Tripura High Court
Accused vs The State Of Tripura on 11 June, 2025
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
A.B. No.44 of 2025
Sri Pranab Biswas,
S/o-Sri Ratan Biswas, resident of vill-Jolaibari, Bangali Para, near
Debdaro H.S. School, P.S.-Baikhora, Dist.-South Tripura, Pin-799141.
---- Accused applicant(s)
Versus
The State of Tripura
[---
----Respondent(s)
For Applicant(s) : Mr. Bibhal Nandi Majumder, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Dhruba Jyoti Saha, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Raju Datta, P.P.
Mr. Rajib Saha, Addl. P.P.
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Order
11/06/2025
This pre-arrest bail application under Section 482 of BNSS,
2023 is filed for granting bail to the accused applicant, Sri Pranab
Biswas in connection with West Agartala Women PS case No.2025
WAW 017 under Sections 376/323/417/506 of IPC.
Heard Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Bibhal Nandi Majumder
assisted by Learned Counsel, Mr. Dhruba Jyoti Saha appearing on
behalf of the accused-applicant. Also heard Learned P.P., Mr. Raju
Datta along with Learned Addl. P.P., Mr. Rajib Saha appearing on
behalf of the State-respondent.
Learned P.P. has produced the case diary. The records from
the concerned Court below is also received.
In course of hearing, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the accused applicant submitted before this Court that from
the contents of the F.I.R., no allegation for commission of offence of
(2)
rape could be made out against the accused applicant. According to
Learned Senior Counsel, from the contents of the F.I.R. to the extent
formal charge under Section 417 can be made out, if ultimately the
case is ended in charge-sheet. Learned Senior Counsel also drawn the
attention of this Court referring different contents of the F.I.R. and
submitted that in the present case both the alleged victim and the
accused applicant are major and matured enough and if the statement
of the victim is to be believed, in that case if the first offence is
committed in the year 2021 then why till 2025 i.e. before the date of
filing of F.I.R. the victim totally remained silent without approaching to
any forum. Furthermore, from the contents of the F.I.R. it is clear that
with the consent of the victim both the present accused applicant and
the victim herself continued physical relation with each other. So,
Learned Senior Counsel submitted that there is no evidence of
commission of rape against the accused applicant. Learned Senior
Counsel further drawn the attention of this Court referring Annexure-2
annexed with this bail application i.e. the legal notice wherein in para
No.9 it was clearly informed by the present victim to the accused that
he is to ensure production of order of divorce with his wife which
shows that the victim never alleged commission of rape against the
accused applicant and there was no false promise of marriage on his
part. Finally, Learned Senior Counsel referred Annexure-4 i.e. the copy
of order dated 06.05.2022 passed by Learned Special Judge (NDPS),
West Tripura, Agartala in Sidhai P.S. Case No.56 of 2020 wherein it
appears that the present victim was one of the accused in an NDPS
case which shows the conduct of the victim. Learned Senior Counsel
(3)
further referred the following citations and urged for releasing the
accused applicant on bail in any condition.
Learned Senior Counsel referred one citation of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. The State
of Maharashtra & Anr., (2019) 9 SCC 608 wherein in para Nos.9,
10, 14, 16 and 21, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:
"9. The present proceedings concern an FIR registered
against the appellant under Sections 376, 417, 504 and
506(2) IPC and Sections 3(1)(u), (w) and 3(2)(vii) of the
SC/ST Act. Section 376 IPC prescribes the punishment for
the offence of rape which is set out in Section 375. Section
375 prescribes seven descriptions of how the offence of rape
may be committed. For the present purposes only the second
such description, along with Section 90 IPC is relevant and is
set out below:
"375. Rape.--A man is said to commit "rape" if he--
***
under the circumstances falling under any of the
following seven descriptions--
Firstly.--
Secondly.--Without her consent.
***
Explanation 2.--Consent means an unequivocal
voluntary agreement when the woman by words,
gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal
communication, communicates willingness to
participate in the specific sexual act:
Provided that a woman who does not physically resist
to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of
that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual
activity."
"90. Consent known to be given under fear or
misconception.--A consent is not such a consent as is
intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is
given by a person under fear of injury, or under a
misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act
knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was
given in consequence of such fear or misconception;
or"
10. Where a woman does not "consent" to the sexual acts
described in the main body of Section 375, the offence of
rape has occurred. While Section 90 does not define the term
"consent", a "consent" based on a "misconception of fact" is
not consent in the eye of the law.
14. In the present case, the "misconception of fact" alleged
by the complainant is the appellant's promise to marry her.
Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court
has observed that there is a distinction between a false
promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will
be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in
good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. In Anurag Soni v.
State of Chhattisgarh [Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh,
(2019) 13 SCC 1 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 509] , this Court held
: (SCC para 12)
"12. The sum and substance of the aforesaid
decisions would be that if it is established and
proved that from the inception the accused who
gave the promise to the prosecutrix to marry, did
not have any intention to marry and the prosecutrix
gave the consent for sexual intercourse on such an
assurance by the accused that he would marry her,
such a consent can be said to be a consent obtained
on a misconception of fact as per Section 90 IPC
and, in such a case, such a consent would not
excuse the offender and such an offender can be
said to have committed the rape as defined under
Sections 375 IPC and can be convicted for the
offence under Section 376 IPC."
Similar observations were made by this Court in
Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v.
State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC
(Cri) 660] (Deepak Gulati) : (SCC p. 682, para 21)
"21. ... There is a distinction between the mere
breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false
promise. Thus, the court must examine whether
there was made, at an early stage a false promise of
marriage by the accused;"
16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of
the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to
abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to
engage in sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact"
that vitiates the woman's "consent". On the other hand, a
breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To
establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should
have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of
giving it. The "consent" of a woman under Section 375 is
vitiated on the ground of a "misconception of fact" where
such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage
in the said act. In Deepak Gulati [Deepak Gulati v. State of
Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] this
Court observed : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24)
"21. ... There is a distinction between the mere breach
of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the
court must examine whether there was made, at an
early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused;
and whether the consent involved was given after
wholly understanding the nature and consequences of
sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the
prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on
account of her love and passion for the accused, and not
solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by
the accused, or where an accused on account of
circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or
which were beyond his control, was unable to marry
her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases
must be treated differently.
***
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate
evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the
initial stage itself, the accused had no intention
whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim.
There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person
having the best of intentions is unable to marry the
victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The
"failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future
uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear
from the evidence available, does not always amount to
misconception of fact. In order to come within the
meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact
must have an immediate relevance". Section 90 IPC
cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon
the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability
on the other, [Ed. : The matter between two asterisks
has been emphasised in original.] unless the court is
assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the
accused had never really intended to marry her [Ed. :
The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised
in original.] ."
(emphasis supplied)
21. The allegations in the FIR do not on their face indicate
that the promise by the appellant was false, or that the
complainant engaged in sexual relations on the basis of this
promise. There is no allegation in the FIR that when the
appellant promised to marry the complainant, it was done in
bad faith or with the intention to deceive her. The appellant's
failure in 2016 to fulfil his promise made in 2008 cannot be
construed to mean the promise itself was false. The
allegations in the FIR indicate that the complainant was
aware that there existed obstacles to marrying the appellant
since 2008, and that she and the appellant continued to
engage in sexual relations long after their getting married
had become a disputed matter. Even thereafter, the
complainant travelled to visit and reside with the appellant
at his postings and allowed him to spend his weekends at her
residence. The allegations in the FIR belie the case that she
was deceived by the appellant's promise of marriage.
Therefore, even if the facts set out in the complainant's
statements are accepted in totality, no offence under Section
375 IPC has occurred."
Learned Senior Counsel further referred another citation of
Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajnish Singh alias Soni vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh & Anr., (2025) 4 SCC 197 wherein in para Nos.36, 38 and
41, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:
"36. Further, on the perusal of the statement made by the
complainant under Section 161CrPC, it is evident that she
came to know about the relations between the appellant and
Namrata in the year 2020-2021. Thus, once the complainant
was aware that the appellant had broken the ties with her
and was involved in a relationship with another woman,
there was no reason for her to hold back from filing the FIR.
38. It is trite that there is a distinction between rape and
consensual intercourse. This Court in Deepak Gulati v. State
of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC
675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] , differentiated between a
mere breach of promise and not fulfilling a false promise and
held that an accused will only be liable if the Court concludes
that his intentions are mala fide and he has clandestine
motives. The relevant extract is reproduced hereinbelow :
(SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24)
"21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or
misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit.
Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by
deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the
good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction
between rape and consensual sex and in a case like
this, the court must very carefully examine whether
the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim,
or had mala fide motives, and had made a false
promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the
latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception.
There is a distinction between the mere breach of a
promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the
court must examine whether there was made, at an
early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused;
and whether the consent involved was given after
wholly understanding the nature and consequences of
sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the
prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on
account of her love and passion for the accused, and
not solely on account of misrepresentation made to
her by the accused, or where an accused on account of
circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or
which were beyond his control, was unable to marry
her, despite having every intention to do so. Such
cases must be treated differently. An accused can be
convicted for rape only if the court reaches a
conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala
fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
***
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate
evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the
initial stage itself, the accused had no intention
whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the
victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when
a person having the best of intentions is unable to
marry the victim owing to various unavoidable
circumstances. The „failure to keep a promise made
with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons
that are not very clear from the evidence available,
does not always amount to misconception of fact. In
order to come within the meaning of the term
"misconception of fact", the fact must have an
immediate relevance‟. Section 90IPC cannot be called
into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl
in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other,
unless the court is assured of the fact that from the
very beginning, the accused had never really intended
to marry her."
(emphasis in original and supplied)
41. Thus, by no stretch of imagination, can this Court be
convinced that present is a case wherein the appellant is
liable to be prosecuted for having sexually
exploited/assaulted the complainant based on a false
promise of marriage. The allegations of the complainant are
full of material contradictions and are ex facie unbelievable.
Throughout the prolonged period of 16 years, the
complainant kept completely quiet about the alleged sexual
abuse, meted out to her by the appellant until she learnt that
the appellant had married another woman. Further in
complete contradiction to the case set up in the FIR, the
complainant has on many occasions portrayed herself to be
the wife of the appellant and thus, evidently, they lived
together as man and wife. Additionally, the long gap of 16
years between the first alleged act of sexual intercourse,
continued relations for one-and-a-half decade till the filing of
the FIR convinces us that it is a clear case of a love
affair/live-in relationship gone sour."
Further, Learned Senior Counsel referred another citation of
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Batlanki Keshav (Kesava)
Kumar Anurag vs. State of Telangana & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 1258 wherein in para Nos.23 and 31, Hon'ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
"23. The de-facto complainant is a highly educated woman
aged 30 years. In FIR No. 751 of 2021, she has only alleged
about a single sexual encounter dated 24th June, 2021. On
the contrary, in the impugned FIR No. 103 of 2022 which
came to be lodged on 1st February, 2022, 4-5 such incidents
have been referenced each of which ante-date the FIR No.
751 of 2021. It is thus inherently improbable that the
complainant would have forgotten or omitted to mention
these incidents of sexual intercourse made under a false
promise of marriage while filing the earlier FIR No. 751 of
2021 because all the incidents had already taken place as per
the version of the complainant up to 7th June, 2021 whereas,
the FIR No. 751 of 2021 came to be lodged on 29th June,
2021.
31. Resultantly, FIR bearing Crime No. 103 of 2022 dated 1st
February, 2022, FIR bearing Crime No. 751 of 2021 dated
29th June, 2021, and all proceedings sought to be taken as a
consequence thereof, are quashed in entirety."
Lastly, Learned Senior Counsel also relied upon another
citation of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Sonu alias Subhash
Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2021) 18 SCC 517
wherein in para Nos.8, 9, 10 and 11, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed
thus:
"8. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar
v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC
(Cri) 903] , while dealing with a similar situation, the
principles of law which must govern a situation like the
present were enunciated in the following observations : (SCC
p. 618, para 16)
"16. Where the promise to marry is false and the
intention of the maker at the time of making the
promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the
woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations,
there is a "misconception of fact" that vitiates the
woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a
promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To
establish a false promise, the maker of the promise
should have had no intention of upholding his word at
the time of giving it."
9. Further, the Court has observed : (Pramod Suryabhan
Pawar case [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of
Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] ,
SCC p. 620, para 18)
"18. To summarise the legal position that emerges
from the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with
respect to Section 375 must involve an active and
reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To
establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a
"misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to
marry, two propositions must be established. The
promise of marriage must have been a false promise,
given in bad faith and with no intention of being
adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise
itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct
nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual
act."
10. Bearing in mind the tests which have been enunciated in
the above decision [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of
Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] ,
we are of the view that even assuming that all the
allegations in the FIR are correct for the purposes of
considering the application for quashing under Section
482CrPC, no offence has been established. There is no
allegation to the effect that the promise to marry given to
the second respondent was false at the inception. On the
contrary, it would appear from the contents of the FIR that
there was a subsequent refusal on the part of the appellant
to marry the second respondent which gave rise to the
registration of the FIR. On these facts, we are of the view
that the High Court was in error in declining to entertain the
petition under Section 482CrPC on the basis that it was only
the evidence at trial which would lead to a determination as
to whether an offence was established.
11. For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside
the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated
26-9-2019 [Sonu v. State of U.P., 2019 SCC OnLine All 6911]
. In view of the reasons which have been adduced earlier,
the charge-sheet dated 25-4-2018, which has been filed in
pursuance of the investigation which took place, shall stand
quashed. The order of the trial court dated 3-10-2018 taking
cognizance shall accordingly stand quashed and set aside."
Referring all these citations Learned Senior Counsel drawn
the attention of this Court that in the case at hand there is no
evidence on record that the present accused applicant made false
promise of marriage to the victim and continued physical relation with
her and as such no case under Section 376 of IPC is made out against
him. So, Learned Senior Counsel urged for releasing the accused
applicant on bail in any condition.
On the other hand, Learned P.P. appearing on behalf of the
State-respondents relied upon a citation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
of India in Naim Ahamed vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in
(2023) 15 SCC 385 wherein in para No.21 Hon'ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
"21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the
respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for
sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the
accused had given a false promise to marry her and
subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent
was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under
Clause Secondly of Section 375IPC. In this regard, it is
pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a
false promise and committing breach of promise by the
accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the
beginning would not have any intention to marry the
prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the
prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with
a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of
promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused
might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry
her, and subsequently might have encountered certain
circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances
beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise.
So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to
marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the
offence under Section 376. As stated earlier, each case would
depend upon its proved facts before the court."
Referring the same, Learned P.P. submitted that in the
instant case the accused applicant made physical relation with the
victim under the misconception of fact that the accused applicant gave
a false promise to marry her suppressing the fact of his earlier
marriage and having one son. Thus, the accused applicant continued
physical relation with the victim girl which amounts to rape. Learned
P.P. referring the contents of the F.I.R. drawn the attention of this
Court that the citations as referred by Learned Senior Counsel for the
accused applicant are not applicable in the instant case and urged for
dismissal of the instant bail application.
To reply, Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that he
also relied upon the said judgment referred by the prosecution and in
the said judgment Hon'ble the Apex Court set aside the judgment and
order passed by the High Court and the Sessions Court and the
appellant was acquitted. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted
that the submission made by Learned P.P. cannot be accepted as the
facts and circumstances of this case does not reveal commission of
offence of rape by the accused applicant and thereby urged for
rejection of the submissions made by Learned P.P.
Considered.
The present prosecution was based upon submission of an
F.I.R. laid by the alleged victim (name withheld) to O/C, West Agartala
Women PS alleging inter alia that on 26.06.2021 she came into
contact with the accused applicant through Facebook. After that, the
accused applicant took her phone number and added her on
Whatsapp. He started calling her at various times and started initiating
conversations. The accused applicant also desired to meet her and
accordingly, the victim invited him to her younger brother's residence
at Teliamura on 17.07.2021 when there was Manasa Puja. Thus, they
developed good relation. The accused applicant introduced himself as
a Rifleman serving under 6th Battalion TSR and the P.G. of
Commandant Mr. Jayanta Chakraborty. The accused presented himself
in such a manner that the victim laid confidence upon him and shared
her past activities with him. On 18.07.2021, the accused applicant
called her over phone and told her that he was going to Agartala and
he wanted to see her quarters as she was also serving as police
personnel. Believing him the victim allowed the accused to come to
her quarter when he forcefully committed rape upon her. That time
she was mentally disturbed but the accused assured her that he would
marry her after talking to his family. Thereafter, he started regularly
visiting the quarters of the informant-cum-victim and continued
physical relation with her. He also extorted Rs.20,00,000/- from her
telling her about his financial hardships and she withdrew the money
from her salary and GPF accounts. The accused also took her to
Shillong and Cherrapunji when they went to the residence of the sister
of the victim and stayed together there as husband and wife. The
accused applicant also took her to Jampui Hill. He also introduced
himself to all of her relatives, staff and officers as her future groom
and said that he would marry her. In February, 2022 she came to
know that the accused was a married person and has a son. When she
could understand that the accused cheated her she broke down. The
accused assured her that he would marry her after divorcing his first
wife. Not only that he also used to cause physical assault to her and
he also informed the victim that he has filed a case of divorce against
his wife but later on she could know that the statement was totally
false and in March, 2023 the wife of the accused along with her elder
brother and other members came to her quarters. They scolded and
abused her and told her to go away from the life of the accused failing
which they threatened to kill her. She has sent a legal notice to the
accused but got no response and accordingly, she laid the F.I.R. The
victim further stated in the F.I.R. that on 05.04.2025 the accused
applicant came to her quarters at night stating that he would resolve
the disputes with her and thereafter he again committed forceful rape
upon her. But on 06.04.2025 he told her that he would not marry her
and thus cheated her both mentally and physically. Hence, she laid the
F.I.R. On the basis of the F.I.R. the case was registered. The
investigation of the case is still in progress.
I have perused the F.I.R. and the statements of witnesses
so far collected by the I.O. during investigation including the
statement of the victim. There is no dispute on record that both the
victim and the accused applicant developed relation with each other
from the month of June, 2021. I have also seen the application filed by
the accused applicant and also the legal notice sent by the victim to
the accused petitioner.
It is the admitted position that the present accused
applicant cohabited with the victim with her consent. It is surprising
that how the victim being a police constable knowing the
consequences of the act alleged to be committed by the accused
remained silent till March, 2025 without seeking any redress to any
authority. It is not that the victim was a village rustic woman and
having no legal understanding allowed the accused applicant to
continue physical relation with her. Rather, it is clear that the victim
knowing the consequences allowed the accused applicant to continue
relation with her and from the legal notice itself (Annexure-2) it is
clear that she asked the accused to produce the order of divorce with
his wife.
In course of hearing, Learned P.P. drawn the attention of
this Court that the accused applicant committed rape upon the victim
with a false promise to marry her but from the contents of the F.I.R.
and also from the materials so far collected by the I.O. nowhere I find
that there was any false promise of marriage on the part of the
accused applicant. Rather, it appears that it was a consensual
relationship and the victim being a police constable easily could take
recourse of law even during the year 2021. But till 2025 i.e. prior to
the filing of the F.I.R. the victim totally remained silent without
seeking any redress to any authority.
The citations as referred by Learned Senior Counsel appear
to be more relevant in this case. On the other hand, Learned P.P.
although relied upon one citation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court but in
the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court also acquitted the
appellant/accused from the charge of that case.
Here in the case at hand, at this stage there is/are no
convincing materials on record that the accused had given a false
promise to marry the victim and later on did not marry her and
committed rape upon her. So, at this stage of investigation,
considering the materials on record and on the basis of the principles
of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the afore noted cases, I
do not find any scope to disallow the application filed by the accused
applicant. Accordingly, the same is allowed.
The accused applicant may be enlarged on bail in the event
of his arrest of his execution of bond of Rs.1,00,000/- with one surety
of like amount to the satisfaction of the O/C of the concerned PS with
a condition that the accused applicant shall be available before the I.O.
of this case as and when called for and he shall not make any attempt
to tamper the evidence on record nor shall make any attempt to
threaten the informant-cum-victim or her witnesses. Further, the
accused applicant shall not leave the jurisdiction of the concerned PS
without prior permission of the O/C of the concerned PS failing which
the I.O shall be at liberty to approach to the competent Court for
cancellation of the privilege of bail granted to the accused applicant for
violation of the conditions of bail.
With this observation, the anticipatory bail application
stands allowed and disposed of.
Send down the LCR along with a copy of this order. Send
down the CD to I.O. through Learned P.P. along with a copy of this
order. A copy of this order also be supplied to Learned Senior Counsel
in course of the day for information and compliance.
JUDGE
Snigdha
MOUMIT Digitally signed by
MOUMITA DATTA
A DATTA Date: 2025.06.11
17:22:36 +05'30'
