886-90) All ER Rep 1

2025:UHC:6440-DB (HL)] , Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education [(2003) 8 SCC 311] and Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar v. State of Maharashtra [(2005) 7 SCC 605] .)

16. In Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi [(2003) 8 SCC 319] this Court had observed that fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine.

17. Recently, in State of Maharashtra v.

Ravi Prakash Babulalsing Parmar [(2007) 1 SCC 80 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 5] dealing with a similar situation, this Court has observed thus:

(SCC p. 89, para 23)

"23. The makers of the Constitution laid emphasis on equality amongst citizens. The Constitution of India provides for protective discrimination and reservation so as to enable the disadvantaged group to come on the same platform as that of the forward community. If and when a person takes an undue advantage of the said beneficent provision of the Constitution by obtaining the benefits of reservation and other benefits provided under the Presidential Order although he is not entitled thereto, he not only plays a fraud on the society but in effect and substance plays a fraud on the Constitution. When, therefore, a certificate is granted to a person who is not otherwise entitled thereto, it is entirely incorrect to contend that the State shall be helpless spectator in the matter."

2025:UHC:6440-DB

18. Having considered the matter in the light of the aforestated legal position, in our judgment, the decision of the High Court is untenable. As noted supra, the employee having accepted the finding of the Scrutiny Committee, holding that the caste certificate furnished by the employee was false, the very foundation of her appointment vanished and her appointment was rendered illegal. Her conduct renders her unfit to be continued in service and must necessarily entail termination of her service. Under these circumstances, there is absolutely no justification for her claim in respect of the post merely on the ground that she had worked on the post for over twenty years. The post was meant for a reserved candidate but she usurped the same by misrepresentation and deception. In our opinion, the fact that caste certificate was referred to the Scrutiny Committee for verification after ten years of her joining the service and a long time was taken by the Scrutiny Committee to verify the same is of no consequence inasmuch as delay on both the counts does not validate the caste certificate and the consequent illegal appointment."

11. Respondent was terminated on the ground that he secured appointment on forged BTC Certificate.

BTC Certificate furnished by respondent at the time of his appointment was sent for verification to the Deputy Registrar, Examination Regulatory Authority, U.P. and the Deputy Registrar informed the District Education Officer (Elementary) Udham Singh Nagar that no such certificate of training was issued by his office. Thereafter, respondent was give notice asking him to

2025:UHC:6440-DB show cause within ten days and thereafter the time given to respondent for showing cause was extended for another fifteen days, however, respondent did not respond to the notice issued to him from time to time.

12. Thus respondent himself is to be blamed for not responding to the show cause notice and the only inference which can be drawn against him is that he was not possessed of BTC qualification which is essential qualification for appointment as Primary School Teacher.

13. In view of the legal position as discussed above, the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution of India would not be available to the respondent. Thus, the judgment rendered by learned Single Judge is interferable.

14. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 01.05.2017. Thus, the special appeal is allowed.

(Subhash Upadhyay, J.) (Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.) 22.07.2025 SS

SUKHBANT

DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH

2.5.4.20=71978f9c61bfde0ba69967c787b1764ea7bc7dd12 9a8a6380d49b1885e628615, postalCode=263001,

SINGH st=UTTARAKHAND, serialNumber=2D8B71B8D8E345F6B7F95B1DD4FB4BEBD2 B7D72C42261361AED33172F152148D, cn=SUKHBANT SINGH Date: 2025.07.24 10:22:35 +05'30'