[Cites 2, Cited by 0]
Telangana High Court
M. Balram vs Smt Dundumulla Amrutha Alias Nagireddy ... on 16 April, 2026
1
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR
I.A.No.2 of 2026
IN/AND
C.M.A.No.136 OF 2026
DATE: 16.04.2026
Between:
M. Balram, S/o. Nagabhushanam.
... Appellant
And
Smt. Dundumulla Amrutha alias Nagireddy Amruthamma
and 8 others
...Respondents
Mr. J. Prabhakar, learned Senior Counsel representing Mrs. D. Venkata
Padmaja, learned counsel appearing for the appellant.
Mr. A. Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr.Rammohan B.V.N,
learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1/plaintiff.
COMMON JUDGMENT:
(Per Hon'ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya)
1. The applicant/appellant filed I.A.No.2 of 2026 seeking
condonation of delay of 262 days in filing the Civil
Miscellaneous Appeal against a docket order dated 21.04.2025
passed by the learned I Additional District Judge, Medchal-
Malkajgiri District at Kushaiguda, in I.A.No.71 of 2025 in
O.S.No.10 of 2025, insofar as the petition schedule 'B' and 'D'
properties are concerned.
2. We have heard learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellant/defendant No.9 as well as learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the respondent No.1/plaintiff.
3. We do not wish to go into the particulars of the cause
pending before the Trial Court, save and except to note that the
respondent No.1 filed the Suit (O.S.No.10 of 2025) against the
appellant and the respondent Nos.2 to 9 herein for partition of
the suit schedule properties.
4. By the impugned docket order dated 21.04.2025, the Trial
Court directed both the parties to maintain status quo existing
as on that date in respect of the suit schedule properties till
09.06.2025. The said order was subsequently extended on
09.06.2025, 17.06.2025, 12.08.2025 and 19.08.2025. The
present Appeal was filed on 31.03.2026 with a delay of 262
days.
5. The only three paragraphs in the Affidavit filed in support
of I.A.No.2 of 2026, namely, paragraph Nos.7, 8 and 9 seek to
explain the delay by showing 'sufficient cause'.
6. Paragraph No.7 of the Affidavit states that the
appellant/defendant No.9 filed a counter affidavit to the I.A.
filed by the respondent No.1/plaintiff, on 09.06.2025. However,
notices could not be served on all the parties since there are
several parties to the Suit. It is further stated that even after
service, the I.A. was adjourned on one pretext or another and is
yet to be adjudicated. Paragraph 8 states that the respondents
were heard on 19.08.2025 and that the appellant was hopeful
that appropriate orders would be passed in the plaintiff's I.A
thereafter. However, the matter continued to be adjourned for
the plaintiff's arguments. Paragraph 9 states that the delay
was caused on account of the appellant pursuing the plaintiff's
I.A (I.A.No.71 of 2025) on its merits.
7. These are the only three paragraphs which seek to explain
the delay of 262 days. Even if the appellant is given the benefit
of the pleadings in the said paragraphs, it is obvious that the
only reason stated in paragraph 9 is that the delay was caused
due to the appellant pursing the I.A. filed by the plaintiff before
the Trial Court. The other pleadings in paragraphs 7 and 8 are
irrelevant for the purpose of section 5 of The Limitation Act,
1963 since those paragraphs dwell on events subsequent to the
impugned docket order dated 21.04.2025.
8. Section 5 of the 1963 Act confers discretionary power
upon the Court to condone the delay in an application or Appeal
filed beyond the prescribed period. An appeal or application,
other than an application under any of the provisions of Order
XXI of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after
the prescribed period, only if the appellant or the applicant
satisfies the Court that he had 'sufficient cause' for not
preferring the appeal or making the application within such
period. Hence, the Court must primarily determine whether the
cause shown is legally sustainable and satisfactory to warrant
such condonation. Section 5 of the 1963 Act contemplates that
the applicant must provide reasons that are not only credible
and bona fide, but are also substantiated by the records made
available to the Court.
9. In the present case, although an allegation of suppression
has been made by the respondent No.1/plaintiff, we do not wish
to adjudicate upon it at this stage; such suppression would only
dent the bona fides of the applicant/appellant but would,
strictly speaking, not be material for the purpose of the
'sufficient cause' requirement under section 5 of the 1963 Act.
10. We, however, note that even after the impugned docket
order dated 21.04.2025, there were at least 9 - 10 hearings
before the Trial Court, including a substantive order passed by
the Trial Court on 03.02.2026, whereby the Trial Court rejected
a document sought to be marked as evidence by the appellant.
11. The Court is also informed that I.A.No.71 of 2025 in
O.S.No.10 of 2025 filed by the respondent No.1/plaintiff is now
at the state of arguments and is not proceeding by reason of the
present Appeal.
12. The above reasons constrain us to dismiss the Appeal on
the ground of limitation. The only reason for disallowing the
prayer of the applicant/appellant is the complete absence of
'sufficient cause' being shown by the appellant for condoning
the delay. Needless to say, the appellant has chosen to remain
silent for a substantial number of hearings even after the
impugned docket order dated 21.04.2025, including at least
four docket orders up to 19.08.2025, all of which form part of
the Record.
13. I.A.No.2 of 2026 is accordingly dismissed. Consequently,
C.M.A.No.136 of 2026, along with all connected applications, is
also dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
_________________________________
MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J
____________________________
GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, J
Date: 16.04.2026
va
