Tripura High Court
Sri. Nilmadhab Nath On Behalf Of ... vs The State Of Tripura on 24 September, 2021
Page 1 of 17
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
B.A No.68 of 2021
Sri. Nilmadhab Nath on behalf of accused person
SRI NIPAN NATH @ LITON, S/O Lt. Gakul Chandra
Nath of Village and P.O-Bhagaban Nagar, Ward No. 7,
PS-Kailashahar, District- Unakoti.
............... Petitioner(s).
Vs.
THE STATE OF TRIPURA,
Represented by Ld. PP, High Court of Tripura,
Agartala.
............... Respondent(s).
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. S. Chakraborty, Advocate.
Mr. P. Saha, Advocate.
For Respondent(s): Mr. Ratan Datta, Public Prosecutor.
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. G. CHATTOPADHYAY
ORDER
24/09/2021
This is an application under Section 439 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C hereunder) for granting bail to
accused Nipan Nath @ Liton who is in custody for about 80 days in
connection with Irani Police Station Case No.2021/IRN/039 dated
02.07.2021 under sections 21(c), 22(c), 25, 27, 27A and 29 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (the NDPs
Act hereunder). Accused has applied for bail on various grounds.
[2] Heard Mr. Saradindu Chakraborty, learned Advocate
appearing for the accused. Heard Mr. Ratan Datta, learned Public
Prosecutor representing the State respondent.
[3] The factual background of the case is as under:
A suo motu complaint was lodged by Sri Kamala Kanta
Jamatia, Sub-Inspector of Police of Irani Police Station, Kailashahar
on 02.07.2021 with the Officer-in-charge of Irani police station. In
his suo motu FIR, the informant alleged that on 1.7.2021 at about
17.55 hours he received a secret information to the effect that
contraband were stored in the house of Md. Abdul Shaheed at
Arabindanagar within the jurisdiction of his police station and said
Abdul Shaheed also engaged people for sale of such contraband
among the consumers. The informant recorded the information in
the General Diary of the police station and passed over the said
information to the jurisdictional SDPO and Superintendent of Police.
At about 18.30 hours he along with his accompanying officers and
staff including SDPO, Kailashahar conducted raid in the house of Md.
Abdul Shaheed at Arabindanagar and spotted six persons including
present accused Nipan Nath in the house of said Md. Abdul Shaheed.
The police team detained those persons and in their presence
recovered the following contraband from the bed room of Md. Abdul
Shaheed and personal possession of the detainees:
840 Yaba tablets containing Methamphetamine
weighing 83.80 gm and 2640 SAMPFX+ tablets
containing Tramadol, several unregistered mobile
sets, cash, motor bikes etc.
From the personal possession of the present petitioner
200 Yaba Tablets and 30 strips of SAMPFX+ tablets each strip
containing 24 tablets were recovered. After search and recovery the
accused persons including the present accused were brought to the
police station for interrogation. From their interrogation police came
to know that they were engaged by accused Abdul Shaheed for
supply of such contraband among the consumers. Six accused
including Md. Abdul Shaheed and the present petitioner were
arrested by police and the investigation of the case was taken up.
[4] Mr. S. Chakraborty, learned counsel appearing for the
accused has argued that alleged recovery and seizure of contraband
from the possession of the accused is completely illegal due to non
compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. Counsel submits that
Section 50 embodies a reasonable, fair and just procedure that must
be followed during search and seizure under the NDPS Act otherwise
the evidence of search and seizure of contraband from the
possession of the accused cannot be used against him. In support of
his contention Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel of the accused
petitioner has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the Case of
State of Punjab Vrs. Baldeb Singh: reported in (1999) 6 SCC
172 : AIR 1999 SC 2378 wherein the Apex Court has held as
under:
"11. Section 50 of the Act prescribes the
conditions under which search of a person shall be
conducted. Sub-section (1) provides that when the
empowered officer is about to search any
suspected person, he shall, if the person to be
searched so requires, take him to the nearest
gazetted officer or the Magistrate for the purpose.
Under sub-section (2) it is laid down that if such
request is made by the suspected person, the
officer who is to take the search, may detain the
suspect until he can be brought before such
gazetted officer or the Magistrate. Sub-section (3)
lays down that when the person to be searched is
brought before such a gazetted officer or the
Magistrate and such gazetted officer or the
Magistrate finds that there are no reasonable
grounds for search, he shall forthwith discharge the
person to be searched, otherwise he shall direct
that the search be made."
[5] Counsel has also relied on the observations of the Apex
Court in paragraphs 32, 33, 34 and 35 of the said judgment wherein
the Apex Court has held as under:
"32. However, the question whether the
provisions of Section 50 are mandatory or directory
and if mandatory to what extent and the
consequences of non-compliance with it does not
strictly speaking arise in the context in which the
protection has been incorporated in Section 50 for
the benefit of the person intended to be searched.
Therefore, without expressing any opinion as to
whether the provisions of Section 50 are mandatory
or not, but bearing in mind the purpose for which
the safeguard has been made, we hold that the
provisions of Section 50 of the Act implicitly make it
imperative and obligatory and cast a duty of the
investigating officer (empowered officer) to ensure
that search of the person (suspect) concerned is
conducted in the manner prescribed by Section 50,
by intimating to the person concerned about the
existence of his right, that if he so requires, he
shall be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a
Magistrate and in case he so opts, failure to
conduct his search before a Gazetted Officer or a
Magistrate, would cause prejudice to the accused
and render the recovery of the illicit article suspect
and vitiate the conviction and sentence of the
accused, where the conviction has been recorded
only on the basis of the possession of the illicit
article, recovered during a search conducted in
violation of the provisions of Section 50 of the Act.
The omission may not vitiate the trial as such, but
because of the inherent prejudice which would be
caused to an accused by the omission to be
informed of the existence of his right, it would
render his conviction and sentence unsustainable.
The protection provided in the section to an
accused to be intimated that he has the right to
have his personal search conducted before a
Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, if he so requires,
is sacrosanct and indefeasible--it cannot be
disregarded by the prosecution except at its own
peril.
33. The question whether or not the safeguards
provided in Section 50 were observed would have,
however, to be determined by the court on the
basis of the evidence led at the trial and the finding
on that issue, one way or the other, would be
relevant for recording an order of conviction or
acquittal. Without giving an opportunity to the
prosecution to establish at the trial that the
provisions of Section 50, and particularly, the
safeguards provided in that section were complied
with, it would not be advisable to cut short a
criminal trial.
34. The next question which arises for our
consideration is whether evidence collected in a
search conducted in violation of Section 50, is
admissible in evidence? This question arises in the
context of the judgment of the Constitution Bench
in Pooran Mals case (supra).
35. A submission was made in Ali Mustaffa Abdul
Rahman Moosas case (supra) before the Bench on
behalf of the State of Kerala to reconsider the
judgment in Balbir Singhs case in view of the
judgment of this Court in Pooran Mal v. The Director
of Inspection (Investigation), New Delhi and others. It
was urged in Ali Mustaffa's case that even if search
and seizure of the contraband was held to be illegal
having been conducted in violation of the
provisions of Section 50, it could not affect the
conviction because the recovered articles could still
be used as "admissible evidence" under
the Evidence Act to establish unlawful possession of
the contraband on the person concerned from
whom it was recovered during that search. This
Court repelled that contention and held that the
judgment in Pooran Mals case (supra) could not be
read to have laid down that a contraband seized as
a result of an illegal search or seizure could still be
used as admissible evidence "of unlawful
possession of the contraband on the person from
whom the contraband had allegedly been seized in
an illegal manner." The Bench in Ali Mustaffas case
(supra) observed:
"8. The last submission of the learned
counsel for the respondents is that even if the
search and seizure of the contraband are held
to be illegal and contrary to the provisions
of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, it would still not
affect the conviction because the seized
articles could be used as „evidence‟ of
unlawful possession of a contraband. Reliance
for this submission is placed on the judgment
of this Court in Pooran Mal v. Director of
Inspection. We are afraid the submission is
misconceived and the reliance placed on the
said judgment is misplaced. The judgment in
Pooran Mal case only lays down that the
evidence collected as a result of illegal search
or seizure, could be used as evidence in
proceedings against the party under
the Income Tax Act. The judgment cannot be
interpreted to lay down that a contraband
seized as a result of illegal search or seizure,
can be used to fasten that liability of unlawful
possession of the contraband on the person
from whom the contraband had allegedly
been seized in an illegal manner. „Unlawful
possession‟ of the contraband is the sine qua
non for conviction under the NDPS Act and
that factor has to be established by the
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
Indeed the seized contraband is evidence but
in the absence of proof of possession of the
same, an accused cannot be held guilty under
the NDPS Act."
[6] It is also contended by Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel
that in the given case it may be argued by the prosecution that
requirement of Section 50 of the NDPS Act for conducting search in
presence of a Gazetted Officer was fulfilled in the case because
search was done in presence of SDPO who was a Gazetted Officer.
Counsel submits that the SDPO being a member of the raiding party,
requirement of Section 50 would not stand fulfilled if the search is
made in his presence. Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel argues that
the object of requiring the search to be conducted in presence of a
Gazetted Officer or nearest Magistrate is to ensure that the officers
engaged in conducting search, conduct the search properly and do
no harm such as planting of an offending drug by any interested
party. According to Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel the object of
the provision would be frustrated, if the search is conducted in
presence of a member of the raiding party even though he is a
Gazetted Officer as per law. Counsel has relied on paragraph-25 of
the judgment of the Apex Court in the State of Rajasthan Vrs.
Ram Chandra; reported in (2005) 5 SCC 151: AIR 2005 SC
2221 which reads as under:
"25. The powers to detain, search and arrest have
been conferred by Sections 41(2), 42 and 43.
Under Section 42(1)(d) the officer authorized may
between sunrise and sunset detain and search and
if he thinks proper arrest any person who he has
reason to believe has committed an offence
punishable under Chapter IV relating to the notified
drug or substance. The question of arrest comes
after a person is detained and searched and
thereafter if the officer thinks proper arrest can be
effected on the foundation that the officer has
reason to believe that the person so detained and
searched has committed an offence punishable
under Chapter IV. It cannot be said that the person
accompanying the officer authorized cannot say
'no' to the proposed search even if he sees no
reasonable ground for search. It is the legislative
trust imposed on a superior officer to act fairly and
reasonably. Therefore, it is for the accused to
establish prejudice which is to be done at the trial.
On the facts of the case, actually these questions
do not arise. The object of requiring the search to
be conducted if so required before the specified
Gazetted officer or nearest Magistrate is to ensure
that the officers who are charged with a duty of
conducting search conduct it properly and do no
harm or wrong such as planting of an offending
drug by any interested party and preventing
fabrication of any false evidence. The provision in
essence intends to act as a safeguard against
vexatious search, unfair dealings and to protect
and safeguard the interest of innocent persons. In
order to avoid arrest and nip the investigation in
the bud thereby protecting the liberty of a person,
a statutory safeguard is provided in sub- section
(3) of Section 50.*****"
[7] Counsel further submits that apparently in this case
accused was not informed about his right to be searched in presence
of a Gazetted Officer or nearest Magistrate before his personal
search was conducted by the investigating agency. In terms of
Section 50 of the NDPS Act it is mandatory for the investigating
agency to inform the accused that his body would be searched in
presence of a Gazetted Officer and if the accused expresses his
desire to be taken to the nearest Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate
he cannot be searched till the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate, as
the case may be, directs the authorized officer to do so. Relying on
paragraphs 24 and 25 of the judgment of the Apex Court in
Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja Vrs. State of Gujarat; reported in
(2011) 1 SCC 609 : AIR 2011 SC 77 counsel submits that the
alleged seizure of Yaba tablets from the physical possession of the
accused was completely illegal since the requirements of Section 50
of NDPS Act were not at all fulfilled by the investigating agency.
Relevant observations of the Apex Court are as under:
"24. Although the Constitution Bench in Baldev
Singh case did not decide in absolute terms the
question whether or not Section 50 of the NDPS Act
was directory or mandatory yet it was held that
provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 50 make it
imperative for the empowered officer to "inform"
the person concerned (suspect) about the
existence of his right that if he so requires, he shall
be searched before a gazetted officer or a
Magistrate; failure to "inform" the suspect about
the existence of his said right would cause
prejudice to him, and in case he so opts, failure to
conduct his search before a gazetted officer or a
Magistrate, may not vitiate the trial but would
render the recovery of the illicit article suspect and
vitiate the conviction and sentence of an accused,
where the conviction has been recorded only on the
basis of the possession of the illicit article,
recovered from the person during a search
conducted in violation of the provisions of Section
50 of the NDPS Act. The Court also noted that it
was not necessary that the information required to
be given under Section 50 should be in a prescribed
form or in writing but it was mandatory that the
suspect was made aware of the existence of his
right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a
Magistrate, if so required by him. We respectfully
concur with these conclusions. Any other
interpretation of the provision would make the
valuable right conferred on the suspect illusory and
a farce.
25. As noted above, sub-sections (5) and (6) were
inserted in Section 50 by Act 9 of 2001. It is
pertinent to note that although by the insertion of
the said two sub-sections, the rigour of strict
procedural requirement is sought to be diluted
under the circumstances mentioned in the sub-
sections, viz. when the authorised officer has
reason to believe that any delay in search of the
person is fraught with the possibility of the person
to be searched parting with possession of any
narcotic drug or psychotropic substance etc., or
article or document, he may proceed to search the
person instead of taking him to the nearest
gazetted officer or Magistrate. However, even in
such cases a safeguard against any arbitrary use of
power has been provided under sub-section (6).
Under the said sub-section, the empowered officer
is obliged to send a copy of the reasons, so
recorded, to his immediate official superior within
seventy two hours of the search. In our opinion,
the insertion of these two sub-sections does not
obliterates the mandate of sub-section (1)
of Section 50 to inform the person, to be searched,
of his right to be taken before a gazetted officer or
a Magistrate."
[8] Counsel also contends that it is an imperative for the
investigating agency to inform the accused of his right to be
searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate and failure to
comply with this mandatory provision of section 50 of the NDPS Act
would vitiate the arrest and detention of the accused as well as his
conviction in a case under the NDPS Act. In support of his contention
counsel has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Suresh and
Others Vrs. State of Madhya Pradesh; reported in 2012 AIR
SCW 6495 wherein the Apex Court in paragraph-12 of the
judgment has observed as under:
"12) We reiterate that sub-section (1) of Section
50 makes it imperative for the empowered officer
to "inform" the person concerned about the
existence of his right that if he so requires, he shall
be searched before a gazetted officer or a
Magistrate, failure to do so vitiate the conviction
and sentence of an accused where the conviction
has been recorded only on the basis of possession
of the contraband. We also reiterate that the said
provision is mandatory and requires strict
compliance."
[9] In support of his contention that compliance of Section
50 of the NDPS Act is not a mere formality, rather it is mandatory
for the investigating agency, Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel has
also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan
Vrs. Parmanand and Another; reported in (2014) 5 SCC 345 :
2014 Cri. L.J 1756 wherein the Apex Court has held as under:
"17. In our opinion, a joint communication of the
right available under Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act
to the accused would frustrate the very purport
of Section 50. Communication of the said right to the
person who is about to be searched is not an
empty formality. It has a purpose. Most of the
offences under the NDPS Act carry stringent
punishment and, therefore, the prescribed
procedure has to be meticulously followed. These
are minimum safeguards available to an accused
against the possibility of false involvement. The
communication of this right has to be clear,
unambiguous and individual. The accused must be
made aware of the existence of such a right. This
right would be of little significance if the beneficiary
thereof is not able to exercise it for want of
knowledge about its existence. A joint
communication of the right may not be clear or
unequivocal. It may create confusion. It may result
in diluting the right. We are, therefore, of the view
that the accused must be individually informed that
under Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act, he has a right
to be searched before the nearest gazetted officer
or before the nearest Magistrate. Similar view
taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in
Paramjit Singh and the Bombay High Court in
Dharamveer Lekhram Sharma meets with our
approval."
[10] Counsel argues that non compliance of the mandatory
provision of Section 50 of the NDPS Act creates doubt about the
search and seizure. Learned counsel contends that offences under
the NDPS Act are based on recovery of elicit drugs for which
stringent punishment has been prescribed. Therefore, fairness and
purity in investigation in a case under the NDPS Act is so necessary.
Referring to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Nafe Singh
Vrs. Union of India; reported in 2019 SCC OnLine All 4390 :
2020 Cri LJ 1148 counsel submits that non compliance of Section
50 of the NDPS Act in cases of personal search would vitiate the
entire search and recovery.
[11] Counsel submits that accused petitioner is completely
innocent who was a visitor to the house of the principal accused as
his neighbor when the investigating agency conducted raid in the
house of the principal accused. According to learned counsel, non
compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act has vitiated the entire
search and seizure. The provision was bypassed by the investigating
agency because presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate would
have revealed the truth. Counsel submits that search in presence of
SDPO would not amount to compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS
Act since he was a member of the raiding party. Counsel therefore,
urges the Court to grant bail to the accused who has spent almost
80(eighty) days in custody despite being innocent.
[12] Mr. Ratan Datta, learned Public Prosecutor representing
the State respondent refers to the case diary and argues that the
case diary would demonstrate that huge quantity of contraband was
recovered and seized from the personal possession of the accused
and more over, the investigating agency informed the accused about
the intended personal search and with his consent the said search
was carried out in presence of the SDPO who himself was a Gazetted
Officer. Learned P.P submits that materials available on record would
demonstrate that petitioner was a member of the gang and in his
presence commercial quantity of contraband was recovered from the
dwelling house of the principal accused namely, Md. Abdul Shaheed.
According to learned Public Prosecutor, for argument's sake, even if
it is assumed that Section 50 of the NDPS Act was not complied with
in respect of personal search of the petitioner, Petitioner cannot
escape liability because it is evident that he was a member of the
team by whom commercial quantity of contraband was stored in the
house of Md. Abdul Shaheed which was recovered by police during
the search in his house. It is contended by Mr. Datta, learned P.P
that requirements of Section 50 would not apply for search and
seizure in a dwelling house. Counsel submits that the offence
involves commercial quantity of contraband and as such the
restrictions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act with regard to bail will
apply in this case and in view of the sufficient incriminating materials
available on record, release of the accused on bail at this stage will
impair a full and fair investigation of the case. Counsel therefore,
urges for rejecting the bail application.
[13] Perused the entire record including the updated case
diary. Considered the submissions of learned counsel made at the
Bar. It is true that Section 50 of the NDPS Act provides a significant
safeguard against false implication. Such legislative protection is
provided because the Act prescribes stringent punishment for the
offences made thereunder. The said provision creates a right in
favour of the accused to be informed about this safeguard before his
personal search is undertaken by the investigating agency.
Therefore, even at the bail stage accused is entitled to raise a plea
of non-compliance of the provision.
[14] But the context of the present case is different. In the
given case, charge against the accused is that he was one of the
members of a gang of six members who conspired to commit an
offence under the said Act and stored huge quantity of contraband in
the dwelling house of Md. Abdul Shaheed for which charge of Section
29 of the NDPS Act has also been brought against him. Petitioner
never denied his presence in the house of said Md. Abdul Shaheed
along with the other 5(five) accused when the search was conducted
in the house and recovery of commercial quantity of contraband was
made therefrom. In these circumstances, the plea of non-compliance
of Section 50 of the Act cannot help the petitioner. Moreover, as a
matter of fact, the case diary demonstrates compliance of Section 50
of the Act.
[15] With regard to entitlement of the petitioner to bail in this
case, it would appear from the record that charges of offence
involving commercial quantity have been brought against him.
Therefore, Section 37 of the NDPS Act which regulates bail under the
NDPS Act has to be looked into which reads as under:
"(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),--
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be
cognizable;
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for
[offences under section 19 or section 24 or section
27A and also for offences involving commercial
quantity] shall be released on bail or on his own
bond unless--
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for such
release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not
guilty of such offence and that he is not likely
to commit any offence while on bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in
clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the
limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time
being in force on granting of bail."
(emphasis supplied)
[16] Regarding implication of Section 37, the Apex Court in a
recent judgment dated 22.09.2021 in Union of India through
Narcotics Control Bureau, Lucknow Vrs. Md. Nawaz Khan
(Criminal Appeal N o. 1043 of 2021) has held as under:
18. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on
the grant of bail for offences punishable under
Sections 19, 24 or 27A and also for offences
involving a commercial quantity are :
(i) The Prosecutor must be given an
opportunity to oppose the application for
bail; and
(ii) There must exist „reasonable grounds to
believe‟ that (a) the person is not guilty of
such an offence; and (b) he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail.
19. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail
is „reasonable ground to believe‟ that the person is
not guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard
of „reasonable grounds to believe‟, a two-judge
Bench of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari
(supra), held that:
"7. The expression used in Section
37(1)(b)(ii) is "reasonable grounds". The
expression means something more than
prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial
probable causes for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the offence charged
and this reasonable belief contemplated in
turn points to existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves
to justify recording of satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of the offence charged.
8. The word "reasonable" has in law the
prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard
to those circumstances of which the actor,
called on to act reasonably, knows or ought
to know. It is difficult to give an exact
definition of the word "reasonable".
"7. ... In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn.,
p. 2258 states that it would be unreasonable to
expect an exact definition of the word
„reasonable‟. Reason varies in its conclusions
according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual,
and the times and circumstances in which he
thinks. The reasoning which built up the old
scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a
child's toy."
(See Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok
Kumar [(1987) 4 SCC 497] (SCC p. 504, para 7)
and Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v.
Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [(1989) 1 SCC
532]
[...]
10. The word "reasonable" signifies "in accordance
with reason".
In the ultimate analysis it is a question of fact,
whether a particular act is reasonable or not
depends on the circumstances in a given situation.
(See Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla
Mills Ltd. [(2003) 6 SCC 315]
11. The court while considering the application for
bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act is not
called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is
for the limited purpose essentially confined to the
question of releasing the accused on bail that the
court is called upon to see if there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty
and records its satisfaction about the existence of
such grounds. But the court has not to consider the
matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of
acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty."
[17] Therefore, keeping in view, the parameters of Section 37
of the NDPS Act, the nature and gravity of the accusation, severity
of punishment in the event of conviction, consequence of the
accused absconding and fleeing if released on bail, likelihood of the
offence being repeated, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses
being influenced and the necessity of a full, fair and uninterrupted
investigation, this Court is of the view that in the given context
accused petitioner is not entitled to bail. Resultantly, his bail
application stands rejected.
[18] It is made clear that observations made herein against
the petitioner will have no bearing on the trial of the case. In terms
of the above, the matter is disposed of.
Return the CD.
JUDGE
Dipankar
