9. Before dealing with the respective contentions put
forward by the parties, we would like to discuss in
general the effect and value of family arrangements
entered into between the parties with a view to
resolving disputes once for all. By virtue of a family
settlement or arrangement members of a family
descending from a common ancestor or a near
relation seek to sink their differences and disputes,
settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed
titles once for all in order to buy peace of mind and
bring about complete harmony and goodwill in the
family. The family arrangements are governed by a
special equity peculiar to themselves and would be
enforced if honestly made. In this connection, Kerr in
his valuable treatise Kerr on Fraud at p. 364 makes
the following pertinent observations regarding the
nature of the family arrangement which may be
extracted thus:
18. In the recent decision of this Court in S.
Shanmugam Pillai v. K. Shanmugam Pillai:(1973) 2
SCC 312 the entire case law was discussed and this
Court observed as follows: [pp. 319. 321-322. paras
12, 24-25]
If in the interest of the family properties or
family peace the close relations had settled
their disputes amicably, this Court will be
reluctant to disturb the same. The courts
generally lean in favour of family
arrangements.
19. Thus it would appear from a review of the
decisions analysed above that the courts have taken
a very liberal and broad view of the validity of the
family settlement and have always tried to uphold it
and maintain it. The central idea in the approach
made by the courts is that if by consent of parties a
matter has been settled, it should not be allowed to
be reopened by the parties to the agreement on
frivolous or untenable grounds.
With reference to the first question:
(1) A family arrangement can be made
orally.
(2) If made orally, there being no
document, no question of registration
arises.
With reference to the second question:
(3) If though it could have been made
orally, it was in fact reduced to the form
of a "document", registration (when the
value is Rs.100 and upwards) is
necessary.
(4) Whether the terms have been
"reduced to the form of a document" is
a question of fact in each case to be
determined upon a consideration of the
nature and phraseology of the writing
and the circumstances in which and the
purpose with which it was written.
(5) If the terms were not "reduced to
the form of a document", registration
was not necessary (even though the
value is Rs.100 or upwards); and while
the writing cannot be used as a piece of
evidence for what it may be worth, e.g.
as corroborative of other evidence or as
an admission of the transaction or as
showing or explaining conduct.
(6) If the terms were "reduced to the
form of a document" and, though the
value was Rs.100 or upwards, it was not
registered, the absence of registration
makes the document inadmissible in
evidence and is fatal to proof of the
arrangement embodied in the
document.
24. This Court has also clearly laid down that a
family arrangement being binding on the parties to
the arrangement clearly operates as an estoppel so
as to preclude any of the parties who have taken
advantage under the agreement from revoking or
challenging the same. We shall deal with this point a
little later when we consider the arguments of the
respondents on the question of the estoppel. In the
light of the decisions indicated above, we shall now
try to apply the principles laid down by this Court
and the other courts to the facts of the present case.
42. Finally in a recent decision of this Court in S.
Shanmugam Pillai's case (supra) after an exhaustive
consideration of the authorities on the subject it was
observed as follows:
Equitable principles such as estoppel, election,
family settlement, etc. are not mere technical
rules of evidence. They have an important
purpose to serve in the administration of
justice. The ultimate aim of the law is to
secure justice. In the recent times in order to
render justice between the parties, courts
have been liberally relying on those principles.
We would hesitate to narrow down their
scope."
* * * *
As observed by this Court in T. V. R. Subbu
Chetty's Family Charities' case(supra), that if a
person having full knowledge of his right as a
possible reversioner enters into a transaction
which settles his claim as well as the claim of
the opponents at the relevant time, he cannot
be permitted to go back on that agreement
when reversion actually falls open.
In these circumstances there can be no doubt that
even if the family settlement was not registered it
would operate as a complete estoppel against
respondents Nos.4 and 5. Respondent No.1 as also
the High Court, therefore, committed substantial
error of law in not giving effect to the doctrine of
estoppel as spelt out by this Court in so many cases.
The learned Counsel for the respondents placed
reliance upon a number of authorities in Rachbha v.
Mt. Mendha:AIR 1947 All 177; Chief Controlling
Revenue Authority v. Smt. Satyawati Sood:AIR 1972
Delhi 171 and some other authorities, which, in our
opinion have no bearing on the issues to be decided
in this case and it is therefore not necessary for us to
refer to the same."
Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that in
view of the principles laid down in the aforesaid citation, there is no
scope to disbelieve the unregistered written agreement dated
27.09.2011 and as such Learned Trial Court rightly delivered the
judgment.
8. Learned Senior Counsel also referred another citation in S.
Saktivel(Dead) by LRS. Vs. M. Venugopal Pillai and others
reported in (2000) 7 SCC 104 wherein in para Nos.5 and 6, Hon'ble
the Apex Court observed as under:
"5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant
urged that the view taken by the High Court in
decreeing the suit of the plaintiff was erroneous
inasmuch as the settlees under Ext. A-1 got the suit
property and by the subsequent oral arrangement,
they agreed to work out their rights without varying
or substituting the terms of Ext. A-1 and, therefore,
the High Court was not right in not considering the
oral arrangement as pleaded by the defendant-
appellant. It is not disputed that disposition under
Ext. A-1 in the present case is by way of grant and
under the said disposition all the sons of
Muthuswamy Pillai acquired rights. It is also not
disputed that the settlement deed is a registered
document and by virtue of alleged subsequent oral
arrangement, the other sons of Muthuswamy Pillai
were divested of the rights which they acquired
under the settlement deed. Under such
circumstances the question that arises for
consideration is as to whether any parol evidence
can be let in to substantiate subsequent oral
arrangement rescinding or modifying the terms of
the document which, under law, is required to be in
writing or is a registered document, namely, Ext. A-
1. Section 92 of the Evidence Act reads as thus:
"92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement.-
When the terms of any such contract, grant or
other disposition of property, or any matter
required by law to be reduced to the form of a
document, have been proved according to the
last section, no evidence of any oral
agreement or statement shall be admitted, as
between the parties to any such instrument or
their representatives in interest, for the
purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to,
or subtracting from, its terms:
* * * *
Proviso (4). The existence of any distinct
subsequent oral agreement to rescind or
modify any such contract, grant or disposition
of property, may be proved, except in cases in
which such contract, grant or disposition of
property is by law required to be in writing, or
has been registered according to the law in
force for the time being as to the registration
of documents."
A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that what
Section 92 provides is that when the terms of any
contract, grant or other disposition of property, or
any matter required by law to be reduced in the form
of a document, have been proved, no evidence of any
oral agreement or statement is permissible for the
purpose of contradicting, varying, adding or
subtracting from the said written document.
However this provision is subject to provisos (1) to
(6) but we are not concerned with other provisos
except proviso (4), which is relevant in the present
case. The question then is whether the defendant-
appellant can derive any benefit out of proviso (4) to
Section 92 for setting up oral arrangement arrived at
in the year 1941 which has the effect of modifying
the written and registered disposition. Proviso (4) to
Section 92 contemplates three situations, whereby:
(i) The existence of any distinct subsequent
oral agreement to rescind or modify any
earlier contract, grant or disposition of
property can be proved.
(ii) However, this is not permissible where the
contract, grant or disposition of property is by
law required to be in writing.
(iii) No parol evidence can be let in to
substantiate any subsequent oral arrangement
which has the effect of rescinding a contract
or disposition of property which is registered
according to the law in force for the time being
as to the registration of documents."
Relying upon the same, Learned Senior Counsel further
submitted that since from the evidence of the appellant, it appears
that he is an educated person and is a contractor and business man
by profession, so, the plea taken by the appellant that without
knowing the contents of the document he had put his signature on the
said unregistered notarized document cannot be accepted and
furthermore, the appellants have not challenged the WILL as stated
earlier and there is also no evidence on record from the side of the
appellants to disbelieve the said unregistered document. So, the
judgment delivered by Learned Trial Court was good in law and there
is no materials on record to interfere with the judgment and urged for
dismissal of this appeal.
9. Learned Senior Counsel at the time of hearing of argument
also referred the provision of Order VI Rule 4 of CPC and submitted
that in the case at hand the appellant could not prove any fraud
played by the respondent-defandants and in this regard, Learned
Senior Counsel also relied upon another citation of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Placido Francisco Pinto (D) by Lrs and Another Vs. Jose
Francisco Pinto and Another reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC
842 wherein in para No.15, 19, 23 and 29, Hon'ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
"15. It is an admitted fact that consequent to the
amendment in the plaint and in the written
statement, no evidence was led. Mr. Dhruv Mehta,
learned senior counsel for the respondents stated
that the evidence was already on record in respect of
misrepresentation leading to fraud, therefore, the
pleadings were amended so as to support the
evidence.
19. We have heard the learned counsels for the
parties and find that the findings of the First
Appellate Court as affirmed by the High Court are
clearly erroneous. Respondent No. 1 in the written
statement has admitted payment of Rs. 12,000/- to
his creditors by the appellant No. 1. It is also
admitted by him that his and his wife's signatures
were obtained outside the Municipal Office and also
before the Officers in the Municipal Building when
there were about 10-12 people in the office.
23. Order VI Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 is to the effect that every pleading shall
contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise
form of the material facts on which the party
pleading relies upon for his claim or defence as the
case may be, but not the evidence by which they are
supposed to be proved. Appellant No. 1 has relied
upon the sale deed which contains the recital of
payment of Rs. 3,000/- as the sale consideration.
The evidence in support of such sale deed was not
required to be pleaded in the plaint filed by the
appellant. Still further, in terms of Order VI Rule 4 of
the Code, in all cases in which the party pleading
relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, or undue
influence shall state in the pleadings the particulars
with dates and items in the pleadings. The extract
from the written statement or the plaint does not
show that there is any pleading of misrepresentation
or fraud. The evidence led by the respondents is not
indicative of any instance of fraud or
misrepresentation as well. Respondent No. 1 was
candid enough to admit that there were debts of Rs.
12,000/-which were paid off by appellant No. 1. He
also admits that he was taken to the Municipal Office
and signed once outside the Municipal Office and
once inside the Municipal Office. His wife had
accompanied him. With such facts on record, we find
that the findings recorded by the Courts below that
the sale deed was result of fraud or
misrepresentation are clearly not sustainable.
29. The respondents were free to prove fraud in
execution of the sale deed. However, factually, the
respondents have not alleged any fraud in their suit
or in the written statement in the suit filed by
appellant No. 1. The feigned ignorance about the
nature of document cannot be said to be an instance
of fraud. In the absence of any plea or proof of fraud,
respondent No. 1 is bound by the written document
on which he admitted his signatures and of his wife.
There is no oral evidence which could prove fraud,
intimidation, illegality or failure of consideration to
permit the respondents to lead oral evidence to
dispute the sale deed dated 14.9.1970. Therefore,
the judgments referred to by Mr. Mehta are of no
help to support his arguments. Thus, the findings
recorded by the First Appellate Court as affirmed by
the High Court are clearly erroneous in law and are,
thus, set aside."
Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel again submitted
that in the plaint there were no specific assertions in this regard. So,
the plea taken by the appellant cannot be accepted.
10. Regarding limitation, Learned Senior also referred another
citation of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Thankamma George
vs. Lilly Thomas and Another reported in (2024) 8 SCC 351
wherein in para No.19, the Hon'ble Apex Court further observed as
under:
19. We examine the plea of limitation raised by the
respondents. The respondents' case is that the suit
was filed on 11-5-2011, and in effect, the suit seeks
to set aside the sale deed dated 16-4-2008 (Ext.A-5).
The suit was filed beyond the limitation period and
should have been dismissed. Limitation is a question
of law and fact. The period of limitation and the time
from which the period begins to run, depend on the
article in the schedule appended to the Limitation
Act of 1963. The case falls under "Part III- Suits
Relating to Declarations". Article 58 reads thus:
Description of suit Period of Time from which
limitation period begins to
run
To obtain any Three years When the right
other declaration to sue first
accrues.
Referring the same, he submitted that the same was also
barred by law of limitation and before the Learned Trial Court the suit
was also not maintainable although no such specific issue was framed
by the Learned Trial Court in this regard.
11. To counter the reply made by Learned Senior Counsel for the
respondents, Learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon one
citation of Orissa High Court in Cheti Balakrishnamma alias
Balakrishna Vs. Chetti Chandrasekhar Rao and others reported
in AIR 1991 Ori 332 wherein Hon'ble Orissa High Court came to the
observation that based upon unreasoned unregistered family
arrangement no decree can be passed and in this regard, Learned
Counsel referred para Nos.10, 11 and 12, wherein Hon'ble the Orissa
High Court observed as under:
"10. So far as the third point is concerned,
admittedly the property being the self-acquired
property of Venkataswamy as held by us earlier, and
said Venkataswamy having executed a will indicating
the manner of disposition of the property, the
successors of Venkataswamy cannot by way of a
family arrangement change the devolution or mode
of succession. In other words, the heirs of
Venkataswamy had no right to meddle with the
property in any manner contrary to the wishes of the
testator who had acquired the property in question
and who had indicated the manner of disposition of
his property. The express desire of the testator as
reflected in the will cannot be deviated and,
therefore, the so-called family arrangement must be
held to be invalid and inoperative and cannot in any
manner override the will (Ext. 43). In this view of
the matter, even though the plaintiff's parents are
signatories to the family arrangement of the year
1961 under Ext. 4, the plaintiff will not be bound in
any manner and the disposition of the property
under Ext. A is invalid and inoperative.
11. So far as the fourth point for consideration is
concerned, we really fail to understand as to why
instead of granting the relief of partition as claimed
by the plaintiff, the Subordinate Judge directed that
the said remedy should be worked out by filing a
separate suit for partition. If the plaintiff succeeds in
establishing that it was the property of
Venkataswamy and Venkataswamy had indicated a
particular way of disposition of that property under
the will, and in view of our conclusion with regard to
the validity of the will as well as with regard to the
invalidity of Ext. A, there is absolutely no
justification for driving the plaintiff to work out his
remedy by filing a separate suit for partition. We
would, therefore, held that the plaintiff's right under
the will may be worked out by partitioning the
property and the plaintiff's interest as per the will
may be carved out. It may, however, be indicated
that since the so-called family arrangement has been
given effect to, in carving out the interest of the
plaintiff under the will, care should be taken to see
as far as practicable that the property that had been
sold by plaintiff's parents on the basis of Ext. A
should be allotted to the share of the plaintiff so that
the bona fide transferees will not suffer in any
manner.
12. So far as the cross-appeal is concerned, it is also
necessary to examine whether the decision of the
trial Court that the will executed by Venkataswamy
would be valid to the extent of one-third of his
interest is correct or not. In our considered opinion,
the said decision is wholly contrary to law. If the
property is the property of Venkataswamy and in
view of our conclusion that it was his self-acquired
property, Venkataswamy must be held to have full
power of disposing of the same in any manner he
liked and the property being in the nature of the
property of a joint acquirer, the heirs of
Venkataswamy cannot claim any interest in the same
by birth. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court that
the will was valid only to the extent of one-third
interest of Venkataswamy is wholly unsustainable
and the same is accordingly set aside. On the other
hand, it must be held that the will is valid so far as
the entire property of Venkataswamy is concerned
and not to the extent of only his one-third interest as
held by the Subordinate Judge. In this view of the
matter the cross-appeal must succeed."
Relying upon the same, Learned Counsel submitted that the
judgment delivered by Learned Trial Court cannot be sustained in the
eye of law as the Learned Trial Court without appreciation of the
evidence on record relied upon that said unregistered notarized
agreement treating the same to be as family arrangements and urged
for allowing this appeal by setting aside the judgment.
12. After hearing both the sides at length, it appears to this Court
that the entire arguments of both the sides rest upon the said
unregistered notarized agreement i.e. Exbt.-D/1 which was relied
upon by the respondent-defendants and the same document was also
relied upon by the appellant-plaintiff as Exbt.-4 series(3 sheets).
Admittedly, there is no dispute on record in this case regarding the
registered WILL vide No.III-57 executed in the year 1996(Exbt.-1
series) although it was asserted by the appellant-plaintiffs that they
were not happy with the execution of the WILL but at the time of
hearing of argument, Learned Counsel relied upon said Exbt.-1 series
and submitted that on the basis of Exbt.1 series, khatians were
opened in the name of the respective legal heirs of the deceased.
Now, regarding execution of unregistered notarized
agreement dated 26.09.2011, it was the case of the appellant-
plaintiffs that as the respondent-defendant No.1 was the elder
brother of the family so he obtained the signature of appellant-
plaintiffs keeping them in dark which could not be acted upon and the
Learned Trial Court relied upon the said document and dismissed the
suit. According to learned Counsel for the appellants as the registered
deed of WILL i.e. Exbt.-1 series contained everything including the
suit path measuring 6 feet as such, by the mutual family settlement
of the year 1998 there was no scope to execute any further
document i.e. Exbt.-D/1.
13. Now, here in this appeal we are to see:-
"Whether the judgment and decree delivered by the
Learned Trial Court suffers from any infirmity to be interfered
with?"
To prove the said contention both the parties have placed
their elaborate arguments.
Examined the evidence on record
14. On perusal of Exbt.-D/1 i.e. the notarized agreement it
appears that all the parties to the suit have appended their signature
on the body of the same and there is verification made by the
interested parties that the contents of the same were read over to
them and the said Exbt.-D/1 was duly proved by the respondent-
defendants before the Learned Trial Court. The appellant-plaintiffs did
not dispute their signatures on the said document. Learned Trial Court
came to the observation that all the beneficiaries/legatees to the WILL
after the death of their testator were allotted their respective share
and they became the absolute owners in possession of the said
property and thereafter all the co-sharers of the suit path had
mutually made an agreement for re-allocation of the suit path by dint
of a written document as a mutual family arrangement. Furthermore,
the said document i.e. Exbt.-D/1 dated 26.09.2011 was executed by
all the parties mutually giving their assent to such re-allocation and
pursuant there to all the parties have been acting upon it for years
together which is apparent from the face of record.
From the evidence on record further it appears that the family
arrangement was made in the year 1998 amongst the interested
parties. It is also on record that by this time the respondent-
defendant No.2 completed his construction in the year 2006. The
appellant-plaintiffs took the plea that their cause of action arose in the
year 2006 when the respondent-defendants started encroaching upon
the suit path but surprisingly inspite of having opportunity no step
was taken by the appellant-plaintiffs. Even if it is taken into
consideration that the cause of action started on and from 26.09.2011
but this suit was filed before the Learned Trial Court on 19.02.2015
which was after the statutory period of limitation. So, although no
specific issue was formulated by the Learned Trial Court in this regard
but there is a clear finding by the Learned Trial Court in para No.51
that the suit was barred by law of limitation. As submitted by Learned
Counsel for the appellant that in view of the recitals of the registered
WILL, there was no scope to make any obstruction over the path way
by dint of mutual family settlement. Since the parties have made
alternative arrangements to use another path way situated to the
southern side wherein the appellant-plaintiffs have also put their
signatures, so, by their action the appellant-plaintiffs were themselves
stopped from raising the plea that the said document i.e. Exbt.D/1
was executed beyond their knowledge and understanding and they
have also approached to the Learned Trial Court after the statutory
period of limitation.
Moreso, from the evidence on record further it appears that
the appellant-plaintiffs could not adduce any convincing evidence on
record before the Learned Trial Court that they were totally ignorant
or in dark about execution of Exbt.-D/1 i.e. the notarized agreement
dated 26.09.2011 since the appellant had the scope and knowledge
being a literate person about the existence of said document.
15. Learned Trial Court at the time of deciding issue Nos.I, II and
IV discussed the evidence on record elaborately and relying upon the
judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kale(supra) came to the
observation that the agreement dated 26.09.2011 was created
voluntarily and the cause of action to file the suit arose on 26.09.2011
not during November, 2014 or 30.01.2015 as pleaded by the
appellant-plaintiffs since the appellant-plaintiffs failed to satisfy the
Court that they had no previous knowledge about the execution of
document dated 26.09.2011 and finally decided those issue Nos.I, II
and IV against the appellant-plaintiffs.
In deciding issue Nos.III and V Learned Trial Court came to
the observation that as per Will i.e. Exbt.-1 series the legatees of the
WILL were given the right of ingress and egress through the suit path
as described in schedule-A of the plaint but the parties to the suit who
are/were the beneficiaries of the WILL made a family arrangement
vide document dated 26.09.2011 i.e. Exbt.-D/1 by which they have
waived their right to ingress and egress through schedule-A suit path
and all the parties using the 10 feet wide road on the southern side.
Further, according to the Learned Trial Court the WILL was executed
in the year 1996 and subsequent to the death of the testator, the
beneficiaries were allotted to the respective shares as per the recitals
and five brothers became the owner of their respective shares while
the common pathway of 6 feet on the northern side as per the WILL
was made common to all the brothers in equal shares and accordingly
khatian was prepared(Exbt.-2 and Exbt.-3) but in the year 1998
following the convenience and inconvenience the parties made family
settlement and accordingly made some re-allocation for converting
common pathway from being 6 feet to 10 feet in the southern side
and all the parties accordingly agreed to such arrangements and
started using the same and the said family settlement was accepted
by all the parties which was later on notarized on 26.09.2011. More
so, it was not the case of appellant-plaintiffs that they did not put
their signatures on the said document. So, by execution of those
documents the appellant-plaintiffs have waived off their rights.
Further, it appears that the respondent-defendants have raised some
constructions encroaching upon the land of schedule-A and it is also
on record that as per Exbt.-D/13, Exbt.-D/2 and Exbt.-D/4, the
respondent-defendants have undertaken their construction with
permission from Udaipur Municipal Council. So, Learned Trial Court
also after discussing the evidence on record rightly decided the issue
Nos.III and V in negative.
In deciding issue Nos.VI and VII, Learned Trial Court came to
the finding that the suit was not maintainable in its form and nature
being barred by law of limitation and also being bad for estoppel,
waiver and acquiescence and ultimately also decided the said issue
No.VI and VII in negative against the appellants of this case.
16. I have also gone through the citations relied upon by Learned
Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-defendants.
The principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court also in
the aforenoted cases are very much relevant for decision of this case.
It appears that without registration of written document of family
settlement and arrangement a document can be acted upon. In this
regard, Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Thulasidhara and another
Vs. Narayanappa and others reported in (2019) 6 SCC 409 in
para No.9.5 observed as under:
"9.5. As held by this Court in Subraya M.N.:(2016) 8
SCC 705 even without registration a written
document of family settlement/family arrangement
can be used as corroborative evidence as explaining
the arrangement made thereunder and conduct of
the parties. In the present case, as observed
hereinabove, even the plaintiff has also categorically
admitted that the oral partition had taken place on
23-4-1971 and he also admitted that 3 to 4
panchayat people were also present. However,
according to him, the same was not reduced in
writing. Therefore, even accepting the case of the
plaintiff that there was an oral partition on 23-4-
1971, the document, Ext. D-4 dated 23-4-1971, to
which he is also the signatory and all other family
members are signatory, can be said to be a list of
properties partitioned. Everybody got right/share as
per the oral partition/partition. Therefore, the same
even can be used as corroborative evidence as
explaining the arrangement made thereunder and
conduct of the parties. Therefore, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the High Court has
committed a grave/manifest error in not looking into
and/or not considering the document Ext. D-4 dated
23-4-1971."
From the said principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex
Court that in absence of registered document based upon family
arrangement/settlement legal action can be taken and here in this
case at hand since the appellant-plaintiff have failed to cast any doubt
in respect of execution of Exbt.-D/1, so, in my considered view, the
Learned Trial Court rightly relied upon the same and dismissed the
suit and not only that all the issues were thoroughly discussed and
duly ventilated by the Learned Trial Court for which I do not find any
scope to interfere with the judgment delivered by Learned Trial Court.
17. The citation of the Hon'ble Orissa High Court referred by the
learned Counsel for the appellants appears to be distinguishable in
facts from the facts of the present case. So, the same cannot be
relied upon in deciding this appeal.
18. So, after going through the records of the Learned Court
below and also after going through the judgment delivered by the
Learned Trial Court it appears that the appellant-plaintiffs have failed
to project their case before the Learned Trial Court for warranting
decree in their favour and as such the Learned Trial Court after
discussing all the issues in detail rightly dismissed the suit and this
Court does not find any scope to interfere with the judgment and
decree of the Learned Trial Court and the same is liable to be
dismissed accordingly.
19. In the result, the appeal filed by the appellant is hereby
dismissed on contest with costs. The judgment dated 29.07.2024 and
decree dated 02.08.2024 delivered by Learned Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Court No.2, Gomati District, Udaipur in connection with case
No.T.S. No.5 of 2015 is hereby upheld and the same is accordingly
affirmed. The appellant-plaintiffs are not entitled to get any relief
against Exbt.-D/1 i.e. unregistered notarized agreement dated
26.09.2011.
With this observation, this present appeal stands disposed of.
Prepare decree accordingly.
Send down the record(s) of the Learned Court(s) below along
with a copy of this judgment and Order.
Pending applications(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
JUDGE
MOUMITA Digitally signed by
MOUMITA DATTA
DATTA Date: 2025.07.31
10:39:53 -07'00'
Deepshikha
