[Cites 10, Cited by 0]
Uttarakhand High Court
Anand Singh vs Champa Devi on 1 December, 2025
Author: Ravindra Maithani
Bench: Ravindra Maithani
2025:UHC:10703-DB
Reserved on 25.11.2025
Delivered on 01.12.2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
First Appeal No.203 of 2022
Anand Singh ..............Appellant
Versus
Champa Devi ..........Respondent
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Presence:-
Mr. Sachin Mohan Singh Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant.
Mr. Asif Ali, learned counsel for respondent.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Coram: Hon'ble Ravindra Maithani, J.
Hon'ble Alok Mahra, J. (Per)
The present First Appeal, filed under Section 19 of
the Family Courts Act, 1984, seeks to set aside the judgment
and order dated 02.08.2022, as well as the judgment and
decree dated 16.08.2022, passed by the Family Court, Almora
in Divorce Petition No. 118 of 2018, Anand Singh vs. Champa
Devi. By the judgment and decree dated 16.08.2022, the
Family Court has rejected the divorce petition instituted by
the appellant/husband under Section 13(1)(i) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955.
2. Brief facts of the case, as per record, are that the
marriage between the appellant and the respondent was
solemnized on 09.05.1997 according to Hindu rites and
customs. Out of the said wedlock, the parties were blessed
with two children i.e. one son and one daughter. Due to
matrimonial discord, the appellant earlier filed Divorce
Petition No. 149 of 2017, in which both parties arrived at a
compromise through mediation. Thereafter, the appellant
instituted Divorce Petition No. 118 of 2018 on the ground of
cruelty, contending inter alia that pursuant to the
compromise dated 10.11.2017, the appellant had been
depositing ₹1500/- per month in the respondent's account;
that, a separate room, kitchen, toilet, bathroom etc. were
constructed and handed over to the respondent in the
appellant's ancestral house at Village Matena, in compliance
with the terms of compromise. However, soon after the
compromise, the respondent allegedly began to abuse and
harass the appellant and the minor children day and night,
locked the entire house, and even assaulted the appellant's
aged mother. In January-February 2018, due to the
respondent's conduct, the situation became unbearable,
forcing the appellant, his mother, and the minor children to
shift temporarily to the restaurant of the appellant's brother
at Kasardevi. The respondent frequently visited the said
restaurant and allegedly created scenes by using abusive and
derogatory language in front of customers.
3. The respondent filed her written statement in the
divorce suit denying the allegations, stating that soon after
their marriage after Diwali, the appellant left for Pune for
employment, leaving the respondent at his village home, and
returned only after three years; that, the appellant, his
mother, and his brother allegedly treated her with cruelty and
neglected their matrimonial obligations; that, after returning
from Pune, the appellant and his younger brother jointly
started a restaurant in Kasardevi, where the appellant now
resides; that, as per the compromise dated 10.11.2017, the
appellant agreed to provide her one room in the Matena house
and pay ₹1500/- per month, which he did only partially; that,
the appellant shifted his mother and children to the Kasardevi
restaurant, keeping all other rooms in the Matena house
locked, leaving only a small room for the respondent; that, the
appellant continued to neglect his duties and obligations
towards her; hence, he is not entitled to any relief.
4. On the basis of pleadings, the learned Family
Court framed the following issues:
(i) Whether the respondent has treated the appellant
with cruelty? If so, its effect.
(ii) Whether the appellant is entitled to the relief
sought? If so, its effect.
(iii) Whether the suit is barred by the principle of res
judicata?
5. The appellant examined himself as PW1. In cross-
examination, he admitted that the parties lived together in the
village continuously from 1997 to 2017. PW2, Kundan Singh,
stated that the appellant shifted with his minor children and
mother to his brother's restaurant due to the respondent's
conduct. According to PW2, the respondent used to beat the
children and abuse the appellant's mother, and locked all
rooms of the house. He further stated that the respondent
visited the restaurant and insulted the appellant in front of
customers using filthy language. PW3, Bhupal Singh Mehta, a
taxi driver who regularly visited the restaurant, corroborated
PW2's version. He stated that the respondent did not permit
the appellant or the children to enter the ancestral house and
frequently abused them. He further stated that the
respondent used highly derogatory language in the presence
of customers. The respondent examined herself as DW1 and
reiterated the facts stated in her written statement. In cross-
examination, she admitted the compromise dated 10.11.2017
and acknowledged receipt of ₹1500/- per month up to May
2020. She also admitted lodging complaints before authorities
on 12.07.2017, where counselling took place. She stated that
she has been living separately since 29.09.2017, and denied
allegations of quarrelling, fighting, or misbehaviour. The
learned Family Court held that though Matrimonial Suit No.
149 of 2017 had earlier been filed and compromised, the
principle of res judicata does not apply to matrimonial
proceedings. The trial court further held that the burden to
prove cruelty lay on the appellant, which he failed to
discharge and dismissed the divorce petition filed by the
appellant.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit
that the Family Court failed to consider the material evidence,
including the appellant's prior complaints dated 12.07.2017
to the District Magistrate, Mahila Police Station, Almora, and
the S.D.M., wherein counselling was conducted; that the
respondent left the matrimonial home with all her belongings
on 29.09.2017; that pursuant to the compromise dated
10.11.2017, the appellant complied with all conditions
depositing maintenance and constructing a separate living
space for the respondent, which she herself admitted.
Learned counsel would further submit that due to lack of
space in the restaurant, the appellant and his minor children
are compelled to study and sleep within the premises of the
running restaurant, causing severe hardship. The appellant
supports both children alone and continues to pay ₹1500/-
monthly to the respondent. It is argued that after the
compromise, the respondent's behaviour did not improve. Her
continued abusive conduct forced the appellant to shift his
family, given his poor financial condition. The respondent
violated the compromise by repeatedly visiting the restaurant
and using indecent language in front of customers.
7. It is contended that the parties have lived
separately since 2017 with no cohabitation, and the Family
Court wrongly concluded that cruelty was not proved. The
respondent allegedly made contradictory statements regarding
the appellant's employment at Kasardevi. PW2 and PW3,
being independent witnesses, supported the appellant's case,
yet their testimony was not duly appreciated.
8. It is further argued that the compromise dated
10.11.2017 had twofold implications: (i) any prior cruelty
stood condoned; yet (ii) the respondent's insistence on
separate residence and maintenance amounted to refusal of
cohabitation, thereby causing mental cruelty. Reliance is
placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511, which
outlines parameters of mental cruelty and recognises
irretrievable breakdown of marriage as relevant. Accordingly,
it is prayed that the impugned judgment dated 02.08.2022
and decree dated 16.08.2022 of the Family Court, Almora be
set aside and the divorce petition be allowed.
9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent
supports the impugned judgment. It is submitted that the
respondent lived in the matrimonial home while the appellant
frequently left for Pune for employment. The respondent bore
and raised the children largely in his absence. After returning
from Pune, the appellant allegedly mistreated her and
neglected his duties. He would further submit that the
appellant is attempting to take advantage of his own wrong
and is not entitled to any relief under Section 23 of the Hindu
Marriage Act. It is asserted that the appellant failed to comply
with the compromise conditions by disconnecting water and
electricity at Matena, where the respondent lived alone.
Counsel submits that the appellant never visited the
respondent after the compromise and that the allegation of
abuse at the restaurant is false. No material witness,
including the appellant's mother or children, was produced to
prove cruelty. Since both parties have been living separately
after the compromise, there was no occasion for cruelty
thereafter. Hence, the appeal lacks merit and deserves
dismissal.
10. This Court has thoroughly examined the pleadings,
the evidence on record, and the findings of the Family Court.
After considering the material as a whole, it is clear that the
relationship between the parties has broken down completely.
They have been living separately since September 2017, and
for more than seven years there has been no attempt or
possibility of resuming cohabitation. Such a long and
continuous separation, along with repeated allegations from
both sides, shows that the marriage has become emotionally
dead and practically unworkable. Under Section 13(1)(ia) of
the Hindu Marriage Act, cruelty includes any physical or
mental conduct that causes such pain, distress, or suffering
that living together becomes impossible. The Supreme Court
in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511, laid down
broad guidelines for determining mental cruelty, including
continuous abusive or humiliating behaviour, refusal to
discharge matrimonial obligations, long separation making
the marriage beyond repair, and conduct that causes deep
mental stress or insecurity.
11. Applying these principles to the present case, the
testimonies of PW2 and PW3--who are independent witnesses
and not related to the appellant--clearly show that after the
compromise dated 10.11.2017, the respondent repeatedly
went to the appellant's workplace, used abusive and insulting
language in front of customers, and created disturbances. Her
actions became so serious that the appellant had to shift his
elderly mother and minor children to a small space inside a
running restaurant for their safety and peace. The respondent
has not been able to challenge or weaken this evidence during
cross-examination.
12. Further, the appellant built a separate room and
fulfilled the terms of the compromise--including paying ₹1500
per month--the respondent's behaviour did not improve.
These repeated acts of verbal aggression, public insults, and
disruption of peaceful family life even after compromise dated
10.11.2017 clearly amount to mental cruelty. The
respondent's claim that the appellant neglected her while he
was working in Pune cannot justify her later conduct. Once
the parties reached a compromise in November 2017 and
resumed living together on agreed terms, all earlier allegations
are treated as condoned. However, any cruelty committed
after the compromise becomes relevant and revives the
appellant's earlier grounds for divorce. As held by the
Supreme Court in Gurbux Singh v. Harminder Kaur, (2010) 14
SCC 301, cruelty after condonation revives the previous
allegations and entitles the aggrieved spouse
13. The parties have been living separately for more
than seven years. In Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, (2006) 4 SCC
558, the Supreme Court held that long and continuous
separation, along with the absence of cohabitation, creates a
presumption that the marriage has broken down beyond
repair and causes mental cruelty to both spouses. Similarly,
in R. Srinivas Kumar v. R. Shametha, (2019) 9 SCC 409, the
Supreme Court observed that when parties have been living
apart for many years with no possibility of reconciliation,
forcing them to continue the marriage itself amounts to
cruelty.
14. In the present case, the parties have been living
separately since 29.09.2017. Serious allegations have been
exchanged, litigation has continued for several years, and
even mediation has failed. These circumstances clearly show
that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. Although
irretrievable breakdown is not an independent ground for
divorce under the Act, the Supreme Court in Samar Ghosh,
Naveen Kohli, and other decisions has held that such
circumstances are relevant in deciding the issue of cruelty
under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The
respondent has also made vague allegations that the
appellant has an illicit relationship, but no evidence--oral or
documentary--has been produced to support this serious
allegation. As held in Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela
Vijaykumar Bhate, (2003) 6 SCC 334, reckless and unproven
allegations of infidelity themselves amount to mental cruelty.
The Family Court failed to appreciate that such baseless
accusations seriously damage the appellant's reputation.
15. The Family Court further erred in rejecting the
testimonies of independent witnesses PW2 and PW3 without
giving proper reasons. Their statements were consistent,
credible, and remained intact during cross-examination. The
Court also overlooked the settled principle that cruelty is to be
proved on the standard of preponderance of probabilities, not
beyond reasonable doubt. The long and undisputed
separation, the conduct of the respondent after the
compromise, and the admitted fact that the parties have not
cohabited since 2017 were all important circumstances that
the Family Court failed to consider.
16. The Family Court also ignored the principle laid
down in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati,
(1956) 2 SCC 382, which has been repeatedly reaffirmed by
later judgments, that continuous refusal to cohabit and
hostile conduct amount to desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) of
the Hindu Marriage Act. In the present case, the essential
ingredients of desertion--namely, the fact of separation and
intention to desert (animus deserendi)--stand clearly proved
from the admitted facts.
17. For all these reasons, this Court is of the view that
the conduct of the respondent amounts to mental cruelty
under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act and that the
long, continuous, and voluntary separation since 2017
satisfies the requirements of desertion under Section 13(1)(ib)
of the Hindu Marriage Act.
18. Accordingly, the judgment and order dated
02.08.2022 and the judgment and decree dated 16.08.2022
passed by the Family Court, Almora in Divorce Petition No.
118 of 2018 Anand Singh v. Champa Devi are set aside. The
appeal is allowed. A decree of divorce is hereby granted in
favour of the appellant-husband under Sections 13(1)(ia) and
13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The marriage
solemnized on 09.05.1997 between the parties stands
dissolved.
19. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Alok Mahra, J.) (Ravindra Maithani, J.)
01.12.2025 01.12.2025
Mamta
MAMT
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF
UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF
UTTARAKHAND,
2.5.4.20=6a812005bebfcf46f244f3e5
84af1449e430ef900bf09a6d67ebbd6
42671329b, postalCode=263001,
A RANI
st=Uttarakhand,
serialNumber=5de1751a4f1d9cabfd
54852c9e68911ca8b66dd26690a191
648ab5d8dd004ef0, cn=MAMTA
RANI
Date: 2025.12.01 17:02:22 +05'30'
