Shyamlata Verma vs Collector Dehdraun on 22 December, 2025

Author: Rakesh Thapliyal

Bench: Rakesh Thapliyal

HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
                               First Appeal No. 21 of 2013


Shyamlata Verma.                                                         ...........Appellant.

                                                 Versus
Collector Dehdraun
and another.                                                             ........Respondents
Present:
Mr. Lokendra Dobhal, learned counsel for the appellant.
Mr. Rahul Consul, learned counsel for the MDDA.
Mr. I.P. Kohli, learned Standing Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand.



Hon'ble Rakesh Thapliyal, J.

1. The instant first appeal has been preferred by the appellant under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act against the judgment and order passed by Addl. District & Session Judge / Special Judge, Dehradun dated 04.12.2012 and decree dated 18.12.2012 passed in Acquisition Suit No. 83 of 2004 (Shyamlata Verma Vs. Collector, Dehradun and another).

2. Brief facts of the present case are that a Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 12.06.2001 whereby the land was proposed to be acquired for ISBT in which land of the appellant was also included and subsequently, possession was taken on 03.10.2002 and thereafter, award by declared by the SLAO on 08.08.2003. Being aggrieved with the award, the appellant and other claimants have approached to the Reference Court by moving an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and all the reference applications were decided by the impugned judgment and decree and now, being aggrieved with the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Reference Court, the instant first appeal has been preferred.

3. Appeal was admitted on 14.10.2020. Thereafter, an application was moved by the appellant under Section 151 CPC by placing certain new facts that the land of the appellant, which was acquired, was not utilized for ISBT rather in the said land a multistoried building was constructed and thereafter, the same were sold out. This application is supported with an affidavit containing two photographs, one constructed house of the appellant and another multistoried building, which was constructed after demolition of two storied house of the appellant.

4. The MDDA was asked to file an affidavit and in compliance thereof, the Chief Engineer and Incharge of the Legal Section Harichand Singh Rana filed an affidavit giving following statement:

"3. That it is submitted that Notification under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 12.06.2001 for acquisition of various lands including the land of the Appellant consisting in Khasra No. 538, Majra, Dehradun for Planned Development Scheme for construction of Bus Terminal by the Respondent No. 2 / Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority, Dehradun in District Dehradun.

4. That thereafter Notification under Section 6 read with Section 17 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 28.02.2002 for directing the Collector, Dehradun to take order of the acquisition of the aforesaid land for Planned Development Scheme for construction of Bus Terminal by the Respondent No. 2 / Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority, Dehradun in District Dehradun.

5. That pursuant to the Notifications issued under Section 4, 6 and 17 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as above, the possession of the acquired land including that of Khasra No. 538, Village Majra, Dehradun was taken on 03.10.2002 by Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority, Dehradun.

6. That Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority, Dehradun / Respondent No. 2 got an Overhead Water Tank constructed by Uttarakhand Peyjal Nigam for supply of water to the residential colony situated nearby the aforesaid Khasra No. 538, Village Majra, Dehradun.

7. That after the construction of Overhead Water Tank having been completed, one Shri Jogindra Singh Kukreja made representations to the Respondent No. 2 / Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority, Dehradun to the effect that the said Overhead Water Tank had been constructed over his land measuring 186.6 Sq.Mtrs, forming part of Khasra No. 538/1-M (new Khasra No. 549 Ka), Mauza Majra, which part of his land was not under acquisition.

8. That after thoughtful consideration and deliberation over the matter in 87th Board Meeting dated 20.12.2014 of Respondent No. 2 / Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority, Dehradun, it was decided that a piece of land measuring 188 Sq.Mtrs. situated in Khata No. 0332 forming part of Khasra No. 545 (old Khasra No. 538/1- M) situated in Mauza Majra, Dehradun so acquired and owned by the Respondent No. 2 / Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority, Dehradun (land acquired belonging to the Appellant) be exchanged with the land

comprised in plot of land bearing Plot No. 37, measuring 186.6 Sq. Mtrs situated in Khata No. 0332, Khasra No. 538/1-M (new number 549 Ka) in Mauza Majra, Dehradun belonging to the said Shri Jogindra Singh Kukreja.

9. That pursuant to the above a registered Deed of Exchange dated 10.07.2015 was executed between the Respondent No. 2 / Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority, Dehradun and Shri Jogindra Singh Kukreja. Copy of Deed of Exchange dated 10.07.2015 is being filed and placed as Annexure B-1 to this affidavit."

5. On perusal of the affidavit of the MDDA, admittedly, it appears that land owned by the appellant, which was acquired under land acquisition proceedings, was given to one Jogindra Singh Kukreja on the basis of decision of the Board by way of Exchange Deed dated 10.07.2015.

6. After gone through with the aforesaid statement, as given on the affidavit, learned counsel for the MDDA is directed to place before this Court the original record regarding exchange of land. Now, the original records have been shown to this Court.

7. First document is the letter of Jogindra Singh Kukreja dated 11.02.2011 addressed to the then Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, on first page of which, there is an endorsement of the Chairman of the Assembly dated 07.02.2011.

8. When no action was taken on the representation of the Jogindra Singh Kukreja then he again approached the Sub Divisional Magistrate, who advised him that for the land on

which water tank head was constructed by Jal Sansthan, alternate land may be provided to him.

9. Third document is the report of the Revenue Sub Inspector which was based on the report of the Junior Engineer of the MDDA who recommended for the exchange of land and based on the report of the Junior Engineer, agenda no. 19 was placed before the Board headed by the Commissioner, Garhwal Mandal and Vice Chairman of MDDA and a decision was taken that some another land be given to Jogindra Singh Kukreja in place of land, which was utilized for the construction of the water head tank on exchange and pursuant to the decision of the Board, land owned by the appellant, which was acquired under the acquisition was given on exchange to Jogindra Singh Kukreja.

10. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that since first appeal is in continuation of the proceeding initiated under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, therefore, subsequent development can be taken into consideration.

11. I perused the entire original record.

12. Mr. Rahul Consul, raised an objection that since it is a first appeal, therefore, the appellant has to prove his case by placing relevant original record by moving an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC.

13. Mr. Dobhal, learned counsel for the appellant, argued that admittedly, the land owned by the appellant was not used for ISBT purpose and in fraudulent manner land was transferred to a third person, who after constructing the flats sold out to other person, which is impermissible in the eyes of law.

14. In reference to this, he has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Royal Orchid Hotels Ltd. Vs. G. Jayarama Reddy and others (2011) 10 SCC 608, by placing reliance to paragraph 33 to 39 of the aforesaid judgment which are being reproduced herein as under:

"33. A reading of the impugned judgment, the relevant portions of which have been extracted hereinabove shows that the Division Bench of the High Court adverted to all the facts, which had bearing on the issue of delay including the one that on the advice given by an advocate, Respondent 1 had availed other remedies and opined that the delay had been adequately explained. Thus, it cannot be said that the discretion exercised by the High Court to entertain and decide the writ petition filed by Respondent 1 on merits is vitiated by any patent legal infirmity. It is true that the writ petitions filed by the brothers of Respondent 1 had been dismissed by the learned Single Judge on the ground of delay and the writ appeals and the special leave petitions filed against the order of the learned Single Judge were dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court and this Court respectively, but that could not be made basis for denying relief to Respondent 1 because his brothers had neither questioned the diversification of land to private persons nor prayed for restoration of their respective shares.

34. That apart, we find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to approve the approach adopted by the learned Single Judge in dealing with Writ Petitions Nos. 2379-80 of 1993 filed by the brothers of Respondent 1. He distinguished the judgments of the Division Bench in Behroze Ramyar Batha v. Land Acquisition Officer

and H.N. Lakshmamma v. State of Karnataka without any real distinction and did not adhere to the basic postulate of judicial discipline that a Single Bench is bound by the judgment of the Division Bench. Not only this, the learned Single Judge omitted to consider the order dated 3-10-1991 passed in Annaiah v. State of Karnataka in which the same Division Bench had quashed the Notifications dated 28-12-1981 and 16-4- 1983 in their entirety.

35. Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the High Court went a step further and dismissed the writ appeals filed by the brothers of Respondent 1 without even adverting to the factual matrix of the case, the grounds on which the order of the learned Single Judge was challenged and ignored the law laid down by the coordinate Bench in three other cases. The special leave petitions filed by the brothers of Respondent 1 were summarily dismissed by this Court. Such dismissal did not amount to this Court's approval of the view taken by the High Court on the legality of the acquisition and transfer of land to private persons. In this connection, reference can usefully be made to the judgment in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala.

36. The next question which merits examination is whether the High Court was justified in directing restoration of land to Respondent 1. In Behroze Ramyar Batha v. Land Acquisition Officer , the Division Bench of the High Court categorically held that the exercise undertaken for the acquisition of land was vitiated due to fraud. The Division Bench was also of the view that the acquisition cannot be valid in part and invalid in other parts, but did not nullify all the transfers on the premise

that other writ petitions and a writ appeal involving challenge to the acquisition proceedings were pending. In Annaiah v. Stateof Karnataka the same Division Bench specifically adverted to the issue of diversification of purpose and held that where the landowners are deprived of their land under the cover of public purpose and there is diversification of land for a private purpose, it amounts to fraudulent exercise of the power of eminent domain.

37. The pleadings and documents filed by the parties in these cases clearly show that the Corporation had made a false projection to the State Government that land was needed for execution of tourism-related projects. In the meeting of officers held on 13-1-1987 i.e. after almost four years of the issue of declaration under Section 6, the Managing Director of the Corporation candidly admitted that the Corporation did not have the requisite finances to pay for the acquisition of land and that Dayananda Pai, who had already entered into agreements with some of the landowners for purchase of land, was prepared to provide funds subject to certain conditions including transfer of 12 acres 34 guntas land to him for house building project. After 8 months, the Corporation passed a resolution for transfer of over 12 acres land to Dayananda Pai. The Corporation also transferred two other parcels of land in favour of Bangalore International Centre and M/s Universal Resorts Limited. These transactions reveal the true design of the officers of the Corporation, who first succeeded in persuading the State Government to acquire a huge chunk of land for a public purpose and then transferred a major portion of the acquired land to a private individual and corporate entities by citing poor

financial health of the Corporation as the cause for doing so.

38. The courts have repeatedly held that in exercise of its power of eminent domain, the State can compulsorily acquire land of the private persons but this proposition cannot be overstretched to legitimise a patently illegal and fraudulent exercise undertaken for depriving the landowners of their constitutional right to property with a view to favour private persons. It needs no emphasis that if land is to be acquired for a company, the State Government and the company is bound to comply with the mandate of the provisions contained in Part VII of the Act. Therefore, the Corporation did not have the jurisdiction to transfer the land acquired for a public purpose to the companies and thereby allow them to bypass the provisions of Part VII. The diversification of the purpose for which land was acquired under Section 4(1) read with Section 6 clearly amounted to a fraud on the power of eminent domain. This is precisely what the High Court has held in the judgment under appeal and we do not find any valid ground to interfere with the same more so because in Annaiah v. State of Karnataka, the High Court had quashed the notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6 in their entirety and that judgment has become final.

39. The judgment in Om Parkash v. Union of India on which reliance has been placed by Shri Naganand is clearly distinguishable. What has been held in that case is that quashing of the acquisition proceedings would enure to the benefit of only those who had approached the Court within reasonable time and not to those who remained silent. In this case, Respondent 1 independently

questioned the acquisition proceedings and transfer of the acquired land to M/s Universal Resorts Ltd. In other words, he approached the High Court for vindication of his right and succeeded in convincing the Division Bench that the action taken by the Corporation to transfer his land to M/s Universal Resorts Limited was wholly illegal, arbitrary and unjustified."

15. Be that as it may, since the original record are with the MDDA, let the same be filed by MDDA including exchange deed within a week.

16. List on 30.12.2025 on top of board.

(Rakesh Thapliyal, J.) 22.12.2025 SKS