[Cites 2, Cited by 0]

Tripura High Court

Sri Debasish Das vs Smt. Pritilata Barman on 28 November, 2025

              IN THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
                            AGARTALA


                          I.A. No.01 of 2025
                      in MAT APP. No.21 of 2025


Sri Debasish Das,
son of late Surendra Das of Jogendranagar,
Vidyasagar Road, P.S. East Agartala,
District- West Tripura
                                                ......... Petitioner (s)

                            -Versus-
Smt. Pritilata Barman,
wife of Sri Debasish Das, daughter of Sri
Haradhan Barman of Rangamura, Rudijala,
P.O. & P.S. Melaghar, District- Sepahijala,
Tripura
                                              ........ Respondent(s)

For the Petitioner (s) : Ms. Rashmi Bhattacharjee, Adv.

Mr. Saibal Biswas, Adv.

For the Respondent(s)        :    None
Date of hearing              :    28.10.2025
Date of delivery of          :    28.11.2025
Judgment & Order
                                   YES   NO
Whether fit for reporting    :           √

HON‟BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA

JUDGMENT & ORDER

This petition has been filed under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, 1963 praying for condoning the delay of 404

days in preferring the connected appeal No.MAT App.21 of 2025,

against the judgment dated 30.03.2024 passed by learned Addl.

Judge, Family Court, Agartala, West Tripura in T.S (RCR) 24 of

2022 and the related decree thereof, whereby the petition for

restitution of conjugal rights was dismissed.

[2] In an attempt to explain the delay of such a long

period, the petitioner states that after the said judgment was

pronounced on 30.03.2024, he learnt about the same only in

the last week of June 2024 through his engaged Advocate.

Thereafter, he applied for the certified copies of the said

judgment and decree in the first week of July 2024 and received

the same in the second week of August 2024. It is further

stated that he earlier lost his vision of one eye and he was also

suffering from various diseases during that period, for which he

had to visit different hospitals outside the State, including

receiving of treatment at Hyderabad, and thereafter also he was

confined in his house as per medical advice. Subsequently, in

the first week of December 2024, he met his Advocate who

instructed him to visit again after 2[two] weeks. He again met

the said Advocate on 18.12.2024, and at that time he was

advised to meet him again in the first week of January 2025, as

the winter vacation was intervening in the meantime.

[3] Thereafter, the petitioner met his Advocate on

15.01.2025 and said Advocate advised him at that time to

engage another Advocate who was practising in the High Court.

Accordingly, he consulted another learned Advocate in the first

week of February, 2025 and said Advocate advised him to meet

him in the first week of March, 2025 i.e. after one month but

due to his poor health condition, he was unable to meet him and

ultimately he visited the Advocate's chamber only in June 2025.

As the health condition of that learned counsel was also not

well, the petitioner, on his advice again, approached his present

Advocate in July 2025. Then on scrutiny, it was found that

certain documents, including said certified copies of the

judgment and decree, were missing from the file. He therefore

again, collected certified copies and the appeal was finally

submitted on 08.08.2025. Therefore, such a long delay has

occurred.

[4] Ms. Rashmi Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing

for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner is a partially blind

person and he had to undergo treatment in various hospitals

outside the state, which incapacitated him from pursuing the

cause and filing the appeal in time. She, therefore, earnestly

prays for condoning the delay in filing the connected appeal.

[5] As per the order of the Court, necessary medical

papers relating to the treatment of the petitioner were

submitted by the petitioner.

[6] On consideration of all these medical papers, it

appears that after the disposal of said suit [T.S.(RCR) 24 of

2022] on 30.03.2024 till filing of the appeal on 06.08.2025, only

on one occasion he visited one eye clinic situated at Agartala

itself in the month of June 2024. The bunch of prescriptions and

several medical reports submitted by him relate to his treatment

either for the period prior to the pronouncement of the

impugned judgment or after filing of the connected appeal.

Therefore, the grounds as taken by the petitioner-that major

portion of delay was occasioned due to his illness and receiving

of treatment at different hospitals outside the State, are not

acceptable. It also appears to us that the petitioner was

consistently negligent and inactive in respect of filing of the

appeal. Normally, he was supposed to collect the information

from his Advocate about the disposal of the case just after

pronouncement of the impugned judgment, but he collected the

information when already the period of filing of appeal had

expired. According to him, when his learned Advocate asked him

to meet in the first week of March 2025, he met him in the third

week of June 2025 i.e. after more than 4[four] months and

there is no satisfactory explanation for such inaction on his part.

[7] Law is fairly settled that as a matter of generosity,

the delay cannot be condoned without having shown sufficient

reasons for such delay. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court

in case of Union of India & another v. Jahangir Byramji

Jeejeebhoy (D) through his L.Rs., 2024 SCC Online SC

489, has held that when it is decided that a party has lost his

right to have the matter considered on merits because of his

own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-

deliberate delay and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard

to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as

against the technical considerations. The relevant paragraph

nos.26 and 27 of said decision are extracted below:

"26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the „Sword of Damocles‟ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants."

[8] Again in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar

Choudhury, [Special Leave Petition(C) Diary No.48636 of

2024 decided on 29.11.2024], above said principle has been

reiterated by the Apex Court. It is also further observed in said

case that the discretion to condone the delay has to be

exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstance of each

case and that, the expression "sufficient cause‟ cannot be

liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides

is attributed to the party.

[9] Considering all these aspects, we are not at all

satisfied with the explanations as offered by the petitioner in the

petition for condoning such delay of 404 days in preferring the