2 December vs State Of Uttarakhand And Others on 2 December, 2025

Author: Manoj Kumar Tiwari

Bench: Manoj Kumar Tiwari

                                                     2025:UHC:10727
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
         Writ Petition Misc. Single No. 840 of 2024
                      02 DECEMBER, 2025


Reshma                                           ... Petitioner
                             Versus
State of Uttarakhand and others                 ... Respondents
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Mr. Vipul Sharma, Advocate for the petitioners.
Mr. Ganesh Kandpal, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State of
Uttarakhand.
Mr. Arvind Vashisth, learned Senior Counsel for respondent no. 7
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Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.

                          JUDGMENT

1. Petitioner was elected as Pradhan of Gram Sabha Nagla Khurd, Block Bhadrabad, District Haridwar in the last election held in 2022. A complaint was made that she does not possess the requisite educational qualification for holding the Office as Pradhan. Copy of the complaint was supplied to petitioner and a notice was also issued to her, asking her to put forth her version. In her reply, petitioner stated that she passed 8th Standard from Shanti Modern Junior High School, Bhauri Bharapur, Roorkee, District Haridwar, during Academic Session 2007-08.

2. The complaint was referred to Deputy Education Officer (Roorkee), Haridwar for enquiry. Deputy Education Officer in his report stated that Shanti Modern Junior High School was granted recognition by the Competent Authority, for the first time, on 02.12.2008 and it was not a recognized school earlier. Record reveals that petitioner passed 8th Standard during academic session 2007-08.

3. Mr. Arvind Vashisth, learned Senior Counsel

2025:UHC:10727 appearing for respondent no. 7 points out from letter dated 07.07.2023 issued by Deputy Education Officer that petitioner was never a student of Shanti Modern Junior High School.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the report submitted by Deputy Education Officer was wrongly relied by Prescribed Authority/Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Haridwar for disqualifying petitioner under Section 8(1)(q) of Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016, while Prescribed Authority was required to hold the enquiry himself. He further submits that there is no requirement of passing Middle/Eighth examination from a recognized institution/Board for a women candidate and such requirement is applicable only to candidates who are not specified in proviso to Section 8(1)(q) of the Act. Section 8(1)(q) of Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016 is extracted below for ready reference:-

"8. Disqualification for membership of Gram Panchayat:

(1) A person shall be diqaulaified for being appointed, a Pradhan, Up-Pradhan and member o f a Gram Panchayat, if he -

(q) He has not passed High School or equivalent examination from any recognized institution/Board.

[Provided that in the matter of candidate of General Category women, Other Backward Classes and Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes candidate has not passed minimum Middle/Eight examination;]"

5. Section 8 of Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016 enumerates the grounds on which a person may be declared disqualified for being appointed as Pradhan, Up-Pradhan or Member of a Gram Panchayat. Section 8(1)(q) thereof provides that a person shall be

2025:UHC:10727 disqualified for being appointed as a Pradhan, Up- Pradhan or Member of a Gram Panchayat, if he has not passed High School or equivalent examination from any recognized institution/Board, however the minimum qualification required in respect of women and members of Other Backward Classes/Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe would be Middle examination or Eight Standard. Petitioner contends that the expression 'recognized institution/Board' is missing in the proviso, therefore, this condition would not be applicable to the candidates belonging to the General Category Women, Other Backward Class and Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe.

6. Section 8(5) of the said Act provides that if any question arises as to whether a person has become subject to any disqualification mentioned in the Act, then the question shall be referred to the prescribed authority and his decision shall, subject to the result of any appeal as may be prescribed, be final.

7. From the Statutory Scheme, it is apparent that the issue of disqualification suffered by a person for holding the office of Pradhan has to be referred to Prescribed Authority for decision. Since recognition to educational institutions is given by Education Department, therefore, calling report from the Competent Authority in Education Department was the best course to be adopted in the given circumstances and the Prescribed Authority could not have formed any independent opinion, on the question of recognition, in the absence of report from the Competent Authority. Thus, calling of report from Authorities of Education by

2025:UHC:10727 the Prescribed Authority cannot be faulted.

8. The contention raised on behalf of petitioner that the requirement of passing middle/eighth examination from a recognized institution/board would not be applicable to cases covered by proviso to Section 8(1)(q), cannot be accepted. One of the conditions of eligibility for appointment as Pradhan is that one should have passed minimum High School or equivalent examination from a recognized institution/Board. Although Legislature in its wisdom has relaxed the said condition in favour of persons belonging to Other Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and General women candidates for whom the minimum educational qualification prescribed is middle/eighth examination; however, middle/eighth qualification must be obtained from a recognized institution/Board, even though, the expression "recognized institution/Board" is missing in the proviso. Any other interpretation will render Section 8(1)(q) otiose.

9. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mavilayi Service Cooperative Bank Limited & others vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Calicut & another, reported as 2021 (7) SCC 90 has considered and discussed the question whether a proviso can be used to cut down the language of the main enactment where such language is clear, or to exclude by implication what the main enactment clearly states. Entire law on the point has been considered and discussed in para 44 to 47 of the said judgment, which are extracted below:-

2025:UHC:10727 "44. A number of judgments have held that a proviso cannot be used to cut down the language of the main enactment where such language is clear, or to exclude by implication what the main enactment clearly states. Thus, in CIT v. Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd. [CIT v. Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd., 1959 Supp (2) SCR 256 : AIR 1959 SC 713:

(1959) 36 ITR 1] , this Court held : (SCR p. 266 : AIR p.

717, para 9) "9. ... The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out as it were, from the main enactment, a portion which, but for the proviso would fall within the main enactment. Ordinarily it is foreign to the proper function of a proviso to read it as providing something by way of an addendum or dealing with a subject which is foreign to the main enactment. 'It is a fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso'. Therefore it is to be construed harmoniously with the main enactment. (Per Das, C.J.) in Abdul Jabar Butt v. State of J&K [Abdul Jabar Butt v. State of J&K, 1957 SCR 51 : AIR 1957 SC 281 :

1957 Cri LJ 404] , SCR at p. 59. Bhagwati, J., in Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. CST [Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. CST, (1955) 2 SCR 483 : AIR 1955 SC 765] , SCR at p. 493 said : (AIR p. 769, para 10) '10. ... It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other.'

Lord Macmillan in Madras & Southern Mahratta Railway Co. Ltd. v. Bezwada Municipality [Madras & Southern Mahratta Railway Co. Ltd. v. Bezwada Municipality, 1944 SCC OnLine PC 7 : (1943-44) 71 IA 113] , IA at p. 122 laid down the sphere of a proviso as follows : (SCC OnLine PC)

'... The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined to that case. Where, as in the present case, the language of the main enactment is clear and unambiguous, a proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it by implication what clearly falls within its express terms.'

The territory of a proviso therefore is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and exclude something which otherwise would have been within the section. It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear it cannot be used for the purpose of interpreting the main enactment or to exclude by

2025:UHC:10727 implication what the enactment clearly says unless the words of the proviso are such that that is its necessary effect. (Vide also Corpn. of the City of Toronto v. Attorney General for Canada [Corpn. of the City of Toronto v. Attorney General for Canada, 1946 AC 32 (PC)], AC at p. 37.)"

45. To similar effect, a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal [Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, (1991) 3 SCC 442] held : (SCC p. 447, para 6) "6. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field, which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted by the proviso and to no other. The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is to confine to that case. Where the language of the main enactment is explicit and unambiguous, the proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it, by implication what clearly falls within its express terms. The scope of the proviso, therefore, is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and it excludes something which otherwise would have been within the rule. It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear, the proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to nullify by implication what the enactment clearly says nor set at naught the real object of the main enactment, unless the words of the proviso are such that it is its necessary effect."

46. Another two-Judge Bench in J.K. Industries Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Factories & Boilers [J.K. Industries Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Factories & Boilers, (1996) 6 SCC 665 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1] then declared : (SCC pp. 688-89, paras 33-36) "33. A proviso to a provision in a statute has several functions and while interpreting a provision of the statute, the court is required to carefully scrutinise and find out the real object of the proviso appended to that provision. It is not a proper rule of interpretation of a proviso that the enacting part or the main part of the section be construed first without reference to the proviso and if the same is found to be ambiguous only then recourse may be had to examine the proviso as has been canvassed before us. On the other hand an accepted rule of interpretation is that a section and the proviso thereto must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest. A proviso is normally used to remove special cases from the general enactment and provide for them specially.

2025:UHC:10727

34. A proviso qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out from the main provision, a portion, which, but for the proviso would be a part of the main provision. A proviso must, therefore, be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso should not be read as if providing something by way of addition to the main provision which is foreign to the main provision itself.

35. Indeed, in some cases, a proviso, may be an exception to the main provision though it cannot be inconsistent with what is expressed in the main provision and if it is so, it would be ultra vires of the main provision and struck down. As a general rule in construing an enactment containing a proviso, it is proper to construe the provisions together without making either of them redundant or otiose. Even where the enacting part is clear, it is desirable to make an effort to give meaning to the proviso with a view to justify its necessity.

36. While dealing with proper function of a proviso, this Court in CIT v. Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd. [CIT v. Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd., 1959 Supp (2) SCR 256 : AIR 1959 SC 713 : (1959) 36 ITR 1] opined :

(AIR p. 717, para 9) '9. ... The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out as it were, from the main enactment, a portion which, but for the proviso would fall within the main enactment. Ordinarily it is foreign to the proper function of a proviso to read it as providing something by way of an addendum or dealing with a subject which is foreign to the main enactment.'

This view has held the field till date."

47. More recently, in Union of India v. Dileep Kumar Singh [Union of India v. Dileep Kumar Singh, (2015) 4 SCC 421 : (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 1] , this Court held as follows :

(SCC pp. 429-30, para 20) "20. Equally, it is settled law that a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso.

Therefore, the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction. This is laid down in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf [Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, (1976) 1 SCC 128] , as follows : (SCC p. 137, para 18) '18. We may mention in fairness to counsel that the following, among other decisions, were cited at the Bar bearing on the uses of provisos in statutes : CIT v. Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd. [CIT v. Indo- Mercantile Bank Ltd., 1959 Supp (2) SCR 256 : AIR

2025:UHC:10727 1959 SC 713 : (1959) 36 ITR 1] ; Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. CST [Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. CST, (1955) 2 SCR 483: AIR 1955 SC 765]; Thompson v. Dibdin [Thompson v. Dibdin,1912 AC 533 (HL)], AC at p.541; R. v. Dibdin [R. v. Dibdin, 1910 P 57 (CA)] , and Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. [Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012 : 1959 Cri LJ 1231] The law is trite. A proviso must be limited to the subject-matter of the enacting clause. It is a settled rule of construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. It is not a separate or independent enactment. 'Words are dependent on the principal enacting words to which they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as divorced from their context' (Thompson v. Dibdin [Thompson v. Dibdin, 1912 AC 533 (HL)]). If the rule of construction is that prima facie a proviso should be limited in its operation to the subject-matter of the enacting clause, the stand we have taken is sound. To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso, although the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction.'"

10. Now coming back to section 8(1)(q) of Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016. The said provision requires that one should have passed High School or equivalent examination from a recognized institution/board. The condition of possessing High School qualification is relaxed for persons belonging to weaker sections of the society, including women, who are treated as eligible if they have passed middle/eighth examination. However, the requirement of passing middle/eighth examination, from a recognized institution/board, cannot be dispensed with in respect of persons covered by proviso to Section 8(1)(q) of the Act, as that will make the provision nugatory and will defeat the purpose for which Section

2025:UHC:10727 8(1)(q) was enacted. Thus, in the considered opinion of this Court, persons covered by proviso to Section 8(1)(q) should also possess middle/eighth qualification from a recognized institution/board.

11. Even otherwise also, law is well settled that an interpretation which advances the purpose of the Act and which ensures its smooth and harmonious working must be chosen and an interpretation which leads to absurdity, or confusion, or friction, or contradiction and conflict between its various provisions must be eschewed, as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vivek Narayan Sharma & others vs. Union of India & others, reported as 2023 (3) SCC 1. Relevant para of the said judgment are extracted below:-

"137. A statute must be construed having regard to the legislative intent. It has to be meaningful. A construction which leads to manifest absurdity must not be preferred to a construction which would fulfil the object and purport of the legislative intent.

148. It is thus clear that it is a settled principle that the modern approach of interpretation is a pragmatic one, and not pedantic. An interpretation which advances the purpose of the Act and which ensures its smooth and harmonious working must be chosen and the other which leads to absurdity, or confusion, or friction, or contradiction and conflict between its various provisions, or undermines, or tends to defeat or destroy the basic scheme and purpose of the enactment must be eschewed. The primary and foremost task of the Court in interpreting a statute is to gather the intention of the legislature, actual or imputed. Having ascertained the intention, it is the duty of the Court to strive to so interpret the statute as to promote or advance the object and purpose of the enactment. For this purpose, where necessary, the Court may even depart from the rule that plain words should be interpreted according to their plain meaning. There need be no meek and mute submission to the plainness of the language. To avoid patent injustice, anomaly or absurdity or to avoid invalidation of a law, the court would be justified in departing from the so- called golden rule of construction so as to give effect to the

2025:UHC:10727 object and purpose of the enactment. Ascertainment of legislative intent is the basic rule of statutory construction."

12. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the complaint made against the petitioner was not supported by affidavit, as is required by Rule 3 of The Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Removal of Pradhans, Up-Pradhans and Members) Enquiry Rules, 1997 and the enquiry was also not made as per provision of the said Rules.

13. Learned State Counsel, however, submits that the said aspect has been answered against the petitioner in a judgment dated 26.11.2025 rendered in WPMS No. 2940 of 2025.

14. This Court finds substance in the submission made by learned State Counsel. In WPMS No. 2940 of 2025, this Court has held that The Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Removal of Pradhans, Up-Pradhans and Members) Enquiry Rules, 1997 were framed by State of Uttar Pradesh to give effect to Section 95 (1)(g) of Uttar Pardesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, which provided for removal of Pradhan, Up-Pradhan or Member of a Gram Panchayat, after enquiry held in a manner as may be prescribed.

15. Section 8(5) of Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, however, does not provide for any enquiry. No mode of enquiry is prescribed in Section 8(5) of Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act and the Prescribed Authority is free to take decision in the reference. Under Section 95(1)(g) of Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, the person, authorized to hold enquiry and the

2025:UHC:10727 mode of enquiry, is such as prescribed by the Rules. In that background, this Court made following observation in para 14 of the judgment rendered in WPMS No. 2940 of 2025:-

"14. Reliance upon UP Panchayat Raj (Removal of Pradhans, Up-Pradhans and Members) Enquiry Rules, 1997 is also misplaced. The said Rules were framed by State of Uttar Pradesh to give effect to Section 95(1)(g) of U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, which provides that Pradhan, UpPradhan or Member of a Gram Panchayat can be removed after enquiry held by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed. Section 8(5) of Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, however provides that whenever a question arises as to whether a person has become subject to any disqualification mentioned in the Act, then such question may be referred to the Prescribed Authority for decision. Thus Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act does not provide for a detailed enquiry, as provided in Section 95(1)(g) of UP Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, therefore the Rules framed to give effect to the provision contained in UP Act cannot be ipso facto made applicable to proceedings under Uttarakhand Act, when the nature of proceedings is different. Since Uttarakhand Act is silent as regards affidavit, therefore, requirement of affidavit cannot be read into Uttarakhand Act by having recourse to 1997 Rules, relied by the petitioner."

16. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court do not find any scope for interference in the matter. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. Interim order dated 24.04.2024 is vacated. The Competent Authority shall be at liberty to proceed in the matter, as per law.

__________________________ MANOJ KUMAR TIWARI, J.

02.12.2025 Aswal NITI RAJ Digitally signed by NITI RAJ SINGH ASWAL DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, 2.5.4.20=eacc6757ee7881e933ff8934f07477005aa85f9802a3a08b08d136951

SINGH ASWAL 2ea30f3, postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND, serialNumber=44EB54CBF00B7698CB6F10C2CE3D26F5C22DACF4F4610C1F E58A58531726FBB0, cn=NITI RAJ SINGH ASWAL Date: 2025.12.10 05:31:20 -08'00'