Tripura High Court
Smt. Rekha Das vs The Union Of India And Ors. on 7 September, 2021
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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WA No.183/2021
Smt. Rekha Das, Scientist (Level -10), W/o Sri Himanshu Priyadarshi,
resident of Manakkolil House, Illathuparambu Road, P.O - Kochi-682041,
Kerela, India. Presently residing at - Quarter Type IV, B-I, College of
Fisheries, P.O. Lembucherra, P.S - Lefunga, District- West Tripura.
.............. Appellant(s).
Vs.
1. The Union of India and Ors., represented by the Secretary, Ministry of
Women and Child Development, A-Wing, Shastri Bhawan, Dr. Rajendra
Prasad Road, New Delhi - 110001.
2. The Director General, Indian Council of Agricultural Research, Krishi
Bhawan, Dr. Rajendra Prasad Road, New Delhi -110001
3. The Secretary Appellate Authority under the Sexual Harassment of
Women at Workplace(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013,
Indian Council of Agricultural Research, Krishi Bhawan, Dr. Rajendra
Prasad Road, New Delhi - 110001.
4. The Director, ICAR Research Complex for NEH Region, Umiam, Umroi
Road, Meghalaya - 793103.
5. The Joint Director, ICAR Research Complex for NEH Region, Tripura
Centre, Lembucherra, P.O - Lembucherra, Lembucherra, P.S. Lefunga,
District - West Tripura
6. Dr. Basant Kumar Kandpal, Joint Director, ICAR Research Complex for
NEH Region, Tripura Centre, P.O. Lembucherra, P.S - Lefunga, District -
West Tripura.
.............. Respondent(s).
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_B_E_ F_O_R_E_
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. AKIL KURESHI
HON'BLE JUSTICE MR. S G CHATTOPADHYAY
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Somik Deb, Sr. Advocate,
Mr. S Bhattacharaya, Advocate,
Ms. Swarupa Chisim, Advocate,
Mrs. Riya Chakraborty, Advocate.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Biduyt Majumder, Asstt. S. G.
Date of hearing & judgment : 7th September 2021.
Whether fit for reporting : Yes.
JUDGMENT(ORAL)
(Akil Kureshi, CJ).
This appeal is filed by the original petitioner to challenge the
judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 17th May 2021 passed in WP(C)
No.243/2021. A short prayer of the petitioner for expeditious disposal of her
appeal against the report of the Internal Complaints Committee (―ICC‖ for
short) under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereinafter to be referred to as ―the
Act of 2013‖), has run into jurisdictional debate. In order to decide whether
this seemingly innocuous prayer of the petitioner can be granted by the High
Court, we shall have to cross the threshold question of maintainability of her
petition.
[2] As briefly as possible, the relevant facts may be narrated :
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The petitioner is employed as a Scientist in the Indian Council of
Agricultural Research (ICAR), a Government of India organization. The
respondent No.6 is the Joint Director of the same organization (hereinafter to
be referred to as ―the private respondent‖). On 5th December 2018, the
petitioner made a complaint to the Director of ICAR against the respondent
No.6 making detailed allegations of her mental and physical harassment by
the said respondent. She gave details of certain incidents during which
according to her, the behaviour of the private respondent was abusive. In
short, this complaint was in the nature of sexual harassment at the workplace
by the private respondent. The complaint of the petitioner was thereupon
placed before the ICC. Under a communication dated 9th April 2019, a copy
of the report submitted by the Committee was furnished to the petitioner. In
the report, the ICC had exonerated the private respondent of all charges. The
petitioner had several issues with respect to the report of the Committee.
She, therefore, filed an appeal under Section 18(1) of the Act of 2013 on 12th
July 2019. Despite reminder from the petitioner since this appeal was not
disposed of, she filed the above mentioned petition in which she had
requested for a direction for early disposal of the appeal.
[3] This petition came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge by
the impugned judgment holding that the proceedings and the report of the
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ICC has to be treated as a service matter, more so when the private
respondent is the employee of the ICAR. Referring to the provisions of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter to be referred to as ―the said
Act of 1985‖), the learned Single Judge formed an opinion that the subject
matter of the writ petition can be entertained by the Administrative Tribunal
set up under the said Act and in view of the decision of the Supreme Court
in case of L Chandrakumar Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in (1997)
3 SCC 261, the High Court at the first instance, would not entertain the writ
petition. The learned Judge was of the opinion that the grievance of the
petitioner falls within the ambit of ―disciplinary matters‖ as referred to in the
definition Section 3(q) of the Act of 1985.
[4] It is this view of the learned Single Judge which the petitioner, has
questioned in this writ appeal. Appearing for the appellant-original petitioner
learned senior counsel Mr. Somik Deb raised two folds contentions. His first
contention was that the term ―service matter‖ defined in Section 3(q) of the
Act of 1985 concerns only the service matter of the petitioner. In the present
case, the issue concerns the private respondent and even if the issue can be
described as a service matter, the petitioner cannot be relegated before the
Administrative Tribunals Act since it is not her service matter which is
under consideration. Second contention of the counsel was that in any case,
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the dispute is not covered under the definition ―service matter‖ as defined in
Section 3(q) of the Act of 1985 since what is at the centre of the controversy
is the correctness of the report of the ICC, its repercussions are not yet at
issue. In this context, counsel drew our attention to various provisions
contained in the Act of 1985 as well as the Act of 2013. He referred to
certain decisions, reference to which would be made at the appropriate stage.
[5] On the other hand, learned Assistant Solicitor General Mr. Bidyut
Majumder, appearing for the respondents, opposed the appeal and supported
the decision of the learned Single Judge. He submitted that the petitioner has
raised a service dispute which has to be examined at the first instance by the
Administrative Tribunal. Counsel submitted that the definition of term
―service matter‖ contained in the Act of 1985 is very wide and includes
within its sweep all kinds of issues and disputes which has even indirect
relation to service conditions of an employee. He contended that when the
statute contains specific and general provisions, the specific provision must
prevail. In support of this contention, he has relied on certain decisions.
However, since we do not dispute this proposition, though we do not agree
with its application in the present case, it is not necessary to refer to these
decisions.
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[6] A short question, which is not possible of a short answer, is, has
the petitioner in the process of asking her appeal to be decided expeditiously,
raised a service dispute? This question has to be answered in the background
of the statutory provisions contained in the Act of 1985 and the Act of 2013.
In exercise of powers under Article 323A of the Constitution, the Act of
1985 was framed for constitution of Administrative Tribunals to deal with
the service matters concerning the Union of India and other local authorities.
Administrative Tribunals were established under Section 4 of the Act.
Section 14 vests jurisdiction, power and authority in the Central
Administrative Tribunal all jurisdiction, power and authority exercisable
immediately before the appointed day by all Courts except the Supreme
Court in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to All
India Services and civil services and all service matters concerning the
employees of such services. As per Section 28 of the Act of 1985, on and
from the date on which the jurisdiction, power and authority becomes
exercisable under the Act by the Tribunals, no Court except the Supreme
Court or the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court will be entitled to
exercise any jurisdiction, power or authority in relation to such matters.
Under Section 29 of the Act of 1985, all suits and proceedings pending
immediately before the date of establishment of the Tribunal, would be
transferred to the Tribunal.
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[7] Combined reading of Sections 14, 28 and 29 of the Act of 1985
would show that upon establishment of the Administrative Tribunal, the
same would have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with service matters of the
employees of Union of India and the matters concerning recruitment in the
services under the Union of India and other notified organizations.
Section 3(q) which defines the term ―service matter‖ therefore becomes
significant. The said section reads as under:
―3(q) ―service matters‖, in relation to a person, means all matters
relating to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs
of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within
the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India,
or, as the case may be, of any corporation [or society] owned or
controlled by the Government, as respects --
(i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and other
retirement benefits;
(ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion,
premature retirement and superannuation;
(iii) leave of any kind;
(iv) disciplinary matters; or
(v) any other matter whatsoever.‖
[8] This definition thus provides that the service matter in relation to a
person means all matters relating to conditions of service in connection with
the affairs of the Union or the State or local authority etc., as respects the
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five categories enumerated in the said definition clause. Sub-clauses (i) to
(iv) are specific and descriptive. Sub-clause (v) is general and expansive
when it refers to ―any other matter whatsoever‖. We may also recall, the
definition is expressed in the form of ―means‖ and not ―includes‖ and
therefore for an issue to be called ―service matter‖, it must fall in any one of
the five sub-clauses of section 3(q).
[9] This definition of ―service matters‖ contained in Section 3(q) of
the Act of 1985, is thus both restrictive as well as expansive at the same
time. In sub-clauses (i) to (iv), when it refers to specific categories of
disputes, it is restrictive. In sub-clause (v) when it refers to ―any other matter
whatsoever‖ it tends to expand the definition. However, the sub-clause (v) is
not meant to cover all or any of the disputes concerning a person even if the
same has no connection with the condition of his service. Sub-clause (v)
must take the colour of the preceding four sub-clauses which are illustrative
in nature, the fundamental requirement of a matter being treated as a service
matter is that it must have relation to the conditions of the service of a
person. In other words, there may be several issues which may have indirect
relation with the condition of service of a person, unless and until it falls
under any of the sub-clauses of Section 3(q) and can also be categorised as
an issue relating to the conditions of the service of the person concerned,
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such a dispute would not be covered within the definition of ―service
matters‖. Any and every proceeding which may have indirect bearing on a
person's service condition is not covered within this definition. By way of
illustration, one can think of a criminal investigation or an inquiry if it
ultimately results into an adverse decision against an employee, may have a
direct repercussion on his service. Upon conviction for a criminal offence he
may be visited with departmental penalty. Even the pendency of a criminal
case may expose him to an order of suspension and debar him from seeking
promotion. However, the criminal proceedings cannot take the colour of
service matter. The effect of pendency or conclusion of the criminal case on
his service conditions is indirect.
[10] With this clarity, we may refer to the provisions contained in the
Act of 2013. Though the instances of sexual harassment of women at
workplace were existing since time immemorial, there was no legislative
response to this peculiar and sensitive problem. The Supreme Court in case
of Vishaka and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in (1997) 6
SCC 241 took cognizance of the difficulties faced by women at workplace
and gave several directions and issued guidelines in order to prevent sexual
harassment of women at workplace. These guidelines included initiation of
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criminal or disciplinary action and setting up of mechanism for examining
complaints of sexual harassment.
[11] In case of Medha Kotwal Lele and Ors Vs. Union of India and
Ors. reported in (2013) 1 SCC 297 further directions were issued by the
Supreme Court in this respect. In particular, in Para-44.1 it was provided that
the report of the Complaints Committee shall be deemed to be an inquiry
report in a disciplinary action under the Service and Conduct Rules. The
disciplinary authority shall treat the report/findings of the Committee as
findings in a disciplinary inquiry against the delinquent employee and shall
act on such report accordingly. It was provided that the findings and the
report of the Complaints Committee shall not be treated as a mere
preliminary findings or report in an inquiry into the misconduct of the
delinquent. This was reiterated in a subsequent judgment in case of Seema
Lepcha Vs. State of Sikkim and Ors. reported in (2013) 11 SCC 641.
[12] The Act of 2013 was framed in the background of such decisions
of the Supreme Court and was brought into force w.e.f 9th December 2013.
The term ―aggrieved woman‖ in relation to a workplace is defined under
Clause (a) of Section 2 as a woman of any age whether employed or not who
alleges to have been subjected to any act of sexual harassment by the
respondent. Term ―sexual harassment‖ has been defined in Section 2(n)
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which would include any one or more unwelcome acts or behaviour
enumerated in sub-clauses (i) to (v) thereof such as physical contact and
advances, demand or request for sexual favours, making sexually coloured
remarks etc. The term ―workplace‖ has been defined in Section 2(o) which
includes any department, organisation, undertaking, establishment etc.
owned, controlled or substantially financed by the appropriate Government.
[13] Section 4 of the Act of 2013 pertains to constitution of Internal
Complaints Committee. Under sub-section (1) of Section 4, every employer
of a workplace is required to constitute a Committee called Internal
Complaints Committee. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 prescribes the members
who would form such a Committee.
[14] Chapter IV of the Act of 2013 pertains to complaint. Under sub-
section (1) of Section 9 contained in the said chapter, any aggrieved woman
can make a complaint in writing of sexual harassment at workplace with the
ICC. Sub-section (2) of Section 9 provides that where the aggrieved woman
is unable to make a complaint on account of her physical or mental
incapacity or death or otherwise, her legal heir or such person as may be
prescribed may make such a complaint. Upon receipt of such a complaint,
the ICC would conduct an inquiry as provided under sub-section (1) of
Section 11 which would be in accordance with the provisions of the service
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rules applicable to the respondent and if prima facie case exists, forward the
complaint to the police for registering the case under Section 509 of the
Indian Penal Code and any other relevant provisions of the Code where
applicable. Second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 11 provides that
where both the parties are employees they shall be given an opportunity of
being heard during the course of the inquiry and a copy of the findings shall
be made available to both of them enabling them to make representation
against the findings of the Committee. Sub-section (3) of Section 11 clothes
the ICC with the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code
of Civil Procedure while trying the suit in respect to summoning and
enforcing attendance of a witness and examining him on oath, requiring
discovery and production of documents and any other matters which may be
prescribed.
[15] Chapter V of the Act of 2013 pertains to inquiry and complaint.
Section 12 contained in the said chapter pertains to action during pendency
of inquiry. Under sub-section (1) of Section 12, during pendency of an
inquiry on a request made by the aggrieved woman, the Committee may
recommend her transfer, grant of leave or grant of such other relief as may
be prescribed. As per sub-section (3) of Section 12, the employer would
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implement the recommendations of the Committee made under sub-section
(1).
[16] Section 13 pertains to inquiry report. Sub-section (1) of Section 13
provides that on completion of an inquiry the ICC or the Local Committee,
as the case may be, would provide a report to the employer or the District
Officer within ten days of the completion of the inquiry and the same would
also be available to the concerned parties. Sub-section (2) of Section 13
provides that where the Committee arrives at the conclusion that the
allegation against the respondent has not been proved, it shall recommend
the employer that no action is required to be taken in the matter.
Sub-section (3) of Section 13 which is of importance reads as
under :
―(3) Where the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the
case may be, arrives at the conclusion that the allegation against the
respondent has been proved, it shall recommend to the employer or
the District Officer, as the case may be -
(i) to take action for sexual harassment as a misconduct in
accordance with the provisions of the service rules
applicable to the respondent or where no such service
rules have been made, in such manner as may be
prescribed;
(ii) to deduct, notwithstanding anything in the service rules
applicable to the respondent, from the salary or wages of
the respondent such sum as it may consider appropriate to
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be paid to the aggrieved woman or to her legal heirs, as it
may determine, in accordance with the provisions of
section 15:
Provided that in case the employer is unable to make such
deduction from the salary of the respondent due to his
being absent from duty or cessation of employment it may
direct to the respondent to pay such sum to the aggrieved
woman:
Provided further that in case the respondent fails to pay the
sum referred to in clause (ii), the Internal Committee or as,
the case may be, the Local Committee may forward the
order for recovery of the sum as an arrear of land revenue
to the concerned District Officer.‖
[17] Section 15 pertains to determination of compensation and reads
as under :
―15. Determination of compensation. - For the purpose of
determining the sums to be paid to the aggrieved woman under
clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of section 13, the Internal Committee or
the Local Committee, as the case may be, shall have regard to -
(a) the mental trauma, pain, suffering and emotional
distress caused to the aggrieved woman;
(b) the loss in the career opportunity due to the incident
of sexual harassment;
(c) medical expenses incurred by the victim for physical
or psychiatric treatment;
(d) the income and financial status of the respondent;
(e) feasibility of such payment in lump sum or in
instalments.‖
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[18] Section 18 is an appeal provision and enables a person aggrieved
by the recommendations made under sub-section (2) of Section 13 or sub-
section (3) of Section 13, beside others, to prefer an appeal to the Court or
Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to
the said person.
[19] Combined reading of the above noted provisions would show that
the very purpose of enabling an aggrieved woman to make a complaint of
sexual harassment and of providing a mechanism for inquiring into and deal
with such complaints is to provide a safe workplace for all women to guard
their human rights and the right of gender parity. The prime purpose of the
Act is not to hand down departmental penalties on the respondent against
whom the allegations of sexual harassment have been proved. It may be an
ultimate outcome in some cases, it is not the prime purpose of the enactment
of the Act. The purpose of enactment of the law is to deal with such
allegations swiftly by providing a mechanism where such complaints can be
dealt with effectively and thereby provide a redress to a woman in distress.
The possible imposition of a departmental punishment on the respondent is
just one of the outcomes of a complaint of sexual harassment. For example,
as provided under Section 11, upon receipt of the complaint of sexual
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harassment and finding prima facie case existing, such complaint would be
forwarded to the police for registering case under Section 509 of Indian
Penal Code which pertains to word, gesture or act intended to insult the
modesty of a woman. As per Section 12, during the pendency of the inquiry
on a request by the aggrieved woman, she may be transferred to another
workplace, may be granted additional leave up to three months or granted
such other relief as may be prescribed.
[20] Sub-section (3) of Section 13 provides that where the Internal
Committee or the Local Committee arrives at a conclusion that the allegation
against the respondent has been probed, it would recommend to the
employer (i) to take action for sexual harassment as misconduct in
accordance with the service rules and (ii) to deduct, notwithstanding
anything in the service rules applicable to the respondent, from his salary
such sum as it may consider appropriate to be paid to the aggrieved woman
or her heirs in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 15. In
turn, Section 15 lays down the circumstances which will be taken into
consideration by the Committee for determining the sum that should be paid
to the aggrieved woman.
[21] It can thus be seen that besides a possible imposition of
punishment under the service rules, the complaint of sexual harassment at
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workplace has many other repercussions. If prima facie case is found, the
same would be forwarded to the police for registration of a case under
Section 509 of IPC. During the pendency of the inquiry into the complaint,
the complainant may make a request for being transferred or being granted
leave or may be granted such some other relief as may be prescribed. Even
upon the conclusion of the inquiry which results into a finding that the
allegations are correct, punishment of imposition of penalty on the
respondent as per the service rules is not the only consequence. The
employer may deduct from the salary or wages of the respondent appropriate
sum so as to pay the same to the aggrieved woman which sum would be
determined in terms of Section 15 taking into account various factors such as
the mental trauma, pain and suffering that has been caused to her, the loss in
carrier opportunity due to the incident of sexual harassment and so on.
[22] Recovery of amount to be paid to an aggrieved woman from the
salary and emoluments of an employee is not part of the normal penal
mechanism in service jurisprudence. It is a special provision enacted under
the Act of 2013 for giving swift relief to a woman who has been harassed at
the workplace and her allegations of harassment have been found to be true
and which may have resulted into mental trauma, pain or suffering including
emotional distress, loss of carrier opportunity or resulted into medical
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expenditure etc. In short, what we are trying to project is that lodging of a
complaint for sexual harassment does not have sole correlation with the
service conditions of the respondent. It has many other repercussions and
consequences, imposition of departmental punishment being just one of
them.
[23] Viewed from this angle, the disputes pertaining to a complaint of
sexual harassment made by a women at the workplace, cannot be included
within the definition of ―service matter‖ as defined in Section 3(q) of the Act
of 1985. It may have indirect consequences on the respondent in relation to
his service conditions, but the same is a matter of different consideration.
Learned senior counsel Mr. Deb rightly pointed out that the term ―service
matters‖ has a special connotation. His reliance in this respect in case of Dr.
H Mukherjee Vs. S K Bhargava reported in (1996) 4 SCC 542 is perfectly
justified. It was a case in which a Government servant had filed a civil suit
against his superior for damages for harassment on account of what he
alleged was vindictive and mala fide orders passed by them. A question
arose whether the suit was maintainable in view of the Act of 1985. In this
respect, the Supreme Court held and observed as under :
―7. The Tribunals under the Act are thus conferred with the exclusive
jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before the
appointed day by all Courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to
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the matters set out in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of
Section 14 The question is whether the present suit does fall under any
of the said clauses. We do not think that it does. The suit appears to be
one based on alleged tortuous acts of the defendant committed with a
view harass the plaintiff and cause him mental pain and injury. At this
stage, it is not our province to say whither the allegations are true or
false. We have to take the plaint allegations as they stand. We also
assume for the purpose of this appeal that such a suit does lie
according to law since no contention to the contrary has been urged
before us nor was urged before the civil court or the High Court. This
is a pure action for damages for deliberately harassing the plaintiff by
passing several vindictive and mala fide orders and proceedings and
also by fabricating official records. Such a suit for damages is
certainly not within the province of Section 14.‖
[24] He is also correct in bringing to our notice a decision in case of
Lieutenant Colonel Vijaynath Jha Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in
(2018) 7 SCC 303 in which referencing to sub-clause (iv) referring to ―any
other matter whatsoever‖ of Section (3)(q) the Supreme Court refused to
read the said expression in isolation without having regard to the preceding
sub-clauses. Following observations may be noted :
―17. The provision excludes certain matters. The present case is not
covered by excluded categories, hence that part of the provision is not
relevant for the present case. The definition of service matters is an
inclusive definition. A look into the enumerations as contained
in Section 3(o) indicates that they all relate to matters relating to the
conditions of the service of persons subject to the Army Act, 1950,
the Navy Act, 1957 and the Air Force Act, 1950. Last enumeration,
i.e., (iv) is ―any other matter whatsoever‖, at first blush; it appears that
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the said enumeration is very wide which may cover all other residual
categories. But, the phrase ―any other matter whatsoever‖ is to take
colour from the other three enumerations and the main provision
of Section 3(o). The pre-condition of a matter to be a service mater
has to be relating to the conditions of their service. Thus, for a matter
to be treated as a service matter, it must relate to the conditions of
their service.‖
[25] Similar view was expressed by a Division Bench of Karnata High
Court in case of Union of India & other Vs. D N Srojadevi reported in 2015
STPL 417 Karnataka. It was the case in which the dispute pertained to
eviction proceedings initiated against the employee. In an order passed by
the competent authority under the provisions of Public Premises Act in the
context of the question whether such a dispute can be stated to be a service
matter or not, the Court made following observations :
―13. A perusal of this provision makes it clear that what is defined
in Section 3(q) is 'service matter' in relation to a person. It provides
that all matters relating to conditions of service come within this
definition. In other words, to qualify as a 'service matter', it has to be a
condition of service or must have proximate nexus to a condition of
service. Secondly, the nexus to the conditions of service must be in
respect of the five categories of matters specified in the clauses. After
specifying four specific conditions of service in clause (i) to (iv), the
residuary clause speaks of 'any other matter whatsoever'. Though the
language employed is wide, it is not possible to infer that the
Parliament intended to bring in every matter without any qualification.
The said expression is qualified and takes its colour from the
expression 'all matters relating to the conditions of service' employed
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in the first part of the definition clause. As this general clause occurs
after enumeration of different specific conditions of service, the
principle of ejusdem generis is attracted. 'Ejusdem generis' is a rule of
legal construction that general words of following enumeration of
particulars are to have their generality limited by reference to the
preceding particular enumeration and to be construed as including
only all other articles of the like nature and quality. Having regard to
the setting and context, the expression 'any other matter whatsoever'
means 'condition of service in respect of any other matter whatsoever'.
14. The procedure for eviction of unauthorized occupants from
public premises is provided in the Public Premises Act. The Tribunal
is not conferred with the power or authority to consider the legality of
the proceedings initiated against the Government servant in respect of
a Government quarters in his/her unauthorized occupation. The
expression 'any other matter' in Section 3(q)(v) would not confer
jurisdiction to the Tribunal to consider the validity of the proceedings
initiated or the order passed by the competent authority under the
provisions of Public Premises Act.‖
[26] We are prima facie not convinced by the contention of Mr Deb that
what is referred to in Section 14 read with Section 3(q) of the Act of 1985 is
a service matter concerning the person who approaches the Court, be the
Tribunal or any other Court and not the respondent in such proceedings.
There is nothing in the language used in Section 14 or Section 3(q) which
would justify this interpretation. However, since the outcome of this petition
does not turn on our acceptance or non-acceptance of this contention of the
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counsel, we leave it open to be judged in a future case when the need so
arises.
[27] In conclusion, we find that the learned Single Judge committed an
error in refusing to entertain the writ petition. The writ petition did not
involve a subject matter which would lay before the Central Administrative
Tribunal. The prayer of the petitioner is only for expeditious disposal of her
appeal. It is, therefore, not necessary to place the matter back before the
Single Judge after hearing this jurisdictional question. While disposing of
the appeal therefore the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside.
Respondent No.3 the appellate authority shall decide the appeal of the
petitioner within 2(two) months from today. This decision shall be
communicated to the said authority by the counsel for the respondents.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
( S G CHATTOPADHYAY, J ) ( AKIL KURESHI, CJ )
Sukehendu
