Accused vs The State Of Tripura
2025 Latest Caselaw 977 Tri

Tripura High Court

Accused vs The State Of Tripura on 17 April, 2025

                        HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
                              AGARTALA
                                B.A.No.25 of 2025

Sri Prasenjit Nag(31),
S/O-Sri Ajit Nag,
R/O-Vill. Ramthakurpara, Ward No.-39
P.O. & P.S.-A.D. Nagar, Agartala,
Dist.-West Tripura, Tripura.

                                                 ---- Accused applicant(s)

                                     Versus

The State of Tripura
                         [---
                                                        ----Respondent(s)

     For Applicant(s)                 :    Mr. Pijush Kanti Biswas, Sr. Adv.
                                           Mr. Samung Debbarma, Adv.
     For Respondent(s)                :    Mr. Raju Datta, P.P.
                                           Mr. Rajib Saha, Addl. P.P.


           HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT

                                     Order
17/04/2025
           This bail application is filed under Section 483 of BNSS read

with Section 37 of the NDPS Act for releasing the accused, Sri

Prasenjit Nag on bail who is lodging in custody in connection with

Agartala   GRPS   case     No.34     of   2025   registered   under   Sections

20(b)(ii)(C), 25 & 29 of the NDPS Act.

           Heard Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Pijush Kanti Biswas

assisted by Learned Counsel, Mr. Samung Debbarma appearing on

behalf of the accused-in-custody. Also heard Learned P.P., Mr. Raju

Datta along with Learned Addl. P.P., Mr. Rajib Saha appearing on

behalf of the State-respondent.

           Taking part in the hearing, Learned Senior Counsel drawn

the attention of this Court that in this case a false allegation has been

levelled against the accused-in-custody and he is lodging in custody on

and from 02.04.2025 and accordingly, a bail application was preferred
                                        (2)


before Learned Special Judge(NDPS), Court No.1, West Tripura,

Agartala     and   Learned   Special     Judge(NDPS)     vide   order    dated

05.04.2025 rejected the bail application without application of proper

mind. Learned Senior Counsel, in course of hearing of argument,

entirely confined his argument on the point that in this case the

ground of arrest was not communicated to the accused-in-custody.

Learned Senior Counsel also referred to Annexure-3 i.e. the Arrest

Memo wherein, from point No.5 it transpires that nothing was

communicated to the accused-in-custody regarding ground of his

arrest. In support of his contention, Learned Senior Counsel referred

few citations and urged for releasing the accused on bail in any

condition.

             Learned Senior Counsel referred one decision of Hon'ble

Supreme Court of India reported in (2024) 7 SCC 576 [Pankaj

Bansal v. Union of India and others dated 03.10.2023] wherein

in para Nos.16, 17, 18, 37, 38, 39, 42 and 45, Hon'ble the Apex Court

observed as under:

                               "16. Though much was stated and argued by
                               both sides on the merits of the matter in terms
                               of the involvement of the appellants in the
                               alleged offence of money laundering, we make it
                               clear that we are not concerned with that issue
                               at this point. The only issue for consideration
                               presently is whether the arrest of the appellants
                               under Section 19 PMLA was valid and lawful and
                               whether the impugned orders of remand passed
                               by the learned Vacation Judge/Additional
                               Sessions Judge, Panchkula, measure up. In that
                               context, we may also make it clear that the mere
                               passing of an order of remand would not be
                               sufficient in itself to validate the appellants'
                               arrests, if such arrests are not in conformity
                               with the requirements of Section 19 PMLA.
                               Though judgments were cited by the ED which
                               held to the effect that legality of the arrest
                               would be rendered immaterial once the
                               competent court passes a remand order, those
                               cases primarily dealt with the issue of a writ of
                               habeas corpus being sought after an order of
                               remand was passed by the jurisdictional court
                               and that ratio has no role to play here. The
                               understanding of ED and its misplaced reliance
                               upon that case law begs the question as to
                               whether there was proper compliance with
       (3)


Section 19(1) PMLA and as to whether the
learned Vacation Judge/Additional Sessions
Judge, Panchkula, correctly considered that
issue while passing the remand orders.
Therefore, as the very validity of the remand
orders is under challenge on that ground, the
issue as to whether the arrest of the appellants
was lawful in its inception may also be open for
consideration.
17. At this stage, it would be apposite to
consider the case law that does have relevance
to these appeals and the issues under
consideration.        In       Vijay       Madanlal
Choudhary:(2023) 12 SCC 1, a 3-Judge Bench of
this Court observed that Section 65 PMLA
predicates that the provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall apply insofar as
they are not inconsistent with the provisions of
PMLA in respect of arrest, search and seizure,
attachment,       confiscation,      investigation,
prosecution     and     all  other     proceedings
thereunder. It was noted that Section 19 PMLA
prescribes the manner in which the arrest of a
person involved in money laundering can be
effected. It was observed that such power was
vested in high-ranking officials and that apart,
Section 19 PMLA provided inbuilt safeguards to
be adhered to by the authorized officers, such
as, of recording reasons for the belief regarding
involvement of the person in the offence of
money laundering and, further, such reasons
have to be recorded in writing and while
effecting arrest, the grounds of arrest are to be
informed to that person. It was noted that the
authorized officer has to forward a copy of the
order, along with the material in his possession,
to the adjudicating authority and this safeguard
is   to    ensure    fairness,    objectivity  and
accountability of the authorized officer in
forming an opinion, as recorded in writing,
regarding the necessity to arrest the person
involved in the offence of money laundering. The
Bench also noted that it is the obligation of the
authorized officer to produce the person so
arrested before the Special Court or Judicial
Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate, as the
case may be, within 24 hours and such
production is to comply with the requirement of
Section 167 Cr.P.C. It was pointed out that there
is nothing in Section 19 PMLA which is contrary
to the requirement of production under Section
167 Cr.P.C and being an express statutory
requirement under Section 19(3) PMLA, it has to
be complied by the authorized officer. It was
concluded that the safeguards provided in 2002
Act and the preconditions to be fulfilled by the
authorized officer before effecting arrest, as
contained in Section 19 PMLA, are equally
stringent and of higher standard when compared
to the Customs Act, 1962, and such safeguards
ensure that the authorized officers do not act
arbitrarily, by making them accountable for their
judgment about the necessity to arrest any
person involved in the commission of the
offence of money laundering, even before filing
of the complaint before the Special Court. It was
on this basis that the Bench upheld the validity
of Section 19 PMLA.
18.   The    Bench    in    Vijay  Madanlal
Choudhary(supra) further held that once the
       (4)


person is informed of the grounds of arrest, that
would be sufficient compliance with the
mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution and
it is not necessary that a copy of the ECIR be
supplied in every case to the person concerned,
as such a condition is not mandatory and it is
enough if the ED discloses the grounds of arrest
to the person concerned at the time of arrest. It
was pointed out that when the arrested person
is produced before the Court, it would be open
to the Court to look into the relevant records
presented by the authorized representative of
the ED for answering the issue of need for
continued detention in connection with the
offence of money laundering. It was, in fact,
such stringent safeguards provided under
Section 19 PMLA that prompted this Court to
uphold the twin conditions contained in Section
45 thereof, making it difficult to secure bail.
37. No doubt, in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary
(supra), this Court held that non-supply of the
ECIR in a given case cannot be found fault with,
as the ECIR may contain details of the material
in the ED's possession and revealing the same
may have a deleterious impact on the final
outcome of the investigation or inquiry. Having
held so, this Court affirmed that so long as the
person is "informed" of the grounds of his/her
arrest, that would be sufficient compliance with
the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution.
38. In this regard, we may note that Article
22(1) of the Constitution provides, inter alia,
that no person who is arrested shall be detained
in custody without being informed, as soon as
may be, of the grounds for such arrest. This
being the fundamental right guaranteed to the
arrested person, the mode of conveying
information of the grounds of arrest must
necessarily be meaningful so as to serve the
intended purpose. It may be noted that Section
45 PMLA enables the person arrested under
Section 19 thereof to seek release on bail but it
postulates that unless the twin conditions
prescribed thereunder are satisfied, such a
person would not be entitled to grant of bail.
The twin conditions set out in the provision are
that, firstly, the Court must be satisfied, after
giving an opportunity to the public prosecutor to
oppose the application for release, that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested
person is not guilty of the offence and, secondly,
that he is not likely to commit any offence while
on bail. To meet this requirement, it would be
essential for the arrested person to be aware of
the grounds on which the authorized officer
arrested him/her under Section 19 and the basis
for the officer's "reason to believe" that he/she
is guilty of an offence punishable under the 2002
Act. It is only if the arrested person has
knowledge of these facts that he/she would be
in a position to plead and prove before the
Special Court that there are grounds to believe
that he/she is not guilty of such offence, so as
to   avail    the   relief  of   bail.  Therefore,
communication of the grounds of arrest, as
mandated by Article 22(1) of the Constitution
and Section 19 PMLA, is meant to serve this
higher purpose and must be given due
importance.
       (5)


39. We may also note that the language of
Section 19 PMLA puts it beyond doubt that the
authorized officer has to record in writing the
reasons for forming the belief that the person
proposed to be arrested is guilty of an offence
punishable under the 2002 Act. Section 19(2)
requires the authorized officer to forward a copy
of the arrest order along with the material in his
possession, referred to in Section 19(1), to the
adjudicating authority in a sealed envelope.
Though it is not necessary for the arrested
person to be supplied with all the material that
is forwarded to the adjudicating authority under
Section 19(2), he/she has a constitutional and
statutory right to be "informed" of the grounds
of arrest, which are compulsorily recorded in
writing by the authorized officer in keeping with
the mandate of Section 19(1) PMLA. As already
noted hereinbefore, it seems that the mode of
informing this to the persons arrested is left to
the option of the ED's authorized officers in
different parts of the country, i.e., to either
furnish such grounds of arrest in writing or to
allow such grounds to be read by the arrested
person or be read over and explained to such
person.
42. That being so, there is no valid reason as to
why a copy of such written grounds of arrest
should not be furnished to the arrested person
as a matter of course and without exception.
There are two primary reasons as to why this
would be the advisable course of action to be
followed as a matter of principle. Firstly, in the
event such grounds of arrest are orally read out
to the arrested person or read by such person
with nothing further and this fact is disputed in
a given case, it may boil down to the word of the
arrested person against the word of the
authorized officer as to whether or not there is
due and proper compliance in this regard. In the
case on hand, that is the situation insofar as
Basant Bansal is concerned. Though ED claims
that witnesses were present and certified that
the grounds of arrest were read out and
explained to him in Hindi, that is neither here
nor there as he did not sign the document. Non-
compliance in this regard would entail release of
the arrested person straightaway, as held in V.
Senthil Balaji (supra). Such a precarious
situation is easily avoided and the consequence
thereof can be obviated very simply by
furnishing the written grounds of arrest, as
recorded by the authorized officer in terms of
Section 19(1) PMLA, to the arrested person
under due acknowledgment, instead of leaving it
to the debatable ipse dixit of the authorized
officer.
45. On the above analysis, to give true meaning
and purpose to the constitutional and the
statutory mandate of Section 19(1) PMLA of
informing the arrested person of the grounds of
arrest, we hold that it would be necessary,
henceforth, that a copy of such written grounds
of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a
matter of course and without exception. The
decisions of the Delhi High Court in Moin Akhtar
Qureshi (supra) and the Bombay High Court in
Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal (supra), which
hold to the contrary, do not lay down the correct
law. In the case on hand, the admitted position
                                  (6)


                           is that the ED's investigating officer merely read
                           out or permitted reading of the grounds of arrest
                           of the appellants and left it at that, which is also
                           disputed by the appellants. As this form of
                           communication is not found to be adequate to
                           fulfil compliance with the mandate of Article
                           22(1) of the Constitution and Section 19(1)
                           PMLA, we have no hesitation in holding that
                           their arrest was not in keeping with the
                           provisions of Section 19(1) PMLA. Further, as
                           already noted supra, the clandestine conduct of
                           the ED in proceeding against the appellants, by
                           recording the second ECIR immediately after
                           they secured interim protection in relation to the
                           first ECIR, does not commend acceptance as it
                           reeks of arbitrary exercise of power. In effect,
                           the arrest of the appellants and, in consequence,
                           their remand to the custody of the ED and,
                           thereafter, to judicial custody, cannot be
                           sustained."


          He also referred another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court of India reported in AIR 2024 SC 2967 [Prabir Purkayastha

v. State (NCT of Delhi) dated 15.05.2024] wherein in para Nos.3,

4, 8, 20, 21, 25, 30, 31 and 34, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as

under:

                           "Brief facts:-
                                3. The officers of the PS Special Cell, Lodhi
                           Colony, New Delhi carried out extensive raids at
                           the residential and official premises of the
                           appellant and the company, namely, M/s. PPK
                           Newsclick Studio Pvt. Ltd. ("said company") of
                           which the appellant is the Director in connection
                           with FIR No.224 of 2023 dated 17-8-2023
                           registered at PS Special Cell, Lodhi Colony, New
                           Delhi for the offences punishable under Sections
                           13, 16, 17, 18, 22C of the Unlawful Activities
                           (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short "UAPA") read
                           with Sections 153A, 120B of the Indian Penal
                           Code, 1860 (hereinafter being referred to as the
                           „IPC‟). During the course of the search and
                           seizure proceedings, numerous documents and
                           digital devices belonging to the appellant, the
                           company and other employees of the company
                           were seized. The appellant was arrested in
                           connection with the said FIR on 3-10-2023 vide
                           arrest memo (Annexure P-7) prepared at PS
                           Special Cell, Lodhi Colony, New Delhi.
                              4. It is relevant to mention here that the said
                           arrest memo is in a computerised format and
                           does not contain any column regarding the
                           „grounds of arrest‟ of the appellant. This very
                           issue is primarily the bone of contention
                           between the parties to the appeal.

                           Submissions on behalf of the appellant:-
                               8. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel
                           representing the appellant canvassed the
                           following submissions in order to question the
                           proceedings of arrest and remand of the
                           appellant:
       (7)


   (i) That FIR No.224 of 2023 (FIR in
connection of which the appellant was arrested)
is virtually nothing but a second FIR on same
facts because prior thereto, another FIR No.116
of 2020 dated 26-8-2020 had been registered by
PS EOW, Delhi Police ("EOW FIR") alleging
violation of foreign direct investment (FDI)
regulations and other laws of the country by the
appellant and the company, thereby causing loss
to the exchequer. A copy of the said FIR was,
however, not provided to the appellant. By
treating the EOW FIR as disclosing predicate
offences, the Directorate of Enforcement (for
short "ED") registered an Enforcement Case
Information Report (for short "ECIR") for the
offences punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of
the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002
(for short "PMLA"). The ED carried out extensive
search and seizure operations at various places
including the office of the company PPK
Newsclick Studio Pvt. Ltd., of which the
appellant is the Director.
   (ii) The company assailed the ECIR by filing
Writ Petitions(Crl.) Nos.1129 and 1130 of 2021
wherein interim protection against coercive
steps was granted by the High Court of Delhi on
21-6-2021. The appellant was also provided
interim protection in an application seeking
anticipatory bail vide order dated 7-7-2021.
    (iii) The FIR No.224 of 2023 has been
registered purely on conjectures and surmises
without there being any substance in the
allegations set out in the report. The contents of
the FIR which were provided to the appellant at
a much later stage discloses a purely fictional
story without any fundamental facts or material
warranting registration of the FIR.
    (iv) Admittedly, the copy of FIR No. 224 of
2023 was neither made available in the public
domain nor a copy thereof supplied to the
appellant until his arrest and remand which is in
complete violation of the fundamental right to
life and personal liberty enshrined in Articles 20,
21 and 22 of the Constitution of India.
    (v) Shri Sibal pointed out that the learned
Remand Judge, vide order dated 5-10-2023,
allowed the application filed by the appellant
seeking certified copy of the said FIR which was
provided to the learned counsel for the appellant
in the late evening on 5-10-2023 i.e. well after
the appellant had been remanded to police
custody.
   (vi) That the grounds of arrest were not
informed to the appellant either orally or in
writing and that such action is in gross violation
of the constitutional mandate under Article
22(1) of the Constitution of India and Section 50
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter being referred to as "CrPC").
    (vii) Reliance was placed by the learned
Senior Counsel on the judgment of this Court
in Pankaj      Bansal v. Union      of    India and
other:2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244, and it was
contended that the mere passing of successive
remand orders would not be sufficient to
validate the initial arrest, if such arrest was not
in conformity with law. The learned Senior
Counsel urged that this Court in the case of
       (8)


Pankaj Bansal(supra) interpreted the provision
of Section 19(1) PMLA which is pari materia to
the provisions contained in Section 43B(1) of
the UAPA. Thus, the said judgment fully applies
to the case of the appellant.
    (viii) Shri Sibal referred to the observations
made in the judgment of Pankaj Bansal (supra)
and urged that since the grounds of arrest were
not furnished to the appellant at the time of his
arrest and before remanding him to police
custody, the continued custody of the appellant
is rendered grossly illegal and a nullity in the
eye of the law because the same is hit by the
mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of
India.
    (ix) Shri Sibal further urged that the view
taken by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ram
Kishor Arora v.      Directorate of Enforcement:
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1682 holding the judgment
in Pankaj Bansal (supra) to be prospective in
operation would also not come in the way of the
appellant in seeking the relief. He pointed out
that the judgment in Pankaj Bansal (supra) was
pronounced on 3-10-2023 whereas the illegal
remand order of the appellant was passed on 4-
10-2023 and hence, the law laid down in Pankaj
(supra) is fully applicable to the case of the
appellant despite the interpretation given
in Ram Kishor Arora (supra).
   (x) That the arrest of the appellant is in gross
violation of the provisions contained in Article
22 of the Constitution of India, hence, the
appellant is entitled to seek a direction for
quashment of the remand order and release
from custody forthwith.
    (xi) That the action of the investigating
officer in arresting and in seeking remand of the
appellant is not only mala fide but also fraught
with fraud of the highest order.
    (xii) Referring to the remand order dated 4-
10-2023, it was contended that the appellant
was kept confined overnight by the investigating
officer without conveying the grounds of arrest
to him. He was presented in the court of the
learned Remand Judge on 4-10-2023 in the early
morning without informing Shri Arshdeep
Khurana, Advocate engaged on behalf of the
appellant who was admittedly in contact with
the investigating officer because he had
attended the proceedings at Police Station Lodhi
Colony, post the appellant's arrest. In order to
clandestinely procure police custody remand of
the     appellant,   the   investigating officer,
presented the appellant at the residence of the
learned Remand Judge before 6.00 a.m. by
informing a remand Advocate Shri Umakant
Kataria who had never been engaged by the
appellant to plead his cause.
    (xiii) Learned Remand Judge remanded the
accused to police custody at 6.00 a.m. sharp as
is evident from the remand order (supra). Shri
Arshdeep Khurana, the appellant's advocate was
informed about the order granting remand by a
WhatsApp message at 7.07 a.m. but the same
was an exercise in futility because there was no
possibility that the learned advocate could have
reached the residence of the learned Remand
Judge in time to oppose the prayer for remand.
       (9)


   (xiv) That, as a matter of fact, the remand
application had already been accepted at 6.00
a.m. which fact is manifested from the time
appended at the end of the remand order
(supra). The learned Remand Judge signed the
proceedings by recording the time as 6.00 a.m.
Hence, there is no escape from the conclusion
that the remand order was passed without
supplying copy of the grounds of arrest to the
appellant or the advocate engaged by him. The
appellant was intentionally deprived from
information about the grounds of his arrest and
thereby he and his advocate were prevented
from opposing the prayer of police custody
remand and from seeking bail.
   (xv) He further urged that the stand taken by
the respondent that the grounds of arrest were
conveyed to the learned counsel for the
appellant well before the learned Remand Judge
passed the remand order is unacceptable on the
face of the record because the time of passing
the remand order is clearly recorded in the order
dated 4-10-2023 as 6.00 a.m. Admittedly, the
grounds of arrest were conveyed to Shri
Arshdeep Khurana, Advocate for the appellant
well after 7.00 a.m. It was contended that the
noting made by the learned Remand Judge in
the order dated 4-10-2023 that the learned
counsel for the appellant was heard on the
application for remand is a subsequent insertion
clearly visible from the remand order. The fact of
subsequent insertion of these lines is fortified
from the fact that the appellant had already
been remanded to police custody by the time the
advocate was informed and the copy of the
remand application containing the purported
grounds of arrest was transmitted to him.
    (xvi) That the foundational facts in FIR
No.224 of 2023 are almost identical to the
allegations set out in the EOW FIR. The
appellant had been granted protection against
arrest by the High Court of Delhi in the EOW FIR.
Owing to this protection, the mala fide objective
of the authorities in putting the appellant behind
bars was not being served and, therefore, a new
FIR No.224 of 2023 with totally cooked-up
allegations came to be registered and the
appellant was illegally deprived of his liberty
without the copy of the FIR been provided and
without the grounds of arrest being conveyed to
the appellant.
    20. Resultantly, there is no doubt in the mind
of the court that any person arrested for
allegation of commission of offences under the
provisions of UAPA or for that matter any other
offence(s) has a fundamental and a statutory
right to be informed about the grounds of arrest
in writing and a copy of such written grounds of
arrest have to be furnished to the arrested
person as a matter of course and without
exception at the earliest. The purpose of
informing to the arrested person the grounds of
arrest is salutary and sacrosanct inasmuch as
this information would be the only effective
means for the arrested person to consult his
advocate; oppose the police custody remand and
to seek bail. Any other interpretation would
tantamount to diluting the sanctity of the
       (10)


fundamental right guaranteed under           Article
22(1) of the Constitution of India.
    21. The right to life and personal liberty is
the    most     sacrosanct    fundamental      right
guaranteed under Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the
Constitution of India. Any attempt to encroach
upon this fundamental right has been frowned
upon by this Court in a catena of decisions. In
this regard, we may refer to the following
observations made by this Court in Roy
V.D. v. State of Kerala :(2000) 8 SCC 590 (SCC p.
593, para 7)
        "7. The life and liberty of an individual is
        so sacrosanct that it cannot be allowed
        to be interfered with except under the
        authority of law. It is a principle which
        has been recognised and applied in all
        civilised countries. In our Constitution
        Article 21 guarantees protection of life
        and personal liberty not only to citizens
        of India but also to aliens."
Thus, any attempt to violate such fundamental
right, guaranteed by Articles 20, 21 and 22 of
the Constitution of India, would have to be dealt
with strictly.
   25. A Constitution Bench of this Court
examined in detail the scheme of Article 22(5)
of the Constitution of India in Harikisan v. State
of Maharashtra and other:1962 SCC OnLine SC
117 and held that the communication of the
grounds of detention to the detenu in writing
and in a language which he understands is
imperative   and    essential   to   provide    an
opportunity to detenu of making an effective
representation against the detention and in
case, such communication is not made, the order
of detention would stand vitiated as the
guarantee    under    Article   22(5)    of    the
Constitution was violated. The relevant para is
extracted hereinbelow : (SCC OnLine SC para 7)

        "7. ... clause (5) of Article 22 requires
        that the grounds of his detention should
        be made available to the detenu as soon
        as may be, and that the earliest
        opportunity of making a representation
        against the Order should also be
        afforded to him. In order that the detenu
        should have that opportunity, it is not
        sufficient that he has been physically
        delivered the means of knowledge with
        which to make his representation. In
        order that the detenu should be in a
        position    effectively  to   make     his
        representation against the Order, he
        should have knowledge of the grounds of
        detention, which are in the nature of the
        charge against him setting out the kinds
        of prejudicial acts which the authorities
        attribute to him. Communication, in this
        context, must, therefore, mean imparting
        to the detenu sufficient knowledge of all
        the grounds on which the Order of
        Detention is based. In this case the
        grounds are several, and are based on
        numerous speeches said to have been
        made by the appellant himself on
        different occasions and different dates.
        Naturally, therefore, any oral translation
       (11)


        or explanation given by the police officer
        serving those on the detenu would not
        amount to communicating the grounds.
        Communication, in this context, must
        mean bringing home to the detenu
        effective knowledge of the facts and
        circumstances on which the Order of
        Detention is based."
                             (emphasis supplied)
    30. Hence,   we    have no     hesitation  in
reiterating that the requirement to communicate
the grounds of arrest or the grounds of
detention in writing to a person arrested in
connection with an offence or a person placed
under preventive detention as provided under
Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of
India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached
under any situation. Non-compliance of this
constitutional    requirement    and    statutory
mandate would lead to the custody or the
detention being rendered illegal, as the case
may be.
   31. Furthermore, the provisions of Article
22(1) have already been interpreted by this
Court in Pankaj (supra) laying down beyond the
pale of doubt that the grounds of arrest must be
communicated in writing to the person arrested
of an offence at the earliest. Hence, the fervent
plea of the learned ASG that there was no
requirement under law to communicate the
grounds of arrest in writing to the appellant-
accused is noted to be rejected.

    34. The accused was arrested on 3-10-2023
at 5.45 p.m. as per the arrest memo (Annexure
P-7). As per Section 43C of the UAPA, the
provisions of CrPC shall apply to all arrests,
search and seizures made under the UAPA
insofar as they are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act. As per Section 57CrPC
read with Section 167(1) CrPC, the appellant
was required to be produced before the
concerned Magistrate within twenty-four hours
of his arrest. The investigating officer, therefore,
had a clear window till 5.44 p.m. on 4-10-2023
for   producing     the   appellant    before    the
Magistrate concerned and to seek his police
custody remand, if so required. There is no
dispute that Shri Arshdeep Khurana, learned
advocate, engaged on behalf of the appellant
had presented himself at the police station on 3-
10-2023 after the appellant was arrested and
the mobile number of the advocate was
available with the investigating officer. In spite
thereof, the appellant was presented before the
learned Remand Judge at his residence
sometime before 6.00 a.m. on 4-10-2023. A
remand Advocate, namely, Shri Umakant Kataria
was kept present in the Court purportedly to
provide legal assistance to the appellant as
required under Article 22(1) of the Constitution
of India. Apparently, this entire exercise was
done in a clandestine manner and was nothing
but a blatant attempt to circumvent the due
process of law; to confine the accused to police
custody without informing him the grounds on
which he has been arrested; deprive the accused
of the opportunity to avail the services of the
legal practitioner of his choice so as to oppose
the prayer for police custody remand, seek bail
                                    (12)


                             and also to mislead the court. The accused
                             having engaged an advocate to defend himself,
                             there was no rhyme or reason as to why,
                             information  about   the   proposed  remand
                             application was not sent in advance to the
                             advocate engaged by the appellant."


           Referring the aforesaid citations, Learned Senior Counsel

drawn the attention of this Court that since in the instant case, ground

of arrest was not communicated to the accused person in custody and

the   concerned   relevant   Arrest   Memo     does     not   contain     such

information, so, in view of the principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble

Apex Court, the accused deserves to be released on bail henceforth.

           Learned Senior Counsel also referred another citation of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Crl. A. No.1518 of 2025 [Ashish

Kakkar v. UT of Chandigarh dated 25.03.2025] wherein in the

middle portion of the said judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court observed as

under:

                                 "This, being a clear non-compliance of the
                             mandate under Section 50 of the Code which has
                             been introduced to give effect to Article 22(1) of
                             the Constitution of India, 1950 we are inclined
                             to    set   aside     the    impugned    judgment,
                             particularly, in light of the judgment rendered by
                             this Court reported as Prabir Purkayastha v.
                             State (NCT of Delhi) :(2024) 8 SCC 254.
                                In such view of the matter, the impugned
                             judgment stands set aside and the arrest of the
                             appellant followed by the consequential remand
                             order are also set aside.
                                The appellant shall be set at liberty, until and
                             unless he is required in any other case. The
                             appeal stands allowed accordingly."


           He further referred another citation of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court of India reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269 [Vihaan Kumar

v. State of Haryana & Anr. dated 07.02.2025] wherein in para

No.33, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:

                                "33. Hence, the appeal is allowed, and we
                             pass the following order:
                                 a) The arrest of the appellant shown on 10th
                             June 2024 in connection with FIR no. 121 of
                             2023 dated 25th March 2023 registered at Police
                             Station DLF, Sector-29, Gurugram stands
                             vitiated;
       (13)


   b) Therefore, the appellant shall be forthwith
released and set at liberty;
   c) We clarify that the finding of this Court
that the arrest of the appellant stands vitiated
will not affect the merits of the chargesheet and
the pending case;
    d) We direct the appellant to regularly and
punctually attend the trial court unless his
presence is exempted, and cooperate with the
trial court for early disposal of the trial. We
direct the appellant to furnish a bond in
accordance with Section 91 of the BNSS to the
satisfaction of the Trial Court within a period of
two weeks from his release;
    e) The State of Haryana shall issue
guidelines/departmental instructions to the
police (i) to ensure that the act of handcuffing
an accused while he is on a hospital bed and
tying him to the hospital bed is not committed
again. (ii) to ensure that the constitutional
safeguards under Article 22 are strictly followed.
If necessary, the State Government shall amend
the existing Rules/guidelines; and
    f) A copy of the judgment shall be forwarded
to the Home Secretary of the State of Haryana.

                     JUDGMENT

N. KOTISWAR SINGH, J.:-- I had the benefit of going through the draft opinion of my esteemed Brother Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay S. Oka and I concur with the analysis and conclusions arrived at. However, I wish to add a few lines in supplement to the aforesaid opinion.

2. The issue on the requirement of communication of grounds of arrest to the person arrested, as mandated under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, which has also been incorporated in the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 under Section 19 thereof has been succinctly reiterated in this judgment. The constitutional mandate of informing the grounds of arrest to the person arrested in writing has been explained in the case of Pankaj Bansal (supra) so as to be meaningful to serve the intended purpose which has been reiterated in Prabir Purkayastha (supra). The said constitutional mandate has been incorporated in the statute under Section 50 of the CrPC (Section 47 of BNSS). It may also be noted that the aforesaid provision of requirement for communicating the grounds of arrest, to be purposeful, is also required to be communicated to the friends, relatives or such other persons of the accused as may be disclosed or nominated by the arrested person for the purpose of giving such information as provided under Section 50A of the CrPC. As may be noted, this is in the addition of the requirement as provided under Section 50(1) of the CrPC.

3. The purpose of inserting Section 50A of the CrPC, making it obligatory on the person making arrest to inform about the arrest to the friends, relatives or persons nominated by the arrested person, is to ensure that they would able to take immediate and prompt actions to secure the release of the arrested person as

permissible under the law. The arrested person, because of his detention, may not have immediate and easy access to the legal process for securing his release, which would otherwise be available to the friends, relatives and such nominated persons by way of engaging lawyers, briefing them to secure release of the detained person on bail at the earliest. Therefore, the purpose of communicating the grounds of arrest to the detenue, and in addition to his relatives as mentioned above is not merely a formality but to enable the detained person to know the reasons for his arrest but also to provide the necessary opportunity to him through his relatives, friends or nominated persons to secure his release at the earliest possible opportunity for actualising the fundamental right to liberty and life as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Hence, the requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest in writing is not only to the arrested person, but also to the friends, relatives or such other person as may be disclosed or nominated by the arrested person, so as to make the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution meaningful and effective failing which, such arrest may be rendered illegal."

Thereafter, Learned Senior Counsel referred one

judgment/order of Hon'ble Gauhati High Court dated 02.04.2025 in

connection with BA No.3429 of 2024[Akash Yadav @ Akash

Kumar v. The State of Assam] wherein in para Nos.15 and 16,

Hon'ble Gauhati High Court observed as under:

"15. More so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vihaan Kumar (supra) has also held that even after filing of the charge-sheet, the arrest and the detention will be considered as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 21 & 22(1) of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph No.16 of the said judgment has held as under:

"16. An attempt was made by learned senior counsel appearing for 1st respondent to argue that after his arrest, the appellant was repeatedly remanded to custody, and now a chargesheet has been filed. His submission is that now, the custody of the appellant is pursuant to the order taking cognizance passed on the charge sheet. Accepting such arguments, with great respect to the learned senior counsel, will amount to completely nullifying Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution. Once it is held that arrest is unconstitutional due to violation of Article 22(1), the arrest itself is vitiated. Therefore, continued custody of such a person based on orders of remand is also vitiated. Filing a charge sheet and order of cognizance will not validate an arrest which is per se

unconstitutional, being violative of Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. We cannot tinker with the most important safeguards provided under Article 22."

16. In view of the entire discussions made above, it is the opinion of this Court that the period of incarceration undergone by the accused/petitioner may not be a good ground for considering his bail application at this stage as the charge already been framed and the trial is about to commence. However, considering the fact that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner or mentioned in the Notice issued to the present accused/petitioner under Section 50 of Cr.P.C., this Court find it a fit case to extend the privilege of bail to the accused/petitioner."

Again, he referred another judgment of the Hon'ble High

Court of Bombay in WP(ST) No.13835 of 2024 with Interim

Application (ST) No.14637 of 2024 dated 18.07.2024 wherein in

para No.25, Bombay High Court observed as under:

"25. For the reasons recorded above, since the arrest of the Petitioner is not compliant with clause (1) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India and Section 50 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and the position of law, as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, to the above effect and it being binding on all the Court, it is declared that the arrest of the Petitioner in connection with F.I.R. No.68 of 2020 registered with Malad Police Station is illegal and in gross violation of his fundamental right. Resultantly, the remand order dated 23/02/2024 and the subsequent orders passed by the Special Judge, MPID Court, Gr. Bombay, also cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside and, accordingly, they are set aside. Upon setting aside the aforesaid orders, the Petitioner is entitled for his release and, since, the charge-sheet has been filed against him, we direct his release from custody on furnishing bail and bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Judge. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms."

Lastly, he referred another citation of Hon'ble Punjab and

Haryana High Court in CRWP No.2396 of 2025 (O & M) dated

11.03.2025 wherein in para No.14 the Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana

High Court observed as under:

"14. Recently, a two Judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vihaan Kumar vs. State of Haryana and another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269, delved into the purpose and object of Article 22 of the Constitution of India and speaking through Justice Abhay S. Oka, opined as follows:

"11. The view taken in the case of Pankaj Bansal was reiterated by this Court in the case of Prabir Purkayastha. In paragraphs nos. 28 and 29, this Court held thus:

"28. The language used in Article 22(1) and Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India regarding the communication of the grounds is exactly the identical. Neither of the constitutional provisions require that the "grounds" of "arrest" or "detention", as the case may be, must be communicated in writing. Thus, interpretation to this important facet of the fundamental right as made by the Constitution Bench while examining the scope of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India would ipso facto apply to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India insofar as the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is concerned.

29. Hence, we have no hesitation in reiterating that the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a person placed under preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached under any situation. Non-compliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would lead to the custody or the detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be."

(emphasis added)

12. This Court held that the language used in Articles 22(1) and 22(5) regarding communication of the grounds is identical, and therefore, this Court held that interpretation of Article 22(5) made by the Constitution Bench in the case of Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra, 1962 SCC Online SC 117, shall ipso facto apply to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India insofar as the requirement to communicate the ground of arrest is concerned. We may also note here that in paragraph 21, in the case of Prabir Purkayastha, this Court also dealt with the effect of violation of Article 22(1) by holding that any infringement of this fundamental right would vitiate the process of arrest and remand. Paragraph 21 reads thus:

"21. The right to be informed about the grounds of arrest flows from Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and any infringement of this fundamental right would vitiate the process of arrest and remand. Mere fact that a charge- sheet has been filed in the matter, would not validate the illegality and the unconstitutionality committed at the time of arresting the accused and the grant of initial police custody remand to the accused."

(emphasis added) xxx xxx xxx

14. ...In a given case, if the mandate of Article 22 is not followed while arresting a person or after arresting a person, it will also violate fundamental right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21, and the arrest will be rendered illegal. On the failure to comply with the requirement of informing grounds of arrest as soon as may be after the arrest, the arrest is vitiated. Once the arrest is held to be vitiated, the person arrested cannot remain in custody even for a second.

15. We have already referred to what is held in paragraphs 42 and 43 of the decision in the case of Pankaj Bansal. This Court has suggested that the proper and ideal course of communicating the grounds of arrest is to provide grounds of arrest in writing.

Obviously, before a police officer communicates the grounds of arrest, the grounds of arrest have to be formulated. Therefore, there is no harm if the grounds of arrest are communicated in writing.

Although there is no requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest in writing, what is stated in paragraphs 42 and 43 of the decision in the case of Pankaj Bansal are suggestions that merit consideration. We are aware that in every case, it may not be practicable to implement what is suggested. If the course, as suggested, is followed, the controversy about the noncompliance will not arise at all. The police have to balance the rights of a person arrested with the interests of the society. Therefore, the police should always scrupulously comply with the requirements of Article 22.

16. An attempt was made by learned senior counsel appearing for 1st respondent to argue that after his arrest, the appellant was repeatedly remanded to custody, and now a chargesheet has been filed. His submission is that now, the custody of the appellant is pursuant to the order taking cognizance passed on the charge sheet. Accepting such arguments, with great respect to the learned senior counsel, will amount to completely nullifying Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution. Once it is held that arrest is unconstitutional due to violation of Article 22(1), the arrest itself is vitiated. Therefore, continued custody of such a person based on orders of remand is also vitiated. Filing a charge sheet and order of cognizance will not validate an arrest which is per se unconstitutional, being violative of Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. We cannot tinker with the most important safeguards provided under Article 22."

(emphasis added) A perusal of Vihaan Kumar's case (supra) would indicate that the grounds of arrest must now be communicated in writing to the arrestee. As such, the failure to adequately inform the arrestee of the

grounds of his arrest equates to deprivation of his personal liberty in contravention of the procedure established by law, which is in direct violation of Article 22 as well as Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, any action taken post an unlawful arrest is automatically rendered void ab initio, be it obtaining a remand order from the jurisdictional Magistrate."

Referring the aforesaid citations, Learned Senior Counsel

finally argued that since the ground of arrest was not communicated to

the accused person in custody this violates Article 22(1) of the

Constitution of India. So, the present accused person needs to be

released henceforth on bail.

On the other hand, Learned P.P. appearing on behalf of the

State-respondent strenuously opposed the submission made by

Learned Senior Counsel in respect of grounds of arrest and referring

the contents of Case Diary, Learned P.P. submitted that on perusal of

the Case Diary, it will be clear that the ground of arrest was duly

communicated to the accused person in custody in writing and prior to

that, other requirements of law as per the relevant provisions of NDPS

Act were duly complied with and before arrest of the accused person,

the contraband items were recovered from his possession. So, the

citations as referred by Learned Senior Counsel cannot be applied in

this case.

In support of his contention, Learned P.P. referred one

citation reported in (2024) 7 SCC 599 [Ram Kishor Arora v.

Directorate of Enforcement dated 15.12.2023] wherein in para

No.22, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:

"22. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929], it has been categorically held that so long as the person has been informed about the grounds of his arrest, that is sufficient compliance with mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution. It is also observed that the arrested person before being produced before the Special Court within twenty-four hours or for that purposes of remand on each occasion, the Court is free to look into the relevant records made available by

the authority about the involvement of the arrested person in the offence of money- laundering. Therefore, in our opinion the person arrested, if he is informed or made aware orally about the grounds of arrest at the time of his arrest and is furnished a written communication about the grounds of arrest as soon as may be i.e. as early as possible and within reasonably convenient and requisite time of twenty-four hours of his arrest, that would be sufficient compliance of not only Section 19 PMLA but also of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India."

He again referred another citation of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court of India reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 520 [Najmunisha v.

Abdul Hamid Chandmiya alias Ladoo Bapu dated 09.04.2024]

wherein in para No.41, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:

"41. In the instant case, we are primarily affected by virtue of the jurisprudence of Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act 1985, which begins from the power of search and seizure conferred by the State upon its executive or administrative arms for the protection of social security in any civilized nation. Such power is inherently limited by the recognition of fundamental rights by the Constitution as well as statutory limitations. At the same time, it is not legitimate to assume that Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India would be affected by the provisions of search and seizure. It is a settled law that the statutory provisions conferring authorities with the power to search and seize are a mere temporary interference with the right of the accused as they stand well regulated by reasonable restrictions emanating from the statutory provisions itself. Thence, such a power cannot be considered as a violation of any fundamental rights of the person concerned. The same is iterated in MP Sharma v. Satish Chandra Sharma, District Magistrate, Delhi, (1954) 1 SCC 385 : 1954 SCR 1077."

Referring the aforesaid citations, Learned P.P. submitted

that the said citations of the Hon'ble Apex Court are very much

relevant for decision of this case.

He further referred another citation of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court of India dated 16.07.2024 in State of Meghalaya v.

Lalrintluanga Sailo & Anr. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1751

wherein in para No.10, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:

"10. The subject FIR viz., FIR No. 06(02)23 under Section(s) 21(c)/29 of the NDPS Act, would reveal that the quantity of the contraband

involved is 1.040 kgs of heroin. The impugned order granting bail to accused-Smt. X, dated 29.09.2023 would reveal, this time also, the bail was granted on the ground that she is suffering from HIV and conspicuously, without adverting to the mandate under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), NDPS Act, even after taking note of the fact that the rigour of Section 37, NDPS Act, calls for consideration in view of the involvement of commercial quantity of the contraband substance. When the accused is involved in offences under Section 21(c)/29 of NDPS Act, more than one occasion and when the quantity of the contraband substance viz., heroin is 1.040 Kgs, much above the commercial quantity, then the non-consideration of the provisions under Section 37, NDPS Act, has to be taken as a very serious lapse. In cases of like nature, granting bail solely on the ground mentioned, relying on the decision in Bhawani Singh v. State of Rajasthan: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1991 would not only go against the spirit of the said decision but also would give a wrong message to the society that being a patient of such a disease is a license to indulge in such serious offences with impunity. In the contextual situation it is to be noted that in Bhawani Singh's case the offence(s) involved was not one under the NDPS Act. We have no hesitation to say that in the above circumstances it can only be held that the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, are not satisfied and on the sole reason that the accused is a HIV patient, cannot be a reason to enlarge her on bail. Since the impugned order was passed without adhering to the said provision and in view of the rigour thereunder the accused-Smt. X is not entitled to be released on bail, the impugned order invites interference."

Referring the said citation, Learned P.P. further submitted

that in view of the provision of Section 37 of NDPS Act, there is no

scope to consider the bail application of the accused-in-custody.

Thereafter, Learned P.P. referred one order dated

08.04.2025 of Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in connection with case

No.BA No.3015 of 2024[Zabel Hussain @ Jabel Hussain v. The

State of Assam] wherein in para Nos.6, 7, Gauhati High Court

observed as under:

"6. Learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has further submitted that the contemporaneous record in this case is the forwarding report which clearly reflects the grounds of arrest. It is further submitted that on interpreting the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it appears that the grounds of arrest has to be communicated in a language understood by the accused. It can also be understood from the decision of Vihaan Kumar (supra) that the grounds of arrest may

not be communicated in writing when there is contemporaneous record of forwarding under the grounds of arrest. Section 50 of CrPC notice submitted by the petitioner clearly reveals that he was aware that he was arrested in a case which falls under the NDPS Act. It is further submitted that over and above communication, the grounds of arrest in the notice under Section 50 of the CrPC was communicated with the full particulars of the offence for which the petitioner was arrested and this has been accepted by the petitioner with his signature.

7. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has thus submitted that the petitioner has failed to affirm effectively that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him in a language understood by him. He has taken a false plea under a false pretext that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him only to take the benefit of decision in Vihaan Kumar's case (supra) and procure an order of bail. It is further submitted that the petitioner is complicit, and when the contraband was found in his possession, he cannot deny that he was not aware of the grounds of arrest when he was taken into custody."

He further referred another judgment of the Hon'ble High

Court of Karnataka in connection with Crl. P. No.3700 of 2024[Mr.

Kalam Narendra @ Pandu v. Union of India] dated 11.06.2024

wherein in para No.39, the High Court of Karnataka observed as

under:

"39. In the present case, it is pertinent to note that the petitioner himself has produced the copy of arrest memo dated 05.01.2024 which reads as under:

ARREST MEMO "Consequent upon the seizure of 0.11 Grams (10 Numbers of Blotter Papers) of LSD and 34.38 Grams of Ganja Gummies (Ganja) on 02.01.2024 at Foreign Post Office, 5th Main, 4th Cross, Chamrajpet, Bangalore-560 018 and on the basis of corroborative evidence and voluntary statement of KALAM NARENDRA ALIS PANDU S/O ANJANEYULU, AGED 28 YEARS dated 05.01.2024 recorded u/s 67 of the NDPS Act, 1985 having reason to believe that Kalam Narendra Alis Pandu S/O Anjaneyulu, Aged 28 Years R/O-308, Royal Heritage Apartments, Old Madras Road, Doorvani Nagar, Bangalore -560 016 (Rented house) And Permanent Address: No-1-26.

Denduluru, Mandalam, Dosapadu, West Godavani, Dosapadu, Andhra Pradesh-534 442 has committed an offence punishable u/s 8 (c) r/w 20b (ii)(A), 22 (c), 27 and 28 of the NDPS Act. Accordingly, I place KALAM NARENDRA ALIS PANDU S/O ANJANEYULU AGED 28 YEARS under arrest on 05.01.2024 at 22:30 Hrs. The grounds of the arrest have been explained to the arrestee"."

Lastly, Learned P.P. referred another citation of Hon'ble

Bombay High Court in Vicky Bharat Kalyani v. State of

Maharashtra & Anr. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 193 dated

31.01.2025 wherein in para No.27, Hon'ble Bombay High Court

observed as under:

"27. The learned Advocate General referred to the order passed in the case of Danish Rafiq Fansophkar v. State of Maharashtra[decided on 16.10.2024 in Criminal Writ Petition (stamp) No.19471/2024 (Division Bench of this Court]. In that case, the Petitioner was caught with the contraband. His search had led to seizure of the contraband. The station diary entry mentioned that the Petitioner was informed about the grounds of arrest. It was observed that in a peculiar case like that, where the Petitioner was conscious of the fact as to why his arrest was being effected, since his search led to seizure of contraband from him and even if the formal grounds of arrest were not communicated to him, the Court did not find any flaw in the action on the part of the investigating agency; and hence he was not released."

Referring the aforesaid citations, Learned P.P. drawn the

attention of this Court that the ground of arrest was duly

communicated.

In this case prosecution was set into motion on the basis of

an F.I.R. laid by one Bishnu Pada Das to O/C of Agartala GRPS alleging

inter alia that on 01.04.2025 at about 08:55 hrs he received one

secret information regarding carrying of contraband items by some

unknown persons for loading inside the Parcel Van at Agartala Station

yard line No.13. The matter was informed in D.D. and also the matter

was immediately informed to IPF/AGTL in writing as per NDPS norms

of Sections 42(2) of NDPS Act. Further, the matter was also informed

to IC/GRP/AGTL to assist in conducting raid and search. Thereafter,

after obtaining permission from IPF/Agartala he along with his staff left

for Agartala Railway Station yard No.13 to the loading and unloading

point for conducting ambush. During ambush, at about 11:45 hrs it

was noticed that one goods carrier mini truck vide Reg. No.AS 01 JC

4571 was coming through approaching road of unloading point Line

No.13 of Agartala Railway Station yard and on arrival at Agartala

Railway Station yard line No.13, 3(three) persons got down from the

said vehicle and hurriedly unloaded some cartoon boxes from the said

vehicle intending to load them in the Parcel Van. On reasonable

suspicion, the said goods carrier mini truck along with 3(three)

persons were detained for verification and checking at the spot.

Immediately the matter was informed to ASC/RPF/AGTL who also

appeared immediately after receiving the information and on spot

interrogation, the detained persons disclosed their name as Prasenjit

Nag, Rajat Debbarma and Rajesh Acharjee and in course of

interrogation they gave contradictory and unsatisfactory statements

regarding their presence at Agartala Railway Station. Thereafter,

following the due process of law, as required under the NDPS Act, he

offered himself to be searched by the said 3(three) person in presence

of the GO and witnesses then prepared 3(three) numbers of pre-

search memos on spot. After that notice under Section 50 of NDPS Act

were also served to them on which they agreed for their body, vehicle

and possessed cartoon boxes search in presence of GO and witnesses.

Then, search was conducted on their body and 6(six) numbers cartoon

boxes and vehicle. From the 6(six) numbers paper cartoon boxes

which were just unloaded from their mini truck in the yard of Agartala

Railway Station line No.13, 28 Nos. suspected dry ganja packets

wrapped with brown colour cello tapes were recovered. Those

contraband items were marked and duly measured. Thereafter, the

contraband items were seized and the accused persons were taken

into custody and grounds of arrest have duly been intimated to their

family members also. On the basis of the F.I.R., the case was

registered and in course of investigation the accused person has been

produced before the Court on 02.04.2025 under arrest and since then

he is lodging in custody.

I have heard detailed arguments of both the sides and

perused the F.I.R. and other relevant prosecution papers. It appears to

me that the grounds of arrest were duly communicated to the accused

on the same day by supplying a copy to him, so, the citations as

referred by Learned Senior Counsel for the accused-in-custody

although are relevant but the principles of said citations cannot be

applied in this case at this stage. Rather, the citations as referred by

Learned P.P. representing the prosecution appear to be relevant for

decision of this bail application. Furthermore, I have also perused the

order dated 05.04.2025 delivered by Learned Special Judge(NDPS),

Court No.1, West Tripura, Agartala wherein it is stated that from the

case diary it appears that on 01.04.2025 in between 1320 hours to

1340 hours, SIPF Bishnu Pada Das had recovered and seized huge

quantum of dry cannabis of commercial quantity from the possession

of the present accused and others and thereafter, the present accused

was arrested by the informant on the same day at about 1400 hours in

connection with RPF Post/BPB GDE No.21 dated 01.04.2025 and

further on perusal of relevant prosecution papers it appears that the

ground of arrest was duly communicated to the accused. So, the

submission made by Learned Senior Counsel at length cannot be

accepted at this stage.

Accordingly, the bail application filed on behalf of the

accused-in-custody stands rejected being devoid of merit. The accused

is to remain in J.C. as before. The I.O. be asked to expedite

investigation and to submit report.

Return back the CD to the I.O. through Learned P.P. along

with a copy of this order. Also send a copy of this order to the

concerned Learned Special Court(NDPS) for information and necessary

action.

With this observation, the present bail application stands

disposed of.

JUDGE

Snigdha

MOUMIT Digitally signed by MOUMITA DATTA

A DATTA Date: 2025.04.19 17:24:52 +05'30'