Tripura High Court
The State Of Tripura To Be Represented By ... vs Sri Churamuni Malakar on 26 August, 2025
Page 1 of 9
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
IA No.01/2024 in/and WA No.114 of 2024
1. The State of Tripura to be represented by the Secretary, Department of
Agriculture, Govt. of Tripura, New Secretariat Complex, Kunjaban, Agartala,
West Tripura, Pin-799010
2. The Director, Department of Agriculture, Government of Tripura, Krishi
Bhavan, Agartala, P.O. Agartala, Pin-799001
3. The Managing Director, Tripura Horticulture Corporation Ltd. (A Govt.
undertaking) R.C.D.F. Complex, P.O. Arundhatinagar, West Tripura, Pin-
799003
4. The Secretary, Department of Finance, Government of Tripura, New
Secretariat Building, New Capital Complex, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN-
799010
.........Applicant/Appellant(s);
Versus
Sri Churamuni Malakar, S/o Lt. Brajendra Malakaar, R/o Bhuiya Chara, Uttar
Machmara, Pecharthal, North Tripura, Pin:799263
.........Respondent(s)
For Applicant/Appellant(s) : Mr. Dipankar Sarma, Addl. G.A.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. P. Roy Barman, Sr. Advocate,
Ms. Aradhita Debbarma, Advocate.
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA
Date of hearing : 14.08.2025
Date of Judgment & Order : 26.08.2025
Whether Fit for Reporting : YES
JUDGMENT & ORDER
(M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.)
This application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 to condone the delay of 920 days in filing a Writ Appeal challenging the
judgment dt. 20.01.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge.
2. It is stated that after the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ
Petition on 20.01.2022, the applicants in this application filed a Review
Petition No.22 of 2024 which was dismissed on 03.10.2024.
3. It is stated that the Tripura Horticulture Corporation Limited
(third applicant) had no Chairman, who was its Administrative Head from
28.01.2023 to 22.09.2023 due to the resignation of predecessor, and a new
person was appointed as the Chairman only on 23.09.2023. It is contended
that the third applicant was not in a position to take appropriate decision
during that period of eight months.
4. According to the applicants, in the meantime the Managing
Director of the Corporation of the third applicant was transferred, and a new
person was appointed on 30.10.2023.
5. It is stated that the third applicant filed WA No.01 of 2024 in this
Court against one Bikash Roy where one of the issues was also of leave
encashment; and after hearing, a Division Bench of this court, according to the
applicants, stayed till the disposal of the Writ Appeal, the operation of the
judgment dt. 02.12.2021 of the learned Single Judge.
6. According to the third applicant, it believed that the stay will
operate in all cases including the instant case.
7. Later it appears to have realized, after discussing with its lawyer,
that it had to file appeal in all cases.
8. Then, a letter dt. 03.07.2024 was issued calling an emergency
meeting on 04.07.2024 as per the desire of the Chairman, and it was then
decided by the Board of Directors to file a Writ Appeal before this Court
against the impugned judgment. Consequently the Review Petition was
withdrawn on 03.10.2024, and the Writ Appeal was filed on 07.10.2024.
9. From the facts narrated above, it is clear that the impugned
judgment was pronounced on 20.01.2022 by the learned Single Judge in
WP(C) No.307 of 2021, and though the limitation period for filing a Writ
Appeal against the said judgment is only thirty days, admittedly the instant
Writ Appeal was filed on 07.10.2024 with a delay of 920 days.
10. Since the Writ Appeal is being filed against the judgment dt.
20.01.2022, the fact that the applicants had filed a Review Petition No.22 of
2024, and then withdrew it on 03.10.2024, cannot be of any help to them.
11. It may be that there was no Chairman of the third applicant from
28.01.2023 to 22.09.2023, but it is not as if all work of the third applicant was
kept in suspended animation for these 8 months. There would have been an
incharge arrangement so that day to day affairs are carried on.
12. In fact there is no explanation as to why there was inaction on the
part of the applicants in challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge
from 20.01.2022 when the said judgment was pronounced till 27.01.2023
(when the vacancy arose in the post of Chairman of the third applicant) i.e. for
almost one year. During the period when there was a Chairman functioning,
nothing prevented the applicants to file a Writ Appeal against the impugned
judgment.
13. The fact that in another WA No.01 of 2024, there was an interim
stay granted against the judgment dt. 02.12.2021 of the learned Single Judge
till the disposal of the Writ Appeal, cannot be a ground for the third applicant
to believe that the said stay would operate in all cases including the judgment
dt. 20.01.2022 in WP(C) No.307 of 2021. The legal advisors of the applicant
would have clarified this aspect to the applicants had they been approached at
that time.
14. The fact that even after the new Chairman was appointed on
23.09.2023, the matter was dragged on till 07.10.2024 speaks volumes of the
negligent attitude of the applicants.
15. Moreover, a perusal of the certified copy of the judgment of the
learned Single Judge annexed to the Writ Appeal filed by the applicants shows
that even the application for issuance of certified copy of the impugned
judgment was made on 15.07.2024, though the judgment had been rendered
on 20.01.2022. No explanation is even offered for the delay in filing
application for certified copy of the judgment of the learned Single Judge for
filing the Writ Appeal.
16. In Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited
and another1, the Supreme Court held:
"25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the "better
affidavit" sworn by Mr Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting
Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the
Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment
of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster
v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent,
their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only
on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very
same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy
of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable
time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-
1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months.
26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by
placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-in-
charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy
within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit
which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at
every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the
decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had
occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was
due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact
remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons
(2012) 3 SCC 563
concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this
Court by taking appropriate steps.
27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or
conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of
limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave
petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period
of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons
familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and
acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be
condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation
of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or
lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances,
the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The
claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the
modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in
several cases such as Commissioner of Customs, Chennai v. Volex
Interconnect (India) Private Limited2, Principal Commissioner Central
Excise Delhi-I v. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd.3, Union of India v.
Central Tibetan Schools Administration & Others4, Union of India &
Others v. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another5, and State
of Uttar Pradesh & Others v. Sabha Narain & Others6.
18. In Union of India & Another v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy
(D) through his legal heir7, the Supreme Court held that it is not permissible
to look into the merits of the matter as long as it is not convinced that
sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of long and inordinate
(2022) 3 SCC 159
(2022) 2 SCC 327
(2021) 11 SCC 557
(2022) 9 SCC 263
(2022) 9 SCC 266
2024 INSC 262 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489
delay; that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or
Union of India when it comes to condoning gross delay of more than 12 years;
length of delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not;
from the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to
fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law
has prescribed a period of limitation; once it is held that a party has lost his
right to have the matter considered on merits because of his long inaction, it
cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances, he
cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as
against the technical considerations. It was reiterated while considering plea
for condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case
and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It declared that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity.
19. This was also reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Ramkumar Choudhary8.
20. In the judgment of the Supreme Court in Inder Singh v. The
State of Madhya Pradesh9 referred to by the counsel for the applicants, no
doubt, there are observations indicating that though delay cannot be condoned
without sufficient cause, it has to be kept in mind that, if in a particular case
merits need to be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the basis of
limitation.
Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 48636 of 2024 dt.29.11.2024
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.6145 of 2024 dt. 21.03.2025
21. Inder Singh ( 9 supra ) was a case where the learned Single
Judge of the High Court had allowed an application for condonation of delay
in filing a Second Appeal, though, the appeal had been filed with a delay of
1537 days, and the Supreme Court did not deem it fit to interfere with the
same.
22. It appears that the attention of the Bench of the Supreme Court in
Inder Singh ( 9 supra ) was not drawn to the judgments referred to by us in
Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy ( 7 supra ) and in the case of Ramkumar
Choudhary ( 8 supra), where the Court had stated that while considering pleas
of condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case
and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation of delay. It also stated that if there is
a long inaction, party would lose the right to have the matter considered on
merits and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead that the
substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical
consideration.
23. Counsel for respondents also relied on Ramchandra Shankar,
Deodhar & Others v. State of Maharashtra & Others10 and also the judgment
in Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives & Others v.
Union of India & Another 11, to contend that liberal approach should be taken
in condoning delays where the limitation ground undermines the merits of the
case and obstructs substantial justice.
24. In Sheo Raj Singh (11 supra), referred to in the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Inder Singh ( 9 supra ), the High Court had
(1974) 1 SCC 317
(2023) 10 SCC 531
condoned the delay of 479 days in filing the Land Acquisition Appeal in the
High Court and the explanation offered found favour of the Supreme Court.
In that case, the Supreme Court observed that it was not hearing
an application for condonation of delay, but sitting in appeal over a
discretionary exercise of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation
of delay; in the case of the former, whether to condone or not, would be the
only question, whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of
discretion in favour of grant of prayer for condonation, would be the question;
that the law is well-settled that a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere
with the discretionary exercise by the courts below; and that the appellate
power should be exercised only when the order challenged in appeal is clearly
wrong and not when it is merely not right.
25. Both these decisions cannot help the applicants, since, in the instant
application, this Court has to consider the question whether sufficient cause has
been shown by the applicants to condone the period of delay. It is not considering
an order passed by a subordinate forum condoning the delay or refusing to
condone it.
26. In the judgment of State of Rajasthan and Another v. Bal
Kishan Mathur (dead) through legal representatives and others 12 cited by
the counsel for the applicants, the delay on the part of the State in filing the
Special Appeal Writ was only 98 days. Also in the facts of that case, the High
Court had declined to condone delay which was not explained merely for a
period of six days out of 98 days. It was undoubtedly a harsh approach on the
part of the High Court, and therefore the Supreme Court rightly intervened, set
(2014) 1 SCC 592
aside the judgment of the High Court and condoned the delay. But where the
delay as in the instant case is 920 days, such a view cannot be adopted.
27. In Executive Officer, Antiyur Town Panchayat v. G. Arumugam
(dead) by legal representatives13 cited by the counsel for the applicants, a
delay of 1373 days in filing Second Appeal by the Executive Officer of a
Panchayat in relation to Panchayat property was condoned on the ground that
there were deliberate lapses on the part of the previous Executive Officer of
the Panchayat at the relevant time, and there was an attempt on the part of the
Government officials or public servants to defeat justice by causing delay. In
the instant case there is no such contention raised, and therefore the said
judgment also has no application.
28. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the case,
that the applicants had been clearly negligent in taking steps to file the Writ
Appeal within the time permitted by law, and no sufficient cause has been
shown by them for condoning the inordinate delay of 920 days in filing the
Writ Appeal.
29. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is
dismissed. Consequently the Writ Appeal is also dismissed.
30. All pending applications shall stand closed.
(S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA, J) (M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO, CJ)
Pijush/
(2015) 3 SCC 569
MUNNA SAHA Digitally signed by MUNNA SAHA
Date: 2025.08.26 13:01:40 +05'30'
