Uttarakhand High Court
Ratan Singh Parihar (Deceased) & Ors. ... vs Vandana Sah @ Vandana Mehra on 16 April, 2024
Author: Vivek Bharti Sharma
Bench: Vivek Bharti Sharma
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Writ Petition (M/S) No.3623 of 2019
Ratan Singh Parihar (deceased) & Ors. ....Petitioners
Versus
Vandana Sah @ Vandana Mehra .... Respondent
Present:
Mr. J.C. Belwal and Mr. R.S. Bisht, learned counsel for the petitioners.
Mr. Narendra Bali, learned counsel for the respondent.
Dated: 16.04.2024
Hon'ble Vivek Bharti Sharma, J. (Oral)
By means of present writ petition, petitioners
seek to set aside the judgment and order dated
13.11.2019 passed by Additional District Judge, Nainital
in Rent Control Appeal No.06/2016 Ratan Singh Parihar
vs. Smt. Vandana Saha as well as the judgment dated
31.03.2016 passed by Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge,
Senior Division, Nainital in Rent Control Case
No.08/2012 Smt. Vandana Sah vs. Ratan Singh Parihar.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners would
submit that the respondent/landlord filed an application
under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 for
release of the suit property; that, the release application
was allowed whereagainst the petitioner/tenant filed an
appeal which has also been dismissed.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners/tenant has
challenged the judgments/orders of the Trial Court and
the Appellate Court mainly on the following grounds:-
a. That, the respondent/landlord is not the owner of
the suit property and claims to be the
owner/landlord of the suit property on the basis of
some family settlement just to evict the present
petitioner/tenant.
b. That, the respondent/landlord had earlier filed an
application for release of the property in
possession of another tenant, namely, Pratap
Singh Manral which has been vacated on the
basis of compromise, thus, the need of the
respondent/landlord stands fulfilled from that
part of the property but neither the Trial Court
nor the Appellate Court has recorded findings to
this effect that the portion acquired after eviction
of another tenant Pratap Singh Manral was not
sufficient to meet the bonafide requirement of the
respondent/landlord.
c. That, both the courts below have not considered
the bonafide requirement and comparative
hardship of the petitioner/tenant and in a very
routine and mechanical manner, has passed
impugned judgment of eviction, which is not
sustainable in the eyes of law.
d. That, the word 'bonafide' is not defined in any
Statue, therefore, it is the bounden duty of the
Trial Court and subsequently of the Appellate
Court to make specific findings on this point.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the
respondent/landlord would submit that the petitioners/
tenant have admitted the landlordship of the
respondent/landlord in written statement at para 2. This
fact has been fairly admitted by the learned counsel for
the petitioners/tenant at Bar.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent/landlord
would further submit that in para 14 of release
application the respondent/landlord has specifically
stated the necessity and requirement of the rooms and
space for herself and her family, therefore, it is not the
case that the respondent/landlord had concealed the
ground of her bonafide requirement from the Trial Court.
6. He would further submit that though
'bonafide' may not be defined in the statue but if the
petitioner/tenant has not raised any objection or made
any submission to the effect that the requirement of the
respondent/landlord is not as per para 14 stated in the
plaint or that she can meet her requirement by residing
in the portion evicted by another tenant Mr. Pratap Singh
Manral then there was no occasion for the Trial Court or
the Court of Appellate to make specific findings on this
point.
7. He would further submit that it is not the
petitioner/tenant who should advice or suggest the
respondent/landlord that how much space would be
enough or sufficient for her to meet her requirements.
8. Lastly, learned counsel for the
respondent/landlord would submit the present petition is
against the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the
Appellate Court and both judgments are duly based on
the facts and law and therefore this Court should not
interfere in the well reasoned judgments.
9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the material available on record.
10. On the issue of bonafide requirement and
comparative hardship, the Trial Court and the Appellate
Court observed that the respondent/landlord is employed
in Kurmanchal Nagar Sahkari Bank in Nainital while her
matrimonial house is at a distance of 13 kms from
Nainital; that, her son is also studying in Nainital and
during the pendency of eviction case second son of the
respondent/landlord was born in the year 2015,
therefore, she is compelled to live in the part of parental
house which she has acquired on the basis of family
settlement. Moreover, the courts below have also taken
into consideration the fact that the petitioner/tenant has
not placed on record any material evidence to
demonstrate that after filing of the release application
any efforts were made by him to search for an alternative
accommodation.
11. Insofar as the tenancy created by previous
tenant Pratap Singh Manral on part of suit property is
concerned, this fact was duly disclosed by the
respondent/landlord and it was her case before the
courts below that said portion is not sufficient to meet
the requirement of her family. In the opinion of the
Court, it is not for the tenant to dictate how much space
is adequate for the family requirement or to suggest that
the available space with the landlord will be adequate.
12. There has been paradigm shift in the law as
enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in many of its
judgment enlarging the scope of the bonafide
requirement and need of the landlord in which it has
been laid down that landlord is the best judge of his
residential requirement and that he had complete
freedom in that matter and it is not open to the tenant to
dictate to the landlord as to how and in what manner
he/she should live or to prescribe for him/her a
residential standard.
13. In view of the above, this Court is of the
considered view that the Prescribed Authority and the
Appellate Court having recorded concurrent findings of
facts based upon appreciation of evidence. The scope of
judicial review in exercise of writ jurisdiction under
Article 227 in such a matter is extremely limited and
such findings of fact recorded by statutory authorities
unless they are demonstrated to be vitiated by manifest
error of law or are shown to be patently perverse, are not
to be interfered with.
14. In view of the reasons recorded above, this
Court does not find any material error or illegality in the
judgments/orders passed by the courts below. No
interference is, therefore, called for.
15. Accordingly, writ petition is dismissed.
(Vivek Bharti Sharma, J.)
16.04.2024
BS
