----Respondent(s)
______________________________________________________
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Anjan Kanti Pal Adv.
Mr. Tushar Kanti Bhattacharjee, Adv.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
No.F.1(92)ADMN/TPSC/2016, inquiry report dated 16.01.2024, order of
disciplinary authority vide No.F.1(92)-ADMN/TPSC/2016/1568 dated
[02] Heard Mr. A.K. Pal along with Mr. T. Bhattacharjee, Learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as Mr. R. Datta, Learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-TPSC.
[03] At the time of hearing, Mr. A.K. Pal, Learned counsel appearing
TPSC. He joined as a fixed pay employee on 12.08.2015 and later on, his
satisfactorily to the utmost satisfaction of the authority till 2023. But,
suspension with immediate effect. Thereafter, by the order dated 11.09.2023
extended for further period of sixty days by order dated 08.12.2023. Prior to
disciplinary proceeding will be initiated against him with the following Article of
ten days. For the sake of convenience, the statement of Article of Charges
ARTICLE-V
Consequent upon absenting Sri Ajoy Ranjan Das, Peon, TPSC himself from
the office to his caprices and whims regularly, the matter was brought to
the notice of the appropriate authority, the secretary of the Commission
herein, who after hearing is pleased to proceed with Sri Ajoy Ranjan Das,
Peon, TPSC and towards contemplated such proceedings, Sri Das was
placed under suspension w.e.f 14.06.2023.
The suspension order in question was accordingly arranged to sent to his
residence through messengers namely Sri Manas Debbarma, Accountant,
TPSC and Sri Biman Bhattacharjee, LDACT, TPSC but Sri Das
notwithstanding presenting himself in residence refused to receive the
suspension order as stated herein above which is not healthy on the part
of a Govt. servant to manifest the refusal in such a manner. Sri Das also
not advanced any communication verbally and or orally to those 2(two)
messengers, the messengers reported.
Later on, the suspension order was sent through the whatsapp to his
mobile number (9774146781) and registered post in his residence and in
response to the same ultimately Sri Das acted upon by receiving the
suspension order from the office on 17.06.2023. A copy of the peon book is
annexed herewith which will speak for itself.
The aforesaid activities of Sri Ajoy Ranjan Das, Peon, TPSC is most
unbecoming and insubordination on the part of a public servant and
tantamount to breach of Rule 3(1) of The Tripura Civil Services (Conduct)
Rules, 1988."
[04] It was further submitted that the petitioner has been falsely
imputed by the authority concerned on the basis of a fake allegation of one
Smt. Manika Shil, UDA, TPSC and false FIR was lodged against her by the
under Secretary, TPSC on 09.06.2023. He submitted his written statement
against the Article of Charges. In the meantime, the disciplinary authority
appointed one Narayan Sankar Sengupta, Senior Librarian cum Research
Officer (Retd.), Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench as the inquiring authority
to inquire into the charges leveled against him. Accordingly, the inquiring
authority conducted the proceeding, took evidence both oral/documentary and
after that submitted his report to the disciplinary authority. Thereafter, the
disciplinary authority found the petitioner to be guilty of the alleged Article of
Charges and vide memo No.F.1(92)-ADMN/TPSC/2016/1568 dated 06/02/2024
imposed punishment upon him for "compulsory retirement". After that, the
petitioner preferred appeal which was also dismissed by the authority of the
Department concerned and challenging the same, he preferred the writ petition
before this Court.
[05] Learned counsel further drawn the attention of the Court that
from the evidence on record who deposed before the inquiring authority it will
be found that there was no allegation of any misbehavior or misconduct by him
to said Smt. Manika Shila, UDA, TPSC but with an ulterior motive, he has been
falsely imputed in the alleged Charges and a false FIR was laid against him on
the basis of minutes of the Committee constituted for the purpose of sexual
harassment of woman and complain. Even, before imposing punishment upon
him, no opportunity was given to him to submit his defence. Furthermore,
according to Learned counsel, said Manika Shil did not submit/lodge any
complaint against him, so, the entire proceeding was arbitrary with a view to
harass the petitioner because before the inquiring authority, the prosecution
side could not adduce any material evidence to support the Charges and the
order of punishment was lacking of reasonings. Regarding issuance of
showcause notice, he submitted that he never violated/disobeyed the said
notice. Furthermore, he was not given any scope to appear before the sexual
harassment committee and he was unaware about the orders and notices
served upon him. On the basis of material evidence on record, the Charges
cannot stand against the petitioner, so, according to Learned counsel serious
prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. It was further submitted that the
punishment imposed was too harsh. The petitioner is a person of 37/38 years
and due to this order of major penalty, his entire service career has been
spoiled and his family leads to starvation. So, Learned counsel for the
petitioner in summing up his submission urged for setting aside the order of
the disciplinary authority as well as of the appellate authority or alternatively,
Learned counsel urged for imposing lesser punishment terminating the order of
"compulsory retirement" for the interest of justice considering his age.
[06] On the other hand, Mr. R. Datta, Learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the TPSC-respondent submitted that the act and conduct of the
petitioner was all along not conducive to the interest of the Department. By his
act and conduct, the petitioner exhibited continuous insubordination, rude
behavior and disobedience to the official orders. He was given showcause
notice but inspite of receipt of notice, he did not respond which was
unbecoming for a public servant. Even, he disobeyed the order of the
Secretary of the Department, he was asked to appear before the Secretary but
inspite of remaining present in the Office, he refused to accept the order and
did not appear before the disciplinary authority. Again a showcause notice was
issued on 09.02.2023, but the petitioner failed to respond. Not only that, on
05.06.2023, the petitioner misbehaved and shouted Manika Shil, UDA, TPSC
when she was discharging official task and on 06.06.2023, he threatened her
with dire consequences, if she reports the incident. Even the individual
witnesses namely Asim Pal, Sanjay Chakma supported the version of said
Manika Shil. The sexual harassment committee also found him guilty, even the
petitioner did not bother to appear before the Committee without any cogent
grounds and the FIR was lodged on the basis of threats and intimidation. It
was further submitted by Learned counsel that the misbehavior of the
petitioner with the senior female colleague repeated disobedience to orders,
dereliction of duties, shows breach of service rules as provided under Rule 3(1)
of the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules. Learned counsel further
submitted that from the entire proceeding nowhere it will be found that there
was any violation of principles of natural justice. It is not the case of the
petitioner that no scope was given to him to submit his written statement of
defence to adduce his evidence, to allow him to cross examine the witnesses of
the prosecution side. So, according to Mr. Datta, Learned counsel the
punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority was proportionate to
misconduct. It was further submitted that the appellate authority after careful
consideration of the findings of the disciplinary authority dismissed his appeal
and herein this case, the petitioner could not project anything to quash the
orders and to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. There is also no submission from the side of the petitioner that there
were procedural irregularities. So, Learned counsel, Mr. Datta submitted that
at this stage there is no scope to re-appreciate the evidence on record and the
order of the disciplinary authority is based on materials which has been
affirmed by the appellate authority and finally submitted that there is no merit
in the writ petition and urged for dismissal of the writ petition.
[07] Learned counsel, Mr. Datta also drawn the attention of the Court
referring the documents annexed with the counter affidavit. In support of his
contention, Learned counsel for the respondent-TPSC relied upon one citation
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in State of U.P. versus Harendra
Arora and Another reported in (2001) 6 SCC 392 wherein in para No.5 the
Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under :
"5. The aforesaid provision was virtually incorporated in Article 311(2) of
the Constitution. By the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act of 1963,
the scope of "reasonable opportunity" was explained and expanded and for
the expression "until he has been given reasonable opportunity to show
cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him", the
expression
"except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the
charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being
heard in respect of those charges and where it is proposed, after
such inquiry, to impose on him any such penalty, until he has been
given reasonable opportunity of making representation on the
penalty proposed, but only on the basis of evidence adduced
during such inquiry"
was substituted. It would thus appear that the Fifteenth Amendment, for
the first time, in terms provided for holding an inquiry into the specific
charges of which information was given to the delinquent employee in
advance and in which he was given reasonable opportunity to defend
himself against those charges. The Amendment also provided for a second
opportunity to the delinquent employee to show cause against the penalty
if it was proposed as a result of the inquiry. The courts held that while
exercising the second opportunity of showing cause against the penalty,
the delinquent employee was also entitled to represent against the finding
on charges as well. It appears that in spite of this change, the stage at
which the delinquent employee was held to be entitled to a copy of the
enquiry report was the stage at which the penalty was proposed which
was the law prevailing prior to the Amendment."
Referring the same, Learned counsel submitted that in this case
the petitioner could not satisfy the Court that no reasonable opportunity was
granted to him.
He further referred another citation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Haryana Financial Corporation versus Kailash Chandra Ahuja reported in
(2008) 9 SCC 31 wherein in para No.34 Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as
under :
"34. This Court expressed the same option.In Board of High School &
Intermediate Education v. Chitra Srivastava : (1970) 1 SCC 121, the Board
cancelled the examination of the petitioner who had actually appeared at
the examination on the ground that there was shortage in attendance at
lectures. Admittedly, no notice was given to her before taking the action.
On behalf of the Board it was contended that the facts were not in dispute
and therefore, "no useful purpose would have been served" by giving a
show-cause notice to the petitioner. This Court, however, set aside the
decision of the Board, holding that the Board was acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity and, therefore, it ought to have observed the principles of natural
justice."
Referring the same, Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner
in this case could not satisfy the Court that he has been prejudiced.
Learned counsel again referred another citation of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India in Union of India and Others versus Dulal Dutt
reported in (1993) 2 SCC 179 wherein in para Nos.17 and 18 the said Apex
Court observed as under :
"17. It was further observed by this Court that :
"However, this does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded
altogether. While the High Court or the Supreme Court would not
examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they
are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is
based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary in the sense that no
reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given
material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order. The remedy
provided by Article 226 is no less an important safeguard. Even with
its well known constraints, the remedy is an effective check against
malafide perverse or arbitrary action"
18. It will be noticed that the Tribunal completely erred in assuming in the
circumstances of the case, that there ought to have been a some order for
compulsory retirement. This Court has been repeatedly emphasising right
from the case of R-L Butail v. Union of India, [1970] 2 SCL 876 and Union
of India v. J.N. Sinha [1970] 2 SCC 458 that an order of compulsory
retirement is not an order of punishment. It is actually a prerogative of the
Government but it should be based on material and has to be passed on
the subjective satisfaction of the Government. Very often, on enquiry by
the Court the Government may disclose the material but it is very much
different from the saying that the order should be a speaking order. No
order of compulsory retirement is required to be a speaking order. From
the very order of the Tribunal it is clear that the Government had, before it,
the report of the Review Committee yet it thought it fit of compulsory
retiring the respondent. The order cannot be called either mala fide or
arbitrary in law."
Referring the same, Learned counsel submitted that it is not the
case of the petitioner that the proceeding was malafide and the same was
based on no evidence and arbitrary.
He also referred another citation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
India in Central Industrial Security Force versus HC(GD) Om Prakash
reported in (2022) 5 SCC 100 wherein in para No.13 the said Apex Court
observed as under :
"13. There are numerous other judgments upholding the orders of
premature retirement of judicial officers inter alia on the ground that the
judicial service is not akin to other services. A person discharging judicial
duties acts on behalf of the State in discharge of its sovereign functions.
Dispensation of justice is not only an onerous duty but has been
considered as discharge of a pious duty, therefore, it is a very serious
matter. This Court in Ram Murti Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Another : (2020) 1 SCC 801 held as under:
"6. ....The scope for judicial review of an order of compulsory
retirement based on the subjective satisfaction of the employer
is extremely narrow and restricted. Only if it is found to be
based on arbitrary or capricious grounds, vitiated by mala fides,
overlooks relevant materials, could there be limited scope for
interference. The court, in judicial review, cannot sit in
judgment over the same as an appellate authority. Principles of
natural justice have no application in a case of compulsory
retirement."
Referring the same, he drawn the attention of the Court that since
in the case at hand, the petitioner was imposed "compulsory retirement". So,
the scope for judicial review is very limited.
Learned counsel also referred another citation of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India in Union of India and Others versus Constable
Sunil Kumar reported in (2023) 3 SCC 622 wherein in para No.8 Hon'ble the
Apex Court observed as under :
"8.At the outset, it is required to be noted that the disciplinary
authority imposed the penalty of dismissal after holding the
departmental enquiry and after following the due procedure as
required under Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955 and after
having held the charges and misconduct proved. The charges
and misconduct held to be proved against the respondent who
was serving in CRPF - a disciplined force can be said to be a
grave and serious misconduct. The charges and misconduct
proved against the respondent is of misbehaving with superior
and giving threats of dire consequences to the superior, may be
under the influence of intoxication. He also misbehaved and
gave threats to the colleagues. The misconduct committed by
the respondent is of insubordination also. The misconduct of
misbehaving with the superior/senior officer and of
insubordination can be said to be a very serious misconduct and
cannot be tolerated in a disciplined force like CRPF and
therefore, as such the Division Bench of the High Court is not
justified in observing that on the proved charges and
misconduct penalty of dismissal can be said to be
disproportionate."
Referring the same, he submitted that here in the case at hand
there is serious allegation of misconduct against the petitioner, so, the
disciplinary authority rightly found him guilty and imposed punishment and
there is no scope to interfere with the same.
Finally, he has submitted another citation of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India in State of Rajasthan and Others versus Bhupendra Singh
reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1908 wherein in para Nos.23 and 24
Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under :
"23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article
226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as
an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior
court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are
not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law
which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by
a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to
be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ
can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding,
the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and
material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible
evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded
as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari.
A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged
on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced
before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a
finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point
and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed
Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477].
24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire
evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was
not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court
does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the
evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the
present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be
scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is
no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that
the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave
reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court
to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these
conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed
the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence.
That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari should not do."
Referring the same, he submitted that the jurisdiction of the High
Court is a supervisory jurisdiction, so, there is no scope to review/reassess the
evidence on record at this stage and finally, Learned counsel for the
respondents urged for dismissal of the writ petition.
[08] On the other hand, Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon
one citation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Swaran Singh Chand
versus Punjab State Electricity Board and Ors. in Civil Appeal No.3298
of 2009 arising out of SLP (Civil)No.20202 of 2006 wherein in para
Nos.13 and 14 the said Apex Court observed as under :
13. It is a well-settled principle of law that an order of
compulsory retirement would be held to be stigmatic inter alia,
in the event the employer has lost confidence [See Chandu Lal
v. Management of M/s. Pan American World Airways Inc.
(1985) 2 SCC 727 at 730, para 8], or he has concealed his
earlier record [See Jagdish Parsad v. Sachiv, Zila Ganna
Committee, Muzaffarnagar and Another (1986) 2 SCC 338 at
342-343, para 9].
He can, however, be subjected to compulsory retirement
inter alia if he has outlived his utility [See The State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Madan Mohan Nagar, AIR 1967 SC 1260 at 1262].
In Allahabad Bank Officers' Association and Another v.
Allahabad Bank and Others [(1996) 4 SCC 504], it was held:
"17. The above discussion of case-law makes it clear that
if the order of compulsory retirement casts a stigma on
the government servant in the sense that it contains a
statement casting aspersion on his conduct or character,
then the court will treat that order as an order of
punishment, attracting provisions of Article 311(2) of the
Constitution. The reason is that as a charge or imputation
is made the condition for passing the order, the court
would infer therefrom that the real intention of the
Government was to punish the government servant on the
basis of that charge or imputation and not to exercise the
power of compulsory retirement. But mere reference to
the rule, even if it mentions grounds for compulsory
retirement, cannot be regarded as sufficient for treating
the order of compulsory retirement as an order of
punishment. In such a case, the order can be said to have
been passed in terms of the rule and, therefore, a
different intention cannot be inferred. So also, if the
statement in the order refers only to the assessment of
his work and does not at the same time cast an aspersion
on the conduct or character of the government servant,
then it will not be proper to hold that the order of
compulsory retirement is in reality an order of
punishment. Whether the statement in the order is
stigmatic or not will have to be judged by adopting the
test of how a reasonable person would read or understand
it."
14. The question came up for consideration before a Division
Bench of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M.
Patel [(2001) 3 SCC 314] wherein Balakrishnan, J. (as the
learned Chief Justice then was), summarized the law, thus:
"11. The law relating to compulsory retirement has now
crystallised into definite principles, which could be
broadly summarised thus:
(i) Whenever the services of a public servant are no
longer useful to the general administration, the officer can
be compulsorily retired for the sake of public interest.
(ii) Ordinarily, the order of compulsory retirement is not
to be treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of
the Constitution.
(iii) For better administration, it is necessary to chop off
dead wood, but the order of compulsory retirement can be
passed after having due regard to the entire service
record of the officer.
(iv) Any adverse entries made in the confidential record
shall be taken note of and be given due weightage in
passing such order.
(v) Even uncommunicated entries in the confidential
record can also be taken into consideration.
(vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be
passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when
such course is more desirable.
(vii) If the officer was given a promotion despite adverse
entries made in the confidential record, that is a fact in
favour of the officer.
(viii) Compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a
punitive measure."
Relying upon the same, he urged before the Court to set aside the
order of punishment imposed upon the petitioner as nothing was
communicated to him by the respondent Department and the punishment so
imposed is too harsh for which the interference of the Court is required.
[09] I have heard both the sides at length and perused the writ
petition and the connected documents and also gone through the counter-
affidavit and the documents annexed with the counter-affidavit by the
respondent-TPSC. It is the admitted position that the respondent authority
framed in total five numbers of Article of Charges against the petitioner:
(i) The first Charge Article-I was regarding his misbehavior with the senior
staff, Manika Shil, UDA, TPSC.
(ii) Article-II was regarding his frequent leaving his office without
permission of the Higher Authority.
(iii) Article-III was defying the order of the Secretary to appear before his
chamber on 25.01.2023 at 11 a.m.
(iv) Article-IV was regarding absent himself from the Office after putting
his signature in the attendance register.
(v) Article-V was regarding refusal to accept the suspension order and also
not advanced any communication verbally or orally two messengers
reported.
Now for the sake of convenience, I would like to refer herein
below Rule 3(i) of the Tripura State Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988 which
reads as under :
"3. General
(1) Every Government Employee shall at all times-
(i) maintain absolute integrity;
(ii) maintain devotion to duty; and
(iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government
employee."
[10] Admittedly, in this case, there was no allegation of sexual
harassment against the petitioner, rather, a committee was constituted on his
misconduct and misbehavior with the senior staff of the Department. From the
documents annexed with the writ petition and also the counter-affidavit it
appears to this Court that the present petitioner as a Group-D employee of the
Department inspite of receipt of notice, developed a habit not to give any
response and to disregard the official communication, to remain absent in the
office after putting signature in the attendant register and to defy the order of
his superior appointing authority which primafacie shows the petitioner's
misconduct and misbehavior. To substantiate the charge from the side of
TPSC, total eight numbers of witnesses were adduced and the petitioner was
also examined himself as defence witness but by the style of cross-
examination and defence evidence, the present petitioner could not create any
doubt to disbelieve the Article of Charges framed against him.
[11] In course of hearing, Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted
that the he has been falsely implicated in this case and no opportunity was
given to him. But after going through the relevant documents, nowhere I find
that the principle of natural justice was violated and the petitioner was not
given the scope to defend the charges properly. As already stated, there was
not any allegation of sexual harassment by the petitioner, rather, on the
recommendation of the inquiry committee one FIR was laid against him and
the case also been registered accordingly which is still pending for disposal for
alleged threatening of said Manika Shil and other officials of TPSC. Although
the same FIR and the report of the Committee constituted for sexual
harassment of women was not part of the proceeding.
[12] I have also gone through the citations referred by Learned
counsel for the State-respondents and it appears to this Court that the
petitioner could not show any materials before the Court for interference of the
orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority. The citations as
relied upon by the Learned counsel for the respondents-TPSC are very much
relevant for decision of this case and accordingly the said principles have been
taken care off at the time of delivery of the judgment and it appears to this
Court that there is no scope to interfere with the findings of the authority
concerned. Now, regarding alternative argument raised by Learned counsel for
the petitioner we are to see whether the order of major punishment is
disproportionate or not to the Charges levelled against him. It is submitted by
Learned counsel for the petitioner that even if the findings of the disciplinary
authority and the appellate authority is accepted to be lawful since, the
petitioner being a Group-D employee has left a considerable period of his
service for his retirement in such a situation, if he is sent to compulsory
retirement that his entire family would lead to starvation. So, Learned counsel
urged before the Court to give him a scope to amend himself.
[13] On the other hand, in this regard, Learned counsel for the
respondent-TPSC counter the submission made by Learned counsel for the
petitioner and submitted that due to his constant misbehavior and misconduct
the authority was compelled to take the decision and nobody wants that a
person who is in regular service be placed under such hardship, so, he urged
for upholding the order of the disciplinary authority and the appellate
authority.
[14] In this regard, after hearing of both the sides it appears to this
Court that the petitioner could not satisfy the Court by showing any materials
on record to set aside the findings of the disciplinary authority as well as
appellate authority but since the petitioner has left a considerable period of his
normal retirement, so, for the sake of justice, this Court believes that an
opportunity should be given to rectify/amend himself in the coming days.
Accordingly, the matter needs to be remanded back to the disciplinary
authority to reconsider the punishment imposed upon the petitioner.
[15] In the result, the writ petition filed stands disposed of on contest.
The findings of the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority stands
affirmed as the petitioner failed to satisfy the Court to invoke the jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for interference. But considering
the facts and circumstances of the present case and also the fact that the
petitioner is aged about 35 years, the matter is remanded back to the
disciplinary authority only to the limited extent of reconsideration of the
punishment imposed upon the petitioner within a period of 2(two) months from
the date of passing of this judgment.
With this observation, the present writ petition stands disposed
of.
JUDGE
MOUMITA Digitally signed by
MOUMITA DATTA
DATTA Date: 2025.08.09
01:55:30 +05'30'
Sabyasachi B
